Chad

Ethnicity in Chad

Group selection

The first question regarding the list of ethnic groups concerns the two Toubou branches Daza and Teda. They have constituted rival factions in Chad's politico-military struggles and were led by different leaders who played a very influential role in the country's history (the Daza by Habré, the Teda by Goukouni). Nevertheless, they were not listed separately as they seem to constitute different clans of the same ethnic group (Toubou). Note that for example Decalo (both in 1980 and 1997) also listed the whole Toubou people as one ethnic group.

The politically relevant ethnic group of the south is the Sara group. In the forefront of independence and the advent of party politics, the main political antagonism was between the Sara south and the Muslim Sahel groups under the leadership of the eastern Ouadai region ([1031]). These Sahel groups (particularly the eastern groups) were also a major part of the rebellions against the Tombal-baye regime later, whereas the main rift between the regime's opponents was between the eastern and central Sahel groups and the northern Toubou. Furthermore, in the north the Toubou can be distinguished from the Arabs. ([1032]). Therefore, initially the following groups are listed: **Toubou, Sara, Arabs, Muslim Sahel groups**

While divisions between the different Sahel groups were always important, they became truly relevant in national politics when the common "southern enemy" was defeated ([1033]). The Muslim Sahel groups are thus listed as one politically relevant ethnic group during the rule of the southern Sara group and in the transition period before Habré's seizure of power (hence in the first four periods). Afterwards, the individual politically relevant ethnic groups are listed separately, i.e. the following groups were distinguished: **Toubou, Sara, Arabs, Hadjerai, Zaghawa Bideyat and later the Tama**. Note that this leads to a significant decrease in the total size of the politically relevant ethnic groups, as there is only concrete evidence of the political relevance of two specific Sahel groups after Habré's seizure of power.

All group sizes are drawn from Decalo ([1034]). The group sizes were adjusted for the period 2018-2021. The numbers are based on the Central Intelligence Agency ([1035]), with the exception of the Tama whose number was deducted from Refworld ([1036]).

[1031] [Decalo, 1980]

[1032] [Decalo, 1980]

[1033] [Decalo, 1980]

[1034] [Decalo, 1997]

[1035] [Central Intelligence Agency, 2016]

[1036] [Refworld, 1998]

Power relations

1960-1975: Tombalbaye's regime

Tombalbaye's Sara group clearly dominated politics after independence (Decalo 1997). Tombalbaye eliminated all political opposition and banned all parties except for his own PPT which was the party of the southern Sara ethnic group ([1037]; [1038]). His power soon became absolute. Muslim leaders opposing southern political dominance were arrested ([1039]; [1040]). Some Muslims from the north and east were included in the cabinets (see e.g. [1041]; [1042]). However, they remained detached from the positions of real political power ([1043]). There were no power-sharing agreements with the key leaders from the north and the Sahel, and Tombalbaye's repressive rule openly neglected the north ([1044]). The notion that the included Muslims were token members is supported by the fact that they could not impede the abuses committed by the southern administrators in the Sahel region and the north against the local Muslim population ([1045], 1997; [1046]). Neither could they do anything against the regime's insensitivity to the mass starvation and death in the Muslim north and east during the drought in the 1970s ([1047]). Therefore, the Sara were coded as "dominant" during this period and all other groups as "powerless". The fact that towards the end of his rule, Tombalbaye's repression increasingly targeted southern opponents, as well, can be interpreted as a sign that the northern political opposition (apart from the armed opposition) had effectively been eliminated. Thus, attention was shifted to southern threats.

1976-1978

After the assassination of Tombalbaye, Malloum ruled the country at the head of a military junta. Power is still mostly in the hands of the southern Sara ([1048]). However, Malloum's cabinet is more inclusive and features a strong component of Muslims from the east and north ([1049]). In 1978, Habré one of the two important Toubou leaders was named prime minister. Although, in the end, this power-sharing arrangement turned out to be too little too late, the Sara were coded as "senior partner" and the Toubou and the Muslim Sahel groups as "junior partners" in this period. There was no concrete information about the inclusion of Arabs in the central government, so their status continued to be "powerless".

1979

After the overthrow of Malloum, N'Djamena became the arena of unrestrained warlord activities, a chaotic war zone with up to eleven factions fighting against each other. The concept of central government was rendered virtually meaningless under these circumstances ([1050]). The year of 1979 is thus considered here as a period of "state collapse", with all groups coded accordingly.

[1037] [Decalo, 1980]
[1038] [Lanne, 1997]
[1039] [Decalo, 1980]
[1040] [Lanne, 1997]
[1041] [Morrison, 1972]
[1042] [Decalo, 1997]
[1043] [Lanne, 1997]
[1044] [Library of Congress, 2014]
[1045] [Decalo, 1980]
[1046] [Lanne, 1997]
[1047] [Decalo, 1980]
[1048] [Decalo, 1997]
[1049] [Decalo, 1980]
[1050] [Library of Congress, 2014]

1980-1982: Transitional Government of National Unity

Coalition government under the leadership of the north, with Gouk-
ouni as president, and Kamougé the new leader of the Sara south as
vice-president. Every war faction received its share of power. (Habré,
for example, became defense minister; Acyl, an Arab leader, for-
eign minister) ([1051]). However, although the south[1052] was given
almost as many cabinet posts as the north ([1053], 1997), it appeared
reasonable to code the Sara group as having "only local power" dur-
ing this period. This is because the Sara (under the leadership of
Kamougoué) effectively stayed away from N'Djamena - which now
was in Muslim hands - occupying (and defending) their "own" south-
ern part of the country while the northern factions would carry out
their struggle for power over the central government ([1054]). Gouk-
ouni was rather magnanimous with the Sara and did not intervene
in the south so it was virtually "a state within the state" ([1055]). Un-
der these circumstances, it seems more appropriate to code the Sara
group as having "only local power" than being a "junior partner" in
the central government. With Goukouni as president, the Toubou
are coded as "senior partner". The Muslim Sahel groups and Arabs
are "junior partners".

1983-1986: 1st part of Habré's rule

After finally coming to power, Habré achieved to stabilize the coun-
try. He relied mostly on his Toubou ethnic group, but many former
opponents were co-opted and brought into the government coali-
tion. Habré proved to be very skilled in winning over opponents
and forming a stable regime ([1056]). Although he brutally repressed
the southern revolt (as any other revolt in the country), he also
appointed many southern political leaders to administrative and ex-
ecutive posts ([1057]). Southerners received six out of fifteen seats in
the executive bureau of the new unity-party UNIR and half of the
cabinet ministries, including some "choice posts" ([1058]). Even most
southern rebel leaders (e.g. Kamougoué) were finally co-opted by
Habré, with many of them joining the government ([1059]).

   The Hadjera'i had been long standing supporters of Habrein his
armed struggle, and, together with the Zaghawa/Bideyat group,
they now became key allies of the regime ([1060]). Therefore, Habre's
Toubou group was coded as "senior partner", and the Hadjera'i and
the Zaghawa/Bideyat along with the Sara group as "junior partners".

   As a decided opponent of any Libyan pretensions in Chad, Habre-
distrusted the Chadian Arabs, which he saw as Libyian auxiliaries
(Human Rights Watch 2005, 14). Human Rights Watch describes the
group as a victim of systematic state persecution during the whole of
Habre's regime. The Arabs were thus coded as "discriminated" in all
three periods of Habre's rule.

[1051] [Decalo, 1997]
[1052] [Decalo, 1997]
[1053] [Decalo, 1980]

[1054] [Decalo, 1980]

[1055] [Decalo, 1997]

[1056] [Library of Congress, 2014]

[1057] [Library of Congress, 2014]

[1058] [Decalo, 1997]

[1059] [Decalo, 1997]

[1060] [Decalo, 1997]

1987-1988: 2nd part of Habre's rule

In the mid-1980s, the northern alliance began to disintegrate. The Hadjera'i became alienated and formed an armed opposition movement ([1061]). According to Human Rights Watch (2005, 12-3), Habrethen started to systematically target the Hadjera'i as a group. Hadjera'i were indiscriminately persecuted, arrested and killed, and even a special committee was created for that purpose within the political police (the DDS, which was mainly composed of members of Habre's own ethnic group). Whole villages were destroyed. Human Rights Watch ([1062]) indicates the year of 1987 as the beginning of this targeted attack against the Hadjera'i. Hence, the group was coded as "discriminated" from that year on.

[1061] [Decalo, 1997]

[1062] [Human Rights Watch, 2005]

1989-1990: 3rd part of Habre's rule

1989-1990

In the late 1980s, also the Zaghawa group fell out with Habre's regime ([1063]; Human Rights Watch 2005, 12-3; [1064]). Habre's reaction was the same as towards the Hadjera'i group, and hundreds of Zaghawas were imprisoned, tortured and executed (Human Rights Watch 2005, 12-3). Human Rights Watch ([1065]) indicates the year of 1989 as the beginning of this targeted attack against the Zaghawa. Therefore, from 1989 on (until the end of Habre's rule), the Zaghawa/Bideyat group was also coded as "discriminated".

[1063] [Decalo, 1997]
[1064] [Lanne, 1997]

[1065] [Human Rights Watch, 2005]

1991-1994

Deby, a Zaghawa military leader who had fled N'Djamena and launched a rebellion in 1989, overthrew Habre in December 1990. The Zaghawa now controlled political power in the country, with most key advisers to Deby hailing from that group ([1066]; [1067]). But like Habre, Deby shared a certain degree of power with the Sara south ([1068]). Most of the prime ministers under his rule, for instance, have been southerners ([1069]). His regime is marked by the same system of patronage as that of Habre([1070]). And also like Habre Deby achieved to integrate a key southern rebel leader (in this case: Moise Kette) into his government ([1071]; [1072]). As the Hadjera'i group has fought against Habre alongside the Zaghawa and its leader Abbas has marched into N'Djamena together with Deby ([1073]), it appears reasonable to assume this allied group to be included into the new power hierarchy. Thus, both the Sara and the Hadjera'i were coded as "junior partners" in a power-sharing arrangement with the Zaghawa as "senior partner".

[1066] [Lanne, 1997]
[1067] [U.S. State Department, 2010]
[1068] [Decalo, 1997]
[1069] [Lanne, 1997]
[1070] [Decalo, 1997]

[1071] [Decalo, 1997]
[1072] [Lanne, 1997]

[1073] [Decalo, 1997]

Both Habre and Goukouni fought against the new regime after Deby's seizure of power ([1074]). The Toubou rebellion has gone on until 2005 ([1075]), but Deby did include Toubou elites into his regime. For example, Mahamat Nouri, a long-time associate of Habre, joined forces with Deby and became one of the regime's main pillars until

[1074] [Lanne, 1997]
[1075] [U.S. State Department, 2010]

the beginning of 2004 when he left the government for health reasons and assumed the post of ambassador in Saudi Arabia. Another Toubou leader, Youssouf Togoemi, served as minister of justice and defense until 1997 (when he formed the rebel movement MDJT). And Abderamane Dadi, also a Toubou, was coordinator of Chad's economically extremely important oil project until his death in a plane crash in 2001 ([1076]). Hence, the Toubou are also coded as "junior partner" in this period despite their ongoing rebellion.

[1076] [International Crisis Group, 2009b]

1995-2006

While the power relations did not change for the previously mentioned ethnic groups in 1995, the Tama, became politically relevant. While tensions between the Zaghawa and the Tama existed before, the Tama started to organize themselves in 1994 with the creation of the rebel group l'Alliance nationale de la résistance (ANR). The ANR was lead by Mahamat Garfa, the main Tama political leader, and aimed to resist the Chadian government. Therefore, in line with EPR's January-1st-rule, the Tama are coded as a politically relevant but "powerless" group starting in 1995. In 2003, Garfa signed a peace deal with Deby, which led to Garfa becoming minister of post and telecommunications. However, despite this position, it seems like the Tama were still not thoroughly represented in the Chadian government as many ANR members remained working against it.

In 2005, the year the civil war broke out in eastern Chad, the Tama movement was led by Mahamat Nour (ethnic Tama), who renamed it to the Rassemblement pour la démocratie et les libertés (RDL). Later in the same year, the RDL created together with other Chadian anti-government armed groups the Front uni pour le changement (FUC), which was led again by Nour. Their goal was to overthrow the government of Déby, who was reelected in 2006 ([1077]; [1078]).

[1077] [Tubiana, 2008]
[1078] [Janszky and Jungstand, 2013]

2007

Although Nour signed a peace agreement with Deby in December 2006 and acquired the prestigious post of minister of defence in March 2007, the Tama are still coded as "powerless". In November 2007, tensions between Nour and Deby started to flare up again due to the lack of the promised incorporation of FUC rebels into the Chadian army. Upon Nour's dismissal from the government in December 2007, Nour sought refuge in the Libyan embassy. With the departure of Nour, it seems that the Tama were not properly represented anymore by any political actor and are thus coded henceforth as irrelevant ([1079]; [1080]; [1081]; [1082]).

The coding, which did change in 2007, is for the Toubou group. In May 2006, Mahamat Nouri, a Toubou and former close ally of Deby, left the ruling coalition and joined the armed opposition against Deby over the latter's controversial reelection. Thus, the Toubou should now be seen as "powerless", leading to the insertion

[1079] [Tubiana, 2008]
[1080] [Reliefweb, 2007]
[1081] [De Bruijn and Van Dijk, 2008]
[1082] [Gebrewold, 2016]

of a new period, which due to EPR's January-1st-rule is coded as starting in 2007.

2008-2009

As stated above, the Tama became irrelevant after 2007, whereas the Tobou remain powerless. In contrast, although most of Deby's political key advisors and military leaders are Zaghawa, southern politicians are still represented in the government. The U.S. State Department's Human Rights Reports from 2006 to 2009 note that the Zaghawa are dominant in both civilian and military key institutions, but also that the cabinet is ethnically diverse. Until April 2008 (and again since March 2010), Deby's prime ministers were southerners. This process of co-option is elaborately described in a report by the International Crisis Group. After an agreement of opposition leaders with the government in August 2007, most of them were included in the government and were thus allowed to benefit from state resources, find jobs in the administration for party members, and develop their own clientelist networks ([1083]). The report also gives an overview over the main opposition actors in the country, listing southern leaders such as Jean Alingue and Wadel Abdelkader Kamougue who became minister of justice and minister of defense, respectively ([1084]). Overall, there is no evidence of a change of policy towards the Sara ethnic group compared to the previous period. Thus, the group is still considered a "junior partner" in Deby's regime (with the Zaghawa as "senior partner").

There was no new information available on the Hadjera'i group. Thus, they remain coded as "junior partner". The Arabs still seem to be politically powerless.

The situation in eastern Chad is extremely complicated with multiple rebel groups competing and working together within this part of the country since 2005. CNT is mainly composed of Arabs; FUC is an umbrella organization, which seems to be composed mainly of Tama ([1085]; [1086]). UFCD is an UFDD splinter and predominantly composed of Muslim Sahel groups from the Ouaddai region, whereas the UFDD itself is mainly composed of Toubou; UFDD-F is another UFDD splinter of mainly Arab identity; and UFR includes a coalition of groups that is led by Deby's own nephew (thus a Zaghawa). This information is consistent with that found in the above cited ICG Africa Report N°144 of 2008 ([1087], 42-3). There is, however, no information about concrete ethnic claims by these movements. It is very doubtful that many of them actually politically represent their ethnic groups. Ethnicity here seems to serve mostly as a convenient basis for recruitment although some groups do have a long history of revolts due to (maybe even justified) grievances (as, for example, the Toubou group during Tombalbaye's regime). The war in eastern Chad has also brought about a great amount of inter-ethnic violence in this region, with militias targeting specifically and selectively civilians of other ethnic groups ([1088]). This cross-border (Chad-Sudan-

[1083] [International Crisis Group, 2008]

[1084] [International Crisis Group, 2008]

[1085] [International Crisis Group, 2009a]
[1086] [Human Rights Watch, 2005]

[1087] [International Crisis Group, 2008]

[1088] [Human Rights Watch, 2005]

CAR) communal violence although often triggered and exploited by political elites happens apart from the real locus of power at the center ([1089]). Thus, it was not considered for the codings of the groups' power statuses.

[1089] [International Crisis Group, 2009a]

2010-2017

Reliable information on the ethnic distribution of political power over the recent years is extremely scarce. The only thing that appears beyond question is the overrepresentation of president Deby's Zhagawa-Bideyat group in the civilian administration and the Chadian security apparatus ([1090]; [1091]). Thus, the Zhagawa-Bideyat were again coded as "senior partner".

[1090] [U.S. State Department, 2010]
[1091] [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

To assess the power statuses of the other groups, the author got in touch with two scholars doing research on Chadian politics (Marielle Debos and Rene Lemarchand). Based on Rene Lemarchand's input, the Arabs were coded as "junior partners" from 2010 onwards (although the date of inclusion is somewhat of a judgement call). Apparently, there is now "a sprinkling of Arabs in the government" (personal communication, 21 May 2014). One report mentions the role of Deby's wife Hinda in promoting allies from her Arab home region Oaddai to important government positions and ministries ([1092]).

[1092] [Africa Intelligence, 2015]

The Sara from southern Chad have been holding some power as cabinet or prime ministers ([1093]) and are therefore coded as "junior partner".

[1093] [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016]

Although Deby has successfully coopted some Toubou elites (personal communication with Marielle Debos, 23 May 2014), on balance this does not seem to justify coding them as "junior partner" and their previous coding as "powerless" was thus extended. There was no information on any changes in the power statuses of the Hadjerai.

2018-2020

Information on the political power constellation for the period from 2018-2020 is equally scarce. At the least, there are clear indications that ethnicity still influences the appointments in Chad's political system. Especially the Zaghawa/Bideyat dominate the political and economic sphere with president Deby still being in power. He is appointing primarily his ethnic kin and other northerners and Muslims to key executive and military posts, while southerners hold only token ministerial positions ([1094]; [1095]). Therefore, the Zaghawa/Bideyat are still coded as Senior Partner while the other two Muslim and northern groups, the Arabs and the Hadjera'i as "junior partners".

[1094] [Freedom House, 2018]
[1095] [U.S. State Department, 2017-2019]

The increasing exclusion of southern ethnic groups from the political arena is especially evident in the change of the constitution in 2018, which expanded Deby's power and abandoned the position of prime minister. With this move also the split of powers between the northern and southern regions, fulfilled due to the split of the state's

two highest positions, seemed to be abandoned as well. Therefore the Sara are coded as powerless, starting with the new coding period in 2018 ([1096]).

[1096] [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020]

2021

Crisis Group writes that in 2020, in an alleged effort to improve relations with "key ethnic communities" ahead of general elections in 2021, Déby reintegrated former Defence Minister Mahamat Nour Abdelkerim into the army and pardoned three imprisoned former rebel leaders ([1097]). Nour is ethnic Tama and the report clearly indicates that this group is politically relevant. Thus, the Tama group is coded "powerless" again as of 2021.

[1097] [International Crisis Group, 2021]

Déby further toured Borkou and Tibesti provinces in north in attempt to rebuild relations with the local Toubou population, promised infrastructure investments and deployment of security forces to stabilise restive border regions ([1098]). This does not lead to a change in coding, the Toubou continue to be coded as "powerless".

[1098] [International Crisis Group, 2021]

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    `ACfU3U2c47ePcVX2FysqU74MXUqh-sqkoQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=`
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Political status of ethnic groups in Chad

From 1960 until 1975

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Muslim Sahel groups	0.27	POWERLESS
Sara	0.24	DOMINANT
Arabs	0.14	POWERLESS
Toubou	0.04	POWERLESS

Figure 177: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 1960-1975.

From 1976 until 1978

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Muslim Sahel groups	0.27	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.24	SENIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	POWERLESS
Toubou	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER

Figure 178: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 1976-1978.

From 1979 until 1979

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Muslim Sahel groups	0.27	STATE COLLAPSE
Sara	0.24	STATE COLLAPSE
Arabs	0.14	STATE COLLAPSE
Toubou	0.04	STATE COLLAPSE

Figure 179: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 1979-1979.

From 1980 until 1982

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Muslim Sahel groups	0.27	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.24	POWERLESS
Arabs	0.14	JUNIOR PARTNER
Toubou	0.04	SENIOR PARTNER

Figure 180: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 1980-1982.

From 1983 until 1986

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.24	JUNIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	DISCRIMINATED
Toubou	0.04	SENIOR PARTNER
Hadjerai	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	JUNIOR PARTNER

From 1987 until 1988

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.24	JUNIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	DISCRIMINATED
Toubou	0.04	SENIOR PARTNER
Hadjerai	0.025	DISCRIMINATED
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	JUNIOR PARTNER

From 1989 until 1990

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.24	JUNIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	DISCRIMINATED
Toubou	0.04	SENIOR PARTNER
Hadjerai	0.025	DISCRIMINATED
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	DISCRIMINATED

From 1991 until 1994

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.24	JUNIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	POWERLESS
Toubou	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Hadjerai	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	SENIOR PARTNER

From 1995 until 2006

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.24	JUNIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	POWERLESS
Toubou	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Hadjerai	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	SENIOR PARTNER
Tama	0.005	POWERLESS

Figure 182: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 1987-1988.

Figure 183: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 1989-1990.

Figure 184: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 1991-1994.


Figure 185: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 1995-2006.

From 2007 until 2007

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.24	JUNIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	POWERLESS
Toubou	0.04	POWERLESS
Hadjerai	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	SENIOR PARTNER
Tama	0.005	POWERLESS

Figure 186: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 2007-2007.

From 2008 until 2009

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.24	JUNIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	POWERLESS
Toubou	0.04	POWERLESS
Hadjerai	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	SENIOR PARTNER
Tama	0.005	IRRELEVANT

Figure 187: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 2008-2009.

From 2010 until 2017

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.24	JUNIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	JUNIOR PARTNER
Toubou	0.04	POWERLESS
Hadjerai	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	SENIOR PARTNER
Tama	0.005	IRRELEVANT

Figure 188: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 2010-2017.

From 2018 until 2020

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.277	POWERLESS
Arabs	0.123	JUNIOR PARTNER
Hadjerai	0.067	JUNIOR PARTNER
Toubou	0.063	POWERLESS
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	SENIOR PARTNER
Tama	0.01	IRRELEVANT

Figure 189: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 2018-2020.

From 2021 until 2021

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.277	POWERLESS
Arabs	0.123	JUNIOR PARTNER
Hadjerai	0.067	JUNIOR PARTNER
Toubou	0.063	POWERLESS
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	SENIOR PARTNER
Tama	0.01	POWERLESS

Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Chad

From 1960 until 1960

Figure 191: Map of ethnic groups in Chad during 1960-1960.

	Group name	Area in km^2	Type
	Toubou	518 785	Regionally based
	Arabs	150 825	Regionally based
	Muslim Sahel groups	123 411	Aggregate
	Sara	77 297	Regionally based

Table 63: List of ethnic groups in Chad during 1960-1960.

From 1961 until 1982

Figure 192: Map of ethnic groups in Chad during 1961-1982.

Table 64: List of ethnic groups in Chad during 1961-1982.

	Group name	Area in km^2	Type
	Toubou	518 785	Regionally based
	Arabs	150 825	Regionally based
	Muslim Sahel groups	123 411	Aggregate
	Sara	77 297	Regionally based

From 1983 until 1994

Figure 193: Map of ethnic groups in Chad during 1983-1994.

Group name	Area in km²	Type
Toubou	518 785	Regionally based
Arabs	150 825	Regionally based
Zaghawa, Bideyat	78 473	Regionally based
Sara	77 297	Regionally based
Hadjerai	31 534	Regionally based

Table 65: List of ethnic groups in Chad during 1983-1994.

From 1995 until 2007

Figure 194: Map of ethnic groups in Chad during 1995-2007.

Group name	Area in km²	Type
Toubou	518 785	Regionally based
Arabs	150 825	Regionally based
Zaghawa, Bideyat	78 473	Regionally based
Sara	77 297	Regionally based
Hadjerai	31 534	Regionally based

Table 66: List of ethnic groups in Chad during 1995-2007.

From 2008 until 2020

Figure 195: Map of ethnic groups in Chad during 2008-2020.

	Group name	Area in km^2	Type
	Toubou	518 785	Regionally based
	Arabs	150 825	Regionally based
	Zaghawa, Bideyat	78 473	Regionally based
	Sara	77 297	Regionally based
	Hadjerai	31 534	Regionally based

Table 67: List of ethnic groups in Chad during 2008-2020.

From 2021 until 2021

Figure 196: Map of ethnic groups in Chad during 2021-2021.

	Group name	Area in km^2	Type
■	Toubou	518 785	Regionally based
■	Arabs	150 825	Regionally based
■	Zaghawa, Bideyat	78 473	Regionally based
■	Sara	77 297	Regionally based
■	Hadjerai	31 534	Regionally based

Table 68: List of ethnic groups in Chad during 2021-2021.

Conflicts in Chad

Starting on 1966-07-30

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Chad	Frolinat	Muslim Sahel groups	1966-07-30	Presumed	Yes	Yes
Government of Chad	Frolinat	Toubou	1966-07-30	Presumed	Yes	Yes
Government of Chad	First Liberation Army	Toubou	1971-01-08	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	First Liberation Army	Muslim Sahel groups	1971-01-08	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	Second Liberation Army	Toubou	1971-01-21	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	FAN	Toubou	1976-02-17	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	FAP	Muslim Sahel groups	1977-06-20	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	FAP	Toubou	1977-06-20	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	FAP	Arabs	1977-06-20	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	FAT	Sara	1982-08-26	No	Yes, from EGIP	
Government of Chad	GUNT	Toubou	1983-01-12	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	GUNT	Muslim Sahel groups	1983-01-12	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	GUNT	Arabs	1983-01-12	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	GUNT	Sara	1983-01-12	No	Yes, from EGIP	
Government of Chad	CDR	Arabs	1987-01-01	No	No	
Government of Chad	Islamic Legion	Zaghawa, Bideyat	1987-11-21	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	MOSANAT	Hadjerai	1988-12-18	Explicit	Yes	No
Government of Chad	Revolutionary Forces of 1 April	Zaghawa, Bideyat	1989-10-19	Presumed	Yes	
Government of Chad	MPS	Zaghawa, Bideyat	1990-03-30	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Chad	MPS	Hadjerai	1990-03-30	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Chad	Military faction (forces of Maldoum Bada Abbas)	Hadjerai	1991-10-12	Explicit	Yes	
Government of Chad	MDD		1991-12-30			
Government of Chad	CSNPD	Sara	1992-02-20	Explicit	Yes	No
Government of Chad	CNR	Zaghawa, Bideyat	1992-06-20	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	FNT	Zaghawa, Bideyat	1992-12-30	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	FARF	Sara	1994-08-11	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	MDJT	Toubou	1999-02-04	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Chad	FUCD	Tama	2005-12-17	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	RAFD	Zaghawa, Bideyat	2006-06-03	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	UFDD	Zaghawa, Bideyat	2006-10-22	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	UFDD	Toubou	2006-10-22	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	UFDD	Arabs	2006-10-22	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	FPRN		2007-12-05			
Government of Chad	AN	Tama	2008-02-01	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	AN	Toubou	2008-02-01	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	AN	Zaghawa, Bideyat	2008-02-01	No	Yes	No

Starting on 1983-04-17

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Chad	Government of Nigeria		1983-04-17			

Starting on 1987-08-07

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Chad	Government of Libya		1987-08-07			

Starting on 2015-05-26

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Chad	IS		2015-05-26			