

# Central African Republic

## *Ethnicity in Central African Republic*

### *Group selection*

Overall, there is not much information on the role of specific ethnic groups in the political power structure over the whole of the country's history. In the first periods after independence, the main ethnopolitical cleavage seems to have been between the privileged southern riverine ethnic groups and the northern groups (<sup>521</sup>, 162). Thus, the analysis only lists two politically relevant ethnic groups in the first three periods: "Riverine groups (Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.)" and "northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)". Only after the seizure of power by the Yakoma Andre Kolingba in 1981, it seems that the riverine groups split in two factions (<sup>522</sup>, 168). It is not completely clear from which time on the northern groups should be listed as separate ethnic groups, i.e. from which time on intranorthern ethnic differences became politically salient. In the light of the logic found in other cases, this turning point was attributed to the moment, in 1993, when for the first time of the country's history, a northerner - Ange-Felix Patasse of Sara origin - assumed power. Thus, from the period of Patasse's rule on, the northern groups (Banda, Mandjia, Baya, and Sara) were listed as separate politically relevant ethnic groups. This does not rule out the possibility of alliances between these different groups as has apparently been the case with the Sara and Baya groups during Patasse's rule (<sup>523</sup>).

The size of the northern groups is the sum of the sizes of the ethnic sub-groups which are listed separately afterwards. For these groups, it appears reasonable to rely on the numbers provided by the CIA World Factbook, which are relatively close to those given by Morrison et al. (<sup>524</sup>) for the time around independence. Because the CIA World Factbook does not provide an estimation of the combined riverine population, the analysis relied on the numbers of Morrison et al. (<sup>525</sup>) for this ethnic family.

For those periods, in which the two individual riverine groups Mbaka and Yakoma are listed separately, the analysis relied on the more current group size numbers given by the CIA World Factbook. Because these numbers are smaller than the ones provided by Morrison et al. (<sup>526</sup>), and because only two individual riverine groups are listed, the population total drops a bit in the periods after 1981.

<sup>521</sup> [Decalo, 1989]

<sup>522</sup> [Decalo, 1989]

<sup>523</sup> [United States Government State Department, 2000]

<sup>524</sup> [Morrison, 1972]

<sup>525</sup> [Morrison, 1972]

<sup>526</sup> [Morrison, 1972]

*Power relations*

*1960-1965: Dacko's first term until Bokassa's coup at the end of 1965.* Dacko hails from a riverine ethnic group (Mbaka). The riverine groups are clearly dominant in politics (<sup>527</sup>). The percentages regarding cabinet composition given by Morrison et al. (<sup>528</sup>) indicate the incorporation of a few northerners into the governments under Dacko (1 out of 8 ministers at independence, and 3 out of 11 before the coup). However, this seems to me like a merely numerical inclusion rather than a real participation by northern elites in executive power. According to O'Toole (<sup>529</sup>), the Baya, one of the politically most important northern groups, remained excluded from government circles under Dacko. The riverine groups were thus coded as "dominant" and the northern groups as "powerless" in the first period.

<sup>527</sup> [Decalo, 1989]<sup>528</sup> [Morrison, 1972]<sup>529</sup> [O'Toole, 1986]

*1966-1969: First part of Bokassa's rule.* Bokassa is a Mbaka like Dacko. The northern groups' numerical representation in government does not improve (<sup>530</sup>). However, Bokassa's most important cooperator in the 1965 coup was Captain Banza, a Baya. He is promoted by Bokassa at the beginning - being the first Baya ever who rose to national political prominence - and attains considerable power. He is the "regime's strong man" and the only person with a certain restraining influence on Bokassa (<sup>531</sup>; <sup>532</sup>). With the appointment of Banza (and Patasse), Bokassa also gains much popular support, especially among the Baya (<sup>533</sup>; <sup>534</sup>). In light of this considerable (although short-lived) political influence, it seems reasonable to code the northern groups as "junior partner" and the riverine groups as "senior partner" in a power-sharing regime.

<sup>530</sup> [Morrison, 1972]<sup>531</sup> [Decalo, 1989]<sup>532</sup> [O'Toole, 1986]<sup>533</sup> [Decalo, 1989]<sup>534</sup> [O'Toole, 1986]*1970-1981: Second part of Bokassa's rule and Dacko's second term.*

Bokassa's regime becomes extremely personalist, authoritarian and repressive over time. His power is absolute, the boundaries between himself and the institution of the state are becoming blurred (<sup>535</sup>; <sup>536</sup>). In 1969, Captain Banza - Bokassa's last significant rival - is executed. Given Bokassa's extremely personalist and dictatorial rule - surrounded by a clique of mostly riverine political followers (<sup>537</sup>) - the riverine groups were thus coded as "dominant" and the northern groups as "powerless" in this period. After Bokassa's overthrow, Dacko is again installed as president. However, this does not change the ethno-political power structures. Dacko does not fully break with the ousted regime and even integrates some of its key figures in his government (<sup>538</sup>; <sup>539</sup>). Some of these former leaders are actually relatives of himself (<sup>540</sup>). His "presidential clique" is increasingly composed of ethnic kinsmen and family members (<sup>541</sup>). Farmers in the north (Patasse's ethnic region) actively oppose the regime (<sup>542</sup>). Dacko's second presidential term was added to Bokassa's period with the same power status coding.

<sup>535</sup> [Decalo, 1989]<sup>536</sup> [O'Toole, 1986]<sup>537</sup> [O'Toole, 1986]<sup>538</sup> [Decalo, 1989]<sup>539</sup> [O'Toole, 1986]

*1982-1993: Kolingba's rule.* Kolingba is a Yakoma, and after his rise to power, a major shift in the ethno-political balance takes place, mirrored in the increased influence of several key members of the Yakoma ethnic group (<sup>543</sup>). During his rule, Kolingba increasingly relies on his own ethnic group (<sup>544</sup>), and the Yakoma hold a disproportionate number of senior positions in the government (<sup>545</sup>). However, there was no evidence that the other riverine group, the politically very important Mbaka group, is actually excluded from executive power. Indeed, the basic power structure - and with it the patron-client systems that are also partially controlled by the Mbaka political elite (<sup>546</sup>) - has not changed (<sup>547</sup>). It appears thus reasonable to assume the Mbaka to keep playing an influential role in the country's politics and coded them as "junior partner" during this period. The Yakoma are coded as "senior partner". Regarding the northern groups, however, the above-mentioned evidence makes it seem probable that there is no political space for them during Kolingba's personalist, ethnically based military dictatorship. Moreover, their main political leader, Ange-Felix Patassé, is harassed by the government, and after a failed coup-attempt in 1982, allies of Patasse are purged from the officer corps, the cabinet and the higher civil service (<sup>548</sup>). The northern groups were thus coded as "powerless" again during this period.

<sup>543</sup> [O'Toole, 1986]

<sup>544</sup> [Kalck, 2005]

<sup>545</sup> [United States Government State Department, 2000]

<sup>546</sup> [O'Toole, 1986]

<sup>547</sup> [O'Toole, 1986]

*1994-2001: Patasse's rule, first part.* Ange-Felix Patasse is elected president in late 1993 and becomes the first northern president of the CAR. His regime also relies mainly on his own ethnic group, the Sara, and several key ministers are from this group (<sup>549</sup>). Nevertheless, with his party MLPC not having a majority in parliament, Patasse is forced to form a coalition government. In 1995, he appoints a Yakoma prime minister (<sup>550</sup>). According to the U.S. State Department's Human Rights Report of 1999 (<sup>551</sup>), the Patasse government exhibited a more representative ethnic balance than that of his predecessor Kolingba, although the northern Sara and Baya groups were clearly favored. The Human Rights Report of 2000 (<sup>552</sup>) notes that members of the Sara and Baya groups continued to predominate among the president's advisors after his reelection in 1999, but in his cabinet reshuffle of November of that year he appointed an ethnically diverse government (which, for example, also included the Yakoma and Mbaka groups). The period was thus coded as a power-sharing arrangement between all relevant ethnic groups, with Patasse's Sara group as "senior partner", and the Baya, Mbaka and Yakoma groups as "junior partners". No evidence of any political relevance of the other two northern groups, Banda and Mandjia. Therefore, they are coded as "irrelevant".

<sup>549</sup> [O'Toole, 1986]

<sup>550</sup> [O'Toole, 1986]

<sup>551</sup> [United States Government State Department, 2000]

<sup>552</sup> [United States Government State Department, 2000]

*2002-2003: Patasse's rule, second part.* After the failed coup-attempt in May 2001, for which Kolingba claims responsibility, members of the Yakoma group are indiscriminately and systematically being hunted and killed in Bangui (<sup>553</sup>). A separate period was thus inserted here, coding the Yakoma group as "discriminated" during the last years of Patasse's regime.

<sup>553</sup> [Kalck, 2005]

*2004-2005: General François Bozize assumes power in a coup in March 2003.* According to EPR's January-1st-rule, the new period is coded as starting in 2004.

Bozize's first government includes members of Patasse's party, a son of Dacko and even a son of Kolingba. The ten members of the National Transition Council are from diverse ethnic origins and political affiliations (<sup>554</sup>). According to the U.S. State Department's Human Rights Report of 2003 (<sup>555</sup>), the period was generally characterized by political inclusion and dialogue - also involving the opposition, which is mainly ethnically based. Therefore, this period was coded as a period of power-sharing again. As Bozize is a Baya, and the Baya group holds a dominant position in the army (<sup>556</sup>), the Baya were coded as "senior partner", and the Sara, Mbaka and Yakoma as "junior partners". Again, no evidence of any political relevance of the Banda and Mandjia groups.

<sup>554</sup> [Kalck, 2005]

<sup>555</sup> [United States Government State Department, 2003]

<sup>556</sup> [United States Government State Department, 2003]

*2006: Bozize wins the presidential elections in the run-off in May 2005 against Martin Ziguéle from the MLPC (Patasse's former party).* The key positions in the government and the military are clearly in the hands of Bozize's Baya group (<sup>557</sup>; <sup>558</sup>). Nevertheless, his post-election government seems to have been rather inclusive in general. A son of Kolingba, for example, forms part of it (<sup>559</sup>, 34-5; <sup>560</sup>). However, the Patasse "camp" is excluded (<sup>561</sup>, 35), and Patasse himself was the only relevant candidate who was barred from running in the 2005 elections. Thus the year of 2006 was coded as a period of partial power-sharing, with Bozize's Baya group as "senior partner", and the Yakoma and Mbaka groups as "junior partners". In contrast, Patasse's Sara are coded as "powerless".

<sup>557</sup> [Freedom House Country Reports, 2007-2008]

<sup>558</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2007]

<sup>559</sup> [Mehler, 2008]

<sup>560</sup> [IRIN Africa, 2005]

<sup>561</sup> [Mehler, 2008]

*2007-2008: Several rebel movements surface in the northeast and northwest of the country.* The fighting becomes more intense from 2006 on. Apparently, members of the tiny Goula group are perceived by the country's security forces to be sympathizers/collaborators of the northeastern UFDR rebel movement, and have been selectively targeted with state violence in response (including summary executions) (<sup>562</sup>; <sup>563</sup>). According to our coding practices, this equals active discrimination. However, it is not clear when exactly this targeted violence started and when it ended. It appears reasonable to take the year of 2007, when both sources mention it for the first time, as the starting point. And since it seems that the targeting by government forces diminished after the UFDR became part of the government towards the end of 2008, 2008 is taken as the last

<sup>562</sup> [Human Rights Watch, 2007]

<sup>563</sup> [United States Government State Department, 2008]

year of Goula discrimination. Thus, the Goula are included as a new group in the period of 2007-2008, coded as "discriminated". Note that the U.S. State Department's Human Rights Report of 2009 (<sup>564</sup>) does not refer to any state violence against the Goula in that year anymore. According to an International Crisis Group Policy Briefing of January 2010 (<sup>565</sup>), the UFDR is now perceived as an auxiliary of the government. Thus, for the year of 2009, the Goula are coded as "irrelevant" again (like in 2006 and before) - since there is no evidence either that they are actually politically represented by any organization (<sup>566</sup>, 21-3, 26). Group size according to absolute number of Goula living in the CAR, as indicated in the Ethnologue (<sup>567</sup>).

Although there is some information that Bozize's regime became more exclusionary over the years (<sup>568</sup>; <sup>569</sup>), it appears reasonable to leave the coding unchanged for all other groups for the period of 2007-2008 as there is no sufficient evidence of actual political exclusion of the southern Yakoma and Mbaka groups.

*2009:* Bozize had reached peace agreements with all relevant rebel movements at the end of 2008, leading to an "inclusive national dialogue", which in turn resulted in the forming of a consensus government in January 2009 including former rebel leaders (<sup>570</sup>, 20-1). A follow-up committee was installed, composed of Bozize (Baya), Patasse (Sara), and Kolingba (Yakoma) (what means that the latter two are back in the highest circle of state power) (<sup>571</sup>, 20). Therefore, the year of 2009 was coded as an all-inclusive power-sharing period, with Bozize's Baya group as "senior partner", and Kolingba's Yakoma and Patasse's Sara groups as "junior partners". As regards the Mbaka group, a special remark seems appropriate: This small group has traditionally played an important role in the CAR's political life, with former presidents Dacko and Bokassa hailing from the group. But for the more recent years (approx. 5 years), concrete information about the group's political position is lacking. Their political relevance has to be assumed based on their large representation among the country's elites although there is no information about a specific organization representing them politically. It might well be that in future codings they can/should be considered irrelevant. For the moment and in light of the historical context described in these comments, however, the Mbaka group are still coded as "junior partner". Regarding the coding of the previously discriminated Goula, see the pertinent comments in the above period.

<sup>564</sup> [United States Government State Department, 2009]

<sup>565</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2010]

<sup>566</sup> [Mehler, 2008]

<sup>568</sup> [Freedom House Country Reports, 2007-2008]

<sup>569</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2007]

<sup>570</sup> [Mehler, 2008]

<sup>571</sup> [Mehler, 2008]

*2010-13:* Although some sources report that Bozize has increasingly centralized power and favoured his Baya co-ethnics over the recent years, there is no evidence that this has gone as far as to exclude any of the previously coded Junior Partners from political power (<sup>572</sup>, 2-3). Against this backdrop, the previous coding was extended to the period 2010-2013.

<sup>572</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2013a]

Considering the political topology of CAR, the state has hardly any (only weak) reach into the northeastern prefectures (Vakaga and Haute-Kotto), where rebel movements and criminal organisations have consistently caused instability (<sup>573</sup>,<sup>574</sup>, <sup>575</sup>).

<sup>573</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2010]

<sup>574</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2013a]

<sup>575</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2013b]

From 2006/07 onwards, the UFDR had been the most relevant northeastern armed group in this respect. It largely recruited from the Goula ethnic group and other small Muslim groups in the northeast (Rounga and Kara) and was perceived as a Goula force by the Bozize government (<sup>576</sup>; <sup>577</sup>). In late 2008, the unity of the UFDR collapsed, when a mainly Runga splinter group named CPJP emerged. The Kara strongman Ahamat Mustapha also formed his own splinter group and until 2011, the northeast witnessed inter-ethnic violence between Goula, Rounga and Kara on frequent occasions (<sup>578</sup>, 14; <sup>579</sup>). Since the Central African State had no effective reach into the northeast during that period, it did not actively discriminate against one of the three aforementioned groups. In addition, none of the groups made any political claims in terms of central state power during that period of infighting. On these grounds, neither the Goula, nor the Rounga, nor the Kara group are coded as politically relevant.

<sup>576</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2010]

<sup>577</sup> [United States Government State Department, 2008]

<sup>578</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2010]

<sup>579</sup> [United States Government State Department, 2008]

In 2012, the infighting was largely halted and members of the different splinter groups united into the new Seleka (which means "alliance") movement that rapidly managed to fight its way from the Northeast to the vicinity of the capital Bangui (<sup>580</sup>, p. 6; <sup>581</sup>). According to an International Crisis Group report, Seleka is an „unlikely and heterogenous alliance of convenience“ consisting of combatants „who have nothing in common except being Muslims and stemming from the northeastern border area with Chad (<sup>582</sup>, 6-8). Some sources report that Seleka received support from the Chadian President Idriss Deby, who had fallen out with his former crony Bozize back in 2011. In combination with the fact that some Seleka elites are ethnic Zaghawa and thus kinsmen of Deby, this has led to a portrayal of Seleka as a foreign (Chadian) mercenary force (Scheen2014). Despite Seleka's rapid advances and the central government's failure to effectively control the insurgency, Bozize's government was still in power on 1 January 2013, at least nominally. According to the EPR 1 January coding rule, Bozize's government is coded as intact for the year 2013.

<sup>580</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2013b]

<sup>581</sup> [Van Wyk, 2013]

<sup>582</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2013b]

In March 2013, Seleka successfully seized Bangui and installed Michel Djotodia as first Muslim president in CAR's history (<sup>583</sup>; Djotodia has already been deposed in the meantime). Groups of undisciplined Seleka rebels pillaged through the mainly Christian Bangui and deliberately spared Muslim parts of the city. This led to

<sup>583</sup> [Schlindwein, 2014]

Christian resistance to the “foreign occupation by the Seleka and the formation of so-called "anti-Balaka".

These developments transformed the main cleavage, for the time being, from one between regions, armed movements and small tribes/ethnic groups into an extremely violent inter-communal conflict between the Muslim minority and the Christian majority of the CAR population (<sup>584</sup>, <sup>585</sup>, <sup>586</sup>). In this respect, recent developments in CAR are a clear example of how violence can shape and transform ethnic cleavages. However, as 1 January 2013 is the relevant cutoff date in the present update, this is not yet reflected in the coding (anything else would be problematic in terms of the (partial) endogeneity of ethnic identities to conflict). Only since March 2013, the Christian-Muslim divide represents the main fault line in the complex network of conflicts that have haunted CAR for most parts of its post-independence history. Most probably, this will be reflected in the next EPR update.

<sup>584</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2013a]

<sup>585</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2013b]

<sup>586</sup> [United States Government State Department, 2013]



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## *Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic*

*From 1960 until 1965*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)	0.83	POWERLESS
Riverine groups (Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.)	0.145	DOMINANT

*From 1966 until 1969*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)	0.83	JUNIOR PARTNER
Riverine groups (Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.)	0.145	SENIOR PARTNER

*From 1970 until 1981*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)	0.83	POWERLESS
Riverine groups (Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.)	0.145	DOMINANT




Figure 118: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1960-1965.



Figure 119: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1966-1969.



Figure 120: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1970-1981.

*From 1982 until 1993*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)	0.83	POWERLESS
Yakoma	0.04	SENIOR PARTNER
Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER

*From 1994 until 2001*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.1	SENIOR PARTNER
Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Goula	0.003	IRRELEVANT

*From 2002 until 2003*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.1	SENIOR PARTNER
Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	DISCRIMINATED
Goula	0.003	IRRELEVANT

*From 2004 until 2005*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	SENIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.1	JUNIOR PARTNER
Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Goula	0.003	IRRELEVANT




Figure 121: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1982-1993.



Figure 122: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1994-2001.



Figure 123: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2002-2003.



Figure 124: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2004-2005.

*From 2006 until 2006*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	SENIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.1	POWERLESS
Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Goula	0.003	IRRELEVANT

*From 2007 until 2008*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	SENIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.1	POWERLESS
Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Goula	0.003	DISCRIMINATED

*From 2009 until 2013*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	SENIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.1	JUNIOR PARTNER
Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Goula	0.003	IRRELEVANT




Figure 125: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2006-2006.



Figure 126: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2007-2008.



Figure 127: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2009-2013.

## *Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Central African Republic*

*From 1960 until 1981*




Figure 128: Map of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2009-2013.

Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)	313 929	Regionally based
Riverine groups (Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.)	8 625	Regionally based

Table 40: List of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1960-1981.

*From 1982 until 1993*




Figure 129: Map of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2009-2013.

Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
<span style="color: yellow;">■</span> Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)	313 929	Regionally based
<span style="color: red;">■</span> Mbaka	6649	Regionally based
<span style="color: purple;">■</span> Yakoma	770	Regional & urban

Table 41: List of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1982-1993.

*From 1994 until 2006*




Figure 130: Map of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2009-2013.





Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
 Baya	65 665	Regionally based
 Sara	23 177	Regional & urban
 Mbaka	6649	Regionally based
 Yakoma	770	Regional & urban

Table 42: List of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1994-2006.

*From 2007 until 2008*




Figure 131: Map of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2009-2013.






Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
 Baya	65 665	Regionally based
 Sara	23 177	Regional & urban
 Goula	9608	Regionally based
 Mbaka	6649	Regionally based
 Yakoma	770	Regional & urban

Table 43: List of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2007-2008.

*From 2009 until 2013*






Figure 132: Map of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2009-2013.

Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
<span style="color: purple;">■</span> Baya	65 665	Regionally based
<span style="color: orange;">■</span> Sara	23 177	Regional & urban
<span style="color: red;">■</span> Mbaka	6 649	Regionally based
<span style="color: purple;">■</span> Yakoma	770	Regional & urban

Table 44: List of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2009-2013.

## *Conflicts in Central African Republic*

*Starting on 2001-05-27*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Central African Republic	Military faction (forces of André Kolingba)	Yakoma	2001-05-27	Presumed	Yes	Yes
Government of Central African Republic	Forces of Francois Bozize	Baya	2002-09-20	No	No	No
Government of Central African Republic	UFDR	Goula	2006-10-30	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Central African Republic	CPJP		2009-03-20			
Government of Central African Republic	Seleka		2012-12-10			