

Indonesia

Ethnicity in Indonesia

Power relations

1946-1959 is Indonesia's first years of independence, wherein Indonesia experimented with different systems – federal to unified, democratic to guided democratic. In this period, one sees a lot of local powers standing on relatively equal plane. While the national government was largely controlled by the Javanese, at the province level the local powers have relative autonomy. The Chinese is considered discriminated b/c, unlike the Ambonese, Ternate, Minahasans, etc., it never had any region to claim and govern over and was actively kept out of official political positions. 1967-1998: Soeharto's New Order, wherein Indonesia annexed West Papua and East Timor. Central government was far more powerful under the New Order and the existing local powers became powerless as a result. This led to separatist movements in Papua, East Timor, and Aceh.

General comments: 1. There was no evidence that Madurese was powerless (i.e. elite representatives hold no political power at either the national and regional level without being explicitly discriminated against).

Records show that Madurese military officials were part of military elites in 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s. Meanwhile, Madurese religious leaders were very prominent in local politics in the 1960s and during post-Suharto. During the Old Order, Madurese descendants also held positions in major political parties.

One record mentions that Madurese officials held position in local bureaucracy during the New Order period.

2. One can question the coding of the Amboinese as being powerless in the period of 1967-1971 and 1972-1995. Some Amboinese were recorded to hold key military positions in 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and during the period of 2001-2005.

In 1992, the first non-military governor of Maluku province was from an Ambonese clan, Akib Latuconsina. Meanwhile, according to the Editors of Indonesia, "In May 1999, a new Kodam XVI/Pattimura was established in violence-infested Maluku with an Ambonese engineering officer, Brig. Gen. Max Markus Tamaela, as its first commander."

3. Data on Gorontalos is hard to be found. A single source argues that Gorontalos were discriminated in the local politic compared to ethnic Minahasans who enjoyed privileges in bureaucracy and mili-

tary. The literature focuses on the period of New Order (1967-1998) in outlining the evidences of such discrimination. From the literature, it was not clear how Gorontalo were positioned in the national and local politics during prior to 1967. However, it is mentioned that from 1962-1965, the governor of North Sulawesi province (where the Gorontalo are located) was a Minahasan descendant.

However, some power-sharing arrangement appears to exist in local politics of North Sulawesi province, and that vice governor or head of the provincial legislature was usually from other ethnic group than Minahasan including Gorontalo.

After independence, Gorontalo (the home of ethnic Gorontalo), as well as Minahasa (the home of Minahasans) became part of North Sulawesi province. Gorontalo became a separate province in December 2000. ⁽¹⁵²²⁾

¹⁵²² [The Editors, 2001]

1949-1958: 1) The status of Batak was changed from being discriminated to regional autonomy. As far as the literature shows, Batak was not discriminated during that period of time (or ever as far as my general knowledge goes). Some prominent generals at that time were Batak descendants.

2) The status of Achinese was changed from powerless to separatist autonomy. Starting from 1953, Aceh officially launched a rebellion against the central government through a movement called Darul Islam. Central government endorsed a decree in 1959, giving Aceh right to broad autonomy, The rebellion was brought to end in 1962.

3) One Madura ethnic group was changed to to Makassar and Bugis. The status was changed from regional autonomy to separatist autonomy. In 1952, Kahar Muzakkar started a rebellion against central government and allied himself to Darul Islam movement. The rebellion was brought to end in 1965 after Muzakkar was shot.

4) There was no concrete evidence that Madurese were indeed powerless during this period. Considering the trend of regional autonomy during the early years of Sukarno period, the author's intuition is to code Madurese with regional autonomy as well, especially since Madura used to be a state during in the Federal State of Indonesia (1945-1959). The author does not, however, have any concrete evidence to support this intuition. It is therefore up to you whether you want to keep Madurese as powerless or to change their status to regional autonomy.

1959-1962: There was a separatist movement in Ambon (Republic of South Moluccas - RMS) during 1950. The rebellion started in April 1950 and only lasted until November 1950 when the Indonesian military forces defeated the RMS movement. If you do not wish to keep the separatist autonomy status for Ambon in this period, it appears reasonable to change the status to regional autonomy.

1996-1998: One might ask if the previous coder coded both Madurese and Amboinese as powerless due to the communal conflicts in which both of ethnic groups were targeted during this period of time. Yet, one can disagree that elite representatives of both ethnic groups hold no political power at either the national and regional level without being explicitly discriminated against.

For instance :

a) General Hartono, a Madurese, was made army chief of staff in February 1995 and stayed in that position until June 2009. General Hartono also had close personal ties to several of Suharto's children especially his daughter, Tutut. Madurese status, therefore, should not be coded powerless.

b) In 1992, Akib Latuconsina, a member of Ambonese clan, became the governor of Maluku. Ambonese status, therefore, should not be coded powerless.

2002-2009: The period of 2002-2005 was extended to the year of 2009.

In 1999, Indonesia embarked in decentralization process. Based on Law No 22/1999 political authority was transferred to regional (district) government, while Law No. 25/1999 on fiscal arrangement gave regions a far larger share of the revenue generated within their borders. The decentralization laws came into effect on 1 January 2001. As explained by Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, "Under the new arrangement, the central government is required to cede authority to regional governments in all fields except foreign policy, defence and security, monetary policy, the legal system and religious affairs. It also retains control of a number of specific functions such as national planning and the setting and supervision of technical standards. Thus district governments, whose powers had previously been strictly circumscribed, were now to take on full responsibility for such important areas as education, health, the environment, labour, public works and natural resource management. Local parliaments gained the power to elect and dismiss district heads of government (that is, bupati and mayors) and to determine budgets and the organisational structure of the bureaucracy. (¹⁵²³, pp. 4-5)

¹⁵²³ [Aspinall Fealy, 2003]

Due to the implementation of decentralization laws, the statuses of several ethnic groups who are relevant to national politics have changed into Regional Autonomy. Following are the explanations on how these ethnic groups are relevant to national politics:

a) Minangkabau: Local ethnic elites succeeded in lobbying for the transformation of village governance to the traditional "nagari"

system unique to Minangkabau community. This traditional political organization unit was abolished during the Suharto regime as the regime centralized village administration with the Law on Village Government No 5/1979. Two important ministers of the United Indonesia Cabinet 2009-2010, Minister of Home Affairs and Minister of Justice and Human Rights, are also from Minangkabau ethnic group.

b) Batak: The State Secretary and right hand of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Sudi Silalahi, is a Batak descendant. Batak generals occupy second largest share (9 positions) of leading positions for general-ranking officers in TNI and army headquarters. Batak Christian Protestant Church (HKBP) is the largest Protestant church in Indonesia. In August and September 2010, HKBP church in Bekasi, West Java just outside of the country's capital, was targeted by The Islam Defenders Front (FPI). Worshipers and pastors were attacked.

c) Sundanese: Sundanese occupy 5 ministers position in the United Indonesia Cabinet 2009-2010, namely State Minister for Research and Technology, State Minister for National Development Planning, Religious Affairs Minister, Foreign Minister and State Minister for Disadvantaged Regions. Sundanese generals also hold 7 leading positions in the military, making them the second largest non-Javanese generals to hold leading positions in both TNI and army headquarters.

d) Malay: In 1999 some Riau Malay elites formed Free Riau Movement. On 15 March 1999, Tabrani Rab, the movement's leader proclaimed the sovereignty of Riau and threatened secession from Indonesia if the province was not given a larger share of resource revenues.

Overview, Update 2010-2013

Although Indonesia's democratic transition began in 1998, following decades of autocratic rule under Suharto, it was during Megawati Sukarnoputri's presidency (2001 – 2004) that the most important reforms of the post-1999 era were launched: inter alia, direct presidential elections, as well as direct local elections for governors, mayors and chiefs, were initiated, and a Constitutional Court was established. These reforms became fully operational in 2004 and 2005, when Indonesia's democratic transition is said to have been completed. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY, 2004 – 2014), although often accused of inactivity, has played an important role in further stabilizing the multi-ethnic polity by integrating most political forces into his government (¹⁵²⁴; ¹⁵²⁵). The last two elections – both generally considered free and fair – were held in 2004 and 2009 (¹⁵²⁶; ¹⁵²⁷; ¹⁵²⁸; ¹⁵²⁹). 38 national parties competed in 2009 (and 6 local parties in Aceh only) (¹⁵³⁰), 9 of which met the threshold of 2.5% of the national vote to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives (DPR) (¹⁵³¹). SBY's Democratic Party won a plurality of seats (¹⁵³²; ¹⁵³³). According to Freedom House, the 2009 elections

¹⁵²⁴ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

¹⁵²⁵ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012]

¹⁵²⁶ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

¹⁵²⁷ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012]

¹⁵²⁸ [Freedom House, 2014]

yielded a significant turnover in the DPR, with 75% of the chamber comprised of new lawmakers (1534; 1535). President SBY was elected for a second term, also in 2009 (1536; (1537; 1538).

The Executive: The president is head of state and head of government, as well as the commander-in-chief of the Indonesian armed forces. He/she leads the cabinet, and has the authority to appoint the cabinet members, who themselves do not have to be elected members of the legislature (1539).

1539 [Wikipedia, 2014b]

As mentioned above, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) was re-elected in 2009, having won an outright majority of more than 60% of the votes. A retired Army General Officer, he currently chairs the Democratic Party of Indonesia. SBY is of Javanese ethnicity (1540).

1540 [Wikipedia, 2014e]

SBY's first Cabinet (2004 – 2009, 'United Indonesia Cabinet') was composed of 36 members, including 5 former members of the military (1541; 1542). His second Cabinet (2009 – 2014, 'Second United Indonesia Cabinet') includes 6 former military/police personnel, appointed to the following ministries/positions: Ministry for Political, Law and Security Affairs; State Secretary; Ministry for Transportation; Ministry for Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform; Head of State Intelligence Agency; and Indonesian National Armed Forces Chief of Staff (1543).

1541 [Wikipedia, 2014c]

1542 [Wikipedia, 2014e]

1543 [Wikipedia, 2014c]

Although still represented in the cabinet, the representation of the armed forces and the police in the DPR officially ended in 2004 (1544), and they have been successfully subordinated to civilian democratic leadership (1545). Their influence has therefore been reduced and they are no longer the most important veto power. Instead, oligarchs and business groups, as well as radical Muslim groups, are increasingly gaining political influence (1546; 1547).

1544 [Wikipedia, 2014b]

1545 [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

1546 [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

1547 [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012]

Ethnic Power Relations, Update 2010-2013

General Comments: A number of sources emphasise that there is a great sense of togetherness among all ethnic groups,

based on a shared identity that is defined by a national language (Bahasa Indonesia), ethnic diversity, religious pluralism within a majority Muslim population, and the successful war of independence (1548; 1549). While the decentralisation process is believed to have revived local identities and customs, this has apparently not taken place at a scale that would have undermined the overarching national identity (1550; 1551).

1548 [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012]

1549 [Wikipedia, 2014a]

1550 [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

1551 [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012]

1552 [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012]

All citizens have the same civil rights, and anti-discrimination laws seek to prevent any unequal treatment (1552). Also, President SBY, who is known for his un-confrontational and inclusive style of government, has formed a rainbow coalition with nearly all political forces represented in parliament (1553); his government is said to officially promote racial and ethnic tolerance, and explicitly recognizes the right of all to participate fully in political and social life (1554).

1553 [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012]

1554 [US State Department, 2013]

Although human rights abuses persist, these are now mostly of a non-political nature ⁽¹⁵⁵⁵⁾.

¹⁵⁵⁵ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

An important feature of the Indonesian ethno-political landscape is the fact that parties tend to be multi-ethnic, despite the great number of different identity groups. Although traditionally anchored in specific religio-political constituencies ⁽¹⁵⁵⁶⁾, the switch to a more candidate-centred electoral system in 2004, combined with strict party regulations, has served to reduce the influence of regional and ethnic interests and instead encouraged the emergence of broad-based, country-wide, inclusive ‘catch-all’ parties (e.g. SYB’s Democratic Party) ^(1557; 1558; 1559).

¹⁵⁵⁶ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

Party regulations require political parties to establish as a nationwide organization (i.e., have chapters in all provinces ⁽¹⁵⁶⁰⁾), win a minimum % of the vote to obtain a single seat in the national legislature and gain a high number of parliamentary seats in order to nominate a presidential candidate ^(1561, 1562). (The same requirements apply in district and provincial elections, except in Aceh, where local-level parties are permitted ⁽¹⁵⁶³⁾.) This “prohibits small particularistic parties and compels politicians to compete for broad-based support from across the country” ⁽¹⁵⁶⁴⁾. Similarly, the fact that elections are now candidate-centred obliges parties to field groups of politicians that can appeal to geographically, ethnically, and ideologically diverse constituents ⁽¹⁵⁶⁵⁾.

¹⁵⁵⁷ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

¹⁵⁵⁸ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012]

¹⁵⁵⁹ [Macdonald, 2013]

¹⁵⁶⁰ [Freedom House, 2014]

¹⁵⁶¹ [Freedom House, 2014]

¹⁵⁶² [Macdonald, 2013]

¹⁵⁶³ [Freedom House, 2014]

¹⁵⁶⁴ [Macdonald, 2013]

Likewise emphasising that Indonesian parties seek to appeal to the most Indonesians possible, and thus generally neither form around a particular ethnicity nor situate in a specific region, Bulkin adds that most parties do indeed enjoy support across the country ⁽¹⁵⁶⁶⁾.

¹⁵⁶⁶ [Bulkin, 2013]

Nevertheless, the Javanese remain as the largest and politically dominant ethnic group ⁽¹⁵⁶⁷⁾.

¹⁵⁶⁷ [Wikipedia, 2014a]

The Second United Indonesia Cabinet (2009 - 2014): According to the US Department of State, President Yudhoyono’s second cabinet reflects the ethnic and religious diversity of the country ⁽¹⁵⁶⁸⁾. Looking at the ethnic make-up of the cabinet, this indeed seems to be the case ⁽¹⁵⁶⁹⁾:

¹⁵⁶⁸ [US State Department, 2013]

¹⁵⁶⁹ [The Jakarta Post, 2009]

Javanese: 10 members

- Political, Legal and Security Affairs
- Defence
- Agriculture
- Education
- People’s Welfare
- Finance
- Industry
- Manpower and transmigration
- Head of Investment Coordinating Board

- Public Works
 - Sundanese: 5 members
- Research and Technology
- National Development Planning
- Religious Affairs
- Foreign Minister
- Disadvantaged Regions
 - Minangkabaus : 3 members
- Home Affairs
- Justice and Human Rights
- Women's Empowerment and Child Protection
 - Malay : 2 members
- Coordinating Minister for the Economy
- Energy and Mineral Resources
 - Batak : 2 members
- State Secretary
- Information and Communication
 - Makassar: 2 members
- Cooperatives and SMEs
- Youth & Sports Affairs
 - Balinese: 1 member
- Culture and Tourism
 - Chinese: 1 member
- Trade
 - Papuan: 1 member (former governor of Papua)
- Transportation
 - Aceh: 1 member (former governor of Aceh)
- State Enterprises

Religious Minorities: Muslims comprise a large majority of Indonesia's population, making up approx. 87% (¹⁵⁷⁰; ¹⁵⁷¹). Smaller religious groups include:

- Christians (Minahasans as well as some Amboinese, Bataks, Chinese, Papuans and Dayaks)
- Hindus (Balinese, some Dayaks)
- Buddhists (Chinese)
- Confucianists (Chinese)
- Animists (some Minangkabaus and Papuans)
- Ahmadiyyas

Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism are recognised as official religions of the Indonesian state (¹⁵⁷²), and the right to religious freedom is constitutionally

¹⁵⁷⁰ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

¹⁵⁷¹ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012]

¹⁵⁷² [Freedom House, 2014]

guaranteed (¹⁵⁷³). Yet, discrimination and violence against non-Muslims and members of Islamic sects has continued unabated (¹⁵⁷⁴; ¹⁵⁷⁵; ¹⁵⁷⁶), and many reports emphasise the reluctance on the part of national and local governments to respond to religious intolerance and to effectively protect the rights of religious minority groups (¹⁵⁷⁷; ¹⁵⁷⁸; ¹⁵⁷⁹; ¹⁵⁸⁰). There is also a growing orthodox Muslim influence in politics, which has resulted in the introduction of Sharia-based bylaws in some regions (¹⁵⁸¹; ¹⁵⁸²).

Chinese Minority: During the last decade, there has been a gradual reduction in discrimination as laws and regulations against ethnic Chinese have been repealed, and new opportunities for their cultural, political and social participation have opened up (¹⁵⁸³; ¹⁵⁸⁴):

- Suharto (1967 – 1998): repression and forced assimilation (¹⁵⁸⁵), banned from entering politics (¹⁵⁸⁶), and denied access to citizenship rights (¹⁵⁸⁷).
- President BJ Habibie (1998 – 1999): presidential decree that abolished formal ethnic, racial, religious and social discrimination against all citizens, including Chinese (1998) (¹⁵⁸⁸).
- President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999 – 2001): law that removed ban on any display of Chinese cultural heritage in public.
- President Megawati (2001 – 2004): revoked the requirement necessitating that all Chinese carry an Indonesian Citizenship Certificate (SBKRI) in 2004 and passed a law that made the non-recognition of Chinese citizens punishable (¹⁵⁸⁹). Also, during her presidency, the Coordinating Minister for the Economy was an ethnic Chinese (¹⁵⁹⁰).

Currently, in SBY's second cabinet, Mari Elka Pangestu, an ethnic Chinese, holds the Tourism and Creative Economy portfolio after having served as trade minister in his first cabinet (¹⁵⁹¹; ¹⁵⁹²). She seems to be widely associated with giving the Chinese community greater recognition in the political arena.

However, while Indonesia has increasingly opened up to the participation of the Chinese minority, there are still signs of continuing discrimination and harassment (¹⁵⁹³), such as the foundation of SIKAD, an ethnic Chinese organization established in response to ongoing unequal treatment (¹⁵⁹⁴).

¹⁵⁷³ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

¹⁵⁷⁴ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

¹⁵⁷⁵ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012]

¹⁵⁷⁶ [Freedom House, 2014]

¹⁵⁸³ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

¹⁵⁸⁴ [Hervandi, 2011]

¹⁵⁸⁵ [Hervandi, 2011]

¹⁵⁸⁶ [Primanita Daslani, 2012]

¹⁵⁸⁷ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

¹⁵⁸⁸ [Primanita Daslani, 2012]

¹⁵⁸⁹ [Minorities at Risk, 2010]

¹⁵⁹⁰ [Primanita Daslani, 2012]

¹⁵⁹¹ [The Jakarta Post, 2009]

¹⁵⁹² [Primanita Daslani, 2012]

¹⁵⁹³ [Freedom House, 2014]

¹⁵⁹⁴ [Minorities at Risk, 2010]

Papuans: While freedom of association, assembly and expression are generally respected in Indonesia, in Papua and West Papua, the protection of civil rights has weakened in the last few years (¹⁵⁹⁵; ¹⁵⁹⁶; ¹⁵⁹⁷; ¹⁵⁹⁸). Here, the Bertelsmann Stiftung and others emphasise that the police and military have taken increasingly violent measures against peaceful pro-independence activists and ordinary citizens suspected of assisting them (¹⁵⁹⁹; ¹⁶⁰⁰). Treason laws have been applied (¹⁶⁰¹), and there are currently 70 political prisoners jailed in West Papua (¹⁶⁰²; ¹⁶⁰³). There is a large military presence in the area (¹⁶⁰⁴), and security forces enjoy relative impunity (¹⁶⁰⁵; ¹⁶⁰⁶).

¹⁵⁹⁵ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

¹⁵⁹⁶ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012]

¹⁵⁹⁷ [Freedom House, 2014]

¹⁵⁹⁸ [US State Department, 2013]

¹⁵⁹⁹ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

Conclusion: In light of the above information, the following coding for the current update appears justified:

Acehnese: powerless » junior partner (cabinet minister)

Amboinese: powerless (no change)

Balinese: irrelevant (no change; although they have representation in cabinet, this does not automatically imply that they are politically organised as a group)

Bataks: powerless » junior partner (2 cabinet ministers)

Chinese: discrimination » junior partner (cabinet minister, official revocation of laws and regulations that discriminated against ethnic Chinese)

Gorontalo: irrelevant (no change)

Javanese: dominant » senior partner (inclusion of other groups)

Madura: powerless (no change)

Makassarese & Bugis: irrelevant (no change; although they have representation in cabinet, this does not automatically imply that they are politically organised as a group)

Minahasa: irrelevant (no change)

Minangkabaus: powerless » junior partner (3 cabinet ministers)

Papuans: powerless » junior partner (cabinet minister, situation in Papua does not seem to preclude the group's representation at national level)

Sundanese: powerless » junior partner (5 cabinet ministers)

Ternate: irrelevant (no change)

Dayak: powerless (no change)

Malay: powerless » junior partner (2 cabinet ministers)

Although the current update concentrates on the period 2010 – 2013, it appears recommendable implementing the above listed changes already as of 2005. The reason for this is that the coding decisions not only took into consideration the representation of ethnic groups in the executive, as indicated, but were also especially motivated by President SBY's (sworn into office in October 2004 » 1st January rule » 2005) reputation for inclusive governance and his aspiration to have all political forces represented, and the impact this has had for Indonesia's democratic consolidation.

While there was a lack of exact data on the complete ethnic composition of his first cabinet (2004 – 2009), there are indications that,

at least, the Malay, Balinese, Chinese, Papuan and Sundanese were represented (¹⁶⁰⁷; ¹⁶⁰⁸).

Also, the switch to a more candidate-centred electoral system took place in 2004, as did the revocation of the requirement of all Chinese to carry an Indonesian Citizenship Certificate (SBKRI).

¹⁶⁰⁷ [Wikipedia, 2013]

¹⁶⁰⁸ [Wikipedia, 2014d]

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Political status of ethnic groups in Indonesia

From 1949 until 1958

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Javanese | 0.45 | DOMINANT |
| Sundanese | 0.13 | POWERLESS |
| Madura | 0.05 | POWERLESS |
| Malay | 0.03 | IRRELEVANT |
| Minangkabaus | 0.03 | POWERLESS |
| Chinese (Han) | 0.02 | DISCRIMINATED |
| Bataks | 0.02 | POWERLESS |
| Dayak | 0.015 | POWERLESS |
| Acehnese | 0.01 | POWERLESS |
| Balinese | 0.01 | POWERLESS |
| Makassarese and Bugis | 0.01 | POWERLESS |
| Minahasa | 0.0047 | POWERLESS |
| Amboinese | 0.0039 | SELF-EXCLUSION |
| Gorontalo | 0.0036 | POWERLESS |
| Ternate | 7.0×10^{-4} | POWERLESS |




Figure 349: Political status of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 1949-1958.

From 1959 until 1963

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Javanese | 0.45 | DOMINANT |
| Sundanese | 0.13 | POWERLESS |
| Madura | 0.05 | POWERLESS |
| Malay | 0.03 | IRRELEVANT |
| Minangkabaus | 0.03 | POWERLESS |
| Chinese (Han) | 0.02 | DISCRIMINATED |
| Bataks | 0.02 | POWERLESS |
| Dayak | 0.015 | POWERLESS |
| Balinese | 0.01 | POWERLESS |
| Acehnese | 0.01 | POWERLESS |
| Makassarese and Bugis | 0.01 | POWERLESS |
| Minahasa | 0.0047 | POWERLESS |
| Amboinese | 0.0039 | POWERLESS |
| Gorontalo | 0.0036 | POWERLESS |
| Ternate | 7.0×10^{-4} | POWERLESS |




Figure 350: Political status of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 1959-1963.

From 1964 until 1966

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Javanese | 0.45 | DOMINANT |
| Sundanese | 0.13 | POWERLESS |
| Madura | 0.05 | POWERLESS |
| Malay | 0.03 | IRRELEVANT |
| Minangkabaus | 0.03 | POWERLESS |
| Chinese (Han) | 0.02 | DISCRIMINATED |
| Bataks | 0.02 | POWERLESS |
| Dayak | 0.015 | POWERLESS |
| Acehnese | 0.01 | POWERLESS |
| Balinese | 0.01 | POWERLESS |
| Makassarese and Bugis | 0.01 | POWERLESS |
| Papuans | 0.007 | DISCRIMINATED |
| Minahasa | 0.0047 | POWERLESS |
| Amboinese | 0.0039 | POWERLESS |
| Gorontalo | 0.0036 | POWERLESS |
| Ternate | 7.0×10^{-4} | POWERLESS |




Figure 351: Political status of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 1964-1966.

From 1967 until 1975

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Javanese | 0.45 | DOMINANT |
| Sundanese | 0.13 | IRRELEVANT |
| Madura | 0.05 | IRRELEVANT |
| Minangkabaus | 0.03 | IRRELEVANT |
| Malay | 0.03 | IRRELEVANT |
| Bataks | 0.02 | IRRELEVANT |
| Chinese (Han) | 0.02 | DISCRIMINATED |
| Dayak | 0.015 | IRRELEVANT |
| Acehnese | 0.01 | POWERLESS |
| Balinese | 0.01 | IRRELEVANT |
| Makassarese and Bugis | 0.01 | IRRELEVANT |
| Papuans | 0.007 | POWERLESS |
| Minahasa | 0.0047 | IRRELEVANT |
| Amboinese | 0.0039 | IRRELEVANT |
| Gorontalo | 0.0036 | IRRELEVANT |
| Ternate | 7.0×10^{-4} | IRRELEVANT |



Figure 352: Political status of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 1967-1975.

From 1976 until 1995



Figure 353: Political status of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 1976-1995.

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Javanese | 0.45 | DOMINANT |
| Sundanese | 0.13 | IRRELEVANT |
| Madura | 0.05 | IRRELEVANT |
| Minangkabaus | 0.03 | IRRELEVANT |
| Malay | 0.03 | IRRELEVANT |
| Bataks | 0.02 | IRRELEVANT |
| Chinese (Han) | 0.02 | DISCRIMINATED |
| Dayak | 0.015 | IRRELEVANT |
| Acehnese | 0.01 | POWERLESS |
| Balinese | 0.01 | IRRELEVANT |
| Makassarese and Bugis | 0.01 | IRRELEVANT |
| Papuans | 0.0079 | POWERLESS |
| East Timorese | 0.005 | POWERLESS |
| Minahasa | 0.0047 | IRRELEVANT |
| Amboinese | 0.0039 | IRRELEVANT |
| Gorontalo | 0.0036 | IRRELEVANT |
| Ternate | 7.0×10^{-4} | IRRELEVANT |

From 1996 until 1998

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Javanese | 0.45 | DOMINANT |
| Sundanese | 0.13 | IRRELEVANT |
| Madura | 0.05 | IRRELEVANT |
| Malay | 0.03 | IRRELEVANT |
| Minangkabaus | 0.03 | IRRELEVANT |
| Bataks | 0.02 | IRRELEVANT |
| Chinese (Han) | 0.02 | DISCRIMINATED |
| Dayak | 0.015 | IRRELEVANT |
| Balinese | 0.01 | IRRELEVANT |
| Makassarese and Bugis | 0.01 | IRRELEVANT |
| Acehnese | 0.01 | POWERLESS |
| Papuans | 0.0079 | POWERLESS |
| East Timorese | 0.005 | POWERLESS |
| Minahasa | 0.0047 | IRRELEVANT |
| Amboinese | 0.0039 | IRRELEVANT |
| Gorontalo | 0.0036 | IRRELEVANT |
| Ternate | 7.0×10^{-4} | IRRELEVANT |



Figure 354: Political status of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 1996-1998.

From 1999 until 2001




Figure 355: Political status of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 1999-2001.

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Javanese | 0.45 | DOMINANT |
| Sundanese | 0.13 | POWERLESS |
| Madura | 0.05 | POWERLESS |
| Malay | 0.03 | POWERLESS |
| Minangkabaus | 0.03 | POWERLESS |
| Chinese (Han) | 0.02 | DISCRIMINATED |
| Bataks | 0.02 | POWERLESS |
| Dayak | 0.015 | POWERLESS |
| Makassarese and Bugis | 0.01 | IRRELEVANT |
| Acehnese | 0.01 | POWERLESS |
| Balinese | 0.01 | IRRELEVANT |
| Papuans | 0.0079 | POWERLESS |
| East Timorese | 0.006 | POWERLESS |
| Minahasa | 0.0047 | IRRELEVANT |
| Amboinese | 0.0039 | POWERLESS |
| Gorontalo | 0.0036 | IRRELEVANT |
| Ternate | 7.0×10^{-4} | IRRELEVANT |

From 2002 until 2004

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Javanese | 0.45 | DOMINANT |
| Sundanese | 0.13 | POWERLESS |
| Madura | 0.05 | POWERLESS |
| Malay | 0.03 | POWERLESS |
| Minangkabaus | 0.03 | POWERLESS |
| Chinese (Han) | 0.02 | DISCRIMINATED |
| Bataks | 0.02 | POWERLESS |
| Dayak | 0.015 | POWERLESS |
| Makassarese and Bugis | 0.01 | IRRELEVANT |
| Acehnese | 0.01 | POWERLESS |
| Balinese | 0.01 | IRRELEVANT |
| Papuans | 0.0079 | POWERLESS |
| Minahasa | 0.0047 | IRRELEVANT |
| Amboinese | 0.0039 | POWERLESS |
| Gorontalo | 0.0036 | IRRELEVANT |
| Ternate | 7.0×10^{-4} | IRRELEVANT |




Figure 356: Political status of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 2002-2004.

From 2005 until 2013




Figure 357: Political status of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 2005-2013.

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Javanese | 0.45 | SENIOR PARTNER |
| Sundanese | 0.13 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Madura | 0.05 | POWERLESS |
| Minangkabaus | 0.03 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Malay | 0.03 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Chinese (Han) | 0.02 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Bataks | 0.02 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Dayak | 0.015 | POWERLESS |
| Acehnese | 0.01 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Makassarese and Bugis | 0.01 | IRRELEVANT |
| Balinese | 0.01 | IRRELEVANT |
| Papuans | 0.0079 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Minahasa | 0.0047 | IRRELEVANT |
| Amboinese | 0.0039 | POWERLESS |
| Gorontalo | 0.0036 | IRRELEVANT |
| Ternate | 7.0×10^{-4} | IRRELEVANT |

Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Indonesia

From 1949 until 1963




Figure 358: Map of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 2005-2013.

| Group name | Area in km ² | Type |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------|
| Javanese | 105 283 | Regional & urban |
| Minangkabaus | 72 962 | Regional & urban |
| Makassarese and Bugis | 56 504 | Regional & urban |
| Dayak | 51 583 | Regionally based |
| Sundanese | 41 131 | Regional & urban |
| Bataks | 39 060 | Regional & urban |
| Acehnese | 31 332 | Regional & urban |
| Gorontalo | 20 752 | Regionally based |
| Madura | 20 190 | Regional & urban |
| Balinese | 6 058 | Regionally based |
| Chinese (Han) | 5 284 | Regional & urban |
| Minahasa | 4 248 | Regionally based |
| Amboinese | 3 429 | Regional & urban |
| Ternate | 2 857 | Regionally based |

Table 103: List of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 1949-1963.

From 1964 until 1966




Figure 359: Map of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 2005-2013.

| Group name | Area in km ² | Type |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------|
| Papuans | 405 945 | Aggregate |
| Javanese | 105 283 | Regional & urban |
| Minangkabaus | 72 962 | Regional & urban |
| Makassarese and Bugis | 56 504 | Regional & urban |
| Dayak | 51 583 | Regionally based |
| Sundanese | 41 131 | Regional & urban |
| Bataks | 39 060 | Regional & urban |
| Acehnese | 31 332 | Regional & urban |
| Gorontalo | 20 752 | Regionally based |
| Madura | 20 190 | Regional & urban |
| Balinese | 6 058 | Regionally based |
| Chinese (Han) | 5 284 | Regional & urban |
| Minahasa | 4 248 | Regionally based |
| Amboinese | 3 429 | Regional & urban |
| Ternate | 2 857 | Regionally based |

Table 104: List of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 1964-1966.

From 1967 until 1975




Figure 360: Map of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 2005-2013.

| Group name | Area in km ² | Type |
|---------------|-------------------------|------------------|
| Papuans | 405 945 | Aggregate |
| Javanese | 105 283 | Regional & urban |
| Dayak | 51 583 | Regionally based |
| Acehnese | 31 332 | Regional & urban |
| Chinese (Han) | 5 284 | Regional & urban |
| Amboinese | 3 429 | Regional & urban |

Table 105: List of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 1967-1975.

From 1976 until 1998




Figure 361: Map of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 2005-2013.

| Group name | Area in km ² | Type |
|--|-------------------------|------------------|
| ■ Papuans | 405 945 | Aggregate |
| ■ Javanese | 105 283 | Regional & urban |
| ■ Dayak | 51 583 | Regionally based |
| ■ Acehese | 31 332 | Regional & urban |
| ■ East Timorese | 17 181 | Regionally based |
| ■ Chinese (Han) | 5284 | Regional & urban |
| ■ Amboinese | 3429 | Regional & urban |

Table 106: List of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 1976-1998.

From 1999 until 2001




Figure 362: Map of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 2005-2013.

| Group name | Area in km ² | Type |
|---|-------------------------|------------------|
| ■ Papuans | 405 945 | Aggregate |
| ■ Malay | 330 476 | Regionally based |
| ■ Javanese | 105 283 | Regional & urban |
| ■ Minangkabaus | 72 962 | Regional & urban |
| ■ Dayak | 51 583 | Regionally based |
| ■ Sundanese | 41 131 | Regional & urban |
| ■ Bataks | 39 060 | Regional & urban |
| ■ Acehese | 31 332 | Regional & urban |
| ■ Madura | 20 190 | Regional & urban |
| ■ East Timorese | 17 181 | Regionally based |
| ■ Chinese (Han) | 5284 | Regional & urban |
| ■ Amboinese | 3429 | Regional & urban |

Table 107: List of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 1999-2001.

From 2002 until 2013




Figure 363: Map of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 2005-2013.












| Group name | Area in km ² | Type |
|--|-------------------------|------------------|
|  Papuans | 405 945 | Aggregate |
|  Malay | 330 476 | Regionally based |
|  Javanese | 105 283 | Regional & urban |
|  Minangkabaus | 72 962 | Regional & urban |
|  Dayak | 51 583 | Regionally based |
|  Sundanese | 41 131 | Regional & urban |
|  Bataks | 39 060 | Regional & urban |
|  Acehneses | 31 332 | Regional & urban |
|  Madura | 20 190 | Regional & urban |
|  Chinese (Han) | 5 284 | Regional & urban |
|  Amboineses | 3 429 | Regional & urban |

Table 108: List of ethnic groups in Indonesia during 2002-2013.

Conflicts in Indonesia

Starting on 1945-10-13

| Side A | Side B | Group name | Start | Claim | Recruitment | Support |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|------------|------------|-------|-------------|---------|
| Government of Netherlands | Indonesian People's Army | | 1945-10-13 | | | |

Starting on 1950-08-05

| Side A | Side B | Group name | Start | Claim | Recruitment | Support |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------|------------|----------|-------------|---------|
| Government of Indonesia | Republic of South Moluccas | Amboinese | 1950-08-05 | Explicit | Yes | Yes |

Starting on 1953-12-31

| Side A | Side B | Group name | Start | Claim | Recruitment | Support |
|-------------------------|-------------------|------------|------------|-------|----------------|---------|
| Government of Indonesia | Darul Islam | Javanese | 1953-12-31 | No | Yes, from EGIP | No |
| Government of Indonesia | PRRI | | 1958-03-07 | | | |
| Government of Indonesia | Permesta Movement | Minahasa | 1958-04-02 | No | Yes | Yes |

Starting on 1962-01-15

| Side A | Side B | Group name | Start | Claim | Recruitment | Support |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|------------|------------|-------|-------------|---------|
| Government of Indonesia | Government of Netherlands | | 1962-01-15 | | | |

Starting on 1962-12-08

| Side A | Side B | Group name | Start | Claim | Recruitment | Support |
|-------------------------|------------------------|------------|------------|-------|-------------|---------|
| Government of Indonesia | Government of Malaysia | | 1962-12-08 | | | |

Starting on 1965-07-28

| Side A | Side B | Group name | Start | Claim | Recruitment | Support |
|-------------------------|--------|------------|------------|----------|-------------|---------|
| Government of Indonesia | OPM | Papuans | 1965-07-28 | Explicit | Yes | Yes |

Starting on 1975-12-07

| Side A | Side B | Group name | Start | Claim | Recruitment | Support |
|-------------------------|----------|---------------|------------|----------|-------------|---------|
| Government of Indonesia | Fretilin | East Timorese | 1975-12-07 | Explicit | Yes | Yes |

Starting on 1989-05-31

| Side A | Side B | Group name | Start | Claim | Recruitment | Support |
|-------------------------|--------|------------|------------|----------|-------------|---------|
| Government of Indonesia | GAM | Acehnese | 1989-05-31 | Explicit | Yes | Yes |