

Chad

Ethnicity in Chad

Group selection

The first question regarding the list of ethnic groups concerns the two Toubou branches Daza and Teda. They have constituted rival factions in Chad's politico-military struggles and were led by different leaders who played a very influential role in the country's history (the Daza by Habré, the Teda by Goukouni). Nevertheless, they were not listed separately as they seem to constitute different clans of the same ethnic group (Toubou). Note that for example Decalo (both in 1980 and 1997) also listed the whole Toubou people as one ethnic group.

The politically relevant ethnic group of the south is the Sara group. In the forefront of independence and the advent of party politics, the main political antagonism was between the Sara south and the Muslim Sahel groups under the leadership of the eastern Ouadai region (⁵⁸⁷). These Sahel groups (particularly the eastern groups) were also a major part of the rebellions against the Tombal-baye regime later, whereas the main rift between the regime's opponents was between the eastern and central Sahel groups and the northern Toubou (⁵⁸⁸). While divisions between the different Sahel groups were always important, they became truly relevant in national politics when the common "southern enemy" was defeated (⁵⁸⁹). The Muslim Sahel groups are thus listed as one politically relevant ethnic group during the rule of the southern Sara group and in the transition period before Habré's seizure of power (hence in the first four periods). Afterwards, the individual politically relevant ethnic groups are listed separately. Note that this leads to a significant decrease in the total size of the politically relevant ethnic groups, as there is only concrete evidence of the political relevance of two specific Sahel groups after Habré's seizure of power.

In the north the Toubou can be distinguished from the Arabs. All group sizes are drawn from Decalo (⁵⁹⁰).

⁵⁸⁷ [Decalo, 1980]

⁵⁸⁸ [Decalo, 1980]

⁵⁸⁹ [Decalo, 1980]

⁵⁹⁰ [Decalo, 1997]

Power relations

1960-1975: Tombalbaye's regime Tombalbaye's Sara group clearly dominated politics after independence (Decalo 1997). Tombalbaye eliminated all political opposition and banned all parties except for his own PPT – which was the party of the southern Sara ethnic group (591; 592). His power soon became absolute. Muslim leaders opposing southern political dominance were arrested (593; 594). Some Muslims from the north and east were included in the cabinets (see e.g. 595; 596). However, they remained detached from the positions of real political power (597). There were no power-sharing agreements with the key leaders from the north and the Sahel, and Tombalbaye's repressive rule openly neglected the north (598). The notion that the included Muslims were token members is supported by the fact that they could not impede the abuses committed by the southern administrators in the Sahel region and the north against the local Muslim population (599, 1997; 600). Neither could they do anything against the regime's insensitivity to the mass starvation and death in the Muslim north and east during the drought in the 1970s (601). Therefore, the Sara were coded as "dominant" during this period and all other groups as "powerless". The fact that towards the end of his rule, Tombalbaye's repression increasingly targeted southern opponents, as well, can be interpreted as a sign that the northern political opposition (apart from the armed opposition) had effectively been eliminated. Thus, attention was shifted to southern threats.

591 [Decalo, 1980]

592 [Lanne, 1997]

593 [Decalo, 1980]

594 [Lanne, 1997]

595 [Morrison, 1972]

1976-1978: After the assassination of Tombalbaye, Malloum ruled the country at the head of a military junta. Power is still mostly in the hands of the southern Sara (602). However, Malloum's cabinet is more inclusive and features a strong component of Muslims from the east and north (603). In 1978, Habré one of the two important Toubou leaders was named prime minister. Although, in the end, this power-sharing arrangement turned out to be too little too late, the Sara were coded as "senior partner" and the Toubou and the Muslim Sahel groups as "junior partners" in this period. There was no concrete information about the inclusion of Arabs in the central government, so their status continued to be "powerless".

602 [Decalo, 1997]

603 [Decalo, 1980]

1979: After the overthrow of Malloum, N'Djamena became the arena of unrestrained warlord activities, a chaotic war zone with up to eleven factions fighting against each other. The concept of central government was rendered virtually meaningless under these circumstances (604). The year of 1979 is thus considered here as a period of "state collapse", with all groups coded as "irrelevant".

604 [Library of Congress, 2014]

1980-1982: Transitional Government of National Unity Coalition government under the leadership of the north, with Goukouni as president, and Kamougé the new leader of the Sara south as vice-president. Every war faction received its share of power. (Habré, for example, became defense minister; Acyl, an Arab leader, foreign minister) ⁽⁶⁰⁵⁾. However, although the south⁶⁰⁶ was given almost as many cabinet posts as the north ^(607, 1997), it appeared reasonable to code the Sara group as having "only local power" during this period. This is because the Sara (under the leadership of Kamougoué) effectively stayed away from N'Djamena - which now was in Muslim hands - occupying (and defending) their "own" southern part of the country while the northern factions would carry out their struggle for power over the central government ⁽⁶⁰⁸⁾. Goukouni was rather magnanimous with the Sara and did not intervene in the south so it was virtually "a state within the state" ⁽⁶⁰⁹⁾. Under these circumstances, it seems more appropriate to code the Sara group as having "only local power" than being a "junior partner" in the central government. With Goukouni as president, the Toubou are coded as "senior partner". The Muslim Sahel groups and Arabs are "junior partners".

⁶⁰⁵ [Decalo, 1997]

⁶⁰⁶ [Decalo, 1997]

⁶⁰⁷ [Decalo, 1980]

⁶⁰⁸ [Decalo, 1980]

⁶⁰⁹ [Decalo, 1997]

1983-1986: 1st part of Habré's rule. After finally coming to power, Habré achieved to stabilize the country. He relied mostly on his Toubou ethnic group, but many former opponents were co-opted and brought into the government coalition. Habré proved to be very skilled in winning over opponents and forming a stable regime ⁽⁶¹⁰⁾. Although he brutally repressed the southern revolt (as any other revolt in the country), he also appointed many southern political leaders to administrative and executive posts ⁽⁶¹¹⁾. Southerners received six out of fifteen seats in the executive bureau of the new unity-party UNIR and half of the cabinet ministries, including some "choice posts" ⁽⁶¹²⁾. Even most southern rebel leaders (e.g. Kamougoué) were finally co-opted by Habré, with many of them joining the government ⁽⁶¹³⁾.

⁶¹⁰ [Library of Congress, 2014]

⁶¹¹ [Library of Congress, 2014]

⁶¹² [Decalo, 1997]

⁶¹³ [Decalo, 1997]

The Hadjera'i had been long standing supporters of Habre in his armed struggle, and, together with the Zaghawa/Bideyat group, they now became key allies of the regime ⁽⁶¹⁴⁾. Therefore, Habre's Toubou group was coded as "senior partner", and the Hadjera'i and the Zaghawa/Bideyat - along with the Sara group as "junior partners".

⁶¹⁴ [Decalo, 1997]

As a decided opponent of any Libyan pretensions in Chad, Habre distrusted the Chadian Arabs, which he saw as Libyan auxiliaries (Human Rights Watch 2005, 14). Human Rights Watch describes the group as a victim of systematic state persecution during the whole of Habre's regime. The Arabs were thus coded as "discriminated" in all three periods of Habre's rule.

1987-1988: 2nd part of Habre's rule In the mid-1980s, the northern alliance began to disintegrate. The Hadjera'i became alienated and formed an armed opposition movement (⁶¹⁵). According to Human Rights Watch (2005, 12-3), Habre then started to systematically target the Hadjera'i as a group. Hadjera'i were indiscriminately persecuted, arrested and killed, and even a special committee was created for that purpose within the political police (the DDS, which was mainly composed of members of Habre's own ethnic group). Whole villages were destroyed. Human Rights Watch (⁶¹⁶) indicates the year of 1987 as the beginning of this targeted attack against the Hadjera'i. Hence, the group was coded as "discriminated" from that year on.

⁶¹⁵ [Decalo, 1997]

⁶¹⁶ [?]

1989-1990: 3rd part of Habre's rule In the late 1980s, also the Zaghawa group fell out with Habre's regime (⁶¹⁷; Human Rights Watch 2005, 12-3; ⁶¹⁸). Habre's reaction was the same as towards the Hadjera'i group, and hundreds of Zaghawas were imprisoned, tortured and executed (Human Rights Watch 2005, 12-3). Human Rights Watch (⁶¹⁹) indicates the year of 1989 as the beginning of this targeted attack against the Zaghawa. Therefore, from 1989 on (until the end of Habre's rule), the Zaghawa/Bideyat group was also coded as "discriminated".

⁶¹⁷ [Decalo, 1997]

⁶¹⁸ [Lanne, 1997]

⁶¹⁹ [?]

1991-2006: Deby, a Zaghawa military leader who had fled N'Djamena and launched a rebellion in 1989, overthrew Habre in December 1990. The Zaghawa now controlled political power in the country, with most key advisers to Deby hailing from that group (⁶²⁰; ⁶²¹). But like Habre, Deby shared a certain degree of power with the Sara south (⁶²²). Most of the prime ministers under his rule, for instance, have been southerners (⁶²³). His regime is marked by the same system of patronage as that of Habre (⁶²⁴). And – also like Habre – Deby achieved to integrate a key southern rebel leader (in this case: Moise Kette) into his government (⁶²⁵; ⁶²⁶). As the Hadjera'i group has fought against Habre alongside the Zaghawa and its leader Abbas has marched into N'Djamena together with Deby (⁶²⁷), it appears reasonable to assume this allied group to be included into the new power hierarchy. Thus, both the Sara and the Hadjera'i were coded as "junior partners" in a power-sharing arrangement with the Zaghawa as "senior partner".

⁶²⁰ [Lanne, 1997]

⁶²¹ [United States Government State Department, 2001]

⁶²² [Decalo, 1997]

⁶²³ [Lanne, 1997]

⁶²⁴ [Decalo, 1997]

Both Habre and Goukouni fought against the new regime after Deby's seizure of power (⁶²⁸). The Toubou rebellion has gone on until 2005 (⁶²⁹), but Deby did include Toubou elites into his regime. For example, Mahamat Nouri, a long-time associate of Habre, joined forces with Deby and became one of the regime's main pillars until the beginning of 2004 when he left the government for health reasons and assumed the post of ambassador in Saudi Arabia. Another Toubou leader, Youssouf Togoemi, served as minister of justice and defense until 1997 (when he formed the rebel movement MDJT). And Abderamane Dadi, also a Toubou, was coordinator of Chad's

⁶²⁸ [Lanne, 1997]

⁶²⁹ [United States Government State Department, 2001]

economically extremely important oil project until his death in a plane crash in 2001 (⁶³⁰). Hence, the Toubou are also coded as "junior partner" in this period despite their ongoing rebellion.

⁶³⁰ [ICG, 2009b]

2007-2009

Civil war broke out in eastern Chad in 2005. In 2006, the capital N'Djamena was attacked by FUC, a rebel group apparently led by the Tama group and coordinating with another rebel movement from Deby's own Zaghawa group. At the same time, Deby was reelected as president.

Most of Deby's political key advisors and military leaders are Zaghawa, but southern politicians are also represented in the government. The U.S. State Department's Human Rights Reports from 2006 to 2009 note that the Zaghawa are dominant in both civilian and military key institutions, but also that the cabinet is ethnically diverse. Until April 2008 (and again since March 2010), Deby's prime ministers were southerners. This process of co-option is elaborately described in a report by the International Crisis Group. After an agreement of opposition leaders with the government in August 2007, most of them were included in the government and were thus allowed to benefit from state resources, find jobs in the administration for party members, and develop their own clientelist networks (⁶³¹). The report also gives an overview over the main oppositional actors in the country, listing southern leaders such as Jean Alingue and Wadel Abdelkader Kamougue who became minister of justice and minister of defense, respectively (⁶³²). Overall, there is no evidence of a change of policy towards the Sara ethnic group compared to the previous period. Thus, the group is still considered a "junior partner" in Deby's regime (with the Zaghawa as "senior partner").

⁶³¹ [ICG, 2008]

⁶³² [ICG, 2008]

In contrast, Mahamat Nouri, a Toubou and former close ally of Deby, left the ruling coalition and joined the armed opposition against Deby in May 2006 over the latter's controversial reelection. Thus, the Toubou should now be seen as "powerless", leading to the insertion of a new time period, which – due to EPR's January-1st-rule is coded as starting in 2007.

There was no new information available on the Hadjera'i group. Thus, they remain coded as "junior partner". In contrast, the Arabs still seem to be politically powerless.

The situation in eastern Chad is extremely complicated. A Human Rights Watch Report of 2009 (⁶³³) gives an overview over the rebel groups active in this part of the country since 2005: CNT is mainly composed of Arabs; FUC is an umbrella organization, and no information regarding its ethnic composition is given in the report (⁶³⁴), it is of mainly Tama following); UFCD is an UFDD splinter and predominantly composed of Muslim Sahel groups from the Ouadde region, whereas the UFDD itself is mainly composed of Toubou; UFDD-F is another UFDD splinter of mainly Arab identity; and UFR includes a coalition of groups that is led by Deby's own nephew (thus a Zaghawa). This information is consistent with that found in the above cited ICG Africa Report N°144 of 2008 (⁶³⁵, 42-

⁶³³ [Human Rights Watch, 2005-2009]

⁶³⁴ [ICG, 2009a]

⁶³⁵ [ICG, 2008]

3). There is, however, no information about concrete ethnic claims by these movements. It is very doubtful that many of them actually politically represent their ethnic groups. Ethnicity here seems to serve mostly as a convenient basis for recruitment although some groups do have a long history of revolts due to (maybe even justified) grievances (as, for example, the Toubou group during Tombalbaye's regime). The war in eastern Chad has also brought about a great amount of interethnic violence in this region, with militias targeting specifically and selectively civilians of other ethnic groups (⁶³⁶). This cross-border (Chad-Sudan-CAR) communal violence although often triggered and exploited by political elites happens apart from the real locus of power at the center (⁶³⁷). Thus, it was not considered for the codings of the groups' power statuses.

⁶³⁶ [Human Rights Watch, 2005-2009]

⁶³⁷ [ICG, 2009a]

2010-2013: Reliable information on the ethnic distribution of political power over the recent years is extremely scarce. The only thing that appears beyond question is the overrepresentation of president Deby's Zhagawa-Bideyat group in the civilian administration and the Chadian security apparatus (⁶³⁸; ⁶³⁹). Thus, the Zhagawa-Bideyat were again coded as "senior partner".

⁶³⁸ [United States Government State Department, 2014]

⁶³⁹ [Bertelsmann Country Report, 2014]

To assess the power statuses of the other groups, the author got in touch with two scholars doing research on Chadian politics (Marielle Debos and Rene Lemarchand). Based on Rene Lemarchand's input, the Arabs were coded as "junior partners" from 2010 onwards (although the date of inclusion is somewhat of a judgement call). Apparently, there is now "a sprinkling of Arabs in the government (personal communication, 21 May 2014). Although Deby has successfully coopted some Toubou elites (personal communication with Marielle Debos, 23 May 2014), on balance this does not seem to justify coding them as "junior partner" and their previous coding as "powerless" was thus extended. There was no information on any changes in the power statuses of the Hadjerai and Sara groups.

Bibliography

- [Bertelsmann Country Report, 2014] Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2014). BTI: Benin Country Report 2014. Retrieved on 25 May 2014 from: <http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/wca/tcd>
- [Decalo, 1980] Decalo, Samuel. (1980). Regionalism, Political Decay, and Civil Strife in Chad. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 18(1), 23-56.
- [Decalo, 1997] Decalo, Samuel. (1997). *Historical Dictionary of Chad*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
- [Human Rights Watch, 2005-2009] Human Rights Watch. (2005-2009). Chad: The Victims of Hisséne Habré Still Awaiting Justice. Retrieved on 02.05.2014 from: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/chad0705/chad0705.pdf> (
- [ICG, 2009a] ICG Africa Report, (2009a). ICG Africa Report No. 149. Retrieved on 02.05.2014 from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/ /media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx>
- [ICG, 2009b] ICG Africa Report, (2009a). ICG Africa Report No. 65. Retrieved on 02.05.2014 from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/ /media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/B065%20Chad%20Escaping%20from%20the%20Oil%20Trap.ashx>
- [ICG, 2008] ICG Africa Report, (2008). ICG Africa Report No. 144. Retrieved on 02.05.2014 from <http://http://www.crisisgroup.org/ /media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20A%20New%20Conflict%20Resolution%20Framework.ashx>
- [Lanne, 1997] Lanne, Bernard. (1997). "Chad: Regime Change, Increased Insecurity, and Blockage of Further Reforms." In *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*, edited by J. F. Clark and D. E. Gardinier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 267-286.
- [Library of Congress, 2014] Library of Congress. (2014). Country Studies Chad. Retrieved on 02.05.2014 from: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/tdtoc.htmltd0020>
- [Morrison, 1972] Morrison, Donald G., Robert C. Mitchell, and John N. Paden (Eds.). (1972). *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook*. New York: The Free Press.

[United States Government State Department, 2010]
U.S. Department of State. (2010). Human Rights
Reports Chad. Retrieved on 20.05.2014 from:
<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/>

Political status of ethnic groups in Chad

From 1960 until 1975

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Muslim Sahel groups	0.27	POWERLESS
Sara	0.24	DOMINANT
Arabs	0.14	POWERLESS
Toubou	0.04	POWERLESS

From 1976 until 1978

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Muslim Sahel groups	0.27	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.24	SENIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	POWERLESS
Toubou	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER

From 1979 until 1979

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Muslim Sahel groups	0.27	STATE COLLAPSE
Sara	0.24	STATE COLLAPSE
Arabs	0.14	STATE COLLAPSE
Toubou	0.04	STATE COLLAPSE

From 1980 until 1982

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Muslim Sahel groups	0.27	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sara	0.24	POWERLESS
Arabs	0.14	JUNIOR PARTNER
Toubou	0.04	SENIOR PARTNER



Figure 133: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 1960-1975.




Figure 134: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 1976-1978.





Figure 135: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 1979-1979.



From 1983 until 1986

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.24	JUNIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	DISCRIMINATED
Toubou	0.04	SENIOR PARTNER
Hadjerai	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tamas	0.005	IRRELEVANT

From 1987 until 1988

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.24	JUNIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	DISCRIMINATED
Toubou	0.04	SENIOR PARTNER
Hadjerai	0.025	DISCRIMINATED
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tamas	0.005	IRRELEVANT

From 1989 until 1990

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.24	JUNIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	DISCRIMINATED
Toubou	0.04	SENIOR PARTNER
Hadjerai	0.025	DISCRIMINATED
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	DISCRIMINATED
Tamas	0.005	IRRELEVANT

From 1991 until 2006

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.24	JUNIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	POWERLESS
Toubou	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Hadjerai	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	SENIOR PARTNER
Tamas	0.005	IRRELEVANT



Figure 137: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 1983-1986.



Figure 138: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 1987-1988.




Figure 139: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 1989-1990.




Figure 140: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 1991-2006.

From 2007 until 2009

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.24	JUNIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	POWERLESS
Toubou	0.04	POWERLESS
Hadjerai	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	SENIOR PARTNER
Tamas	0.005	IRRELEVANT



Figure 141: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 2007-2009.

From 2010 until 2013

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Sara	0.24	JUNIOR PARTNER
Arabs	0.14	JUNIOR PARTNER
Toubou	0.04	POWERLESS
Hadjerai	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Zaghawa, Bideyat	0.01	SENIOR PARTNER
Tamas	0.005	IRRELEVANT




Figure 142: Political status of ethnic groups in Chad during 2010-2013.

Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Chad

From 1960 until 1972




Figure 143: Map of ethnic groups in Chad during 2010-2013.





Group name	Area in km ²	Type
 Toubou	636 416	Regionally based
 Muslim Sahel groups	244 879	Regionally based
 Arabs	150 824	Regionally based
 Sara	77 622	Regionally based

Table 45: List of ethnic groups in Chad during 1960-1972.

From 1973 until 1982




Figure 144: Map of ethnic groups in Chad during 2010-2013.





Group name	Area in km ²	Type
 Toubou	520 453	Regionally based
 Muslim Sahel groups	244 879	Regionally based
 Arabs	150 824	Regionally based
 Sara	77 622	Regionally based

Table 46: List of ethnic groups in Chad during 1973-1982.

From 1983 until 2013




Figure 145: Map of ethnic groups in Chad during 2010-2013.

	Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■	Toubou	520 453	Regionally based
■	Arabs	150 824	Regionally based
■	Zaghawa, Bideyat	78 742	Regionally based
■	Sara	77 622	Regionally based
■	Hadjerai	29 584	Regionally based

Table 47: List of ethnic groups in Chad during 1983-2013.

Conflicts in Chad

Starting on 1966-07-31

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Chad	Frolinat	Toubou	1966-07-31	Presumed	Yes	Yes
Government of Chad	Frolinat	Muslim Sahel groups	1966-07-31	Presumed	Yes	Yes
Government of Chad	First Liberation Army	Muslim Sahel groups	1971-01-09	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	First Liberation Army	Toubou	1971-01-09	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	Second Liberation Army	Toubou	1971-01-22	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	FAN	Toubou	1976-02-18	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	FAP	Toubou	1977-06-21	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	FAP	Arabs	1977-06-21	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	FAP	Muslim Sahel groups	1977-06-21	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	FAT	Sara	1982-08-27	No	Yes, from EGIP	
Government of Chad	GUNT	Toubou	1983-01-13	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	GUNT	Arabs	1983-01-13	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	GUNT	Sara	1983-01-13	No	Yes, from EGIP	
Government of Chad	GUNT	Muslim Sahel groups	1983-01-13	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	CDR	Arabs	1987-01-02	No	No	
Government of Chad	Islamic Legion	Zaghawa, Bideyat	1987-11-22	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	MOSANAT	Hadjerai	1988-12-19	Explicit	Yes	No
Government of Chad	Revolutionary Forces of 1 April	Zaghawa, Bideyat	1989-10-20	Presumed	Yes	
Government of Chad	MPS	Zaghawa, Bideyat	1990-03-31	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Chad	MPS	Hadjerai	1990-03-31	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Chad	Military faction (forces of Maldoum Bada Abbas)	Hadjerai	1991-10-13	Explicit	Yes	
Government of Chad	MDD		1991-12-31			
Government of Chad	CSNPD	Sara	1992-02-21	Explicit	Yes	No
Government of Chad	CNR	Zaghawa, Bideyat	1992-06-21	No	Yes	
Government of Chad	FNT	Zaghawa, Bideyat	1992-12-31	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	FARF	Sara	1994-08-12	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	MDJT	Toubou	1999-02-05	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Chad	FUCD	Tamas	2005-12-18	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	RAFD	Zaghawa, Bideyat	2006-06-04	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	UFDD	Arabs	2006-10-23	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	UFDD	Zaghawa, Bideyat	2006-10-23	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	UFDD	Toubou	2006-10-23	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	PFNR		2007-12-06			
Government of Chad	AN	Zaghawa, Bideyat	2008-02-02	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	AN	Arabs	2008-02-02	No	Yes	No
Government of Chad	AN	Toubou	2008-02-02	No	Yes	No

Starting on 1983-04-18

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Chad	Government of Nigeria		1983-04-18			

Starting on 1987-08-08

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Chad	Government of Libya		1987-08-08			