

Ethiopia

Ethnicity in Ethiopia

Group selection

Ethiopia is an ethnically heterogeneous country, with some 70 to 80 different ethnic groups living within its borders. However, the majority of people belong to four groups: the **Oromo**, the **Amhara**, the **Tigry** and the **Somali**. The Oromo (also called Galla) are the largest group and constitute about 35% of the population. They were once concentrated in the southern highlands but have now spread to other regions. The Oromo category is not unified politically and there are important differences in the social organization, religion, and economy across the subgroups. The Amhara live in the western highlands and constitute approximately 30% of the population. Along with the Tigry, they trace their ancestry to a merging of Semitic and African peoples in the region several thousand years ago. The Amhara culture later became the center of the Aksum Kingdom and dominant in the 19th and part of the 20th centuries. The Tigry count about 2 million people (the majority of this group is located in Eritrea, where they make up to 50% of the population). The fourth largest group are the Somali settling in the southeast of the country. The majority of the Somali population belongs to the Ogaden clan (subdivision of the Darod) (¹⁹²³, 2). Amhara and Tigry are overwhelmingly Ethiopian Orthodox Christians, while the Somali are predominantly Muslim and the Oromos are equally made up of Muslims and Christians (¹⁹²⁴, 532-534; ¹⁹²⁵, 131-133; ¹⁹²⁶; Email contact with Scarritt).

Fearon's list of ethnic groups (¹⁹²⁷) was consulted to determine other relevant groups, yet a number of groups have been dropped, since they have not appeared in the literature consulted and therefore do not seem to play a major political role in Ethiopia. We consider the following groups as politically relevant in addition to the four main groups: the **Afar**, the **Anuak**, the **Beni-Shugal-Gumez**, the **Christian Eritreans**, the **Muslim Eritreans**, the **Harari**, the **Sidamo** (from 1979), and **Other Southern Nations** (from 1996).

Estimates for group sizes are drawn from the 1984 and 2007 Ethiopian census (¹⁹²⁸, ¹⁹²⁹). The 1984 estimates are applied for all periods in the dataset prior to 1993 (secession of Eritrea), while the 2007 census estimates are applied from 1993 onwards. For a number of groups (Beni-Shugal-Gumez, Other Southern People, Harari, Muslim and Christian Eritreans), estimates for the 1984 census are

¹⁹²³ [International Crisis Group, 2009]

¹⁹²⁴ [Young, 1996]

¹⁹²⁵ [Levinson, 1998]

¹⁹²⁶ [PolityIV, 2005]

¹⁹²⁷ [Fearon, 2003]

¹⁹²⁸ [Transitional Government, 1991]

¹⁹²⁹ [Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency, 2007]

not available. For the Beni-Shugal-Gumez, Other Southern People and Harari groups, the estimates from the 2007 census are used instead. For the two Eritrean groups, estimates were obtained from the total population for the province of Eritrea during the union with Ethiopia (about 6% of the population) divided equally between both religious groups. Finally, for the Tigry group, the 2007 population estimates are also used, because 1984 estimates pool together Eritrean Tigrinya and Ethiopian Tigry.

Power relations

Ethiopia's recent political history is marked by three general periods: 1930-1974, 1975-1991, 1992-2005. The Emperor Haile Selassie, an Amhara of the Solomonic Dynasty, ruled Ethiopia between 1930 and 1974, with a short break during the Italian occupation 1935-1941. Although the Amhara were closely allied to the Tigry in the 19th century, Selassie started to centralize power within his own ethnicity (¹⁹³⁰, 532-533). This era ended when Selassie was removed from power by a military coup led by Mengistu, also an Amhara and leader of the ruling military council, the "Derg." The subsequent period from 1975 to 1991 was not much different with regard to political access of ethnic groups. The Amhara remained the dominant group due to educational advantages and experience in running the state, which faced various secessionist movements during that period. The final period started as the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a Marxist movement dominated by Tigrayans, took over power in 1991. They implemented a radical program of decentralization towards ethnic-based regional units. Since then, Ethiopia gradually transformed into a federal republic, with the 2005 elections being the first to be considered fair by international observers (¹⁹³¹; ¹⁹³²).

¹⁹³⁰ [Young, 1996]

¹⁹³¹ [Hess, 2005]

¹⁹³² [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003-2016]

1946-1952

The Amhara were long the dominant ethnic group in Ethiopia. Their cultural hegemony was consolidated under Selassie, who declared Amharic the official Ethiopian language, and under his successor Mengistu, as non-Amhara were actively excluded from positions of political and economic power (¹⁹³³, ¹⁹³⁴, 24). As Young (¹⁹³⁵, 533) writes for the Selassie era, there was little space for the integration of other ethnic groups beyond the selective incorporation of individuals who accepted assimilation into the Amhara culture and society.

¹⁹³³ [PolityIV, 2005]

¹⁹³⁴ [International Crisis Group, 2009]

¹⁹³⁵ [Young, 1996]

The coup of 1974 was primarily triggered by the inability of the imperial regime to respond to demands for political reform, land reform and to come to terms with the Eritreans. The Derg then took over power and nationalized all land in order to destroy the material basis of the old regime, which was based on a feudal land system (¹⁹³⁶, 3). The Derg also proclaimed the end of ethnic oppression, promoted the use of different languages and cultures and contemplated the idea of a federal state. However, the military regime did

¹⁹³⁶ [International Crisis Group, 2009]

not display any real intention to weaken the power of the center, or to allow for more than tokenistic participation in the government. In fact, it intensified the policy of centralization and arbitrary rule typical for the previous regime. The Derg thus fought not only to maintain the integrity of the Ethiopian state against strong challenges by Eritrean, Somali, Oromo, Afar and other dissident ethnic groups. It also strove to forge a totally centralized state according to their Marxist-Leninist ideology and therefore refused to share power with either the politically conscious middle class or the emerging regional and ethnic elites, and ensured the state retained its predominantly Amhara character (¹⁹³⁷, 534).

¹⁹³⁷ [Young, 1996]

The Amhara are coded as Dominant and all other groups as Discriminated. The Amhara are not coded with Monopoly status since there were token members of other ethnicities in the government (more so during the Mengistu period), but they had not much power and accepted assimilation to the Amhara culture and language.

1953-1962

The Christian and Muslim Eritreans only become relevant in 1952 when the UN established Eritrea as an autonomous region within the Ethiopian federation. Ethiopia became independent from Italian colonial control in 1941 and was subsequently under British administrative control for 10 years. This requires a new coding period in EPR starting in 1953. Power relations are not affected by this and the Eritreans are coded as Discriminated in line with the other groups but enjoyed regional autonomy during this period.

1963-1978

The Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie abolished Eritrea's autonomous status, annexing it as a province in 1962 (¹⁹³⁸). Therefore, Christian and Muslim Eritreans lose their regional autonomy in the coding.

¹⁹³⁸ [Minority Rights Group International, 2020]

1979-1991

In 1978, the Sidamo, the largest subgroup of the Other Southern Nations, started to mobilize for more self-determination. The formation of the Sidamo Liberation Front in that year marks their first instance of mobilization as a separate ethnic group with its own claims on the central government in the time period we observe (¹⁹³⁹). Hence, we consider them as a separate group from 1979 (according to the January 1 coding rule) on with a total size of 4.1% (¹⁹⁴⁰). Similar to all other groups except the Amhara, they lack access to central government, are affected by Amhara cultural hegemony, and are not granted meaningful regional autonomy (¹⁹⁴¹; ¹⁹⁴², 534). Hence, we code them as discriminated and as not autonomous.

¹⁹³⁹ [Human Rights Watch, 1991]

¹⁹⁴⁰ [Central Intelligence Agency, 2020]

¹⁹⁴¹ [Aalen, 2011]

¹⁹⁴² [Young, 1996]

The power status of all other groups remains unchanged during this time period.

1992-1993

Torn by violent coups, uprisings, wide-scale drought, and massive refugee problems, the military regime was finally toppled in 1991 by a coalition of rebel forces from the TPLF, EPLF, and OLF, called the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Meles Zenawi (a Tigry), the leader of the TPLF, became president of the transitional government. His cabinet was dominated by Tigry but included representatives of the OLF (Oromo) and other groups. However, relations soon deteriorated when the EPRDF sponsored a rival Oromo organization to the OLF, which proceeded to compete against the OLF in the elections in 1995. The OLF thereafter drifted into armed rebellion and was finally banned from Ethiopia.

During this transition period, the Tigry are coded as Senior Partners and the Oromo and Amhara as Junior Partners, while the other groups' status remains unchanged. The Christian and Muslim Eritreans became self-excluded, as Eritrean rebels defeated government forces in 1991, ending a violent 30-year struggle for independence. Two years later, Eritreans overwhelmingly approved independence in a referendum.

1994-1995

Due to Eritrea's secession in 1993, both Christian and Muslim Eritreans become irrelevant in Ethiopia as of 1994. This does not affect any other power relations.

1996-2003

In 1995, the first multi-party elections in Ethiopian history led to a sweeping victory of the EPRDF, basically a coalition of Tigry, Oromo, and Amhara but clearly Tigry dominated. Zenawi (Tigry) became Prime Minister, Gidada (Oromo) assumed the largely symbolic role of the state president, Layne (Amhara) became deputy Prime Minister and minister of defense. Other than the foreign minister, all other 17 ministers were from non-Tigry ethnicities, primarily Oromo and Amhara.

Subsequent elections in 2000 did not change the power sharing arrangement between the Tigry, Oromo and Amhara. The Tigry constituted such a small share of the population that they were forced to maintain a coalition with elements of the numerically superior Oromo and the historically dominant Amhara people. To ensure the stability of this arrangement, ethno-linguistic federalism seemed to be the best strategy (1943, 537-540). Since the Tigry held the prime ministry and dominated the coalition, they are coded as Senior Partner. The two other coalition partners are coded as Junior Partners. When it comes to the Oromo, one could possibly argue for other codings, since the OLF was clearly marginalized by the state and many Oromo people saw the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (member in the EPRDF) as a puppet of the Tigry dominated

¹⁹⁴³ [Young, 1996]

regime. However, following the coding of similar cases, Oromos are coded as Junior Partner. The Afar and the Somali people, which largely supported the rebel groups fighting for their independence, are coded as Discriminated. The coding is justified since political wings of these groups were banned and they had no representatives in the cabinet. Both groups had no recognized political parties to participate in the two elections taking place during this period (1944; 1945).

¹⁹⁴⁴ [Markakis, 1996]

¹⁹⁴⁵ [Hess, 2005]

Before 1996, Ethiopia was divided into 13 provinces, many derived from historical regions. Then, a tiered system consisting of a federal government overseeing ethnically-based regional states, zones, districts (woredas), and neighborhoods (kebele) was established. The constitution assigned extensive power to regional states. Each region had its apex regional council where members were directly elected to represent the districts. The councils had legislative and executive power over their internal affairs. Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution further gave every regional state the right to secede from Ethiopia.

There is debate, however, as to how much of the power guaranteed in the constitution was actually exercised by the states (1946, 539-541). In cultural matters, these entities seemed to enjoy the most autonomy, especially when it came to linguistic matters (1947, 24). There were also variations between different regions. Rather than devolving power equally, an unofficial two-tier federal system that distinguished between highland and lowland states had developed. According to Young (1948, 344) and the International Crisis Group (1949, 17; 1950, 8), the lowland regions remained under close federal supervision and hence cannot be described as genuinely autonomous. Thus, only the Amhara, Oroma, Tigry, and the Other Southern Nations are given Regional Autonomy status, while the Somali, Afar, Beni-Shugal-Gumez, and Harari groups are not coded as autonomous. Similarly, due to the merger of the southern administrative units in 1992, the Sidamo failed to obtain their own region and are thus also not coded as autonomous (1951: 151).

¹⁹⁴⁶ [Young, 1996]

¹⁹⁴⁷ [International Crisis Group, 2009]

¹⁹⁴⁸ [Young, 1999]

¹⁹⁴⁹ [International Crisis Group, 2009]

¹⁹⁵⁰ [International Crisis Group, 2009]

¹⁹⁵¹ [Aalen, 2011]

2004-2012

The Anuak people become relevant in this period and are coded as Discriminated. They are settled in the Western lowland Gambela region bordering South Sudan. Originally the dominant ethnic group in the area, they became a minority following continuous Nuer migration from Sudan (massively increased by the civil war in Sudan) and resettlement of highlanders (including Amhara) under the Derg regime (1952, 6-7). Competition for resources and land led to several instances of communal conflict between Anuak and Nuer, as well as Anuak and highlanders (1953, 8). As a consequence of a 2002 plan to redraw the Gambela state, conflict intensified and many Anuak lost their jobs with the regional government in the process (1954, 40). Against this background, an ambush by armed ethnic Anuak

¹⁹⁵² [Human Rights Watch, 2005]

¹⁹⁵³ [Human Rights Watch, 2005]

¹⁹⁵⁴ [Young, 2007]

against a group of highlanders working for the federal refugee agency led to a reprisal massacre of more than 400 Anuaks in Gambela, where the federal army openly sided with the highlanders, a departure from its previous neutral stance. The events and subsequent abuses and executions forced a large number of Anuak to seek refuge in Sudan, including the president of the regional state (¹⁹⁵⁵, 40; ¹⁹⁵⁶, 2, 48). An Anuak rebel group, the Gambela People Liberation Movement/Front (GPLM/F) was formed in 2005, and started a low-level insurgency (¹⁹⁵⁷, 41). The Anuak remained marginalized and targeted by state-led discrimination (¹⁹⁵⁸, 2012; ¹⁹⁵⁹).

There is evidence to code the Anuak as relevant already prior to 2004, due to the activities of the Gambella People's Liberation Movement (GPLM), founded in 1979. However, the GPLM was generally weak and "unable to mobilise more than a negligible portion of the population" (¹⁹⁶⁰, 9). The GPLM hence does not seem significant enough to code the Anuak as relevant prior to 2004.

Ethiopia's ethnic power configuration did change in this period with regards to other groups. Parliamentary elections in 2005 saw opposition parties gain a sizeable share of the vote but the governing EPRDF was able to remain in power. While the office of the Prime Minister and additional important positions were held by Tigry, most of the cabinet posts were held by Oromos and Amharas.

Both Somali and Afar groups continued to suffer from political marginalization and discrimination. Both groups suffered from forced resettlement and villagisation policies, intended to free land for agricultural projects and oil and gas extraction (¹⁹⁶¹, 19-20, ¹⁹⁶², 2012: 21). Moreover, Somali and Afar regional states remained under close federal supervision and cannot be perceived as autonomous (¹⁹⁶³, 17; see also ¹⁹⁶⁴, 8).

2013-2019

The death of long-time Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in August 2012 led to the nomination of Deputy Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn for this office (¹⁹⁶⁵, 2014). This move came somewhat surprisingly as Desalegn hails from the South Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Front, traditionally perceived as the least influential of the four factions of the EPRDF (¹⁹⁶⁶, 2012: 12-13). Although it appears that Desalegn was far from exerting the amount of power that Zenawi had concentrated and that high ranking-TPLF officials continued to control sensitive ministries and the security apparatus (¹⁹⁶⁷, 2014; see also ¹⁹⁶⁸), he had considerable executive policy-making power. Thus, his nomination as Prime Minister warrants an upgrade of the Other Southern Nations group's status to Junior Partner.

The Oromo remain Junior Partner despite large-scale Oromo protests against the lack of socioeconomic opportunities, perceived discrimination, and the "Integrated Master Plan," proposing to expand the territory of the Addis Abeba municipality into Oromia

¹⁹⁵⁵ [Young, 2007]

¹⁹⁵⁶ [Human Rights Watch, 2005]

¹⁹⁵⁷ [Young, 2007]

¹⁹⁵⁸ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003-2016]

¹⁹⁵⁹ [Human Rights Watch, 2012]

¹⁹⁶⁰ [Tadesse, 2009]

¹⁹⁶¹ [Human Rights Watch, 2012]

¹⁹⁶² [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003-2016]

¹⁹⁶³ [International Crisis Group, 2009]

¹⁹⁶⁴ [International Crisis Group, 2009]

¹⁹⁶⁵ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003-2016]

¹⁹⁶⁶ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003-2016]

¹⁹⁶⁷ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003-2016]

¹⁹⁶⁸ [International Crisis Group, 2009]

regional territory (¹⁹⁶⁹; ¹⁹⁷⁰). The Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization (OPDO) remained part of the ruling EPRDF and several Oromo held ministerial posts. In November 2016, amidst ongoing protest, Prime Minister Desalegn granted two additional ministerial posts to Oromo, increasing the number of ministers from the Oromia region to nine. The OPDO was sometimes seen as a puppet of the EPRDF and the TPLF in particular (¹⁹⁷¹). However, with their large share of votes and all of the seats in the regional parliament of Oromia, the OPDO represented a significant political force.

The situation of the Amhara is comparable to the Oromo. The Amhara also suffered from human rights violations (¹⁹⁷²). However, since the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) was part of the government the Junior Partner status of the Amhara is also retained.

Forced relocation and displacement of Anuak in western Gambella continued. The relocations were often accompanied by threats, assaults, rape, and arrests and jeopardized their access to basic services and infrastructure (¹⁹⁷³; ¹⁹⁷⁴). They are still coded as Discriminated.

Despite both the Afar National Democratic Party and the Somali People's Democratic Party held one ministerial post each (as in the previous period), the Afar and the Somali are coded as Discriminated. As in the case of the Anuak, forced relocation took place and led to the displacement of 500,000 Somali and 500,000 Afar (¹⁹⁷⁵). According to Haggmann (¹⁹⁷⁶, 29), Somalis in Ethiopia "possess a precarious status in terms of their citizenship and political rights under the federal government and in relation to their Ethiopian compatriots."

The status of the Beni-Shangul-Gumuz and the Harari is unchanged. Tensions continued between the Beni-Shangul (Bertha) and the Gumuz subgroups (¹⁹⁷⁷). Further, the Beni-Shangul are organized individually with the separatist Beni-Shangul People's Liberation Movement (BPLM) that was founded in 1995. However, on the national and regional level, the multi-ethnic Beni-Shangul Gumuz People's Democratic Unity Front/Party remains clearly dominant.

The two-tier federal system that distinguishes between highland and lowland states remained in place. There was no evidence that the degree of self-determination in the lowland states increased significantly. According to Abebe (¹⁹⁷⁸, 126), the regional governments in Afar, Ogaden, Beni-Shangul-Gumuz, and Harari remained "closely monitored" by the EPRDF (of these, Harari is not considered a lowland state). After 2012, the central government further tightened federal supervision in Ogaden through the deployment of district-level experts and the ouster of the president of the Somali regional state in 2014 (¹⁹⁷⁹; ¹⁹⁸⁰, 2016: 27). The Somali, Afar, Beni-Shangul-Gumuz, and Harari are hence coded as not autonomous. In the case of Beni-Shangul-Gumuz, this coding is substantiated by Adegehe (¹⁹⁸¹, 257), who states that they do "not exercise autonomy beyond

¹⁹⁶⁹ [Amnesty International, 2016]

¹⁹⁷⁰ [Human Rights Watch, 2016]

¹⁹⁷¹ [Gaffey, 2016]

¹⁹⁷² [Minority Rights Group International, 2016]

¹⁹⁷³ [ICIJ, 2015]

¹⁹⁷⁴ [Human Rights Watch, 2012]

¹⁹⁷⁵ [Human Rights Watch, 2012]

¹⁹⁷⁶ [Haggmann, 2014]

¹⁹⁷⁷ [Adegehe, 2009]

¹⁹⁷⁸ [Abebe, 2016]

¹⁹⁷⁹ [Haggmann, 2014]

¹⁹⁸⁰ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003-2016]

¹⁹⁸¹ [Adegehe, 2009]

that of language and culture.” The highland regions, on the other hand, continue to be coded as regionally autonomous.

2020

After years of deadly protests, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn resigned in February 2018. “Through his resignation, he opened up the space for less repressive and more conciliatory policies”¹⁹⁸² under new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, an ethnic Oromo. The new government – still controlled by the EPRDF – later called on all opposition groups, including those in armed struggle, to return to the country. The move was “welcomed by virtually all major opposition groups, including OLF, Oromo Democratic Front, ONLF, and PG7”¹⁹⁸³ and can be seen as an move to end previous political discrimination of these organizations’ affiliated ethnic groups. One year later, in November 2019, Abiy merged Ethiopia’s nearly 30-year ethnic-based ruling coalition - the EPRDF - into a single unity party called the Prosperity Party. The merger included the four ruling coalition parties, plus the five parties that controlled the Afar, Beni-Shangul-Gumuz, Gambella (the Anuaks’ homeland), Harari and Somali regions¹⁹⁸⁴. Even though the formerly dominant Tigrayan Peoples’ Liberation Front refused to join the new party, the Tigray continued to dominate the security and military forces¹⁹⁸⁵. Based on these developments, the Tigray and Oromo groups are coded as Senior Partners as of 2020 while all other ethnic groups are coded with Junior Partner status.

¹⁹⁸² [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020]

¹⁹⁸³ [U.S. Department of State, 2019]

¹⁹⁸⁴ [International Crisis Group, 2019]

¹⁹⁸⁵ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020]

Moreover, the Sidamo held a referendum in November 2019 to determine if there was enough support to create a new ethnic-based regional state for themselves, an option provided to all ethnic groups under the country’s constitution. The referendum passed, with more than 98 percent of Sidamo voters supporting the measure¹⁹⁸⁶. As reports suggest the transition of power occurred rather slowly (e.g. 1987), the Sidamo are coded as an individual group with regional autonomy starting in 2020. Additionally, they are now regarded as powerless (and not discriminated anymore) at the national level.

¹⁹⁸⁶ [Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020]

¹⁹⁸⁷ [Human Rights Watch, 2020]

While new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has taken important steps to move the country toward more open politics, his efforts to dismantle the old order have weakened the Ethiopian state and given rise to ethno-nationalism. Hostility among the leaders of Ethiopia’s most powerful regions has soared and ethnic clashes have killed hundreds and displaced millions across the country since he assumed office¹⁹⁸⁸. Thus, the above events sum up the relevant developments with regards to the federal government but do not reflect ethnic tensions at the regional level.

¹⁹⁸⁸ [International Crisis Group, 2019]

2021

Tigrayan officials felt that federal authorities were out to punish their ruling party, the TPLF, ever since Abiy assumed office and especially since the TPLF refused to merge into the Prosperity

Party in 2019. Their refusal to join the new national party made the TPLF's 38 lawmakers the sole opposition bloc in the federal parliament while Tigray remained the only region in the country not run by the Prosperity Party. The power struggle between the federal government and Tigrayan elites intensified in 2020 as Abiy gradually ousted all federal ministers belonging to the TPLF. Relations further worsened after the region held elections in defiance of the federal government's directive in September 2020. The move led to a violent incursion of the national armed forces into the region which resulted in lots of casualties and displaced people (¹⁹⁸⁹). The army's actions were accompanied by discriminating measures such as phone and internet communication blackouts and atrocities committed against Tigray people in their region and elsewhere in the country (¹⁹⁹⁰). Finally, in December a government-appointed transitional administration took office in Tigray's regional capital Mekelle. Based on these developments, the Tigry group is coded as discriminated in 2021 and loses its status of regional autonomy. While ethnic tensions and violence intensified in other parts of the country as well, most notably in Oromia and Benishangul Gumez (¹⁹⁹¹), these events do not shift ethnic power balances at the national or regional levels. Thus, all other groups keep their previous codings.

¹⁹⁸⁹ [International Crisis Group, 2020]

¹⁹⁹⁰ [Human Rights Watch, 2021]

¹⁹⁹¹ [Human Rights Watch, 2021]

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Political status of ethnic groups in Ethiopia

From 1946 until 1952

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Oroma	0.2907	DISCRIMINATED
Amhara	0.2829	DOMINANT
Tigry	0.0608	DISCRIMINATED
Somali (Ogaden)	0.0379	DISCRIMINATED
Afar	0.0137	DISCRIMINATED

From 1953 until 1962

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Oroma	0.2907	DISCRIMINATED
Amhara	0.2829	DOMINANT
Tigry	0.0608	DISCRIMINATED
Somali (Ogaden)	0.0379	DISCRIMINATED
Christian Eritreans	0.03	DISCRIMINATED
Muslim Eritreans	0.03	DISCRIMINATED
Afar	0.0137	DISCRIMINATED

From 1963 until 1978

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Oroma	0.2907	DISCRIMINATED
Amhara	0.2829	DOMINANT
Tigry	0.0608	DISCRIMINATED
Somali (Ogaden)	0.0379	DISCRIMINATED
Christian Eritreans	0.03	DISCRIMINATED
Muslim Eritreans	0.03	DISCRIMINATED
Afar	0.0137	DISCRIMINATED

From 1979 until 1991




Figure 344: Political status of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1946-1952.




Figure 345: Political status of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1953-1962.




Figure 346: Political status of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1963-1978.




Figure 347: Political status of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1979-1991.

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Oroma	0.2907	DISCRIMINATED
Amhara	0.2829	DOMINANT
Tigry	0.0608	DISCRIMINATED
Sidama	0.041	DISCRIMINATED
Somali (Ogaden)	0.0379	DISCRIMINATED
Christian Eritreans	0.03	DISCRIMINATED
Muslim Eritreans	0.03	DISCRIMINATED
Afar	0.0137	DISCRIMINATED

From 1992 until 1993

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Oroma	0.2907	JUNIOR PARTNER
Amhara	0.2829	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tigry	0.0608	SENIOR PARTNER
Sidama	0.041	DISCRIMINATED
Somali (Ogaden)	0.0379	DISCRIMINATED
Muslim Eritreans	0.03	SELF-EXCLUSION
Christian Eritreans	0.03	SELF-EXCLUSION
Afar	0.0137	DISCRIMINATED

From 1994 until 1995

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Oroma	0.3439	JUNIOR PARTNER
Amhara	0.2695	JUNIOR PARTNER
Somali (Ogaden)	0.0622	DISCRIMINATED
Tigry	0.0608	SENIOR PARTNER
Sidama	0.041	DISCRIMINATED
Afar	0.0173	DISCRIMINATED

From 1996 until 2003

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Oroma	0.3439	JUNIOR PARTNER
Amhara	0.2695	JUNIOR PARTNER
Other Southern Nations	0.1614	POWERLESS
Somali (Ogaden)	0.0622	DISCRIMINATED
Tigry	0.0608	SENIOR PARTNER
Sidama	0.041	DISCRIMINATED
Afar	0.0173	DISCRIMINATED
Beni-Shugal-Gumez	0.0106	POWERLESS
Harari	4.0×10^{-4}	POWERLESS

From 2004 until 2012




Figure 348: Political status of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1992-1993.




Figure 349: Political status of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1994-1995.




Figure 350: Political status of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1996-2003.




Figure 351: Political status of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 2004-2012.

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Oroma	0.3439	JUNIOR PARTNER
Amhara	0.2695	JUNIOR PARTNER
Other Southern Nations	0.1614	POWERLESS
Somali (Ogaden)	0.0622	DISCRIMINATED
Tigry	0.0608	SENIOR PARTNER
Sidama	0.041	DISCRIMINATED
Afar	0.0173	DISCRIMINATED
Beni-Shugal-Gumez	0.0106	POWERLESS
Anuak	0.0012	DISCRIMINATED
Harari	4.0×10^{-4}	POWERLESS

From 2013 until 2019

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Oroma	0.3439	JUNIOR PARTNER
Amhara	0.2695	JUNIOR PARTNER
Other Southern Nations	0.1614	JUNIOR PARTNER
Somali (Ogaden)	0.0622	DISCRIMINATED
Tigry	0.0608	SENIOR PARTNER
Sidama	0.041	DISCRIMINATED
Afar	0.0173	DISCRIMINATED
Beni-Shugal-Gumez	0.0106	POWERLESS
Anuak	0.0012	DISCRIMINATED
Harari	4.0×10^{-4}	POWERLESS

From 2020 until 2020

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Oroma	0.3439	SENIOR PARTNER
Amhara	0.2695	JUNIOR PARTNER
Other Southern Nations	0.1614	JUNIOR PARTNER
Somali (Ogaden)	0.0622	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tigry	0.0608	SENIOR PARTNER
Sidama	0.041	POWERLESS
Afar	0.0173	JUNIOR PARTNER
Beni-Shugal-Gumez	0.0106	JUNIOR PARTNER
Anuak	0.0012	JUNIOR PARTNER
Harari	4.0×10^{-4}	JUNIOR PARTNER

From 2021 until 2021




Figure 352: Political status of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 2013-2019.




Figure 353: Political status of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 2020-2020.




Figure 354: Political status of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 2021-2021.

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Oroma	0.3439	SENIOR PARTNER
Amhara	0.2695	JUNIOR PARTNER
Other Southern Nations	0.1614	JUNIOR PARTNER
Somali (Ogaden)	0.0622	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tigry	0.0608	DISCRIMINATED
Sidama	0.041	POWERLESS
Afar	0.0173	JUNIOR PARTNER
Beni-Shugal-Gumez	0.0106	JUNIOR PARTNER
Anuak	0.0012	JUNIOR PARTNER
Harari	4.0×10^{-4}	JUNIOR PARTNER

Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Ethiopia

From 1946 until 1951




Figure 355: Map of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1946-1951.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
Oroma	329 089	Regionally based
Somali (Ogaden)	282 488	Regionally based
Amhara	182 708	Regionally based
Afar	74 919	Regionally based
Tigry	44 793	Regionally based

Table 123: List of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1946-1951.

From 1952 until 1952




Figure 356: Map of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1952-1952.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■ Oroma	329 089	Regionally based
■ Somali (Ogaden)	282 488	Regionally based
■ Amhara	182 708	Regionally based
■ Afar	74 919	Regionally based
■ Tigry	44 793	Regionally based

Table 124: List of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1952-1952.

From 1953 until 1978




Figure 357: Map of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1953-1978.








Group name	Area in km ²	Type
 Oroma	329 089	Regionally based
 Somali (Ogaden)	282 488	Regionally based
 Amhara	182 708	Regionally based
 Muslim Eritreans	118 285	Regionally based
 Afar	74 920	Regionally based
 Christian Eritreans	63 499	Regionally based
 Tigry	44 793	Regionally based

Table 125: List of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1953-1978.

From 1979 until 1992




Figure 358: Map of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1979-1992.








Group name	Area in km ²	Type
 Oroma	329 089	Regionally based
 Somali (Ogaden)	282 488	Regionally based
 Amhara	182 708	Regionally based
 Muslim Eritreans	118 285	Regionally based
 Afar	74 920	Regionally based
 Christian Eritreans	63 499	Regionally based
 Tigry	44 793	Regionally based

Table 126: List of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1979-1992.

From 1993 until 1993




Figure 359: Map of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1993-1993.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
Oroma	329 089	Regionally based
Somali (Ogaden)	282 488	Regionally based
Amhara	182 708	Regionally based
Muslim Eritreans	118 285	Regionally based
Afar	74 920	Regionally based
Christian Eritreans	63 499	Regionally based
Tigry	44 793	Regionally based

Table 127: List of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1993-1993.

From 1994 until 1995




Figure 360: Map of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1994-1995.






Group name	Area in km ²	Type
 Oroma	329 089	Regionally based
 Somali (Ogaden)	282 488	Regionally based
 Amhara	182 708	Regionally based
 Afar	74 919	Regionally based
 Tigry	44 793	Regionally based

Table 128: List of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1994-1995.

From 1996 until 2003




Figure 361: Map of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1996-2003.









Group name	Area in km ²	Type
 Oroma	329 089	Regionally based
 Somali (Ogaden)	282 488	Regionally based
 Amhara	182 708	Regionally based
 Other Southern Nations	128 518	Regionally based
 Afar	74 919	Regionally based
 Tigry	44 793	Regionally based
 Beni-Shugal-Gumez	44 377	Regionally based
 Harari	377	Regional & urban

Table 129: List of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 1996-2003.

From 2004 until 2021




Figure 362: Map of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 2004-2021.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
Oroma	329 089	Regionally based
Somali (Ogaden)	282 488	Regionally based
Amhara	182 708	Regionally based
Other Southern Nations	128 518	Regionally based
Afar	74 919	Regionally based
Tigry	44 793	Regionally based
Beni-Shugal-Gumez	44 377	Regionally based
Anuak	15 763	Regionally based
Harari	377	Regional & urban

Table 130: List of ethnic groups in Ethiopia during 2004-2021.

Conflicts in Ethiopia

Starting on 1960-12-16

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Ethiopia	Military faction (forces of Mengistu Neway)		1960-12-16			
Government of Ethiopia	TPLF	Tigry	1975-08-26	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Ethiopia	EPRP	Tigry	1975-12-30	No	Yes	No
Government of Ethiopia	EDU	Tigry	1977-01-30	No	Yes	No
Government of Ethiopia	EPDM	Amhara	1982-12-30	No	Yes, from EGIP	No
Government of Ethiopia	EPRDF	Tigry	1989-01-07	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Ethiopia	EPRDF	Oroma	1989-01-07	No	Yes	
Government of Ethiopia	EPRDF	Amhara	1989-01-07	No	Yes	
Government of Ethiopia	Military faction (forces of Amsha Desta and Merid Negusie)		1989-05-15			
Government of Ethiopia	Forces of Harar garrison		1991-06-01			

Starting on 1961-09-29

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Ethiopia	ELF	Muslim Eritreans	1961-09-29	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Ethiopia	EPLF	Muslim Eritreans	1973-09-29	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Ethiopia	EPLF	Christian Eritreans	1973-09-29	Explicit	Yes	Yes

Starting on 1964-01-10

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Ethiopia	Ogaden Liberation Front	Somali (Ogaden)	1964-01-10	Explicit	Yes	No
Government of Ethiopia	WSLF	Somali (Ogaden)	1976-01-03	Explicit	Yes	No
Government of Ethiopia	AIAI	Somali (Ogaden)	1993-10-12	Explicit	No	No
Government of Ethiopia	ONLF	Somali (Ogaden)	1994-02-25	Explicit	Yes	Yes

Starting on 1964-02-09

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Ethiopia	Government of Somalia		1964-02-09			

Starting on 1974-08-30

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Ethiopia	OLF	Oroma	1974-08-30	Explicit	Yes	No

Starting on 1975-06-29

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Ethiopia	ALF	Afar	1975-06-29	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Ethiopia	ARDUF	Afar	1996-12-30	Explicit	Yes	No

Starting on 1977-12-30

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Ethiopia	SALF	Somali (Ogaden)	1977-12-30	Presumed	Yes	No
Government of Ethiopia	SALF	Oroma	1977-12-30	No	Yes	No

Starting on 1981-03-20

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Ethiopia	SLM		1981-03-20			

Starting on 1991-10-09

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Ethiopia	IGLF	Somali (Ogaden)	1991-10-09	Explicit	Yes	

Starting on 1998-05-05

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Eritrea	Government of Ethiopia		1998-05-05			

Starting on 2019-06-21

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Ethiopia	Military faction (forces of Asaminew Tsige)	Amhara	2019-06-21	Explicit	Yes	Yes