

# Guinea-Bissau

## *Ethnicity in Guinea-Bissau*

### *Group selection*

The Peul and the very small Brame (Mancanha) ethnic groups are not considered politically relevant according to the definition of EPR.

Group sizes are coded following figures provided by the CIA World Factbook and the Encyclopedia of the Nations (<sup>1407</sup>).

<sup>1407</sup> [Nations Encyclopedia, 2014]

### *Power relations*

*1974–1980; Luiz Cabral's rule:* After the independence war, the tiny Cape Verdean minority – the ethnic group favored and installed as administrative elite by the Portuguese colonialists – assumed a dominant role in the country's politics. President Cabral – himself a Cape Verdean – relied heavily on them in both the government and the party leadership to secure his power (<sup>1408</sup>). Furthermore, he also gave promotions to the leading positions in the army to trusted confidants, mainly Cape Verdeans – although the vast majority of the army was composed of Balanta (<sup>1409</sup>; <sup>1410</sup>).

<sup>1408</sup> [Forrest, 1992]

<sup>1409</sup> [Forrest, 1987]

<sup>1410</sup> [Galli Jones, 1987]

Regarding the distribution of funds, the situation was essentially the same as during colonialism, and the rural population did not experience any improvements. Although only 16% of the total population lived in Bissau, 50% of all investments and 80% of the budget were allocated to the capital (<sup>1411</sup>).

<sup>1411</sup> [Lopes, 1982]

As political power was still monopolized by the same elite after independence, there was increasing resentment among other ethnic groups (<sup>1412</sup>; <sup>1413</sup>; <sup>1414</sup>), especially the Balanta who had already constituted the bulk of the soldiery during the war but did not see themselves sufficiently rewarded for their important contribution to the country's independence (<sup>1415</sup>).

<sup>1412</sup> [Enders, 1994]

<sup>1413</sup> [Galli, 1990]

<sup>1414</sup> [Forrest, 1992]

<sup>1415</sup> [Forrest, 1987]

The Cape Verdean minority was thus coded as "dominant" and all other ethnic groups as "powerless" in this time period.

*1981-1999; Vieira's rule after his coup d'état at the end of 1980:*

After coming to power, Vieira ousted the Cape Verdeans from the important, upper-level positions in the government (1416; 1417; 1418). They then stopped to play a significant role in the country's politics. Thus they were coded as politically irrelevant in all periods after the first one.

1416 [Forrest, 1987]

1417 [Enders, 1994]

1418 [Forrest, 1992]

The ruling institutions became now well balanced among the other ethnic groups (1419). However, many Balanta military men were disappointed of Vieira as he did not promote them as much as they had expected after his rise to power (also leading to several coup attempts by Balanta) (1420; 1421; 1422). With the president and intermittently also the Vice-President from this group (and at the same time sharing their power with other groups) (1423), the Papel were coded as "senior partner". The Balanta – although not content with the size of their "piece of the cake", and despite the attempted coups and subsequent retribution measures – do now have considerably more access to executive power (1424). Thus they were coded as "junior partner" of the government. The same applies to the Manjaco group.

1419 [Forrest, 1987]

1420 [Forrest, 1987]

1421 [Forrest, 1992]

1422 [Galli, 1990]

1423 [Forrest, 1987]

The period ends with the military coup in May 1999, and Vieira fleeing the country.

*2000-2005:* After the military coup against Vieira (following the civil war) and an interim government, power is transferred to a democratically elected president, Kumba Yala. He rules the country until September 2003 when he, too, is ousted by another military coup.

Both Yala and the military officers that replace him are Balanta. According to Prof. Joshua Forrest (personal correspondence) the 2000-2005 period is "largely dominated" by the Balanta which hold the presidency and are appointed to "positions of dominance in the security and military apparatuses". In contrast, the Papel have "dramatically less influence" during this period and are "out of central power" - as well as the Manjaco group. The Balanta were thus coded as "dominant" during this time period.

According to the same source, both the Papel and the Manjaco still have to be regarded as politically relevant. The Manjaco apparently retain "dominance over their own region" (Cacheu, one of the country's most important political regions) and "de-facto control over local affairs". However, no signs have been found for any kind of institutionalized regional autonomy with core competencies of the state, which is why no regional autonomy is coded.

*2006-2009* Vieira's comeback as president (after being elected in the 2005 elections)

According to the U.S. State Department's Human Rights Reports from 2006 to 2009 (autocitewww.state.gov), his term constituted an improvement in democratic governance in Guinea-Bissau. In general, ethnicity still plays a significant role in national politics (<sup>1425</sup>, 6; autociteFreedom House). All relevant ethnic groups were included in the government according to the U.S. State Department (<sup>1426</sup>). Due to lack of any other reliable sources, the analysis had to rely on this information for the coding. As president Vieira himself is a Papel, the Papel group was coded as "senior partner" of a power-sharing arrangement. This is in line with the coding of the 1981-1999 period (Vieira's first presidential era). The Balanta and Manjaco, the two other groups identified as politically relevant in the periods before, were coded as "junior partners" (also analogous to 1981-1999). No new evidence of any political relevance of the Peul and the Cape Verdeans (the former dominant group). They are therefore still coded as "irrelevant".

<sup>1425</sup> [Kohnert, 2010]

<sup>1426</sup> [US State Department, 1999-2013]

*2010-2012:* After the assassination of president Vieira in March 2009 and until the coming into power of the newly elected president Sanhá in September, there was much political violence – military intimidation, torture, and killing of politicians (e.g. of a presidential candidate) – by which the political opposition was effectively suppressed (<sup>1427</sup>). Guinea-Bissau's army is largely dominated by the Balanta (<sup>1428</sup>; autociteFreedom House; cp. also the comments on earlier periods above). According to the U.S. State Department Human Right Report from 2009 to 2011, the Balanta ethnic group, through its control of the armed forces, dominated the political system during this time. (Note that the president's assassination was the army's response to the killing of the army chief, the president's archrival, by armed militiamen. According to an article published by Reuters, this rivalry seems to have had an ethnic overtone with president Vieira being Papel and army chief Na Wai from the Balanta group. "A security source said soldiers from Na Wai's Balanta ethnic group led the attack on Vieira, who is from the smaller Papel community, and looted his home afterwards" (<sup>1429</sup>).

<sup>1427</sup> [US State Department, 1999-2013]

<sup>1428</sup> [US State Department, 1999-2013]

<sup>1429</sup> [Reuters, 2009]

After the homicide of Vieira, the President of the National Assembly, R. Pereira (PAIGC) was nominated interim President (<sup>1430</sup>), to be succeeded by M. B. Sanha (PAIGC) (<sup>1431</sup>) who won against ex-President Yala (affiliated with the Balanta) in the elections of July 2009. The election results were accepted by Yala and the Balanta-dominated military. The PAIGC is regarded as a political party that does not mobilize supporters along ethnic lines (<sup>1432</sup>). Dias (<sup>1433</sup>) stresses the role of the PAIGC to foster an integrated national culture through its basis in "creole", or transethnic, identity. Sanha is reported to belong to the Beafada ethnic group (<sup>1434</sup>). Prime Minister's Gomes Junior's ethnic identity is unclear; he was born in Boloma, an area where Manjacos, Papels and Mancanhas live (<sup>1435</sup>);

<sup>1430</sup> [BBC, 2009]

<sup>1431</sup> [Jeune Afrique, 2009]

<sup>1432</sup> [Temudo, 2008]

<sup>1433</sup> [Dias, 2013]

<sup>1434</sup> [EUEOM, 2009]

the International Crisis Group reports him to be decried as a member of the Christian Mestico minority (<sup>1436</sup>). However, given the absence of political organizations representing either the Beafada or the Mesticos, the government is best characterized as being interethnic, being well in line with the before mentioned nature of the PAIGC. This is also reflected in the difficulty of finding the ethnic identities of the executive elite. This suggests that their ethnic affiliation did not play an important role during the electoral campaign and the period. In parallel, the US State Department, in its yearly Human Rights Reports, writes that all ethnic minorities are represented in the government. Although the military is dominated by the Balanta group, it has accepted the electoral results in 2009. No signs have been found for constant interference of the army in daily executive politics; it rather appears that PM Gomes tried to strengthen its control over the army. The latter might therefore be considered as constituting a constant "shadow of power". Given this assessment, it seems reasonable to code all relevant ethnic groups as being senior partners.

*2013* After the (natural) death of President Sanha in January 2012, he was succeeded by R. Pereira, also from the PAIGC. In April 2012 a Balanta-led military coup led to the imprisonment of Pereira and Gomes (<sup>1437</sup>). Various motives for the coup have been cited, inter alia drug-trafficking interests (<sup>1438</sup>), as well as personal interests and ethnic grievances (<sup>1439</sup>). Shortly after the coup, a transitional government was established, including members of the PAIGC, the PRS and other small parties (<sup>1440</sup>). Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo (ex-member of PAIGC) was nominated interim president, and Rui Duarte Barros (PRS associate with a Balanta mother) serves as Prime Minister. For the year 2012 and 2013, the US State Department, in its yearly Human Rights Reports, reports that all ethnic minorities are represented in the government. Considering that the office of the Prime Minister is formally more powerful (<sup>1441</sup>) and that the Balanta Army Chief of Staff, Antonio Indjai, has considerable power over the transitional government (<sup>1442</sup>), the Balanta were coded as being senior partners, while the Manjaco and Papel are junior partners in the year 2013.

Elections were severely delayed and are planned to be held on April 13, 2014.

<sup>1437</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2012]

<sup>1438</sup> [Dias, 2013]

<sup>1439</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2012]

<sup>1440</sup> [Dias, 2013]

<sup>1441</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2012]

*Note (2010-2013):* The status of political relevance for the Papel and Manjaco groups has been kept on the basis of the expert assessment of Prof. Forrest. It is however unclear, if these groups are really relevant in the sense that their claims are represented by a political organization. There was no evidence of any political organization representing their potential claims for the years 2010-2013. In this regard, Temudo (<sup>1443</sup>, p. 260) claims (although only on the basis of a personal communication) that "in Guinea-Bissau there is no party that claimed to be an 'ethnic' organization, and that even the PRS tried to disguise its stable Balanta constituency."

<sup>1443</sup> [Temudo, 2008]

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## *Political status of ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau*

*From 1974 until 1980*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Balanta	0.3	POWERLESS
Peul	0.2	IRRELEVANT
Manjaco	0.14	POWERLESS
Papel	0.07	POWERLESS
Cape Verdean	0.02	DOMINANT

*From 1981 until 1999*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Balanta	0.3	JUNIOR PARTNER
Peul	0.2	IRRELEVANT
Manjaco	0.14	JUNIOR PARTNER
Papel	0.07	SENIOR PARTNER
Cape Verdean	0.02	IRRELEVANT

*From 2000 until 2005*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Balanta	0.3	DOMINANT
Peul	0.2	IRRELEVANT
Manjaco	0.14	POWERLESS
Papel	0.07	POWERLESS
Cape Verdean	0.02	IRRELEVANT




Figure 314: Political status of ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau during 1974-1980.



Figure 315: Political status of ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau during 1981-1999.



Figure 316: Political status of ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau during 2000-2005.

*From 2006 until 2009*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Balanta	0.3	JUNIOR PARTNER
Peul	0.2	IRRELEVANT
Manjaco	0.14	JUNIOR PARTNER
Papel	0.07	SENIOR PARTNER
Cape Verdean	0.02	IRRELEVANT

*From 2010 until 2012*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Balanta	0.3	SENIOR PARTNER
Peul	0.2	IRRELEVANT
Manjaco	0.14	SENIOR PARTNER
Papel	0.07	SENIOR PARTNER
Cape Verdean	0.02	IRRELEVANT

*From 2013 until 2013*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Balanta	0.3	SENIOR PARTNER
Peul	0.2	IRRELEVANT
Manjaco	0.14	JUNIOR PARTNER
Papel	0.07	JUNIOR PARTNER
Cape Verdean	0.02	IRRELEVANT




Figure 317: Political status of ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau during 2006-2009.



Figure 318: Political status of ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau during 2010-2012.



Figure 319: Political status of ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau during 2013-2013.

## *Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau*

*From 1974 until 2013*




Figure 320: Map of ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau during 2013-2013.

Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
<span style="color: green;">■</span> Balanta	11 763	Regional & urban
<span style="color: red;">■</span> Manjaco	4718	Regionally based
<span style="color: brown;">■</span> Papel	868	Regional & urban
Cape Verdean		Urban

Table 94: List of ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau during 1974-2013.

## *Conflicts in Guinea-Bissau*

*Starting on 1963-02-28*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Portugal	PAIGC		1963-02-28			

*Starting on 1998-06-07*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Guinea-Bissau	Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice		1998-06-07			