

Cameroon

Ethnicity in Cameroon

Group selection

The **Fulani** culturally and politically dominate the Muslim north (⁷⁸⁴). The smaller northern Muslim ethnic groups, which can be seen as associated with the Fulani, are thus included into one politically relevant ethnic group named Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples). Note that non-Islamic peoples that also live in the north are not included here.

The group **Bassa/Duala** refers to the Littoral region and, hence, is sort of an ethno-regional marker. (Ethnicity in Cameroon is very much linked to regions and regionalism.) Like the Bamileke, the Beti, the two Anglophone groups and the northerners, the Bassa and Duala have formed their own ethnic association (SAWA) that politically represents their interests (⁷⁸⁵; ⁷⁸⁶).

Groups of the east (e.g. the Maka) are ethnically related to the **Beti** group of the center/south region (⁷⁸⁷), which is why they are listed as a combined group (led by the most relevant Beti).

Due to a lack of comprehensive figures, different sources are used for the group size estimates. The **Bamileke** are said to make up roughly 25% of the population (⁷⁸⁸), a figure close to an estimate of the 1960s (⁷⁸⁹). The combined group of Fulani and other northern Muslim peoples constitutes about 14% according to the U.S. State Department Background Notes (not available online anymore), which is close to the 15% that Takougang estimates (⁷⁹⁰). For the Beti and the Bassa/Duala groups, the estimates of Morrison et al. and Fearon are used (⁷⁹¹; ⁷⁹²). (Note that these group sizes refer to those time periods that already include the Anglophone groups. Thus they were adjusted proportionately for the first time period 1960-61.) Finally, for the two Anglophone groups, group size estimates also relied on Fearon's (⁷⁹³) figures. 12% for the NW and 8% for the SW seem realistic as the whole Anglophone population makes up 20% of Cameroon's population (⁷⁹⁴; ⁷⁹⁵), and the NW is more populous than the SW (⁷⁹⁶).

Regarding the group list there is one paramount question: Should the Anglophones be listed as one politically relevant ethno-linguistic group? In principle, one could see good reasons to proceed in this way. Anglophone West Cameroon joined the Francophone Republic of Cameroon separately in 1961 and was first a state of its own within the so-created federation. In 1972, it was practically annexed

⁷⁸⁴ [Mehler, 1993]

⁷⁸⁵ [Fonchingong, 2005]

⁷⁸⁶ [Nkwi, 2006]

⁷⁸⁷ [Morrison, Mitchell & Paden, 1972]

⁷⁸⁸ [Countries and Their Cultures]

⁷⁸⁹ [Morrison, Mitchell & Paden, 1972]

⁷⁹⁰ [Takougang, 1997]

⁷⁹¹ [Morrison, Mitchell & Paden, 1972]

⁷⁹² [Fearon, 2003]

⁷⁹³ [Fearon, 2003]

⁷⁹⁴ [DeLancey, 2000]

⁷⁹⁵ [Mehler, 1993]

⁷⁹⁶ [Nkwi, 2006]

into the new unitary state, which led to a certain subjugation under the francophone-dominated central state. As a result, the anglophone community came to feel marginalized both politically and culturally (797; 798; 799; 800; 801). Particularly with the political liberalization at the beginning of the 1990s, many Anglophone leaders complained about this perceived injustice and marginalization, and several pressure groups were formed to fight for the “Anglophone cause”. A return to the federal system or even secession were postulated (802; 803; 804; 805).

However, although there certainly is an “Anglophone question” in Cameroon, the Anglophone group has been far from politically homogeneous. In contrast, there is quite significant ethnic division between the coastal/forest people of the Southwest Province and the grassfield people in the Northwest Province (who are, in fact, culturally closer to the French speaking people of the Western Province). This ethnic division has resulted in a political rift dating back to the time even before the unification with French Cameroon (806; 807; 808; 809). The first Southwest political pressure group was founded in the 1960s already and succeeded by both southwestern and northwestern separate lobbies in the course of democratization (810; 811; 812). The Francophone center was able to take advantage of this division and to pit the two regions and their leaders against each other (813; 814; 815; 816). Thus, the Anglophone group very seldom acted as a united political bloc, and that bit of joint political action it was able to take was always hampered by regionalism, mutual suspicion, and internal elite power struggles. For this reason, the **Anglophones** are not listed as a united ethno-linguistic group, and instead are divided into two politically relevant groups, corresponding to the two cultural and administrative regions.

Power relations

Periodization refers to the delimitation of the periods after the inclusion of anglophone Cameroon and, particularly, to two crucial events in Cameroon’s history: the abolition of the federation in 1972, and the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1990. According to my assessment, both events did not significantly change the ethno-regional power structure of the country. In the case of the former, it needs to be pointed out that from the very beginning, the Cameroonian federation was a highly centralized construct - with the Francophone part clearly having the upper hand and not a partnership between two equal sides, despite the existence of a separate legislature and a prime minister for the Anglophone part (817). Thus, already before 1972, the Anglophone provinces could not be more than “junior partners” anyways - and, as explicated below, over the years they were always more or less equally included in executive power at the center.

In the case of the latter event, it seems clear to me that although the introduction of multiparty democracy altered the political landscape of the country, it did not lead to any significant changes in

797 [DeLancey, 2000]
798 [Fonchingong, 2005]
799 [Konings, 1997]
800 [Mehler, 1993]
801 [Takougang, 1997]

802 [DeLancey, 2000]
803 [Fonchingong, 2005]
804 [Konings, 1997]
805 [Takougang, 1997]

806 [Fonchingong, 2005]
807 [Konings, 1997]
808 [Mehler, 1993]
809 [Nkwi, 2006]
810 [Fonchingong, 2005]
811 [Konings, 1997]
812 [Nkwi, 2006]
813 [Fonchingong, 2005]
814 [Konings, 1997]
815 [Nkwi, 2006]
816 [Nyamnjoh, 1999]

817 [Konings, 1997]

the actual distribution of power. Paul Biya has managed to stay in power, and behind him is the same national party (the former unity-party RDPC) with the more or less same party barons that represent the country's widespread political elite (very similar, thus, to the case of Gabon and Bongo's regime). Political liberalization has led to the emergence of political parties along ethnic lines (⁸¹⁸; ⁸¹⁹). Also, some groups apparently are more prone to vote for the opposition parties, especially the SDF (e.g. the NW Anglophones, the Bamileke etc.) (⁸²⁰; ⁸²¹; ⁸²²). However, such ethno-political cleavages are not clear-cut and absolute and, above all, the RDPC remains a multi-ethnic national party (again similar to Gabon's PDG) (⁸²³; ⁸²⁴; ⁸²⁵). Thus, two periods are inserted which correspond to the terms of Cameroon's two presidents (Ahidjo until November 1982, Biya since then).

Regarding the power status of the ethno-regional groups, again there is diverging information. Several sources speak of the marginalization (or even exclusion) of certain groups and of the dominance of others. For instance, the Bamileke (⁸²⁶), the Anglophones as a whole (⁸²⁷; ⁸²⁸; ⁸²⁹), or the southwestern part of them (Konings/Nyamnjoh 1997; ⁸³⁰) are mentioned by some sources to have been politically marginalized, whereas the Beti are sometimes said to exclusively dominate politics under Biya (⁸³¹; ⁸³²). However, these very same sources also speak of a system of "ethnic balance", of the "co-optation of ethno-regional factions" etc., thus contradicting themselves somewhat. A different view holds that Cameroonian politics - both under Ahidjo and Biya - is characterized by a highly sophisticated neo-patrimonial system of ethnic balance and "divide and rule", and a very much multi-ethnic (party) elite including representatives from all parts of the country (⁸³³; ⁸³⁴; ⁸³⁵).

This second view seems much more convincing because it can draw on clear examples of co-opted elites and concrete figures of ethno-regional representation in the government. The ethno-regional power-sharing in Ahidjo's first cabinets is demonstrated by figures in the literature (see e.g. ⁸³⁶). According to Mehler (⁸³⁷), Ahidjo followed a careful proportional representation in ethno-regional terms regarding the allocation of important posts, particularly cabinet posts. Gabriel (⁸³⁸) explicitly distinguishes Cameroon under Ahidjo from the case of Nigeria which developed a "tradition of northern primacy" that could not be observed in Cameroon. Although the distribution of power clearly altered under Biya, none of the important ethno-regional groupings has been neglected. Mehler's (⁸³⁹) recording of the regional distribution of cabinet seats in all of Biya's governments gives a clear picture of inclusion and representation of all parts of the country. Although the regions are not homogeneous, almost all of them are dominated by one specific ethnic group (e.g. the Western Province by the Bamileke, the Center by the Beti etc.). Decisions in favor of a region are thus seen as decisions in favor of that region's dominant ethnic group. Overall, Gabriel (⁸⁴⁰) states that both the Fulani and the Beti, when in power, always shared

⁸¹⁸ [Gabriel, 1999]

⁸¹⁹ [Nyamnjoh, 1999]

⁸²⁰ [Fonchingong, 2005]

⁸²¹ [Gabriel, 1999]

⁸²² [Takougang, 1997]

⁸²³ [Gabriel, 1999]

⁸²⁴ [Konings, 1997]

⁸²⁵ [Nyamnjoh, 1999]

⁸²⁶ [DeLancey, 2000]

⁸²⁷ [DeLancey, 2000]

⁸²⁸ [Fonchingong, 2005]

⁸²⁹ [Konings, 1997]

⁸³⁰ [Nkwi, 2006]

⁸³¹ [Fonchingong, 2005]

⁸³² [Konings, 1997]

⁸³³ [DeLancey, 1989]

⁸³⁴ [Gabriel, 1999]

⁸³⁵ [Nyamnjoh, 1999]

⁸³⁶ [Morrison, Mitchell & Paden, 1972]

⁸³⁷ [Mehler, 1993]

⁸³⁸ [Gabriel, 1999]

⁸³⁹ [Mehler, 1993]

⁸⁴⁰ [Gabriel, 1999]

power with other ethnic groups. Also the unity-parties UNC and RDPK contained/contains elites from all ethno-regional groups ⁽⁸⁴¹⁾. On the whole, the case of Cameroon reminds me strongly of Gabon under Bongo: a national unity-party with a very much multi-ethnic elite, a politically clever personalistic leadership with the president as “father of the nation” who distributes resources to all parts of the country and co-opts all important elites into his neo-patrimonial system of “divide and rule”, giving each ethnic group its “fair share”.

This share, of course, varies over time and is thus a basis for complaints by groups and their elites in many instances. Every group (to a lesser degree even the Beti, see ⁸⁴²) feels the need to lobby for a bigger share at some point by complaining about its marginalization. However, these complaints symbolize the momentary disappointment about a reduction of the share and the demand for a bigger “piece” in the next “round”, rather than a serious protest against total exclusion. (And many times this strategy is successful as the regime reacts by allocating more appointments to the complaining group.) It seems that some of the sources mentioned above reflect such expressions of relative dissatisfaction of groups rather than the actual situation. The Beti under Biya also remind me of the Baule in Cote d’Ivoire during Houphouet-Boigny’s rule. They, too, were sometimes accused of dominating Ivoirian politics in that period. Although holding the most powerful political posts, both the Baule in Cote d’Ivoire and the Beti in Cameroon share(d) their power with other groups. Therefore - in the light of all these impressions - Cameroon’s political system was coded as a power-sharing arrangement with a national, multi-ethnic unity-party and a multi-ethnic co-opted elite.

Bamileke: Some of the above sources state that the Bamileke group dominates the economy but has been kept out of political power. This claim is strongly disputed by others. Gabriel ⁽⁸⁴³⁾ holds that the Bamileke have always been politically included, both under Ahidjo and Biya, and that there has always been a co-opted Bamileke elite even after the introduction of multiparty democracy. Already Ahidjo incorporated Bamileke representatives into his governments, for example as finance ministers ⁽⁸⁴⁴⁾. According to Morrison et al. ⁽⁸⁴⁵⁾, they even constituted a plurality in Cameroon’s cabinets in the first years after independence, holding 40% of all government seats. The UPC rebellion in the 1960s, which was mainly based on the Bassa and Bamileke groups ⁽⁸⁴⁶⁾, seems not to have influenced that. And Mehler’s ⁽⁸⁴⁷⁾ figures also show a constant inclusion of the group in Biya’s governments. Therefore, the Bamileke are coded as “junior partners” in both periods.

Beti: Together with the Fulani they form a successful north-south political alliance ⁽⁸⁴⁸⁾. Biya was prime minister under Ahidjo before he succeeded him, and other Beti were appointed to important posts ⁽⁸⁴⁹⁾. Thus, the Beti are coded “junior partner” in the first period. Under Biya, elites of the group have clearly been promoted and now control the most important positions in the government, as Biya has increasingly relied on their loyalty to safeguard his power ⁽⁸⁵⁰⁾;

⁸⁴¹ [Mehler, 1993]

⁸⁴² [Nyamnjoh, 1999]

⁸⁴³ [Gabriel, 1999]

⁸⁴⁴ [Mehler, 1993]

⁸⁴⁵ [Morrison, Mitchell & Paden, 1972]

⁸⁴⁶ [Morrison, Mitchell & Paden, 1972]

⁸⁴⁷ [Mehler, 1993]

⁸⁴⁸ [Gabriel, 1999]

⁸⁴⁹ [Morrison, Mitchell & Paden, 1972]

⁸⁵⁰ [DeLancey, 2000]

⁸⁵¹, ⁸⁵²). Hence, in the second period, the Beti are coded “senior partner”.

Fulani: With Ahidjo as president, the Fulani were the country’s leading ethnic group (⁸⁵³). They were favored by the president, and an important part of political power was held by Ahidjo himself (⁸⁵⁴). Thus, the Fulani should be considered “senior partner” in the first period. In the second period, their position deteriorated somewhat (⁸⁵⁵) especially after the failed 1984 coup attempt which was apparently “northern-inspired”, yet they are still included in executive power (⁸⁵⁶). After the political transition of the 1990s, several northern leaders for example, of the UNDP, a party that is based in the north were co-opted into Biya’s governments (⁸⁵⁷; ⁸⁵⁸; ⁸⁵⁹). Overall, the north has always had a disproportionate share of political power since independence (⁸⁶⁰). Therefore, the Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples) are coded “junior partner” in the second period.

Bassa/Duala: According to the figures provided by Morrison et al. (⁸⁶¹) and Mehler (⁸⁶²), and based on other information (⁸⁶³), the Bassa/Duala groups have also been included into the governments under both Ahidjo and Biya. After the elections of 1992, for instance, a political agreement was achieved between the RDPC and the UPC, a party rooted in the Littoral Province. UPC leader Kodock became minister (⁸⁶⁴). Therefore, the Bassa/Duala are also coded “junior partners” in both periods.

Northwestern and southwestern Anglophones: The Francophone part is clearly dominant in Cameroonian politics and society, already because of its demographic advantage. There are claims by the Anglophone community of political and cultural marginalization, and within it, southwestern complaints of northwestern supremacy. However, as explained above, the evidence points in another direction. Leaders of both regions have been included into governments and sometimes appointed to important posts like that of the prime minister under both Ahidjo and Biya (⁸⁶⁵; ⁸⁶⁶; ⁸⁶⁷). I thus decided to code both Anglophone groups as “junior partners” in both periods, despite playing an inferior role compared to the Francophone groups as a whole.

Biya’s rule remains based on the same stabilizing pillars of a clientelistic distribution of resources, the co-optation of a multi-ethnic elite and the principle of “divide and rule” as in the periods before mirrored in an overbloated cabinet consisting of about 60 ministers. His personalist, neo-patrimonial rule has made Cameroon one of the most corrupt countries in the world. On the other hand, through this system of ethnic clientelism, he has also ensured an ethnic balance in his regime despite ongoing claims of marginalization from different ethnic groupings (see e.g. ⁸⁶⁸, 2006-2010; ⁸⁶⁹; ⁸⁷⁰). His prime ministers, for example, were always Anglophones during these four years: Inoni, a Bakweri from the southwest, until June 2009, and since then, Yang from the northwest. Also the Fulani (and other northern Muslims) have been included into the central government

⁸⁵¹ [Konings, 1997]

⁸⁵² [Mehler, 1993]

⁸⁵³ [Takougang, 1997]

⁸⁵⁴ [DeLancey, 2000]

⁸⁵⁵ [Takougang, 1997]

⁸⁵⁶ [Mehler, 1993]

⁸⁵⁷ [Gabriel, 1999]

⁸⁵⁸ [Nyamnjoh, 1999]

⁸⁵⁹ [Takougang, 1997]

⁸⁶⁰ [DeLancey, 2000]

⁸⁶¹ [Morrison, Mitchell & Paden, 1972]

⁸⁶² [Mehler, 1993]

⁸⁶³ [DeLancey, 2000]

⁸⁶⁴ [Takougang, 1997]

⁸⁶⁵ [DeLancey, 2000]

⁸⁶⁶ [Fonchingong, 2005]

⁸⁶⁷ [Gabriel, 1999]

⁸⁶⁸ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003-2016]

⁸⁶⁹ [IRIN Africa, 2004]

⁸⁷⁰ [IRIN Africa, 2007]

(⁸⁷¹). Overall, and like before, Biya's Beti group enjoys the greatest access to political (and military) power among all of Cameroon's ethnic groups (⁸⁷², 2006-2009; ⁸⁷³, 2007), holding about one third of all cabinet positions (⁸⁷⁴, 2006-2010).

Reelection of Biya in 2011. Still, the Beti are reported to be over-represented in the cabinet, but not at the expense of a total exclusion of other ethnic groups considered to be politically relevant (⁸⁷⁵, 2012). The Northwestern Anglophone Yang was reelected as Prime Minister. After the elections, Biya reshuffled the cabinet, without however breaking up his old alliances with the Northern, muslim parties NUSDP, NADP, and FSNC, or excluding previously included ethnic groups (⁸⁷⁶; ⁸⁷⁷).

As of 2021, Paul Biya, member of the Beti ethnic group, is still president, and the Northwestern Anglophone Philémon Yang still acts as prime minister. No exclusion of specific groups has taken place, all of them are still represented in the overblown cabinet, albeit more or less proportionally (⁸⁷⁸; ⁸⁷⁹, 2014-2016). The president's CPDM, which is, however, not an ethnicity-specific party, is clearly overrepresented and retains power, amongst other things, due to patronage, bribes and control over local elections (⁸⁸⁰, 2015).

During the last few years, the dissatisfaction among parts of the Anglophone population has grown. Activists call for the separation of the anglophone parts of the country (the Northwest and the Southwest region) called Ambazonia. Deadly confrontations between activists and the government have been taking place and the crisis, which erupted in 2016 after a strike against the imposition of the French language in schools, has not been resolved until today. In fact, the grievances voiced by the anglophone population are not only grounded in language cleavages, but also in economic underdevelopment and deprivation. The distribution of investments within the country seems to be strongly unbalanced. The anglophone regions achieve far less than the others, while the president's ethnic constituency, the Beti's territory, receives disproportionately high amounts of resources (⁸⁸¹). These considerations point out that the peace in Cameroon is very vulnerable and that ethnic differences might in fact play a role. However, if we can speak of the Anglophone groups being discriminated, then these facts rather point to economic and social discrimination than to political discrimination. Politically, as mentioned above, the anglophone people are included into the government by ministerial and other key positions. As mentioned, the prime minister is even an anglophone. However, it should also be noted that the prime minister's position is not as significant as one might think - it is the fourth position in state control, after the head of state, the president of the senate and the speaker of the national assembly, who are all francophones (⁸⁸²). (The head of senate has been Marcel Niat Njifenji since 2013, a politician coming from Cameroon's West region and therefore assumingly representing the interests of the Bamileke. The head of state is, as mentioned, Paul Biya, a member of the Beti ethnic group. The president of the

⁸⁷¹ [IRIN Africa, 2004]

⁸⁷² [US State Department, 1999-2016]

⁸⁷³ [Freedom House, 1999-2017]

⁸⁷⁴ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003-2016]

⁸⁷⁵ [US State Department, 1999-2016]

⁸⁷⁶ [Reuters, 2011]

⁸⁷⁷ [Africa Review, 2014]

⁸⁷⁸ [Cameroon Government, 2017]

⁸⁷⁹ [US State Department, 1999-2016]

⁸⁸⁰ [Freedom House, 1999-2017]

⁸⁸¹ [Quartz Media, 2017]

⁸⁸² [Quartz Media, 2017]

National Assembly is Cavaye Yeguie Djibril, belonging to the Mada, a northern muslim group.)

Despite of these critical developments, there is no indication strong enough to legitimize a change of the coding of Cameroon as a power-sharing regime. It is thus concluded to prolong the coding of the years since 1983 up to 2017, with the Beti being "senior partner" and the other groups being included in the government as "junior partner".

According to a survey by the OECD, Cameroon was defined a "decentralized unitary country" in the constitution of 1996, consisting of 10 regions and 374 councils. Decentralization is, however, still an on-going process in Cameroon. Only in 2004, several laws have been set which define some transfers of power to the regional level, including, for example, social care, health care or education. Until 2010, half of these competences have been effectively transferred to these regions. Many mandates are unfunded and the means are not sufficient to make sure the regional competences can be upheld⁸⁸³). Furthermore, the local leadership positions are assigned and controlled by the president, which indicates that the local executive might not necessarily be members of the ethnic group living in the respective areas⁸⁸⁴, 2015). Therefore, it is decided not to code regional autonomy status for all ethnic groups.

⁸⁸³ [OECD, 2015]

⁸⁸⁴ [Freedom House, 1999-2017]

In 2018 and 2019, the Anglophone crisis continued and escalated into an armed conflict between the government and secessionist groups⁸⁸⁵). In combination with the violent threats from Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA), concern over security dominated the social-political agenda in Cameroon. However, despite widespread security threats, Cameroon held its presidential elections in October 2018. Biya was re-elected as president with 71.3% of the votes. Several sources reported on the poor organization of the elections, highlighting primarily that the turnout in the Anglophone-dominated regions was estimated to be around 10% due to the fear of violence. Moreover, the low turnout shows the growing discontent in the Anglophone regions with the central government⁸⁸⁶).

⁸⁸⁵ [Crisis Group, 2017]

⁸⁸⁶ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020]

While Biya appointed a large portion of new ministers, the reshuffle did not significantly change the composition of ethnic representation in the executive body. A new prime minister - Joseph Dion Ngute (from the southwestern Anglophone region) - was appointed and several ministers were moved to a new ministerial post. With the appointment of Ngute as prime minister, Biya continues his tradition to appoint prime-ministers from the Anglophone region⁸⁸⁷). Moreover, the Anglophones were represented with several other ministerial positions as well. Additionally, a ministry of decentralisation was established with the aim of further devolving decision-making power to regional level. The Bamileke, the Anglophone groups from the northwest and southwest, the Fulani and Bassa/Duala retained their presence in the executive body. As such, no developments warrant a change in the coding of the power relations between the ethnic groups.

⁸⁸⁷ [Chatham House, 2020]

Bibliography

- [Africa Review, 2014] Africa Review (2014). Cameroon names new cabinet. Retrieved on 17.04.2014 from: <http://www.africareview.com/News/Cameroon-names-new-cabinet/-/979180/1287010/-/6wctes/-/index.html>
- [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020] Bertelsmann Stiftung (2020). Cameroon Country Report. Retrieved on 08.9.2020 from: <https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/CMR/>
- [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003-2016] Bertelsmann Stiftung (2003-2016). Cameroon Country Report. Retrieved on 09.11.2017 from: <https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/CMR/>
- [Cameroon Government , 2017] Cameroon Government (2017). Services du premier ministre. Retrieved on 09.11.2017 from: <http://www.spm.gov.cm/index.php?L=1>
- [Chatham House, 2020] Chatham House (2020). Cameroon's President Makes a Fresh Overture to Anglophones. Retrieved on 08.9.2020 from: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/cameroon-s-president-makes-fresh-overture-anglophones>
- [Countries and Their Cultures] Countries and Their Cultures. Cameroon. Retrieved on 31.03.2014. from: <http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Cameroon.html>
- [Crisis Group, 2017] Crisis Group (2017). Cameroon's Worsening Anglophone Crisis Calls for Strong Measures. Retrieved on 08.9.2020 from: <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b130-cameroon-a-worsening-anglophone-crisis-calls-for-strong-measures.pdf>
- [DeLancey, 2000] DeLancey, Mark W., and Dike DeLancey (2000). Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Cameroon. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
- [DeLancey, 1989] DeLancey, Mark W. (1989). Cameroon: Dependence and Independence. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

- [Fearon, 2003] Fearon, James D. (2003). Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country. *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2):195-222.
- [Fonchingong, 2005] Fonchingong, Charles C. (2005). Exploring the Politics of Identity and Ethnicity in State Reconstruction in Cameroon. *Social Identities* 11 (4):363-380.
- [Freedom House, 1999-2017] Freedom House (1999-2017). Country Reports Cameroon. Retrieved on 16.11.2017 from: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/cameroon>
- [Gabriel, 1999] Gabriel, Jürg Martin (1999). Cameroon's Neopatri-monial Dilemma. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 17 (2):173-196.
- [IRIN Africa, 2007] IRIN Africa (2007). Secessionist minority Anglophone group silenced. Retrieved 31.03.2014 from: <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=70258>
- [IRIN Africa, 2004] IRIN Africa (2004). Biya aide named premier, cabinet reshuffled. Retrieved 31.03.2014 from: <http://www.irinnews.org/news/2004/12/13/biya-aide-named-premier-cabinet-reshuffled>
- [Konings, 1997] Konings, Piet, and Francis B. Nyamnjoh (1997). The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 35 (2):207-229.
- [Mehler, 1993] Mehler, Andreas (1993). Kamerun in der Ära Biya: Bedingungen, erste Schritte und Blockaden einer demokratischen Transition, *Hamburger Beiträge zur Afrika-Kunde*. Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde.
- [Morrison, Mitchell & Paden, 1972] Morrison, Donald G., Robert C. Mitchell, and John N. Paden (1972). *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook*. New York: The Free Press.
- [Nkwi, 2006] Nkwi, Walter G. (2006). Elites, Ethno-regional Competition in Cameroon, and the Southwest Elites Association (SWELA), 1991-1997. *African Study Monographs* 27 (3):123-143.
- [Nyamnjoh, 1999] Nyamnjoh, Francis B. (1999). Commentary: Cameroon: A Country United by Ethnic Ambition and Difference. *African Affairs* 98 (390):101-118.
- [OECD, 2015] OECD (2015). Cameroon. Retrieved on 20.11.2017 from: <https://www.oecd.org/regional/regional-policy/profile-Camaroon.pdf>
- [Quartz Media, 2017] Quartz Media (2017). Cameroon's Anglophone crisis isn't about language, but economic deprivation. Retrieved on 16.11.2017 from: <https://qz.com/1097892/cameroons-anglophone-crisis-is-danger-of-becoming-a-full-blown-conflict/>

- [Reuters, 2011] Reuters (2011). Cameroon's Biya reshuffles cabinet. Retrieved on 17.04.2014. from: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/10/ozatp-cameroon-reshuffle-idAFJ0E7B900J20111210>
- [Takougang, 1997] Takougang, Joseph (1997). Cameroon: Biya and Incremental Reform. In Political Reform in Francophone Africa, edited by J. F. Clark and D. E. Gardinier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 162-181.
- [US State Department, 1999–2016] US State Department (1999–2016). Human Rights Reports: Cameroon. Retrieved 09.11.2017 from: <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/>

Political status of ethnic groups in Cameroon

From 1960 until 1961

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Bamileke	0.3125	JUNIOR PARTNER
Beti (and related peoples)	0.225	JUNIOR PARTNER
Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples)	0.175	SENIOR PARTNER
Bassa/Duala	0.1	JUNIOR PARTNER

From 1962 until 1982

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Bamileke	0.25	JUNIOR PARTNER
Beti (and related peoples)	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples)	0.14	SENIOR PARTNER
Northwestern Anglophones (Grassfielders)	0.12	JUNIOR PARTNER
Bassa/Duala	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Southwestern Anglophones (Bakweri etc.)	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER

From 1983 until 2021

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Bamileke	0.25	JUNIOR PARTNER
Beti (and related peoples)	0.18	SENIOR PARTNER
Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples)	0.14	JUNIOR PARTNER
Northwestern Anglophones (Grassfielders)	0.12	JUNIOR PARTNER
Bassa/Duala	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Southwestern Anglophones (Bakweri etc.)	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER




Figure 142: Political status of ethnic groups in Cameroon during 1960-1961.



Figure 143: Political status of ethnic groups in Cameroon during 1962-1982.




Figure 144: Political status of ethnic groups in Cameroon during 1983-2021.

Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Cameroon

From 1960 until 1960




Figure 145: Map of ethnic groups in Cameroon during 1960-1960.

	Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■	Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples)	83 720	Regionally based
■	Beti (and related peoples)	51 576	Regionally based
■	Bassa/Duala	17 175	Regionally based
■	Bamileke	13 990	Regionally based

Table 49: List of ethnic groups in Cameroon during 1960-1960.

From 1961 until 1961




Figure 146: Map of ethnic groups in Cameroon during 1961-1961.

	Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■	Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples)	83 720	Regionally based
■	Beti (and related peoples)	51 576	Regionally based
■	Bassa/Duala	17 175	Regionally based
■	Bamileke	13 990	Regionally based

Table 50: List of ethnic groups in Cameroon during 1961-1961.

From 1962 until 2021




Figure 147: Map of ethnic groups in Cameroon during 1962-2021.

	Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■	Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples)	83 720	Regionally based
■	Beti (and related peoples)	51 576	Regionally based
■	Northwestern Anglophones (Grassfielders)	23 791	Regionally based
■	Southwestern Anglophones (Bakweri etc.)	22 385	Regionally based
■	Bassa/Duala	17 784	Regionally based
■	Bamileke	17 552	Regionally based

Table 51: List of ethnic groups in Cameroon during 1962-2021.

Conflicts in Cameroon

Starting on 1957-09-29

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of France	UPC		1957-09-29			

Starting on 1960-01-30

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Cameroon	UPC	Bassa/Duala	1960-01-30	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Cameroon	UPC	Bamileke	1960-01-30	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Cameroon	Military faction (forces of Ibrahim Saleh)	Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples)	1984-04-05	Presumed	Yes	
Government of Cameroon	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad		2015-01-11			

Starting on 1994-02-17

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Cameroon	Government of Nigeria		1994-02-17			

Starting on 2015-03-18

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Cameroon	IS		2015-03-18			

Starting on 2017-09-15

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Cameroon	Ambazonia insurgents	Northwestern Anglophones (Grassfielders)	2017-09-15	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Cameroon	Ambazonia insurgents	Southwestern Anglophones (Bakweri etc.)	2017-09-15	Explicit	Yes	Yes