

# Congo, DRC

## *Ethnicity in Congo, DRC*

### *Group selection*

The coding of the DR Congo /Zaire is particularly difficult, because central authority has generally remained rather weak. Congo has faced many challenges to its territorial integrity, either by secession or by external intervention. This means that during significant periods since independence the country was not under (complete) control of the central government or the government itself was mainly controlled by outsiders. Though ethnicity constantly played a role in Congolese politics, this was mainly true for the local and provincial level. Things are further complicated by the fact that some relevant groups do not hold Congolese citizenship, e.g. parts of the Banyarwanda/Banyamulenge living in eastern Congo. Their citizenship rights have been changed several times, but the group has been included during all time periods. Now signs of political mobilization and relevance of the Azande-Mangbetu cluster have been found, neither with regard to some organization or ethnic voting patterns. The Group has therefore been coded as being irrelevant for the entire period from 1960 to 2013.

### *Power relations*

*1960-1965:* The Belgian Congo achieved independence on 30.6.1960. Hence, the coding period begins in 1960.

The newly independent state lost most of its functions during its first days. Triggered by a mutiny of Congolese soldiers in the army, the plan of the Belgian administration to design a post-independence transition with an army and national bureaucracy firmly in the hands of Belgians fell apart. Almost all Belgian soldiers and bureaucrats (all of them occupying the highest echelons of the organizations) were removed – except for those in the state of Katanga that quickly announced its secession from the Republic of the Congo, retaining its Belgian base <sup>(778)</sup>. The lack of competent personnel left the Republican state of the Congo without the capability to fulfill its functions. Young <sup>(779)</sup> concludes that during these early years, the provinces of the later DRC were practically independent, nurtured by lump-sum payments from the central government, with their own budgetary autonomy and the police forces under control, which were at least equivalent to the national army in size and equipment. As the provinces were drawn up along ethnic lines, all ethnic groups are

<sup>778</sup> [Young, 1966a]

<sup>779</sup> [Young, 1966a]

coded as having regional autonomy for this early period.

The years 1960 to 1965 are also described as the Congo Crisis. Far from being consolidated, executive power changed hands often, with major involvement of foreign actors amounting partly to a proxy-war of the Cold War. After the first election in 1960, Kasavubu, a Bakongo from the party ABAKO (Alliance des Bakongo), was named president (<sup>780</sup>) (Bakongo = Senior Partner in 1960). He remained in office until 1965. Patrice Lumumba, an ethnic Tetela-Tusu, was appointed as prime-minister but was quickly removed in September 1960 by the president (Tetela-Kusu = Junior Partner in 1960, powerless afterwards). Few days later, Mobutu (an ethnic Ngabandi = powerless in 1960, as no minister; <sup>781</sup>), a high-rank military official at the time, led his first coup d'état, leading to a further escalation of the situation and the establishment of a parallel government in Stanleyville in the Eastern province (which was rather short-lived). Mobutu held power with the support of the so-called "Binzu group", a connection of a few political elites not including the president, until 1964. The large inequalities between the state personnel and the population was perceived, so Young (<sup>782</sup>, p. 26), through an ethnic lens. Especially the Tetela-Kusu "saw the government as controlled by groups hostile to them", which is not surprising after the assassination of their co-ethnic Lumumba. Therefore, they are coded as being powerless.

<sup>780</sup> [Young, 1966b]

<sup>781</sup> [Morrison, Mitchell and Paden, 1989]

<sup>782</sup> [Young, 1966b]

On the ethnic composition of the inner power circle no much is known. President Kasavubu is an ethnic Bakongo, wherefore the group is coded as Junior Partner from 1961 on, given the limited power the president had at the time vis-a-vis Mobutu and his group. Mobutu is an ethnic Ngabandi, coded as the Senior Partner here given the dominant role he had in the power constellation. Furthermore, prime minister Cyrille Adoula, who succeeded Lumumba in the government is an ethnic Mongo (who also had an own party at the time). Hence, the group is coded as another junior partner in the government. No further ethnic information is available for the other members of the Binzu group.

Furthermore, the Lunda are coded as self-excluded with regional autonomy for the year 1961-1963. Their king Tschombé led the secessionist struggle against the state and later UN forces that ended with his defeat in 1963. In the following year, they are coded as powerless, mirroring Tschombes (short) time in exile. However, in July 1964 he was named prime minister, making the Lunda junior partner in the government.

The Luba Shaba are reported to have been mobilized in the Party BALUBAKAT, that allied with Lumumba in 1960. They are, consistent with reports in Morrison et al (<sup>783</sup>) about Luba ministers in his cabinet, coded as Junior Partners. They are considered powerless during the time of the Katangan autonomy, as all power over Katanga was in the hands of Tschombe and his allies. No signs of later inclusion into the national government has been found. So, they are coded as being powerless for the period.

<sup>783</sup> [Morrison, Mitchell and Paden, 1989]

The Luba Kasai, under the leadership of Kalonji, proclaimed independence in 1960 before the independence of the Congo itself, holding this status until 1961 when he was arrested (he managed to break free in the following). This is taken as a sign of the Luba Kasai's powerlessness in the following years.

No other information either on the political mobilization or representation of all other ethnic groups has been found. They are therefore coded as being irrelevant. Given the scarcity of information on the ethnic composition of the inner power circle in Kinshasa and the fragmented nature of the early Congolese state, split almost in four parts with one government in Leopoldville, another, parallel one in Stanleyville led by loyalists to the dead Lumumba around A. Gizenga in 1961, as well as the two secessionist regions Kasai and Katanga, this coding is based on the information available and must be taken as a "best guess". Given the number of insurgencies, including the Simba Rebellion of 1964 which might have had ethnic motivations (alongside ideological reasons), further investigation might be reasonable.

*1966-1990:* With the centralization under Mobutu, groups started to compete for access to central government. He established a one party state around the Mouvement Populaire de Revolution (MPR). During the first years of his rule Mobutu officially concentrated on the promotion of national identity and his campaign of ethno-authenticite (Zairian nationalism); ethnically based parties were forbidden, but it seems that his regime merely reduced the visibility of ethnicity in politics. The PREG data stress that the Ngbandi, Mobutu's group, came to dominate the political center, though his regime seemed to be quite representative in the beginning. However, there was widespread perception by many groups that the Ngbandi (and the other groups of Equateur (Lingala speakers) were dominating the others (<sup>784</sup>, 153-154).

<sup>784</sup> [Young, 1976]

Most important units were placed under the command of the Ngbandi group or even relatives of Mobutu. The command as well as the majority of the soldiers of the Special Presidential Division, the head of the Special Research and Surveillance Brigade, the head of the National Intelligence and Protection Service were Ngbandi. Another important part of the Special Presidential Division came from the Ngbaka ethnic group, living in the Equator province. The Military Action and Intelligence Service was headed by a Mbunza (in the coding Mbandja), another group from Equator province (<sup>785</sup>, pp.154). Thus, Mobutu's group is coded Senior Partner while the other groups from Equator province are coded Junior Partner. All others are coded powerless.

<sup>785</sup> [Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002]

Only in the case of the Banyarwanda, there can be some doubt if they really have been powerless because of Barthélémy Bisengimana of Rwandan origin who was director of the presidential office from 1969 to 1977 and had an important role in pursuing the interests of the Banyarwanda. Under his influence, Mobutu granted citizenship

to inhabitants of Rwandan origin (<sup>786</sup>). However, he lost his post in 1977 and citizenship was again withdrawn from the Banyarwanda in 1981. The Banyarwanda seem therefore powerless for most of this period and are coded accordingly. In contrast to the other ethnic groups, there was no information available on the Lunda-Yeke for this period and therefore coded them irrelevant. Generally, the inner core of Mobutu's power maintenance was distinctly Ngbandi, Lingalaphone and based on other groups of the Equator province (<sup>787</sup>, 244).

<sup>786</sup> [Indongo-Imbanda, n.d.]

*1991-1997:* This period could be coded as state collapse according to some sources since the regime increasingly disintegrated and lost authority while external assistance was cut off (<sup>788</sup>, 152). Mobutu did not even dare anymore to be in the capital city, but mainly staid in his palace at the border to CAR and Congo-Brazzaville. However, there was not a complete loss of power and Mobutu was still strong enough to counter attempts to install political pluralism and a multi-party system after the National Conference in 1992. This Conference had been announced in 1990 by Mobutu under increasing pressure. The National Conference exposed (ethnic) tensions in Zaire, e.g. the representatives from North and South Kivu used conference to attack Kinyarwanda speakers in their regions (Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge).

<sup>787</sup> [Jewsiewicki and Buleli, 2004]

<sup>788</sup> [Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002]

By 1993 armed groups started to attack Banyarwanda in North Kivu. Mobutu allowed Interahamwe and ex-FAR elements (Hutu extremists involved in the Rwandan genocide) to reorganise on Zairian territory and to attack Rwanda and the Banyamulenge in South Kivu; throughout the 1990s Mobutu's regime had manipulated ethnic tensions and excluded Tutsi foreigners (<sup>789</sup>, 143). Mobutu's regime increasingly fanned the flames of ethnic hatred in the eastern part of Zaire (<sup>790</sup>, 55). Therefore Tutsi-Banyamulenge are coded as discriminated for this period. All other groups remain in the same position, though the significant loss of power of Mobutu's regime has to be kept in mind.

<sup>789</sup> [Dunn, 2003]

<sup>790</sup> [Dunn, 2003]

*1998:* This is the first period under Laurent Kabila who took power by force from Mobutu in 1997 with major support from Rwanda and Uganda. His regime remained highly dependent on the Rwandan and the Ugandan governments and on Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulenge). For example, the Army chief of staff was a Rwandan Tutsi, the Chief of national security was a Ugandan Tutsi and the Foreign Minister was Rwandan Tutsi (<sup>791</sup>, 112). Basically the narrow domestic support base of Kabila included Tutsi soldiers including Banyamulenge, Katangans and Kadogos (young men recruited during march to Kinshasa) (<sup>792</sup>, 113). Though external support has been tremendous during this period, the Tutsi-Banyamulenge were thus coded as Senior Partner (esp. since the foreign Tutsi support mainly concentrated on securing their position) and Katangese (Kabila's group) as junior partner (in the coding Luba-Shaba and Lunda-Yeke). All

<sup>791</sup> [Afoaku, 2002]

<sup>792</sup> [Afoaku, 2002]

other groups are powerless.

In 1998, a split between Kabila and his former supporters led to the second Congo War which again changed the power configuration at the centre.

*1999-2003:* In 1998 Kabila ended the military presence of Rwanda and Uganda; he reduced the Tutsi influence in cabinet by appointing candidates from Northern Katanga (<sup>793</sup>, 62, 67); but most importantly, he initiated programs against Congolese Tutsi in major cities while eastern brigades in Goma and Bukavu declare desertion (<sup>794</sup>, 115). But the Kabila government remained divided between Kivu and Katanga factions, the latter in turn split between Luba-Katanga/Shaba (ethnic group of Laurent Kabila's father) and Lunda (ethnic group of his mother) (<sup>795</sup>). About two thirds of the Congolese territory (eastern part) were not under the control of Kabila's central government. However, as the central government was still formally in place and had at last some power over the country and state institutions, this period does not amount to state collapse.

<sup>793</sup> [Dunn, 2003]

<sup>794</sup> [Afoaku, 2002]

<sup>795</sup> [Turner, 2000]

*2004-2005:* Laurent Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and his son, Joseph Kabila, inherited his position as president of DR Congo. Joseph Kabila appeared much more moderate than his father and cleared the way for new peace negotiations. However, the power configuration at the centre only changed with the installation of the transitional government in 2003. Joseph Kabila remained as president with four vice presidents (Jean-Pierre Bemba, Azarias Ruberwa, Abdoulaye Yrodia and Arthur Zahidi Ngoma) representing the former government, former rebel groups, and the political opposition. The ministers of the transitional government mainly came from Kabila's group (AFDL), the two strongest rebel groups RCD-Goma und MLC, from the smaller groups of RCD-N and Mai-Mai fighters. The bigger and well-known democratic parties of Congo were basically excluded from power (<sup>796</sup>). Since Kabila remained president, the groups building his main power base were coded Senior Partner while all other groups included in the power sharing arrangement are coded Junior Partners. Bemba's MLC had its power base in Equateur region while the Mai Mai are mainly in the Kivu regions representing the "indigenous communities" vis-a-vis the Rwandophone communities. With regard to the RCD groups, the real power base is hard to define, because as an ICG report states: "Since 1998, the RCD has split into several different movements which have all gone off in search of other sponsors. The leadership of the RCD-Goma has changed hands three times in three years and currently there are six RCD factions, which means the original core is melting away." (<sup>797</sup>, p. 14). Generally the RCD is (perceived to be) Banyamulenge-dominated. Therefore, these are coded as Junior Partner as well.

<sup>796</sup> [Kenga, 2003]

<sup>797</sup> [ICG, 2002]

There was no information available on the other ethnic groups, esp. the Bakongo and Mongo and therefore coded them powerless. This point might need further investigation. Generally, the configuration

of central government in Congo at this point is rather misleading or as one author stated "smokescreen" as fighting continued in Eastern DRC between those groups included in the central government (e.g. RCD-G against Mai-Mai or the Kabila group).

*2006:* Elections in 2006. Transitional government until new government was installed in December 2006. Thus, the year is added to the foregoing period.

*2007-2011:* Joseph Kabila elected president. Since the MLC and therefore, Equateur groups are not represented in the government anymore, Mbandja, Ngbaka and Ngbandi have been changed to powerless. "The results of the 2006 elections revealed a striking division of the country between the west and the east, where President Kabila carried a huge victory. The western parts voted unambiguously against Kabila, and there is a high degree of resentment toward the president and what many perceive as his eastern mafia entourage from the Kivus, Maniema and Katanga" (798). Although his election rested on a political alliance assembling about 25 parties, Kabila dominates the DRC's political system completely. During the period under review, the executive more precisely, President Kabila has had a monopoly on power. Kabila has been able to exercise power vested in the prime minister's office in part due to the fact that the 2006 constitution allows for a strong semi-presidential system, but also because the octogenarian Gizenga made for a weak figure during his tenure (2007-2008) as prime minister (799). Thus, the ethnic groups belonging to Kabila's power base - Luba-Shaba, Lunda-Yeke, and the category of "Other Kivu groups" - are coded as senior or junior partners. In contrast, groups from the western part of the country - which overwhelmingly voted for Bemba - are coded as powerless. The Banyamulenge are generally considered to be discriminated in the DRC's current political landscape: "Minority groups are not denied civic rights as a matter of government policy, but some measure of discrimination exists in some parts of the country. In North Kivu and South Kivu, the Congolese nationality of Rwandophone minorities continues to be questioned by ethnic majority groups" (800). "Which groups could really be identified as being discriminated? The Congolese with Rwandan ancestry for sure. There is still a lot of hate propaganda against them, by all politicians, including Kabila" (E-mail contact with Severine Autesserre, Congo expert).

<sup>798</sup> [Bertelsmann Country Report, 2009-2014]

<sup>799</sup> [Bertelsmann Country Report, 2009-2014]

<sup>800</sup> [Bertelsmann Country Report, 2009-2014]

*2012-2013:* J. Kabila was reelected in a fraudulent election in November 2011 (<sup>801</sup>) running against former prime minister Tshisekedi. The election again showed the same East-West (or Lingala-Swahili) divide as in 2006 (<sup>802</sup>). Bemba, head of the MNC-L and on trial in The Hague, took an anti-Kabila stance in the elections (<sup>803</sup>); hence, the traditional strongholds of the MNC-L (Lulu, Mongo and Tetela) are coded as being powerless for the period. Furthermore, Tshisekedi lost the second round of the election, suggesting that his ethnic support base, the Luba Kasai should also be coded as powerless group. Kabila partnered up with the PALU, having its electoral base in the Eastern Badundu Province. However, PALU is reported to have no support among the Bakongos (<sup>804</sup>).

Kabila has not fully renovated his cabinet, except for exchanging Muziot (PALU) for Augustin M. Ponyo (PALU) as his prime minister and minor reshuffles of the ministers. Given this combination of a persistent government and an East-West divide, with some of the Eastern groups voting for the opposition, this period was coded as having the same power constellation as the years 2006-2011.

<sup>801</sup> [Bertelsmann Country Report, 2009-2014]

<sup>802</sup> [BBC, 2011]

<sup>803</sup> [Congo Planet, 2012]

<sup>804</sup> [Open Democracy, 2007]



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## Political status of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC

*From 1960 until 1960*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Mongo	0.16	JUNIOR PARTNER
Bakongo	0.103	SENIOR PARTNER
Tetela-Kusu	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Luba Kasai	0.07	SELF-EXCLUSION
Azande-Mangbetu cluster	0.07	IRRELEVANT
Lunda-Yeke	0.056	POWERLESS
Lulua	0.05	IRRELEVANT
Other Kivu groups	0.05	IRRELEVANT
Luba Shaba	0.05	JUNIOR PARTNER
Mbandja	0.04	IRRELEVANT
Ngbaka	0.02	IRRELEVANT
Ngbandi	0.02	POWERLESS
Tutsi-Banyamulenge	0.02	IRRELEVANT




Figure 184: Political status of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC during 1960-1960.

*From 1961 until 1961*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Mongo	0.16	JUNIOR PARTNER
Bakongo	0.103	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tetela-Kusu	0.08	POWERLESS
Azande-Mangbetu cluster	0.07	IRRELEVANT
Luba Kasai	0.07	SELF-EXCLUSION
Lunda-Yeke	0.056	SELF-EXCLUSION
Luba Shaba	0.05	POWERLESS
Lulua	0.05	IRRELEVANT
Other Kivu groups	0.05	IRRELEVANT
Mbandja	0.04	IRRELEVANT
Ngbaka	0.02	IRRELEVANT
Ngbandi	0.02	SENIOR PARTNER
Tutsi-Banyamulenge	0.02	IRRELEVANT



Figure 185: Political status of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC during 1961-1961.

*From 1962 until 1963*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Mongo	0.16	JUNIOR PARTNER
Bakongo	0.103	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tetela-Kusu	0.08	POWERLESS
Luba Kasai	0.07	POWERLESS
Azande-Mangbetu cluster	0.07	IRRELEVANT
Lunda-Yeke	0.056	SELF-EXCLUSION
Lulua	0.05	IRRELEVANT
Other Kivu groups	0.05	IRRELEVANT
Luba Shaba	0.05	POWERLESS
Mbandja	0.04	IRRELEVANT
Ngbaka	0.02	IRRELEVANT
Ngbandi	0.02	SENIOR PARTNER
Tutsi-Banyamulenge	0.02	IRRELEVANT




Figure 186: Political status of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC during 1962-1963.

*From 1964 until 1964*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Mongo	0.16	JUNIOR PARTNER
Bakongo	0.103	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tetela-Kusu	0.08	POWERLESS
Luba Kasai	0.07	POWERLESS
Azande-Mangbetu cluster	0.07	IRRELEVANT
Lunda-Yeke	0.056	POWERLESS
Lulua	0.05	IRRELEVANT
Luba Shaba	0.05	POWERLESS
Other Kivu groups	0.05	IRRELEVANT
Mbandja	0.04	IRRELEVANT
Ngbaka	0.02	IRRELEVANT
Ngbandi	0.02	SENIOR PARTNER
Tutsi-Banyamulenge	0.02	IRRELEVANT




Figure 187: Political status of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC during 1964-1964.

*From 1965 until 1965*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Mongo	0.16	JUNIOR PARTNER
Bakongo	0.103	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tetela-Kusu	0.08	POWERLESS
Luba Kasai	0.07	POWERLESS
Azande-Mangbetu cluster	0.07	IRRELEVANT
Lunda-Yeke	0.056	JUNIOR PARTNER
Luba Shaba	0.05	POWERLESS
Lulua	0.05	IRRELEVANT
Other Kivu groups	0.05	IRRELEVANT
Mbandja	0.04	IRRELEVANT
Tutsi-Banyamulenge	0.02	IRRELEVANT
Ngbaka	0.02	IRRELEVANT
Ngbandi	0.02	SENIOR PARTNER




Figure 188: Political status of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC during 1965-1965.

*From 1966 until 1990*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Mongo	0.16	POWERLESS
Bakongo	0.103	POWERLESS
Tetela-Kusu	0.08	POWERLESS
Luba Kasai	0.07	POWERLESS
Azande-Mangbetu cluster	0.07	IRRELEVANT
Lunda-Yeke	0.056	IRRELEVANT
Lulua	0.05	POWERLESS
Other Kivu groups	0.05	POWERLESS
Luba Shaba	0.05	POWERLESS
Mbandja	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tutsi-Banyamulenge	0.02	POWERLESS
Ngbaka	0.02	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ngbandi	0.02	SENIOR PARTNER




Figure 189: Political status of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC during 1966-1990.

*From 1991 until 1997*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Mongo	0.16	POWERLESS
Bakongo	0.103	POWERLESS
Tetela-Kusu	0.08	POWERLESS
Azande-Mangbetu cluster	0.07	IRRELEVANT
Luba Kasai	0.07	POWERLESS
Lunda-Yeke	0.056	IRRELEVANT
Other Kivu groups	0.05	POWERLESS
Luba Shaba	0.05	POWERLESS
Lulua	0.05	POWERLESS
Mbandja	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tutsi-Banyamulenge	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Ngbaka	0.02	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ngbandi	0.02	SENIOR PARTNER




Figure 190: Political status of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC during 1991-1997.

*From 1998 until 1998*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Mongo	0.16	POWERLESS
Bakongo	0.103	POWERLESS
Tetela-Kusu	0.08	POWERLESS
Azande-Mangbetu cluster	0.07	IRRELEVANT
Luba Kasai	0.07	POWERLESS
Lunda-Yeke	0.056	JUNIOR PARTNER
Lulua	0.05	POWERLESS
Other Kivu groups	0.05	POWERLESS
Luba Shaba	0.05	JUNIOR PARTNER
Mbandja	0.04	POWERLESS
Tutsi-Banyamulenge	0.02	SENIOR PARTNER
Ngbaka	0.02	POWERLESS
Ngbandi	0.02	POWERLESS




Figure 191: Political status of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC during 1998-1998.

*From 1999 until 2003*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Mongo	0.16	POWERLESS
Bakongo	0.103	POWERLESS
Tetela-Kusu	0.08	POWERLESS
Azande-Mangbetu cluster	0.07	IRRELEVANT
Luba Kasai	0.07	POWERLESS
Lunda-Yeke	0.056	JUNIOR PARTNER
Luba Shaba	0.05	SENIOR PARTNER
Lulua	0.05	POWERLESS
Other Kivu groups	0.05	JUNIOR PARTNER
Mbandja	0.04	POWERLESS
Ngbandi	0.02	POWERLESS
Ngbaka	0.02	POWERLESS
Tutsi-Banyamulenge	0.02	DISCRIMINATED




Figure 192: Political status of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC during 1999-2003.

*From 2004 until 2006*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Mongo	0.16	POWERLESS
Bakongo	0.103	POWERLESS
Tetela-Kusu	0.08	POWERLESS
Luba Kasai	0.07	POWERLESS
Azande-Mangbetu cluster	0.07	IRRELEVANT
Lunda-Yeke	0.056	SENIOR PARTNER
Other Kivu groups	0.05	JUNIOR PARTNER
Lulua	0.05	POWERLESS
Luba Shaba	0.05	SENIOR PARTNER
Mbandja	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tutsi-Banyamulenge	0.02	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ngbaka	0.02	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ngbandi	0.02	JUNIOR PARTNER




Figure 193: Political status of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC during 2004-2006.

*From 2007 until 2013*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Mongo	0.16	POWERLESS
Bakongo	0.103	POWERLESS
Tetela-Kusu	0.08	POWERLESS
Azande-Mangbetu cluster	0.07	IRRELEVANT
Luba Kasai	0.07	POWERLESS
Lunda-Yeke	0.056	SENIOR PARTNER
Lulua	0.05	POWERLESS
Other Kivu groups	0.05	JUNIOR PARTNER
Luba Shaba	0.05	SENIOR PARTNER
Mbandja	0.04	POWERLESS
Tutsi-Banyamulenge	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Ngbandi	0.02	POWERLESS
Ngbaka	0.02	POWERLESS




Figure 194: Political status of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC during 2007-2013.

## Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC

*From 1960 until 1993*




Figure 195: Map of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC during 2007-2013.

Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
Tetela-Kusu	552 740	Regionally based
Mongo	552 740	Regionally based
Lunda-Yeke	492 778	Regionally based
Luba Kasai	326 251	Regionally based
Azande-Mangbetu cluster	247 798	Regionally based
Bakongo	157 006	Regionally based
Luba Shaba	111 801	Regionally based
Other Kivu groups	65 914	Regionally based
Lulua	51 905	Regionally based
Tutsi-Banyamulenge	35 297	Regionally based
Ngbandi	32 510	Regionally based
Mbandja	26 684	Regionally based
Ngbaka	19 948	Regionally based

Table 57: List of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC during 1960-1993.

*From 1994 until 2013*




Figure 196: Map of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC during 2007-2013.

Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
Tetela-Kusu	552 740	Regionally based
Mongo	552 740	Regionally based
Lunda-Yeke	492 778	Regionally based
Azande-Mangbetu cluster	247 798	Regionally based
Luba Kasai	163 773	Regionally based
Bakongo	157 006	Regionally based
Luba Shaba	111 801	Regionally based
Other Kivu groups	65 914	Regionally based
Lulua	51 905	Regionally based
Tutsi-Banyamulenge	35 297	Regionally based
Ngbandi	32 510	Regionally based
Mbandja	26 684	Regionally based
Ngbaka	19 948	Regionally based

Table 58: List of ethnic groups in Congo, DRC during 1994-2013.



## *Conflicts in Congo, DRC*

*Starting on 1960-08-31*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	Independent Mining State of South Kasai	Luba Kasai	1960-08-31	Explicit	Yes	Yes

*Starting on 1961-10-27*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	State of Katanga	Lunda-Yeke	1961-10-27	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	Kata Katanga	Lunda-Yeke	2011-12-04	Presumed	Yes	No

*Starting on 1964-01-18*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	CNL	Tetela-Kusu	1964-01-18	No	Yes	Yes
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	Military Faction (Forces of Jean Schramme)	Lunda-Yeke	1967-07-05	No	No	No
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	FLNC	Luba Shaba	1977-03-08	No	Yes	No
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	FLNC	Lunda-Yeke	1977-03-08	No	Yes	No
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	AFDL	Tutsi-Banyamulenge	1996-10-18	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	RCD	Tutsi-Banyamulenge	1998-08-01	Explicit	Yes	No
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	MLC	Mbandja	1998-11-01	Presumed	Yes	Yes
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	MLC	Mongo	1998-11-01	Presumed	Yes	Yes
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	MLC	Ngbaka	1998-11-01	Presumed	Yes	Yes
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	MLC	Ngbandi	1998-11-01	Presumed	Yes	Yes
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	CNDP	Tutsi-Banyamulenge	2006-01-18	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	M23	Tutsi-Banyamulenge	2012-05-09	Explicit	Yes	
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	APCLS		2012-10-06			
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	Forces of Paul Joseph Mukungubila	Luba Shaba	2013-12-30	Presumed		

*Starting on 1998-07-02*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	BDK	Bakongo	1998-07-02	Explicit	Yes	No