

Central African Republic

Ethnicity in Central African Republic

Group selection

Overall, there is not much information on the role of specific ethnic groups in the political power structure over the whole of the country's history. In the first periods after independence, the main ethno-political cleavage seems to have been between the privileged southern riverine ethnic groups and the northern groups (⁹³¹, 162). Thus, the analysis only lists two politically relevant ethnic groups in the first three periods: "Riverine groups (Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.)" and "Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)." Only after the Yakoma Andre Kolingba seized power in 1981, it seems that the Riverine groups split in two factions of Ngbaka/Mbaka and Yakoma (⁹³², 168). It is more difficult to determine when the Northern groups should be listed as separate ethnic groups, i.e. when intra-northern ethnic differences became politically salient. Relying on the logic applied to similar cases, the year 1993 was determined as decisive, when a Northerner - Ange-Felix Patasse of Sara origin - assumed power for the first time. Thus, from the period of Patasse's rule on, the Northern groups (Banda, Mandjia, Baya, and Sara) were listed as separate politically relevant ethnic groups. This does not rule out the possibility of alliances between different groups as has apparently been the case with the Sara and Baya groups during Patasse's rule (⁹³³).

⁹³¹ [Decalo, 1989]

⁹³² [Decalo, 1989]

⁹³³ [U.S. State Department, 2000-2013]

The size of the Northern groups is the sum of the sizes of the sub-groups which are listed individually afterwards. For these groups, EPR relies on the numbers provided by the CIA World Factbook, which are relatively close to those given by Morrison et al. (⁹³⁴) for the time around independence. Because the CIA World Factbook does not provide an estimation of the combined Riverine population, the number given relies on Morrison et al. (⁹³⁵).

⁹³⁴ [Morrison, 1972]

⁹³⁵ [Morrison, 1972]

For those periods, in which the two Riverine sub-groups Mbaka and Yakoma are listed separately, however, group sizes reflect the CIA World Factbook, because these numbers are smaller than the ones provided by Morrison et al. (⁹³⁶). As only two of the Riverine sub-groups are listed individually, the total population drops a bit in the periods after 1981.

⁹³⁶ [Morrison, 1972]

Power relations

1960-1965 The Riverine groups are clearly dominant in politics at independence in 1960 ⁽⁹³⁷⁾. The country's first president, David Dacko, hails from the Riverine groups (Mbaka). The cabinet compositions given by Morrison et al. ⁽⁹³⁸⁾ indicate the incorporation of a few Northerners into the governments under Dacko (1 out of 8 ministers at independence, and 3 out of 11 in 1965). However, this seems to be tokenistic inclusion rather than a real participation by Northern elites in executive power. According to O'Toole ⁽⁹³⁹⁾, the Baya, one of the politically most important Northern sub-groups, remained excluded from government circles under Dacko. The Riverine groups were thus coded as "dominant" and the Northern groups as "powerless" in the first period.

⁹³⁷ [Decalo, 1989]

⁹³⁸ [Morrison, 1972]

⁹³⁹ [O'Toole, 1986]

1966-1969

General Jean-Bédél Bokassa, who seized control from Dacko in a coup d'état in 1965, is Mbaka as his predecessor. The Northern groups' numerical representation in government does not improve ⁽⁹⁴⁰⁾. However, Bokassa's most important ally in the coup was Captain Banza, a Baya. He is promoted by Bokassa at the beginning - being the first Baya ever who rose to national political prominence - and attains considerable power. He is the "regime's strong man" and the only person with a certain restraining influence on Bokassa ^(941; 942). With the appointment of Banza (and Ange-Felix Patassé), Bokassa also gains much popular support, especially among the Baya ^(943; 944). In light of this considerable (although short-lived) political influence, it seems reasonable to code the Northern groups as "junior partner" and the Riverine groups as "senior partner" in a power-sharing regime.

⁹⁴⁰ [Morrison, 1972]

⁹⁴¹ [Decalo, 1989]

⁹⁴² [O'Toole, 1986]

⁹⁴³ [Decalo, 1989]

⁹⁴⁴ [O'Toole, 1986]

1970-1981

Bokassa's regime becomes increasingly authoritarian and repressive. His power is absolute, the boundaries between his person and the institution of the state are becoming blurred ^(945; 946). In 1969, Captain Banza - Bokassa's last significant rival - is executed. Given Bokassa's extremely personalist and dictatorial rule - surrounded by a clique of mostly Riverine political followers ⁽⁹⁴⁷⁾ - the Riverine groups return to "dominant" rule and the Northern groups become "powerless" once more. After Bokassa's overthrow in 1979, Dacko is again installed as president. However, this does not change the ethno-political power structures. Dacko does not fully break with the ousted regime and even integrates some of its key figures in his government ^(948; 949). Some of these former leaders are actually relatives of himself ⁽⁹⁵⁰⁾. His "presidential clique" is increasingly composed of ethnic kinsmen and family members ⁽⁹⁵¹⁾. Farmers in the north (Patasse's ethnic region) actively oppose the regime ⁽⁹⁵²⁾. Dacko's second presidency is thus an extension of the Bokassa period with regards to ethnic power relations.

⁹⁴⁵ [Decalo, 1989]

⁹⁴⁶ [O'Toole, 1986]

⁹⁴⁷ [O'Toole, 1986]

⁹⁴⁸ [Decalo, 1989]

⁹⁴⁹ [O'Toole, 1986]

⁹⁵⁰ [Decalo, 1989]

⁹⁵¹ [O'Toole, 1986]

⁹⁵² [Decalo, 1989]

1982-1993

In September 1981, General André Kolingba removes Dacko from office in a bloodless coup and establishes a military government. Kolingba is a Yakoma and he installs many of his ethnic group in positions of power, marking a major shift in the ethno-political balance of power ⁽⁹⁵³⁾. During his rule, Kolingba increasingly relies on his own ethnic group ⁽⁹⁵⁴⁾, and the Yakoma hold a disproportionate number of senior positions in the government ⁽⁹⁵⁵⁾. Moreover, the basic power structures - and with it the patron-client systems that are partially controlled by the Mbaka, another Riverine subgroup ⁽⁹⁵⁶⁾ - have not changed ⁽⁹⁵⁷⁾. Given the “politicization of the north-south ethnic divide” under Kolingba ⁽⁹⁵⁸⁾, the Mbaka and other Riverine sub-groups (Songo/Banziri) are considered to play an influential role in national politics during this period and are coded as “junior partners.” The Yakoma are coded as “senior partner.”

Regarding the Northern groups, however, the above-mentioned makes it evident that there is no political space for them during Kolingba’s personalist, ethnically based military dictatorship. Moreover, their main political leader, Ange-Felix Patassé, is harassed by the government, and after a failed coup-attempt in 1982 allies of Patassé are purged from the officer corps, the cabinet and the higher civil service ⁽⁹⁵⁹⁾. The Northern groups are thus coded as “powerless” again during this period.

1994-2001

Ange-Felix Patassé is elected president in late 1993 in the CAR’s first democratic elections and becomes the first northern president of the CAR. His regime also relies mainly on his own ethnic group, the Sara, and several key ministers are from this group ⁽⁹⁶⁰⁾. Nevertheless, with his party MLPC not having a majority in parliament, Patassé is forced to form a coalition government. In 1995, he appoints a Yakoma prime minister ⁽⁹⁶¹⁾. According to the U.S. State Department’s Human Rights Report of 1999 ⁽⁹⁶²⁾, the Patassé government exhibits a more representative ethnic balance than that of his predecessor Kolingba, although the northern Sara and Baya groups are clearly favored. The Human Rights Report of 2000 ⁽⁹⁶³⁾ notes that members of the Sara and Baya groups continue to predominate among the president’s advisors after his reelection in 1999, but in his cabinet reshuffle of November of that year he appoints an ethnically diverse government (which, for example, also includes the Yakoma and Mbaka groups). Additionally, evidence from the ACPED data set ⁽⁹⁶⁴⁾, which covers the years of 1997-2018, highlights that the Banda group has more ministers than the Baya group in the entire period of Patassé’s regime covered by the data set and that Songo/Banziri are also included in his government. The period is thus coded as a power-sharing arrangement between all relevant ethnic groups, with Patassé’s Sara group as “senior partner”, and the Baya, Banda, Mbaka, Yakoma and Other Riverine groups (Banziri,

⁹⁵³ [O’Toole, 1986]⁹⁵⁴ [Kalck, 2005]⁹⁵⁵ [U.S. State Department, 2000-2013]⁹⁵⁶ [O’Toole, 1997]⁹⁵⁷ [O’Toole, 1986]⁹⁵⁸ [Minority Rights Group, 2018]⁹⁵⁹ [Decalo, 1989]⁹⁶⁰ [O’Toole, 1997]⁹⁶¹ [O’Toole, 1997]⁹⁶² [U.S. State Department, 2000-2013]⁹⁶³ [U.S. State Department, 2000-2013]⁹⁶⁴ [Raleigh & Wigmore-Shepherd]

Songo) as “junior partners.”

2002-2003

After the failed coup-attempt in May 2001, for which Kolingba claims responsibility, members of the Yakoma group are indiscriminately and systematically being hunted and killed in Bangui (⁹⁶⁵). A separate period is thus inserted here, coding the Yakoma group as “discriminated” during the last years of Patassé’s regime.

⁹⁶⁵ [Kalck, 2005]

2004-2005

General François Bozizé assumes power in a coup in March 2003. According to EPR’s January-1st-rule, the new period is coded as starting in 2004. Bozizé is Baya, and the Baya group holds a dominant position in the army (⁹⁶⁶). Bozizé’s first government includes members of Patassé’s party, a son of Dacko and even a son of Kolingba. The ten members of the National Transition Council are from diverse ethnic origins and political affiliations (⁹⁶⁷). Supported by evidence from the ACPED data set (⁹⁶⁸), this period is coded as a period of power-sharing again with the Baya as “senior partner.” The Banda, Mbaka, Yakoma and Other Riverine groups (Banziri, Songo) are coded as “junior partners.” The Sara, however, do not hold any ministerial posts in this period and are thus coded as “powerless.”

⁹⁶⁶ [U.S. State Department, 2000-2013]

⁹⁶⁷ [Kalck, 2005]

⁹⁶⁸ [Raleigh & Wigmore-Shepherd]

2006

Bozizé wins the presidential elections in the run-off in May 2005 against Martin Ziguéle from the MLPC (Patassé’s former party). The key positions in the government and the military are clearly in the hands of Bozizé’s Baya group (⁹⁶⁹; ⁹⁷⁰). Nevertheless, his post-election government seems rather inclusive in general. A son of Kolingba, for example, forms part of it (⁹⁷¹, 34-5; ⁹⁷²). However, the Patassé “camp” is excluded (⁹⁷³, 35), and Patassé himself as the only relevant candidate is barred from running in the 2005 elections. Thus, the year of 2006 is coded as a period of partial power-sharing, with Bozizé’s Baya group as “senior partner,” and the Yakoma, Banda, Mbaka and Other Riverine groups (Banziri, Songo) groups as “junior partners.” In contrast, Patassé’s Sara are coded as “powerless.” (ACPED lists one minister of the Sara and Northerners group but it can’t be determined if this minister was Sara or from another ethnicity and with Patassé excluded it is reasonable to code his ethnic group as “powerless.”)

⁹⁶⁹ [Freedom House Country Reports, 2007-2008]

⁹⁷⁰ [International Crisis Group, 2007]

⁹⁷¹ [Mehler, 2008]

⁹⁷² [IRIN Africa, 2005]

⁹⁷³ [Mehler, 2008]

2007-2008

Several rebel movements surface in the northeast and northwest of the country. From 2006/07 onwards, the UFDR is the most relevant northeastern armed group in this respect. It largely recruits from the Goula ethnic group and other small Muslim groups in the northeast

(Rounga and Kara) and is perceived as a Goula force by the Bozizé government (⁹⁷⁴; ⁹⁷⁵). Apparently, members of the tiny Goula group are perceived by the country's security forces to be sympathizers/collaborators of the northeastern UFDR rebel movement, and have been selectively targeted with state violence in response (including summary executions) (⁹⁷⁶; ⁹⁷⁷). According to our coding practices, this equals active discrimination. However, it is not clear when exactly this targeted violence started and when it ended. It appears reasonable to take the year of 2007, when both sources mention it for the first time, as the starting point. And since it seems that the targeting by government forces diminished after the UFDR became part of the government towards the end of 2008, 2008 is taken as the last year of Goula discrimination. Thus, the Goula are included as a new group in the period of 2007-2008, coded as "discriminated." Note that the U.S. State Department's Human Rights Report of 2009 (⁹⁷⁸) does not refer to any state violence against the Goula in that year anymore. According to an International Crisis Group Policy Briefing of January 2010 (⁹⁷⁹), the UFDR is now perceived as an auxiliary of the government (⁹⁸⁰, 21-3, 26). Group size according to absolute number of Goula living in the CAR, as indicated in the Ethnologue (⁹⁸¹).

Although some reports suggest that Bozizé's regime becomes more exclusionist over the years (⁹⁸²; ⁹⁸³), it appears reasonable to leave the coding unchanged for all other groups for the period of 2007-2008 supported by evidence for continuing inclusion of ministers from various groups in the government (⁹⁸⁴).

2009-2012

Bozizé achieves peace agreements with all relevant rebel movements at the end of 2008, leading to an "inclusive national dialogue," which in turn results in the formation of a consensus government in January 2009 including former rebel leaders (⁹⁸⁵, 20-1). A follow-up committee is installed, composed of Bozizé (Baya), Patassé (Sara), and Kolingba (Yakoma) (what means that the latter two are back in the highest circle of state power) (⁹⁸⁶, 20). Therefore, is coded as an all-inclusive power-sharing period, with Bozizé's Baya group as "senior partner", and Kolingba's Yakoma and Patassé's Sara as "junior partners." Although some sources report that Bozizé increasingly centralizes power and favours his Baya co-ethnics over the following years, there is no evidence that this results in the exclusion of any of the other groups from political power (⁹⁸⁷, 2-3; also see ⁹⁸⁸, 19).

The traditionally strong Ngbaka/Mbaka group loses influence but is still represented by at least one minister throughout this period (⁹⁸⁹) and continues to be coded as "junior partner" as well.

Considering the political topology of CAR, the state has hardly any (only weak) reach into the northeastern prefectures (Vakaga and Haute-Kotto), where rebel movements and criminal organisations have consistently caused instability (⁹⁹⁰; ⁹⁹¹; ⁹⁹²).

⁹⁷⁴ [International Crisis Group, 2010]

⁹⁷⁵ [U.S. State Department, 2000-2013]

⁹⁷⁶ [Human Rights Watch, 2007]

⁹⁷⁷ [U.S. State Department, 2000-2013]

⁹⁷⁸ [U.S. State Department, 2000-2013]

⁹⁷⁹ [International Crisis Group, 2010]

⁹⁸⁰ [Mehler, 2008]

⁹⁸¹ [Ethnologue, 2014]

⁹⁸² [Freedom House Country Reports, 2007-2008]

⁹⁸³ [International Crisis Group, 2007]

⁹⁸⁴ [Raleigh & Wigmore-Shepherd]

⁹⁸⁵ [Mehler, 2008]

⁹⁸⁶ [Mehler, 2008]

⁹⁸⁷ [International Crisis Group, 2013a]

⁹⁸⁸ [Raleigh & Wigmore-Shepherd]

⁹⁸⁹ [Raleigh & Wigmore-Shepherd]

⁹⁹⁰ [International Crisis Group, 2010]

⁹⁹¹ [International Crisis Group, 2013a]

⁹⁹² [International Crisis Group, 2013b]

In late 2008, the unity of the UFDR collapses, when a mainly Runga splinter group named CPJP emerges. The Kara strongman Ahamat Mustapha also forms his own splinter group and until 2011, the northeast witnesses inter-ethnic violence between Goula, Rounga and Kara on frequent occasions (⁹⁹³, 14; ⁹⁹⁴). Since the Central African State has no effective reach into the northeast during that period, it did not actively discriminate against one of the three aforementioned groups. In addition, none of the groups made any political claims in terms of central state power during that period of infighting. On these grounds, neither the Goula, nor the Rounga, nor the Kara group are coded as politically relevant.

⁹⁹³ [International Crisis Group, 2010]

⁹⁹⁴ [U.S. State Department, 2000-2013]

2013

In 2012, the infighting is largely halted and members of the different splinter groups united into the new Seleka (which means “alliance”) movement that rapidly manages to fight its way from the Northeast to the vicinity of the capital Bangui (⁹⁹⁵, p. 6; ⁹⁹⁶). According to an International Crisis Group report, Seleka is an “unlikely and heterogeneous alliance of convenience” consisting of combatants “who have nothing in common except being Muslims and stemming from the northeastern border area with Chad” (⁹⁹⁷, 6-8). Some sources report that Seleka receive support from the Chadian President Idriss Deby, after falling out with his former crony Bozizé back in 2011. In combination with the fact that some Seleka elites are ethnic Zaghawa and thus kinsmen of Deby, this has led to a portrayal of Seleka as a foreign (Chadian) mercenary force (⁹⁹⁸). Bozizé’s security forces reportedly committed violations of human rights and humanitarian law by indiscriminately targeting Muslims while trying to stop the rebel advance (⁹⁹⁹, 5). Therefore, a new group is introduced, the “Northern Muslim groups (Goula, Runga, Kara, Fulani)” and coded as “discriminated.” Their group size is calculated based on the sub-groups’ numbers given by Joshua Project (¹⁰⁰⁰). Despite Seleka’s rapid advances and the central government’s failure to effectively control the insurgency, Bozizé’s government is coded as intact on January 1 and the year 2013. Thus, all other groups keep their coding of the previous period.

⁹⁹⁵ [International Crisis Group, 2013b]

⁹⁹⁶ [Van Wyk, 2013]

⁹⁹⁷ [International Crisis Group, 2013b]

⁹⁹⁸ [Scheen, 2014]

⁹⁹⁹ [Minority Rights Group, 2018]

¹⁰⁰⁰ [Joshua Project, 2021]

2014

In March 2013, Seleka successfully seize Bangui and install Michel Djotodia as the first Muslim president in CAR’s history (¹⁰⁰¹). Groups of undisciplined Seleka rebels pillage through the mainly Christian Bangui and deliberately spare Muslim parts of the city. This leads to Christian resistance to the “foreign” occupation by the Seleka and the formation of so-called “anti-Balaka.”

These developments transformed the main cleavage, for the time being, from one between regions, armed movements and small tribes/ethnic groups into an extremely violent inter-communal conflict between the Muslim minority and the Christian majority of the

¹⁰⁰¹ [Schlindwein, 2014]

CAR population (¹⁰⁰², ¹⁰⁰³, ¹⁰⁰⁴). In this respect, recent developments in CAR are a clear example of how violence can shape and transform ethnic cleavages. Since March 2013, the Christian-Muslim divide represents the main fault line in the complex network of conflicts that have haunted CAR for most parts of its post-independence history.

The Northern Muslim groups (Goula, Runga, Kara, Fulani) - of which the Seleka emerged - are coded as “dominant”, which is corroborated by a Crisis Group report stating that “for the first time since independence, a force stemming from the Muslim population of the north and east of the country held the reins of power” (¹⁰⁰⁵, i). While Djotodia’s transitional government includes ministers of other ethnicities (see ACPED data ¹⁰⁰⁶), those are considered to be tokenistic in this situation close to state collapse.

2015-2016

Djotodia is forced to resign on 10 January 2014 during a period of extreme sectarian violence between mainly Muslim ex-Seleka rebels and mainly Christian anti-Balaka militias that target Muslims (¹⁰⁰⁷). Catherine Samba-Panza, hailing from the Other Riverine groups, is elected as interim president. As a non-partisan, she enjoys some legitimacy from both sides of the conflict. But violence continues throughout the years 2014 and 2015 despite the presence of different peacekeeping missions led by the AU, UN, the EU, and France (¹⁰⁰⁸). The first presidential election after Bozizé’s fall has to be postponed several times due to security concerns until in March 2016, when Faustin Touadéra wins the second round and becomes president (¹⁰⁰⁹). Although both Samba-Panza’s and Touadéra’s governments include Muslims in high-ranking positions, this does not stabilize the country (¹⁰¹⁰, ¹⁰¹¹). Instead, various pre-existing and newly formed rebel groups and militias are active in several provinces of the Central African Republic (¹⁰¹²). The recruitment and targeting strategies of these armed actors featured both religious and ethnic components. In Western CAR, the group 3R forms with the goal to protect Muslim Fulani/Peul cattle herders from Christian Anti-Balaka militias (¹⁰¹³). Crisis group writes that “unlike with the FPRC and the RPRC, the ethnic dimension is much more important in the UPC, which has a majority of Fulani combatants” (¹⁰¹⁴, 8). The group’s leader Ali Darassa’s political discourse is based on the defence of Fulani pastoralists. “A key figure in the ex-Seleka, Ali Darassa came back to Bambari in 2014 at the request of many Fulani who told him they were being extorted not only by the anti-balaka but also by the ex-Seleka. It was at that point that he decided to create the UPC. Setting himself up as protector of the Fulani, he armed many pastoralists who went on to commit their share of atrocities” (ibid.). Therefore, the Fulani are coded as a separate group in this period and determined as “discriminated.”

In the Southeast of the country, three ex-Seleka splinters (FPRC,

¹⁰⁰² [International Crisis Group, 2013a]

¹⁰⁰³ [International Crisis Group, 2013b]

¹⁰⁰⁴ [U.S. State Department, 2000-2013]

¹⁰⁰⁵ [International Crisis Group, 2015]

¹⁰⁰⁶ [Raleigh & Wigmore-Shepherd]

¹⁰⁰⁷ [African Research Bulletin, 2014a]

¹⁰⁰⁸ [Carvalho and Lucey, 2016]

¹⁰⁰⁹ [African Research Bulletin, 2016a]

¹⁰¹⁰ [African Research Bulletin, 2014b]

¹⁰¹¹ [African Research Bulletin, 2016b]

¹⁰¹² [International Crisis Group, 2015]

¹⁰¹³ [Essa, 2016]

¹⁰¹⁴ [International Crisis Group, 2015]

UPC, and MPC) fight each other, with the FPRC targeting Fulani who are seen as supporters of UPC and the latter targeting Goula and Runga who constitute the FPRC's support base. More recently, this dynamic has led to an unlikely alliance of convenience between the FPRC and their former Christian anti-balaka adversaries against the UPC (¹⁰¹⁵). In all these cases, ethnic allegiances seem to be shifting and determined more by local security concerns and conflict dynamics than by any national political ambitions. Several reports mention that during the period 2015-2017 the central government's control is restricted to the capital at best, with various armed groups competing for territory and resources in the different provinces (¹⁰¹⁶; ¹⁰¹⁷; ¹⁰¹⁸). Given Samba-Panza's attempt at restoring a power-sharing government at the national level with the inclusion of ministers from all relevant ethnic groups (see ACPED data ¹⁰¹⁹), these are coded as "junior partners" with Samba-Panza's group as "senior partner."

¹⁰¹⁵ [Kleinfeld, 2017]

¹⁰¹⁶ [Essa, 2016]

¹⁰¹⁷ [International Crisis Group, 2017]

¹⁰¹⁸ [Kleinfeld, 2017]

¹⁰¹⁹ [Raleigh & Wigmore-Shepherd]

2017-2021

Touadéra remains in power until 2021, when he is reelected in office (¹⁰²⁰). The president hails from the Mbaka group, that is consequently coded as "senior partner." However, the lack of central government's control continues in this period. Despite the ratification of a peace agreement in June 2017 between the government and thirteen of the fourteen main armed factions, the country is not stabilized. Violence continues to spread and increases in the eastern, central and western parts of the country in 2018 (¹⁰²¹; ¹⁰²²). Ex-Seleka and anti-balaka militias along with hundreds of other localized groups operate openly and control as much as two-thirds of CAR's territory (¹⁰²³). These groups also fight each other, which includes conflict between Runga, Gula and Kara factions (¹⁰²⁴). Given that the Muslim population of the North historically felt neglected and unrepresented by the government in Bangui (¹⁰²⁵) and that the armed groups in control of these territories have long stopped to represent the communities but mainly operate to gain personal wealth through taxation and violence (¹⁰²⁶), the Northern Muslim Groups and the Fulani are coded as "powerless" even if they have some token representation in Touadéras government (the Fulani, see ACPED data (¹⁰²⁷) and despite the government's attempts to co-opt the rebel leaders (Ex-Seleka leader Ali Darassa and others became military advisors to the government in 2019 for a short time but this didn't stop the violence).

¹⁰²⁰ [Handy, 2021]

¹⁰²¹ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020]

¹⁰²² [Council on Foreign Relations, 2020]

¹⁰²³ [Council on Foreign Relations, 2020]

¹⁰²⁴ [UN Security Council, 2020]

¹⁰²⁵ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020]

¹⁰²⁶ [UN Security Council, 2020]

¹⁰²⁷ [Raleigh & Wigmore-Shepherd]

Additional evidence for the exclusion of Muslim groups in decision-making position is the situation in the army (Faca): According to Ebo et al. (¹⁰²⁸, 115), successive regimes since independence installed people from their own ethnic group in the FACA. This ethnicization in the military has bred resentment among groups that are not in power and has prevented the establishment of a truly representative and cohesive security sector. Currently, the FACA

¹⁰²⁸ [Ebo, Pradier & Sedgwick, 2020]

is mainly composed of Christian-adherent ethnic groups including the Baya (33%), the Banda (27%), and the Mandjia (13%) reflecting their approximate percentages of the overall population. Muslim ethnic groups are very poorly represented in the FACA.

Given no evidence of their exclusion (see e.g. ¹⁰²⁹) and their mainly Christian faith, the Yakoma are coded as “junior partners” in this period. ACPED data, which is available until the end of 2017, supports the claim of their inclusion in executive government in the first year of Touadéra’s rule (¹⁰³⁰). The Sara, on the other hand, seem to have lost political influence and don’t hold minister positions in the Touadéra government according to ACPED. While a member of the Sara group, Martin Ziguele ran in the presidential race in 2020, no evidence could be found that he promotes Sara politics. Therefore, this group becomes “powerless” in the current period.

¹⁰²⁹ [U.S. State Department, 2017-2019]

¹⁰³⁰ [Raleigh & Wigmore-Shepherd]

Bibliography

- [African Research Bulletin, 2014a] African Research Bulletin. (2014a). Central African Republic: President Steps Down. Retrieved on 22.01.2018 from: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2014.05505.x>
- [African Research Bulletin, 2014b] African Research Bulletin. (2014b). Central African Republic: New Prime Minister. Retrieved on 22.01.2018 from: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2014.05838.x>
- [African Research Bulletin, 2014c] African Research Bulletin. (2014c). National Security: Central African Republic. Retrieved on 22.01.2018 from: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2014.05477.x>
- [African Research Bulletin, 2016a] African Research Bulletin. (2016a). Central African Republic: Touadera Wins. Retrieved on 22.01.2018 from: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2016.06875.x>
- [African Research Bulletin, 2016b] African Research Bulletin. (2016b). Central African Republic: Post-Election Cabinet. Retrieved on 22.01.2018 from: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2016.06982.x>
- [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020] Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2020). BTI 2020 Country Report — Central African Republic. Retrieved on 22.06.2020 from: https://www.bti-project.org/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2020_CAF.pdf
- [Carvalho and Lucey, 2016] De Carvalho, Gustavo and Amanda Lucey. (2016). Fractured Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic: Lessons for African Union Engagement. Institute for Security Studies Policy Brief 87 (July 2016). Retrieved on 22.01.2018 from: <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief87.pdf>
- [Council on Foreign Relations, 2020] Council on Foreign Relations. (2020). Violence in the Central African Republic. Retrieved on 22.06.2020 from: <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic>

- [Decalo, 1989] Decalo, Samuel. (1989). *Psychoses of Power: African Personal Dictatorships*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- [Ebo, Pradier & Sedgwick, 2020] Ebo, Adedeji, Christophe Pradier, and Christopher Sedgwick. (2020). UN support to SSR in peace-keeping contexts: A case study of the Central African Republic. In: Adedeji Ebo and Heiner Hänggi (eds.). *The United Nations and Security Sector Reform: Policy and Practice*, DCAF, Geneva, 113-135.
- [Essa, 2016] Essa, Azad. (2016). Newly formed 3R rebel group inflicts horrors in CAR: UN. Retrieved on 22.01.2018 from: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/newly-formed-3r-rebel-group-inflicts-horrors-car-161223035217671.html>
- [Ethnologue, 2014] Ethnologue. (2014). Central African Republic: languages. Retrieved on 10.04.2014 from: <http://www.ethnologue.com/country/CF/languages>
- [Freedom House Country Reports, 2007-2008] Freedom House Country Reports. (2007-2008). Country Reports Togo. Retrieved on 10.4.2014 from: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2007/>
- [Handy, 2021] Handy, Paul-Simon. (2021). CAR elections expose the depth of the country's crisis. ISS Today. Retrieved on 15.01.2021 from: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/car-elections-expose-the-depth-of-the-countrys-crisis>
- [Human Rights Watch, 2007] Human Rights Watch. (2007). State of Anarchy. Retrieved on 10.4.2014 from: <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/09/13/state-anarchy>
- [International Crisis Group, 2007] International Crisis Group. (2007). Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State. Africa Report No. 136. Retrieved on 10.4.2014 from: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-anatomy-phantom-state>
- [International Crisis Group, 2010] International Crisis Group. (2010). Central African Republic: Keeping the Dialogue Alive. Africa Briefing No. 69.
- [International Crisis Group, 2013a] International Crisis Group. (2013a). Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition. Africa Report No. 203.
- [International Crisis Group, 2013b] International Crisis Group. (2013b). Central African Republic: Better Late than Never. Africa Briefing No. 96.

- [International Crisis Group, 2015] International Crisis Group. (2015). Central African Republic: The Roots of Violence. Africa Report No. 230.
- [International Crisis Group, 2017] International Crisis Group. (2017). Avoiding the Worst in Central African Republic. Africa Report No. 253.
- [IRIN Africa, 2005] IRIN Africa. (2005). CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: Newly-appointed premier names cabinet. Retrieved on 10.4.2014 from: <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=54989>
- [Joshua Project, 2021] Joshua Project. (2021). Central African Republic. Retrieved on 14.01.2021 from: <https://joshuaproject.net/countries/CT>
- [Kalck, 2005] Kalck, Pierre. (2005). Historical Dictionary of the Central African Republic. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
- [Kleinfeld, 2017] Kleinfeld, Philip. (2017). Central African Republic: What's gone wrong? IRIN Report. Retrieved on 22.01.2018 from: <https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/02/24/central-african-republic-what%E2%80%99s-gone-wrong>
- [Mehler, 2008] Mehler, Andreas. (2008). Not Always in the People's Interest: Power-sharing Arrangements in African Peace Agreements. GIGA Working Papers. Retrieved on 11.02.2014 from: http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/wp83_mehler.pdf
- [Minority Rights Group, 2018] Minority Rights Group. (2015). Central African Republic on the Eve of Elections: From Crisis to Reconciliation. Briefing, December 2015. Retrieved on 13.01.2021 from: https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/MRG_Brief_CAR_Dec15-2.pdf
- [Minority Rights Group, 2018] Minority Rights Group. (2018). Central African Republic. Retrieved on 22.06.2020 from: <https://minorityrights.org/country/central-african-republic/>
- [Morrison, 1972] Morrison, Donald G., Robert C. Mitchell, and John N. Paden (Eds.). (1972). Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook. New York: The Free Press.
- [O'Toole, 1986] O'Toole, Thomas. (1986). The Central African Republic: The Continent's Hidden Heart. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- [O'Toole, 1997] O'Toole, Thomas. (1997). The Central African Republic: Political Reform and Social Malaise. In J. F. Clark and D. E. Gardinier (Eds.) Political Reform in Francophone Africa (pp.109-123). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

- [Raleigh & Wigmore-Shepherd] Raleigh, Clionadh & Daniel Wigmore-Shepherd. (2020). Elite Coalitions and Power Balance across African Regimes: Introducing the African Cabinet and Political Elite Data Project (ACPED), Ethnopolitics.
- [Scheen, 2014] Scheen, Thomas. (2014). Menschenfleisch auf dem Wochenmarkt. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Retrieved on 08.03.2014 from: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/afrika/zentralafrikanische-republik-menschenfleisch-auf-dem-wochenmarkt-12836474-p2.html?printPage&article=true#pageIndex_2
- [Schlindwein, 2014] Schlindwein, Simone. (2014). Zentralafrika zerstickt am Hass. Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2014.
- [UN Security Council, 2020] UN Security Council. (2020). Letter dated 8 July 2020 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2507 (2020) addressed to the President of the Security Council. Retrieved on 14.01.2021 from: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2020_662_E.pdf
- [U.S. State Department, 2000-2013] U.S. Department of State. (2000-2013). Country Reports Togo. Retrieved on 16.05.2014 from: <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/>
- [U.S. State Department, 2017-2019] U.S. Department of State. (2017-2019). Country Reports Central African Republic. Retrieved on 22.06.2020 from: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2017-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/>
- [Van Wyk, 2013] Van Wyk, Coen. (2013). Central African Republic: A cycle of political violence. Africa Conflict Monthly Monitor. Retrieved on 16.05.2014 from: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic.aspx>

Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic

From 1960 until 1965

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)	0.83	POWERLESS
Riverine groups (Ngbaka/Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.)	0.145	DOMINANT

From 1966 until 1969

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)	0.83	JUNIOR PARTNER
Riverine groups (Ngbaka/Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.)	0.145	SENIOR PARTNER

From 1970 until 1981

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)	0.83	POWERLESS
Riverine groups (Ngbaka/Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.)	0.145	DOMINANT

From 1982 until 1993

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)	0.83	POWERLESS
Other Riverine groups (Banziri, Songo etc.)	0.065	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	SENIOR PARTNER
Ngbaka/Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER




Figure 155: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1960-1965.



Figure 156: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1966-1969.




Figure 157: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1970-1981.



Figure 158: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic

From 1994 until 2001

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	JUNIOR PARTNER
Banda	0.27	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.1	SENIOR PARTNER
Other Riverine groups (Banziri, Songo etc.)	0.065	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ngbaka/Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER

From 2002 until 2003

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	JUNIOR PARTNER
Banda	0.27	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.1	SENIOR PARTNER
Other Riverine groups (Banziri, Songo etc.)	0.065	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ngbaka/Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	DISCRIMINATED

From 2004 until 2005

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	SENIOR PARTNER
Banda	0.27	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.1	POWERLESS
Other Riverine groups (Banziri, Songo etc.)	0.065	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ngbaka/Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER

From 2006 until 2006

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	SENIOR PARTNER
Banda	0.27	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.1	POWERLESS
Other Riverine groups (Banziri, Songo etc.)	0.065	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ngbaka/Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER

From 2007 until 2008

Figure 159: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1994-2001.



Figure 160: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2002-2003.



Figure 161: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2004-2005.



Figure 162: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2006-2006.



Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	SENIOR PARTNER
Banda	0.27	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.1	POWERLESS
Other Riverine groups (Banziri, Songo etc.)	0.065	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ngbaka/Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Goula	0.003	DISCRIMINATED

From 2009 until 2012

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	SENIOR PARTNER
Banda	0.27	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.1	JUNIOR PARTNER
Other Riverine groups (Banziri, Songo etc.)	0.065	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ngbaka/Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Goula	0.003	IRRELEVANT

From 2013 until 2013

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	SENIOR PARTNER
Banda	0.27	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.1	JUNIOR PARTNER
Other Riverine groups (Banziri, Songo etc.)	0.065	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ngbaka/Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Northern Muslim groups (Goula, Runga, Kara)	0.008	DISCRIMINATED

From 2014 until 2014

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	POWERLESS
Banda	0.27	POWERLESS
Sara	0.1	POWERLESS
Other Riverine groups (Banziri, Songo etc.)	0.065	POWERLESS
Ngbaka/Mbaka	0.04	POWERLESS
Yakoma	0.04	POWERLESS
Northern Muslim groups (Goula, Runga, Kara)	0.008	DOMINANT

From 2015 until 2016



Figure 164: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2009-2012.



Figure 165: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2013-2013.




Figure 166: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2014-2014.



Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	JUNIOR PARTNER
Banda	0.27	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.1	JUNIOR PARTNER
Other Riverine groups (Banziri, Songo etc.)	0.065	SENIOR PARTNER
Ngbaka/Mbaka	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Fulani	0.006	DISCRIMINATED
Northern Muslim groups (Goula, Runga, Kara)	0.002	JUNIOR PARTNER

From 2017 until 2021

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baya	0.33	JUNIOR PARTNER
Banda	0.27	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.1	POWERLESS
Other Riverine groups (Banziri, Songo etc.)	0.065	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ngbaka/Mbaka	0.04	SENIOR PARTNER
Yakoma	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Fulani	0.006	POWERLESS
Northern Muslim groups (Goula, Runga, Kara)	0.002	POWERLESS




Figure 168: Political status of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2017-2021.

Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Central African Republic

From 1960 until 1960




Figure 169: Map of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1960-1960.

	Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■	Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)	311 001	Aggregate
■	Riverine groups (Ngbaka/Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.)	19 268	Aggregate

Table 55: List of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1960-1960.

From 1961 until 1981




Figure 170: Map of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1961-1981.

	Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■	Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)	311 001	Aggregate
■	Riverine groups (Ngbaka/Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.)	19 268	Aggregate

Table 56: List of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1961-1981.

From 1982 until 1993




Figure 171: Map of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1982-1993.

	Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■	Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)	311 001	Aggregate
■	Ngbaka/Mbaka	7058	Regionally based
■	Yakoma	1399	Regional & urban

Table 57: List of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1982-1993.

From 1994 until 2006




Figure 172: Map of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1994-2006.

	Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■	Baya	65 379	Regionally based
■	Sara	23 054	Regional & urban
■	Ngbaka/Mbaka	7058	Regionally based
■	Yakoma	1399	Regional & urban

Table 58: List of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 1994-2006.

From 2007 until 2008




Figure 173: Map of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2007-2008.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■ Baya	65 379	Regionally based
■ Goula	32 457	Aggregate
■ Sara	23 054	Regional & urban
■ Ngbaka/Mbaka	7 058	Regionally based
■ Yakoma	1 399	Regional & urban

Table 59: List of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2007-2008.

From 2009 until 2012




Figure 174: Map of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2009-2012.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
<div><div></div> Baya</div>	65 379	Regionally based
<div><div></div> Sara</div>	23 054	Regional & urban
<div><div></div> Ngbaka/Mbaka</div>	7058	Regionally based
<div><div></div> Yakoma</div>	1399	Regional & urban

Table 60: List of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2009-2012.

From 2013 until 2014




Figure 175: Map of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2013-2014.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
<div><div></div> Baya</div>	65 379	Regionally based
<div><div></div> Sara</div>	23 054	Regional & urban
<div><div></div> Ngbaka/Mbaka</div>	7058	Regionally based
<div><div></div> Yakoma</div>	1399	Regional & urban

Table 61: List of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2013-2014.

From 2015 until 2021




Figure 176: Map of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2015-2021.






	Group name	Area in km ²	Type
	Baya	65 379	Regionally based
	Sara	23 054	Regional & urban
	Ngbaka/Mbaka	7058	Regionally based
	Yakoma	1399	Regional & urban
	Fulani	0	Dispersed

Table 62: List of ethnic groups in Central African Republic during 2015-2021.

Conflicts in Central African Republic

Starting on 2001-05-26

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Central African Republic	Military faction (forces of André Kolingba)	Yakoma	2001-05-26	Presumed	Yes	Yes
Government of Central African Republic	Forces of Francois Bozize		2002-10-25			
Government of Central African Republic	Seleka	Goula	2006-10-29	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Central African Republic	CPJP		2009-03-19			
Government of Central African Republic	anti-Balaka		2013-04-13			
Government of Central African Republic	UPC (Ali Darass Fulani supporters)		2018-03-10			