

Cote d'Ivoire

Ethnicity in Cote d'Ivoire

Group selection

Côte d'Ivoire consists of over 60 ethnic groups. The northwestern Mandé (Malinké, and Dioula) groups and the northeastern Voltaic (Senoufo, Lobi, Kulango and other) groups are combined into one single ethnic category of “northerners”, due to their common Muslim faith and because they have come to be seen this way by the groups from the southern half of the country. In fact, the term “Dioula” is commonly used to refer to northerners in general (⁸²⁸, 197; ⁸²⁹, 681; ⁸³⁰, 11). The southern Mandé peoples (for example, the Yacouba and Gouro) are culturally distinct from the northern groups (⁸³¹, 197).

⁸²⁸ [Bouquet, 2011]

⁸²⁹ [Chappell, 1989]

⁸³⁰ [Skogseth, 2006]

⁸³¹ [Bouquet, 2011]

The southeast is generally populated by Akan peoples, of which the Baule are the most important group in political terms. The country's “founding father”, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, hails from this group which has long dominated Côte d'Ivoire's political and social life. Other Akan groups are the Abron, Agni, and the Lagoon peoples (⁸³², 197; ⁸³³), which are relevant above all in their distinction to the Baule. Therefore, they are combined into one single ethnic cluster. Finally, the Kru are composed of the Bété, Dida, Guéré and other sub-groups, of which the Bété are the largest and politically most relevant.

⁸³² [Bouquet, 2011]

⁸³³ [Seibel et al., 1987]

Group sizes:

- Baule: 20% (⁸³⁴ 2003). (Note that the term Baule, common in the English-speaking literature, is used rather than the French term Baoulé, which is much more frequent.)
- Other Akans: Size of whole Akan population (42% according to ⁸³⁵ and ⁸³⁶ (2001)) MINUS ⁸³⁷'s (2003) number for the "Baule" group = 22%.
- Kru: 11% (⁸³⁸ and ⁸³⁹ (2001)).
- Northerners: 34% (⁸⁴⁰).
- Southern Mande: 10% (⁸⁴¹).

⁸³⁴ [Fearon]

⁸³⁵ [CIA, 2014]

⁸³⁶ [Toungara]

⁸³⁷ [Fearon]

⁸³⁸ [CIA, 2014]

⁸³⁹ [Toungara]

⁸⁴⁰ [CIA, 2014]

⁸⁴¹ [CIA, 2014]

Power relations

1960-1993; Houphouët's rule: While building an ethnically highly inclusive regime, life-time president Houphouët-Boigny relied heavily on members of his own ethnic group to fill the key positions in the state apparatus, the state-run companies, and the security sector (842, 690; 843, 844, 31; 845, 144; 846, 39; 847, 146, 154-6). He portrayed his Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) as a pan-ethnic party, and he did indeed achieve a high degree of ethnic inclusion and trans-ethnic cooperation (848, 120, 130-2; 849, 42). Both his governments and the party leadership included most relevant ethnic groups (850; 851). Thus Baule are coded as "senior partner" in a power-sharing regime. Other Akans coded as "junior partner".

842 [Chappell, 1989]
 843 [Gardinier, 1997]
 844 [Jakobeit, 1984]
 845 [Kanté, 1994]
 846 [Langer, 2005]

Northerners must also be coded as "junior partner" during this period because Houphouët's ruling coalition represented above all the political-economic alliance between his Baule group and northern leaders (852, 686; 853, 616, 620, 623; 854, 225; 855, 342-3; 856, 58; 857, 24-6; 858). Cocoa cultivation was largely controlled by Baule plantation owners who relied on workforce from the north and cooperated with northern transporters and traders (859, 76; 860, 647, 650-1). Also according to Jakobeit (861), the East and North (i.e. Akans and Northerners) were over-represented in the cabinet while at the same time, the inner circle of political and economic power was controlled by the Baule.

852 [Chappell, 1989]
 853 [Collett, 2006]
 854 [Crook, 1997]
 855 [Dozon, 1985a]
 856 [Dozon, 1985b]

In contrast, although there were token representatives of the group in the government and party leadership, the Kru were standing outside of this ethno-political alliance (862, 57-8, 80, 83; 863, 649, 654). Having overwhelmingly supported the Mouvement Socialiste Africain (MSA) – the only rival to Houphouët's PDCI – in the lead-up to the country's independence, they were sub-sequently treated with suspicion by the PDCI single-party regime (864, 59, 83). As a result, they were completely powerless in the face of the internal agricultural colonization of their traditional territories – including state-led land expropriations – by Baule, northerners, and immigrants from other African countries (865, 211-3; 866, 342-3; 867, 56-8, 69-73; 868, 85; 869). This inability of the western Kru groups to defend their rights at the level of the central state is interpreted here as a sign of them being mostly politically powerless, despite their formal representation within government structures. Therefore, the Kru are coded as "powerless".

862 [Dozon, 1985b]
 863 [Woods, 2003]

864 [Dozon, 1985b]

865 [Bouquet, 2011]
 866 [Dozon, 1985a]

There was no evidence for the political relevance of the Southern Mande group in this first period. They are thus coded as "irrelevant".

1994-1999; From Bédié's coming into power until Gueï's coup:

Houphouët ruled the country until he died in December 1993 and was succeeded by Henri Konan Bédié, another Baule. After Houphouët's death, the old alliances between the different Ivoirian elite factions disintegrated rapidly – even the historical alliance between the Baule and the north (⁸⁷⁰, 225; ⁸⁷¹, 649) – and ethnic mobilization increased significantly. At the forefront was the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), a formerly illegal opposition party, founded by Laurent Gbagbo, a Bété from the southwest, during the one-party regime. Representing the interests of the Kru people, already in the 1990 multi-party elections the FPI had campaigned on a xenophobic and ethno-nationalist platform decrying Baule political dominance, the discrimination of the Kru, and the flooding of the country with foreign workers (⁸⁷², 220-3; ⁸⁷³, 649). The PDCI under Bédié became now an instrument of Baule/Akan ethno-nationalism (⁸⁷⁴, 214; ⁸⁷⁵, ⁸⁷⁶; ⁸⁷⁷). Moreover, in 1994, PDCI dissidents formed the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) in support of former prime minister Alassane Ouattara, which started out as a non-ethnic reformist party, but due to Ouattara's own northern identity and the PDCI's aggressive ethno-nationalist course, the party soon developed into the political home of the northerners (⁸⁷⁸; ⁸⁷⁹; ⁸⁸⁰). In this process, it took up the messages of an anonymous document that was published after Houphouët's death, called the "Charter of the North", which demanded, among other things, an ending of "Baule nepotism" and the reduction of regional economic inequalities (⁸⁸¹, 226). In short, in all national and local elections in the 1990s, voting patterns clearly followed ethno-regional lines (⁸⁸²; ⁸⁸³ 2001).

Meanwhile, Bédié found himself in a weak political position. He lacked Houphouët's personal charisma, and while the old trans-ethnic alliances around the former long-time ruler were falling apart, he was also confronted by new, ambitious opposition parties, and was faced to deal with a precarious economic situation. The FPI's rhetoric appealing to and instrumentalizing growing anti-foreigner and anti-northern sentiments in the south threatened to take away much of Bédié's support in these regions. Moreover, Ouattara appeared as a dangerous future rival, and in spite of the party's non-ethnic beginning, it was clear that the RDR had a great electoral potential in the north. These two factors pushed Bédié to adopt and appropriate the FPI's nationalist agenda. Together with a close circle of university intellectuals, he developed the concept of "Ivoirité" ("Ivoirianness") which established new, "scientific" criteria for citizenship based on an Akan – or more specifically, a Baule – cultural identity (⁸⁸⁴, 26-30, 214; ⁸⁸⁵, 17). Hence, Bédié and his ideologues invented a new vision of who was a "true" Ivoirian – and, by implication, who was not a true Ivoirian.

In practice, the new electoral code introduced in 1994 stipulated that candidates for the Presidency and the National Assembly had to be born in the country, with both parents also being Ivoirians by birth, while foreigners were no longer allowed to vote (⁸⁸⁶, 625; ⁸⁸⁷,

⁸⁷⁰ [Crook, 1997]

⁸⁷¹ [Woods, 2003]

⁸⁷² [Crook, 1997]

⁸⁷³ [Woods, 2003]

⁸⁷⁴ [Bouquet, 2011]

⁸⁸⁴ [Bouquet, 2011]

⁸⁸⁵ [McGovern, 2011]

⁸⁸⁶ [Collett, 2006]

⁸⁸⁷ [Langer, 2005]

33; ⁸⁸⁸, 649). In this way, Bédié achieved to block the political aspirations of his most dangerous rival Ouattara – whose precise national origins are somewhat unclear – by barring him from running in the 1995 presidential election. (It has repeatedly been asserted that either Ouattara's father or his mother was born in Burkina Faso.) Moreover, in a major purge of all political institutions, he replaced Ouattara loyalists from the north by Baule elites loyal to himself (⁸⁸⁹, 226; ⁸⁹⁰, 33, 41; ⁸⁹¹, 14).

Besides the ethnic exclusion at the elite level, the concept of Ivoirité also had severe consequences for the ordinary population from the north. Because of the blurry boundaries between “original” Ivoirians from the north, second- or third-generation immigrants from northern neighboring countries and more recent immigrants, and the ethno-linguistic connections between them, northerners had increasingly become equated with foreigners. Being “Dioula”, Muslim, and RDR partisan became completely intermixed in the perception of other Ivoirians (⁸⁹², 89-90). As a consequence, with the institutionalization of the concept of Ivoirité, millions of ordinary Ivoirians from the north became excluded from the “national community” and from citizenship (⁸⁹³; ⁸⁹⁴, 33; ⁸⁹⁵, 15; ⁸⁹⁶, 652). Thus, the northerners are coded as “discriminated” during this period.

According to Collett (⁸⁹⁷, 626), the Southern Mande in the far west faced similar discriminations as the northerners. Hence, the Southern Mande are also coded as “discriminated” here. Meanwhile, the Baule can still be seen as the “senior partner” in a power-sharing regime, with the other Akan groups as “junior partner”. The Kru remained mostly marginalized under Bédié. Thus, they are still coded as “powerless” in this period.

2000; Gueï's military junta: In December 1999, Côte d'Ivoire underwent its first military coup. A military junta led by General Robert Gueï, a Yacouba (Southern Mande), took over state power and formed a transitory government in January 2000, which promoted the idea of national integration and included all parties (⁸⁹⁸, 34, 41). Yet just four months later, Gueï changed his political objectives and excluded the RDR from his second transitional government. Moreover, the new constitution introduced in July 2000 still contained the controversial electoral code. Soon after, the Supreme Court rejected Ouattara's candidacy for both presidential and legislative elections. Also, after a failed coup attempt of northern military officers, several senior officers of northern origin were dismissed (⁸⁹⁹, 16). Hence, in practice, Gueï had now adopted Bédié's exclusionary policies (⁹⁰⁰, 626; ⁹⁰¹, 34, 41; ⁹⁰², 17). In accordance with the EPR coding rules, one can disregard the short period of northern inclusion and still code the group as “discriminated” in this year-long period.

In contrast, the Southern Mande rose to political prominence during Gueï's short rule. Langer (⁹⁰³, 40-1) shows that the group's relative representation in the government (and in the inner circle

⁸⁸⁸ [Woods, 2003]⁸⁸⁹ [Crook, 1997]⁸⁹⁰ [Langer, 2005]⁸⁹² [Bouquet, 2011]⁸⁹³ [Collett, 2006]⁸⁹⁴ [Langer, 2005]⁸⁹⁵ [Skogseth, 2006]⁸⁹⁶ [Woods, 2003]⁸⁹⁷ [Collett, 2006]⁸⁹⁸ [Langer, 2005]⁸⁹⁹ [Skogseth, 2006]⁹⁰⁰ [Collett, 2006]⁹⁰¹ [Langer, 2005]⁹⁰² [Skogseth, 2006]⁹⁰³ [Langer, 2005]

of power) increased dramatically in that year. At the same time, Gueï's alliance with Gbagbo also led to a much more prominent political position of the Kru group (⁹⁰⁴, 40-1). For the first time, the Kru moved closer to state power (⁹⁰⁵, 626). In general, during this time, a southern alliance developed between the Kru and the Akans/Baule directed against the northerners, the common "enemy" (⁹⁰⁶, 627; ⁹⁰⁷, 652). Hence, for the year of 2000, the Southern Mandé are coded as "senior partner" in a new power-sharing regime, with the Baule, other Akan groups, and the Kru as "junior partners".

⁹⁰⁴ [Langer, 2005]

⁹⁰⁵ [Collett, 2006]

⁹⁰⁶ [Collett, 2006]

⁹⁰⁷ [Woods, 2003]

2001-2002; Gbagbo's rule, first part: Against contrary announcements Gueï launched his own candidacy for the October 2000 presidential election with Laurent Gbagbo, his close collaborator, as the only serious rival participating. Apparently to his own surprise, Gueï lost the elections, and when he tried to rig the vote Gbagbo's party militants chased him out of office. Gbagbo then proclaimed himself president. The RDR, having peacefully boycotted the vote, called for new elections, but without success. In large-scale street protests, its supporters clashed with the security forces and radical FPI followers. The country's crisis now overwhelmingly became perceived as a conflict between north and south (⁹⁰⁸, 625, 627; ⁹⁰⁹, 641).

⁹⁰⁸ [Collett, 2006]

⁹⁰⁹ [Woods, 2003]

⁹¹⁰ [Langer, 2005]

Gbagbo continued with the politics of exclusion. Langer (⁹¹⁰, 42) holds that the new president "put his anti-Ouattara and anti-RDR rhetoric immediately into practice. In addition to their serious under-representation and lack of influence in the national assembly, Gbagbo effectively guaranteed that the northern ethnic elites were also deprived of any executive power, thereby aggravating the already existing feelings of political exclusion and inequality." Although he did form a government of national unity in August 2002, the four ministerial posts (out of 31) for the RDR were clearly too little, too late. Meanwhile, northern civilians – under the general suspicion of being foreigners – increasingly became the victims of systematic harassment by the security forces (⁹¹¹; Langer 2005, 34; McGovern 2011, 91; Skogseth 2006, 17, 23; ⁹¹², 642, 652-4). In fact, the violence against northerners became worse under Gbagbo, culminating in the infamous "Dioula hunts" (pogroms against northerners) (⁹¹³, 61-72). It was only logical then that Ivoirians from the north saw themselves treated as "second class citizens in their own country" (⁹¹⁴).

⁹¹¹ [IRIN News, 2005]

⁹¹² [Woods, 2003]

⁹¹³ [Bouquet, 2011]

⁹¹⁴ [IRIN News, 2005]

Like all Ivoirian rulers before him, Gbagbo counted on his own ethnic group in the state apparatus and the military. Consequently, the Kru now become the leading ethnic group in Côte d'Ivoire's politics (⁹¹⁵, 34, 41-2). The PDCI, mainly representing the Baule group, entered into a coalition with the FPI (⁹¹⁶, 29). Interestingly, soon after his ousting, Gueï reappeared at the head of a new political party – the UDPCI – that represented his home region (home to the Southern Mandé group), entering into a renewed alliance with Gbagbo and the FPI. This alliance lasted until the assassination of the UDPCI's secretary general in Ouagadougou in August 2002 and

⁹¹⁵ [Langer, 2005]

⁹¹⁶ [Skogseth, 2006]

Gueï's subsequent rupture with Gbagbo, just a few days before the outbreak of Côte d'Ivoire's civil war (⁹¹⁷, 82-98, 288-9). According to Langer (⁹¹⁸, 40), the Southern Mande were well represented in Gbagbo's governments.

⁹¹⁷ [Bouquet, 2011]

⁹¹⁸ [Langer, 2005]

Thus, this period is coded as a "southern" power-sharing regime, with the Kru as "senior partner" and the Baule, other Akans and the Southern Mande as "junior partners", whereas the northerners remain coded as "discriminated".

2003-2011; After the civil war: On September 19, 2002, rebellious soldiers from the north attacked the cities of Abidjan, Bouaké and Korhogo. The rebellion failed in Abidjan (where Gueï was killed) but was successful in the other two places resulting in the outbreak of a civil war. The rebels – the Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI) – quickly took the north and after several months of fighting, a cease-fire line was installed that effectively split the country in two halves. The MPCI, led by Guillaume Soro, a Catholic from the north, claimed to fight against the existing ethnic injustices and for equal rights for the people from the north (⁹¹⁹; ⁹²⁰, 35). Later, two other rebel movements emerged in the country's west: the MPIGO and the MJP, which soon joined the MPCI in the umbrella organization Forces Nouvelles (New Forces, FN). The MPIGO claimed to represent the interests of the Yacouba people and expressed its intentions to avenge the murder of Robert Gueï (⁹²¹, 113; see also ⁹²²).

⁹¹⁹ [Gberie, 2004]

⁹²⁰ [Langer, 2005]

⁹²¹ [Bouquet, 2011]

⁹²² [UCDP, 2014]

The Linas-Marcoussis Peace agreement was signed in January 2003. (Hence, in accordance with the EPR coding rules, no separate new period is inserted for the three first weeks of January 2003, in which the northerners would have probably been coded with "self-exclusion".) The agreement provided for a power-sharing national reconciliation government, including a northerner (Seydou Diarra; Feb 2003-Dec 2005) as prime minister and northern rebel leader Guillaume Soro in prominent positions (although moving in and out of government). All important parties of the conflict were represented in this power-sharing regime (including the UDPCI that was a signatory to the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords) (⁹²³, 24) – a clear sign that all relevant ethnic groups were included. Gbagbo as president remained the most powerful political figure.

⁹²³ [Mehler, 2008]

The planned elections were postponed numerous times while the national reconciliation government was reshuffled repeatedly but remained inclusive (⁹²⁴, 27). (For example, Diarra was replaced as prime minister by Charles Konan Banny, a Baule, in December 2005. Banny served until April 2007. Soro first became second ranking member of the government (after Banny), and in April 2007 was named new prime minister.) Therefore, the Kru are coded as "senior partner", and all other groups as "junior partners" in this period.

⁹²⁴ [Mehler, 2008]

2012-2013; RDR rule: New presidential elections were finally held in the fall of 2010, featuring the same political figures that had dominated the country's political life in the preceding decades: Laurent Gbagbo, Alassane Ouattara, and Henri Konan Bédié. Similarly, the main parties and other political organizations were still very much organized along the same ethnic fault lines (⁹²⁵).

⁹²⁵ [Mark, 2010]

When Gbagbo refused to accept his run-off defeat against Ouattara at the end of November 2010, the country slid into its second ethnic conflict, which only ended when Gbagbo was finally ousted in April 2011, and Ouattara assumed the presidency. During several months, Côte d'Ivoire had two presidents. Ouattara was the internationally recognized election winner, yet Gbagbo stubbornly held on to power. As all negotiations and international mediation came to nothing, fighting erupted again in February 2011. Ouattara's supporters moved towards Abidjan from both the north and the west. With French help, Gbagbo was arrested on April 11.

In accordance with EPR's January 1st rule, the new period starts in 2012. This period is marked by the rise to power by the people from the north. Both the ruling RDR and Ouattara's government are clearly dominated by northerners. However, the RDR is in a formal alliance with the PDCI and the UDPCI. Ouattara's first government featured Baule politician Jeannot Ahoussou-Kouadio as prime minister. Other Baule politicians, such as Charles Koffi Diby or Jean Louis Billon, have also held prominent positions. His second cabinet, appointed in November 2012, has been led by prime minister Daniel Kablan Duncan, an Agni. Likewise, Patrick Achi, another prominent Akan leader from the Attié group, has also been included. Thus, the northerners are coded as "senior partner" in this period, with the Baule, other Akans, and Southern Mande as "junior partners".

The FPI boycotted the parliamentary election held in December 2011 and has generally refused to participate in the political process after Gbagbo's ousting. Together with a certain attempt at retaliation by the RDR, this is the main reason why the Kru group has become somewhat marginalized again in Côte d'Ivoire's new political reality. They are coded as "powerless" for this most recent period.

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Political status of ethnic groups in Cote d'Ivoire

From 1960 until 1993

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)	0.34	JUNIOR PARTNER
Other Akans	0.22	JUNIOR PARTNER
Baule (Akan)	0.2	SENIOR PARTNER
Kru	0.11	POWERLESS
Southern Mande	0.1	IRRELEVANT

From 1994 until 1999

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)	0.34	DISCRIMINATED
Other Akans	0.22	JUNIOR PARTNER
Baule (Akan)	0.2	SENIOR PARTNER
Kru	0.11	POWERLESS
Southern Mande	0.1	DISCRIMINATED

From 2000 until 2000

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)	0.34	DISCRIMINATED
Other Akans	0.22	JUNIOR PARTNER
Baule (Akan)	0.2	JUNIOR PARTNER
Kru	0.11	JUNIOR PARTNER
Southern Mande	0.1	SENIOR PARTNER




Figure 201: Political status of ethnic groups in Cote d'Ivoire during 1960-1993.



Figure 202: Political status of ethnic groups in Cote d'Ivoire during 1994-1999.




Figure 203: Political status of ethnic groups in Cote d'Ivoire during 2000-2000.

From 2001 until 2002

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)	0.34	DISCRIMINATED
Other Akans	0.22	JUNIOR PARTNER
Baule (Akan)	0.2	JUNIOR PARTNER
Kru	0.11	SENIOR PARTNER
Southern Mande	0.1	JUNIOR PARTNER




Figure 204: Political status of ethnic groups in Cote d'Ivoire during 2001-2002.

From 2003 until 2011

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)	0.34	JUNIOR PARTNER
Other Akans	0.22	JUNIOR PARTNER
Baule (Akan)	0.2	JUNIOR PARTNER
Kru	0.11	SENIOR PARTNER
Southern Mande	0.1	JUNIOR PARTNER




Figure 205: Political status of ethnic groups in Cote d'Ivoire during 2003-2011.

From 2012 until 2013

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)	0.34	SENIOR PARTNER
Other Akans	0.22	JUNIOR PARTNER
Baule (Akan)	0.2	JUNIOR PARTNER
Kru	0.11	POWERLESS
Southern Mande	0.1	JUNIOR PARTNER




Figure 206: Political status of ethnic groups in Cote d'Ivoire during 2012-2013.

Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Cote d'Ivoire

From 1960 until 2013




Figure 207: Map of ethnic groups in Cote d'Ivoire during 2012-2013.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■ Northernners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)	144 855	Regionally based
■ Kru	67 713	Regionally based
■ Other Akans	50 399	Regionally based
■ Southern Mande	30 775	Regional & urban
■ Baule (Akan)	28 947	Regionally based

Table 60: List of ethnic groups in Cote d'Ivoire during 1960-2013.

Conflicts in Cote d'Ivoire

Starting on 2002-09-19

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Ivory Coast	MPCI	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)	2002-09-19	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Ivory Coast	MPIGO	Southern Mande	2002-11-28	Explicit	Yes	No
Government of Ivory Coast	MJP		2002-12-03			
Government of Ivory Coast	FRCI	Southern Mande	2004-06-07	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Ivory Coast	FRCI	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)	2004-06-07	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Ivory Coast	FDSI-CI		2011-03-13			