

Angola

# *Ethnicity in Angola*

## *Group selection*

Angola consists of a dozen distinct ethnic groups, which settle in different regions across the country. The Ovimbundu-Ovambo, the largest ethnic group, settles in the central-eastern highlands (Bie, Huambo, Huila, Benguela, and Cuando Cubango). They earn their living as farmers. The Mbundu-Mestiço, term used for racially mixed Portuguese-Africans and the second largest ethnic group of the country, live primarily in the provinces surrounding Luanda (Luanda, Bengo, Cuanza Norte, Cuanza Sul and Malanje). Because of their geographical proximity to the Portuguese, they are more educated and work in a variety of sectors. The Bakongo, the third largest ethnic group, live in the northern provinces bordering the Democratic Republic of Congo (Uige, Zaire). The Lunda-Chokwe, the fourth largest ethnic group, live in the western provinces of Angola (Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul and Moxico). The other minor groups live in central Angola between the Ovimbundu-Ovambo and the Lunda-Chokwe (the Nganguela), in the southeastern provinces Namibe and Cunene (the Helelo and Nyaneka) and the enclave Cabinda in the north of Angola (the Cabinda-Mayombe) (<sup>49</sup>; <sup>50</sup>, 109-110; <sup>51</sup>, 18-47; <sup>52</sup>).

Not all of these groups are politically relevant. Fearon's (<sup>53</sup>) list is used as a starting point since it includes all the larger ethnic groups noted above. The list from the Minorities at Risk program is too sparse and the list from the Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira is far too detailed. Several reasons justify a few changes to the initial list. First, there is not evidence in the literature that points to the Nganguela and Nyaneka as politically relevant groups or that they supported the political movement of any other ethnic groups (Broadhead (<sup>54</sup>, 149) argues that half of the Nganguela supported the MPLA, while the other half supported the UNITA). Hence, they were dropped from the list. Second, although the Cabinda-Mayombe and the Bakongo are closely related they are kept as distinct groups. One the one hand, the Cabinda-Mayombe have their own political group, the *Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda* (FLEC). On the other hand, the FLEC does not strive for political power in all of Angola, but for the independence of the enclave Cabinda in the far north of the country, which has huge oil reserves and is therefore economically important for Angola: over 90% of all Angolas export

<sup>49</sup> [Broadhead, 1992]

<sup>50</sup> [Levinson, 1998]

<sup>51</sup> [Lusani, 2001]

<sup>52</sup> [James, 2004]

<sup>53</sup> [Fearon, 2003]

<sup>54</sup> [Broadhead, 1992]

revenue is based on oil exports from Cabinda (<sup>55</sup>, 115-119, 308-312).

<sup>55</sup> [Lusani, 2001]

After independence from Portugal in 1975, the dominant liberation movement *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) came to power and installed a Marxist-Leninist single party regime following the example of the United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR). Between 1975 and 2002, and with the exception of a few short periods of peace (1990-1992, 1994-1998), Angola found itself in a civil war between the MPLA and the second big liberation movement after independence, the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA). After the loss its charismatic leader in 2002, UNITA agreed to a ceasefire, demobilized its troops and transformed itself into the largest opposition party. Besides minor incidences in the enclave of Cabinda in the north, which strives for independence, Angola has since then lived in peace, politically dominated by the MPLA (<sup>56</sup>).

<sup>56</sup> [James, 2004]

The adapted group list maps nicely into the major political organizations that make up the political arena in Angola. The Mbundu-Mestiço build the primary supporter base of the MPLA, the Ovimbundu and Lunda that of the UNITA, the Bakongo are the main supporters of the *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA), and the FLEC finds their main support among the Cabinda-Mayombe (<sup>57</sup>, <sup>58</sup>).

<sup>57</sup> [Broadhead, 1992]

<sup>58</sup> [James, 2004]

### *The role of ethnicity*

Ethnicity played a significant role in the political life of Angola since independence. There are several pieces of evidence supporting this. First, All of the main political actors during that time period receive primary support from one of the main ethnic groups. Although the MPLA and UNITA tried to build a broad national coalition, their attempt was not very successful and forced them to rely heavily on their core supporters. Moreover, the literature provides evidence that people of these ethnic groups felt represented by those political actors (Ingham 1990: 178-180; <sup>59</sup>; <sup>60</sup>, 109; <sup>61</sup>, 187-188, 196-197).

<sup>59</sup> [Broadhead, 1992]

<sup>60</sup> [Tvedten, 1997]

<sup>61</sup> [Heywood, 2000]

<sup>62</sup> [Heywood, 2000]

Second, Heywood (<sup>62</sup>, 48) notes explicitly that nationalism has failed to break ethnic thinking. She also argues that the ideological dimension of the civil war (East vs. West, Socialism vs. Capitalism) had an underlying ethnic dimension. The fact that the conflict could not be settled when the ideological dimension vanished with the end of the cold war supports this last point. It was only after the death of the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002 that the civil war be successfully settled. Additionally, she argues that when it took over power, the MPLA avoided open elections, because ethnicity could be more important than ideology (<sup>63</sup>, 188).

<sup>63</sup> [Heywood, 2000]

*Power relations**1975-2002*

The first period covers the time from independence to the death of Jonas Savimbi in 2002, after which the UNITA definitely transformed itself into a political party. All the main political groups had been independence movements, and shortly before the independence of Angola (November 1975) had agreed to mutual recognition with equal rights and responsibility. As the moment of independence got closer, however, the groups became engaged in fights for power over the country. At the same time they received financial and technical (e.g. military advisers) support from the United States (UNITA and FNLA) and the Soviets/Cuba (MPLA). In the fighting that ensued, the MPLA could drive the UNITA and FNLA out from Luanda, where due to the geographical and ethnic closeness (the majority of the *assimilados* and mestiços supported the MPLA, while the UNITA and FNLA stressed their African heritage) got formal control over Angola from the Portuguese in November 1975. The MPLA declared the People's Republic of Angola, which was immediately recognized by the Soviet Union, Cuba, the Warsaw Pact Nations, and Brazil. They also began to establish a single party regime following the Soviet example, occupied all official political offices and were officially recognized as the 47th member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1976.

At that point, without becoming a member of MPLA, which was dominated by the Mbundu-Mestiço people, there was no chance of getting access to political power. This is the main reason why the Mbundu-Mestiço people have been coded as having monopoly over central executive power during these years (<sup>64</sup>, 164-321; <sup>65</sup>, xxviii-xxxv). The UNITA and FNLA declared a parallel state, with Huambo as its capital, and built a shadow government. This state and its corresponding government were never officially recognized. However, between 1975 and 1989, it was financially and militarily supported by the United States and South Africa. The UNITA dominated the FNLA (<sup>66</sup>; <sup>67</sup>, 197-200; <sup>68</sup>, 164-165), which, in a last attempt to capture the capital before independence, was defeated by the MPLA and never gained political prominence ever again. They never held a single province under their control either. The Bakongo, the main supporters of the FNLA, are therefore coded as powerless, since there was no evidence that they were formally or informally discriminated (<sup>69</sup>, 86-88; <sup>70</sup>, 61-62). During the whole time period and civil war the UNITA held at least one province and up to two thirds of the country, which is why the Ovimbundu-Lunda have been coded as having local power (<sup>71</sup>).

Finally, the FLEC was defeated by MPLA troops, which needed to gain dominance in the petroleum-rich province to cover their political and military expenses. Since that moment, in 1975, the FLEC has maintained a low-level insurgency, largely ineffective, and eventually split into two subgroups. Again, since there was no

<sup>64</sup> [Lusani, 2001]<sup>65</sup> [James, 2004]<sup>66</sup> [Heywood, 1989]<sup>67</sup> [Broadhead, 1992]<sup>68</sup> [James, 2004]<sup>69</sup> [Broadhead, 1992]<sup>70</sup> [James, 2004]<sup>71</sup> [PolityIV, 2008]

evidence of formal or informal discrimination, the Cabinda-Mayombe have been coded as powerless.

One could object that there have been various ceasefires and periods of peace between 1975 and 2002 and even free and general elections 1992, which should be reflected in the coding. However, the period has not been split because of several reasons. First, both periods (1990-1992 and 1994-1998) were relative short and in none of them was there an effective change in power (<sup>72</sup>, 189-321). Second, none of the peace treaties brought about a significant political change. The parliamentary elections of 1992 led to an absolute majority for the MPLA (130 seats out of 220, UNITA 70 out of 130 and FNLA 5 out of 130) and José Eduardo dos Santos (49.57%, Savimbi 40.07%) missed the absolute majority only scantily. A second round never took place since the UNITA accused the MPLA of fraud, although international observers graded the elections as free and fair. This restarted the civil war again (1992-1994), so the newly elected parliament first met on April 1997 (<sup>73</sup>, <sup>74</sup>, 252-255). The establishment of a national government of unity as outlined in the treaty of Lusaka (1994) also did not lead to any significant changes in power, since the UNITA held only 4 ministries (mining, trade, health and tourism) and 7 vice-ministers (construction, finance, domestic politics, farming, social welfare, media and defense), out of a total of 29 ministers and 57 vice-ministers. Additionally, dos Santos considerably weakened the position of the UNITA in the government, by outsourcing the mining and trade of diamantes to a newly founded holding, among other things. Thus, there was no true period of power sharing (<sup>75</sup>, 277-281).

<sup>72</sup> [Lusani, 2001]

<sup>73</sup> [Haan & Santana, 2005]

<sup>74</sup> [Lusani, 2001]

<sup>75</sup> [Lusani, 2001]

### *2003-2021*

The next time period was coded from the death of Jonas Savimbi (2002) until the end of the latest update (2021 at the time of writing). After the death of Jonas Savimbi and his deputy in 2002, the UNITA, the only remaining big opponent to the MPLA in the post-independence period, surrendered, turn all provinces it controlled to the government, disarmed completely, and transformed itself into a political party. Ever since then, it has been the largest opposition party in terms of popular support and institutional representation in the national parliament.

The MPLA holds all ministries in the government, all the provinces, and the absolute majority in parliament. The Mbunda-Mestiço, the main supporters of the MPLA, have been coded as having dominant power. No monopoly power of power was coded because they have formally agreed to share power based on fair and free elections (<sup>76</sup>, 104-108; <sup>77</sup>). Note, however, that the MPLA is trying to broaden its electoral base and has therefore since 2003 loosened its ethnic ties considerably. It is therefore becoming more difficult to map a single ethnic group to the MPLA as time passes.

<sup>76</sup> [James, 2004]

<sup>77</sup> [Haan & Santana, 2005]

All other groups play at best a minor role in Angolan politics.

The UNITA is the biggest opposition party and currently has 51 seats in the National Assembly, even though it does not have any real political influence. Moreover, UNITA lost formal political control of the provinces it once controlled. The Ovimbundu-Ovambo and the Lunda-Chokwe groups are coded as powerless between 2003 and 2005 (<sup>78</sup>, <sup>79</sup>). There was no evidence of formal or informal discrimination by the ruling MPLA. Regarding the Bakongo and Cabinda-Mayombe, their situation remained unchanged between the two time periods distinguished.

As stated in the previous comments, ethnicity plays a role in Angola's political arena despite different (failed) attempts of political parties to establish an Angolan identity and thereby win the support of voters "outside" their traditional bases (e.g. <sup>80</sup>, 7; <sup>81</sup>, 10). Only the ruling MPLA, due to its dominance and its hold on the machinery of the state, has had some success in this regard and further consolidated its power position in recent years. This is aptly reflected in its landslide victories in the legislative elections in 2008, 2012, and, to a lesser extent, 2017 (<sup>82</sup>; <sup>83</sup>). Originally an Mbundu-Mestiço Movement, MPLA has been increasingly successful in attracting and co-opting elites and citizens from other ethnic groups, mainly from the Ovimbundu-Ovambo and the Bakongo groups (e.g. <sup>84</sup>, 10; <sup>85</sup>, 33; <sup>86</sup>). In today's Angola the key route to political power is an MPLA affiliation. In this sense, the MPLA regime is no longer representing the interests of one ethnic group but has become more inclusive.

The same is not true for the main opposition parties. While UNITA lost some of its traditional areas of support in the 2008 elections (<sup>87</sup>, 92), it still has a mainly Ovimbundu-Ovambo followership. Its electoral support has been increasing since that moment, going from 10.4% in 2008 elections to 26.7% in 2017 elections. FNLA received most of its votes from ethnic Bakongo. However, most Bakongo and Ovimbundu-Ovambo voted for the MPLA both in 2008 and 2012 (<sup>88</sup>, 2010; <sup>89</sup>, 2014). This illustrates the MPLA's success in reaching out to citizens from other groups than its original Mbundu-Mestiço support base.

In any case, recent voting patterns show that ethnicity is still a salient dimension of political contestation. UNITA, FNLA, and also PRS (with a predominantly Lunda-Chokwe support base) remain, to a large extent, ethnic organizations. Yet also within the governing MPLA, as within the Angolan state on the whole, questions of power are "further complicated by subethnic and racial dynamics" (<sup>90</sup>, 107). For example, even president Dos Santos' ethnic background is more complex than claimed.

As far as the Angolan exclave Cabinda is concerned, there is still an active separatist movement and some low-scale outbreaks of violence have occurred in the recent past, most notably an attack on the bus of the Togolese national soccer team in January 2010, claimed by an offshoot of the FLEC, the FLEC-PM (<sup>91</sup>, 2012). There have been some attempts by the central government to co-opt Cabindan elites, but without any meaningful step towards political

<sup>78</sup> [James, 2004]

<sup>79</sup> [Haan & Santana, 2005]

<sup>80</sup> [Orre, 2010]

<sup>81</sup> [Roque, 2008]

<sup>82</sup> [US State Department, 2006-2019]

<sup>83</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]

<sup>84</sup> [Orre, 2010]

<sup>85</sup> [Armundsen and Weimer, 2008]

<sup>86</sup> [Roque, 2009]

<sup>87</sup> [James, 2011]

<sup>88</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]

<sup>89</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]

<sup>90</sup> [Malaquias, 2000]

<sup>91</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]

inclusion (<sup>92</sup>, 2012). On the other hand, the U.S. State Department human rights reports (<sup>93</sup>, 2010-13) do not report evidence of systematic state-led discrimination against Cabindans. On these grounds, the Cabindan Mayombe are continued to be coded as powerless.

The MPLA continues to hold its dominance in the Angolan state administration and politics. It also continues to portray itself as a party that transgresses exclusionary ethnic interests. Indeed, the fact that the party portrays itself as the only movement whose nation-building aspirations transcends ethno-regional and racial boundaries is part of their claim of being the only legitimate guiding force in Angolan politics. The national reconstruction envisioned by the MPLA encompasses an ideological project of transforming the country according to its modernised, urbanised Portuguese speaking capital (<sup>94</sup>, 19).

The Historical Dictionary of Angola continues to declare UNITA and FNLA as ethnic organisations. However, this denomination stems rather from a general remaining importance of ethnicity in politics, not from explicit claims made by organisations on behalf of certain ethnicities. On the contrary, the Bertelsmann Stiftung contains that “all parties carefully refrain from mobilising along ethnic lines” (<sup>95</sup>, 2014: 7) and that in fact “any ‘ethnic question’ has been largely absent from public debate” ever since the end of the civil war (<sup>96</sup>, 2016: 6). UNITA and FNLA remain thus, to a large extent, ethnic organizations when it comes to their support base, but not when it comes to publicly pronouncing ethnic claims, which is something frowned upon in Angolan politics. This remains the case up until 2017 (<sup>97</sup>, 50), and no evidence of changes was found up to 2021.

Earlier codings remarked a tendency of overcoming ethnically motivated politics due to the MPLA’s win of votes in the 2008 election and the decrease of votes for UNITA. However, this trend has been reversed with the 2017 elections: The MPLA lost 10% of its votes (from 72% in 2012 to 61%) while the UNITA gained seats and currently holds 27% of the seats. Also the UNITA splinter CASA-CE (founded in 2012 (<sup>98</sup>, 51)) gained votes and holds 9% of the seats (<sup>99</sup>). Hence, while the MPLA’s refrain from active ethnic mobilisation might indicate a trend towards a dwindling importance of ethnicity in national Angolan politics, it is still too early to completely declare ethnicity as irrelevant in the Angolan political sphere. The winning of the ethnic parties can, on the contrary, be interpreted as an increase in the relevance of ethnic politization. Supporting this coding decision of continued ethnic relevance in Angola’s political sphere, Roque (<sup>100</sup>, 9-10) contends that no political party, including the MPLA “has managed to create a truly nationalist platform”, which has allowed (social and ethnic) fragmentation and stratification to remain unaddressed and thus poses a threat to unity of the ruling class. The SRP and FNLA both lost one seat and thus remain in parliament with two and one seats respectively (<sup>101</sup>).

The MPLA’s dominance in Angolan politics was reinforced by

<sup>92</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]

<sup>93</sup> [US State Department, 2006-2019]

<sup>94</sup> [Soares de Oliveira, 2015]

<sup>95</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]

<sup>96</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]

<sup>97</sup> [Lansford, 2017]

<sup>98</sup> [Lansford, 2017]

<sup>99</sup> [Electoral Geography, 2017]

<sup>100</sup> [Roque, 2017]

<sup>101</sup> [Electoral Geography, 2017]



the 2010 constitutional amendment, which grants the president further power and consolidated the executive's dominance over both legislative and judicative (<sup>102</sup>, 13). Opposition parties don't enjoy equal airtime or coverage in public media nor funding. The president remains the ultimate arbiter of any political decision. The democratically elected parliament is "almost irrelevant, and opposition parties in parliament have little to no leverage to influence decision-making" (<sup>103</sup>, 2014: 10). While formally a democracy, Angola is de facto an authoritarian state (<sup>104</sup>, 2014: 13). The cabinet is directly appointed by the president and the parliament has little power, so the ultimate arbiter of political decisions remains the president (<sup>105</sup>, 2016: 8). Power of the opposition parties in national politics remained largely insignificant over the whole period (<sup>106</sup>, 2016: 14).

Focusing on the executive branch of state power, the Angolan cabinet has comprised ministers from all three major ethnic groups (Mbundu-Mestiço, Bakongo, and Ovimbundu-Ovambo) as well as the Lunda-Chokwe since 2006, the latest (<sup>107</sup>, 2006-2013). However, Roque writes in a report for the Institute for Security Studies that both MPLA and opposition members acknowledge that "no Ovimbundu or Bakongo today holds any real power in the state, despite token placements within the leadership of the military and the cabinet" (<sup>108</sup>, 10). Martins contends further that while there are some Ovimbundu-Ovambo in the Angolan government, those are rather "thinkers in the back", supporting the regime but never reaching leadership positions" (<sup>109</sup>, 14). Also they are facing a trend of growing levels of discrimination in the economy on the basis of their ethnic origin (<sup>110</sup>, 13). In line with this, the previous coding phase is continued and the Mbundu-Mestiço are coded as dominant while Bakongo, Ovimbundu-Ovambo and Lunda-Chokwe are coded as powerless, even though they formally occupy positions of power.

According to the BTI Project Lunda-Chokwe and Cabinda people are the only Angolans that identify as ethnic minorities (<sup>111</sup>, 2016: 6). Both provinces have experienced repression and ethnic activism of some sort. In Lunda provinces, a "Movement for the Protectorate of Lunda-Chokwe" has been peacefully advocating regional autonomy and an end to human rights violations by security forces (<sup>112</sup>, 2016: 6). The PRS, formerly drawing support from Chokwe from the eastern Luanda provinces has refrained from mobilizing along ethnic lines (<sup>113</sup>, 2014: 8).

In Cabinda, during the last few years, and particularly since the death of one of its founders in 2016, the FLEC has become more active, coordinated and destabilising. In February 2017 they claimed to have killed 18 Angolan soldiers and triggered the deploying of private security organisations by the Angolan military intelligence to kill certain FLEC commanders. Efforts to united Cabinda factions are gaining ground (<sup>114</sup>, 19). Although there is evidence that in Cabinda, civil society activists and suspected FLEC-supporters are often prosecuted, detained and tortured (<sup>115</sup>, 2014: 13), that the general human rights and freedom of press situation deteriorated be-

<sup>102</sup> [Orre, 2010]

<sup>103</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]

<sup>104</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]

<sup>105</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]

<sup>106</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]

<sup>107</sup> [US State Department, 2006-2019]

<sup>108</sup> [Roque, 2017]

<sup>109</sup> [Martins, 2015]

<sup>110</sup> [Martins, 2015]

<sup>111</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]

<sup>112</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]

<sup>113</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]

<sup>114</sup> [Roque, 2017]

<sup>115</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]



tween 2014 and 2016 (<sup>116</sup>, 2016: 2) and that repression and violence in both resource rich regions Cabinda and Lunda have increased in 2016/17 (<sup>117</sup>, 20), the U.S. State Department human rights reports (2010-16) and Human Rights Watch do not find evidence that repression reaches a level of systematic state-led discrimination against both ethnic groups (<sup>118</sup>, 2006-2016; <sup>119</sup>). On these grounds, the Lunda-Chokwe and the Cabindan Mayombe are continued to be coded as powerless. The latest reports (e.g. <sup>120</sup> report for 2019) still do not find evidence of systematic state repression, even though detentions still continue as of early 2019.

Lastly, no evidence accounts to a potential change in the political status of the Mbundu-Mestiço from dominant to monopoly. Some irregularities were found in the 2017 elections—both UNITA and CASA-CE protested (e.g. <sup>121</sup>)—and the MPLA is allegedly trying to block other political parties from access to power. However, no evidence of an ethnic bias on this dimension was found, and more importantly, the new president Lourenço distanced himself from dos Santos, denouncing the corruption and opening up media freedom, even though it remains to be seen the scope of these changes (<sup>122</sup>).

<sup>116</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016]

<sup>117</sup> [Roque, 2017]

<sup>118</sup> [US State Department, 2006-2019]

<sup>119</sup> [Human Rights Watch, 2016]

<sup>120</sup> [US State Department, 2006-2019]

<sup>121</sup> [?]

<sup>122</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020]

## *Bibliography*

- [Al Jazeera, 2017] Al Jazeera. (2017). Angola elections: Ruling MPLA wins parliamentary vote. Accessed on 15.09.2020 from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/170825124719728.html>
- [Armundsen and Weimer, 2008] Armundsen, Inge and Weimer, Markus. (2008). Opposition Parties and the Upcoming 2008 Parliamentary Elections in Angola. (CMI Working Paper 2008: 9). Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.
- [Battistoni and Taylor, 2009] Battistoni, Alyssa K. and Taylor, Julie J. (2009). Indigenous Identities and Military Frontiers Reflections on San and the Military in Namibia and Angola, 1960-2000. *Lusotopie*, 16(1), 113-131.
- [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-2016] Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2008-2016). Country Reports Angola. Retrieved on 25.4.2014 from: <http://www.bti-project.org/reports/book-bti-report/>
- [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020] Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2020). Country Report Angola. Accessed 15.09.2020 from: [https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2029525/country\\_report\\_2020\\_AGO.pdf](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2029525/country_report_2020_AGO.pdf)
- [Broadhead, 1992] Broadhead, Susan H. (1992). *Historical Dictionary of Angola*. Second Edition. London: The Scarecrow Press Inc.
- [Chabal and Vidal, 2008] Chabal, Patrick and Vidal, Nuno (Eds.). (2008). *Angola: The weight of history*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- [Corrigan, 2008] Corrigan, T. (2008, September 2012). What Angola's election means. African Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from: [http://www.saiia.org.za/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=83:what-angolas-election-means-&catid=78:diplomatic-pouch&Itemid=230](http://www.saiia.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83:what-angolas-election-means-&catid=78:diplomatic-pouch&Itemid=230)
- [Electoral Geography, 2017] Electoral Geography. (2017). Angola Legislative Election 2017. Retrieved on 22.10.2017 from: <https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/a/angola/angola-legislative-election-2017.html>

[Fearon, 2003] Fearon, James D. (2003). Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country. *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2):195-222.

[Freedom House, 2009] Freedom House. (2009). Country Reports Angola. Retrieved on 03.05.2010 from: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>

[The Guardian, 2017] The Guardian. (2017). Angola's ruling party claims election victory. Accessed on 15.09.2020 from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/24/angola-ruling-party-mpla-claims-election-victory-jose-eduardo-dos-santos>

[Haan & Santana, 2005] Haan, Willi und Augusto Santana. (2005). Politische Parteien und Parteiensystem in Angola. In Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Ed.), *Parteien und Parteiensysteme in Afrika*.

[Heywood, 1989] Heywood, Linda M. (1989). Unita and Ethnic Nationalism in Angola. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27(1), 47-66.

[Heywood, 2000] Heywood, Linda M. (2000). *Contested Power in Angola: 1840s to the Present*. Rochester NY: Rochester University Press.

[James, 2011] James, W. M. (2011). *Historical Dictionary of Angola*. Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, Inc.

[Human Rights Watch, 2016] Human Rights Watch. (2016). Country Chapter Angola. Retrieved on 29.10.2017 from: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/angola>

[Human Rights Watch, 2017] Human Rights Watch. (2017). Angola bans activist demonstrations ahead elections. Retrieved on 29.10.2017 from: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/16/angola-bans-activist-demonstrations-ahead-elections>

[Ingham, 1990] Ingham, Kenneth. (1990). *Politics in Modern Africa*. New York: Routledge.

[James, 2004] James, W. Martin. (2004). *Historical Dictionary of Angola*. (3rd Edition). Lanham: The Scarecrow Press.

[Lansford, 2017] Lansford, T. (2017). *Political Handbook of the World 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc.

[Levinson, 1998] Levinson, David. (1998). *Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook*. Phoenix: Oryx Press.

[Lusani, 2001] Lusani, Lukonde. (2001). *Angola: Zwischen regionaler Hegemonie und nationalem Selbstmord. Die Suche nach einer Lösung*. Marburg: Tectum Verlag.

- [Malaquias, 2000] Malaquias, Assis. (2000). Ethnicity and conflict in Angola: prospects for reconciliation. In Jakkie Cilliers & Christian Dietrich (Eds.), *Angola's War Economy (95-113)*. The Role of Oil and Diamonds.
- [Martins, 2015] Martins, V. (2015). Ovimbundu Identity Attributions in Post-War Angola. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 41(4), 1-15.
- [Orre, 2010] Orre, Aslak. (2010). Who's to challenge the party state in Angola? Political space & opposition in parties and civil society. Paper prepared for the conference on Election processes, liberation movements and democratic change in Africa.
- [PolityIV, 2008] POLITY IV. (2003). Polity IV Country Report: Angola. Retrieved 14.06.2006 from: [http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/country\\_reports/Ang1.htm](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/country_reports/Ang1.htm)
- [Roque, 2017] Roque, Paula Cristina. (2017). Reform or unravel? Prospects for Angola's transition. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved on 22.10.2017 from: <https://www.africaportal.org/publications/reform-or-unravel-prospects-angolas-transition/>
- [Roque, 2008] Roque, Paula Cristina. (2008). Angolan legislative elections: Analyzing the MPLA's triumph. Institute for Security Studies Situation Report.
- [Roque, 2009] Roque, Paula Cristina. (2009). Angola's Façade Democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 20(4), 137-150.
- [Soares de Oliveira, 2015] Soares de Oliveira, R. (2015). *Magnificent and Beggar Land. Angola since the civil war*. London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.
- [Tvedten, 1997] Tvedten, Inge. (1997). *Angola: Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction*. Oxford: Westview Press.
- [US State Department, 2006-2019] U.S. Department of State. (2006-2019). Country Reports for Angola. Retrieved on 15.09.2020 from: <https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/>

## Political status of ethnic groups in Angola

*From 1975 until 2002*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Ovimbundu-Ovambo	0.38	DISCRIMINATED
Mbundu-Mestico	0.26	MONOPOLY
Bakongo	0.13	POWERLESS
Lunda-Chokwe	0.09	DISCRIMINATED
Cabindan Mayombe	0.02	POWERLESS

*From 2003 until 2021*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Ovimbundu-Ovambo	0.38	POWERLESS
Mbundu-Mestico	0.26	DOMINANT
Bakongo	0.13	POWERLESS
Lunda-Chokwe	0.09	POWERLESS
Cabindan Mayombe	0.02	POWERLESS



Figure 21: Political status of ethnic groups in Angola during 1975-2002.



Figure 22: Political status of ethnic groups in Angola during 2003-2021.

# Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Angola

*From 1975 until 1975*




Figure 23: Map of ethnic groups in Angola during 1975-1975.

Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
■ Lunda-Chokwe	295 461	Regionally based
■ Ovimbundu-Ovambo	293 832	Regionally based
■ Mbundu-Mestico	180 684	Regionally based
■ Bakongo	136 844	Regionally based
■ Cabindan Mayombe	4149	Regionally based

Table 9: List of ethnic groups in Angola during 1975-1975.

*From 1976 until 2021*




Figure 24: Map of ethnic groups in Angola during 1976-2021.

Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
Lunda-Chokwe	295 461	Regionally based
Ovimbundu-Ovambo	293 832	Regionally based
Mbundu-Mestico	180 684	Regionally based
Bakongo	136 844	Regionally based
Cabindan Mayombe	4149	Regionally based

Table 10: List of ethnic groups in Angola during 1976-2021.



# *Conflicts in Angola*

*Starting on 1961-02-03*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Portugal	MPLA		1961-02-03			
Government of Portugal	FNLA		1961-03-14			
Government of Portugal	UNITA		1966-12-25			

*Starting on 1975-11-10*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Angola	FNLA	Bakongo	1975-11-10	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Angola	UNITA	Ovimbundu-Ovambo	1975-11-10	No	Yes	Yes

*Starting on 1989-08-03*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Angola	FLEC-FAC	Cabindan Mayombe	1989-08-03	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Angola	FLEC-R	Cabindan Mayombe	1991-06-02	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Angola	FLEC-R	Bakongo	1991-06-02	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Angola	FLEC-FAC-TN	Cabindan Mayombe	2010-11-07	Explicit	Yes	Yes