Iraq

Ethnicity in Iraq

Group selection

Population sizes were compared among four sources, the 1994 projection of ANM, the 2003 Fearon list, the 1993 MAR list (using UN population estimates for 1995) and the CIA World Factbook list of ethnic groups for 2000 and 2005 (cp. references below). The following codings were made after the comparison of the different estimates:

Shi'a Arabs: While the CIA and Gurr estimate the size of this group at 60%, other sources, including Fearon and the Fischer Weltalmanach give a value of 63%, which is consistent with the estimate that the Shi'a make up about 2/3 of the Muslim population of Iraq, which in turn is about 95% of the total population. For this reason, the slightly higher estimate is retained.

Sunni Arabs, Kurds: The values for these two groups fluctuate somewhat, which is unsurprising since accurate estimates for the Kurdish population was harder to come by under the rule of Saddam Hussein and now, some parts of the Sunni Arab population have temporarily sought refuge in neighboring countries regularly returning for a short while when their visitors' visa run out. After weighing all available estimates, the values of 19% for the Sunni Arab population and 16% for the Kurdish population were chosen.

Power relations

1946-1979

After its independence from British administration in 1932, Iraq became a monarchy under King Faisal ([2558]). He fostered unity between the Sunni and Shi'a Arab communities in alignment with the prevailing movement at the time of Panarabism, which promoted Arab unity across the region.

[2558] [Central Intelligence Agency, 2017]

In 1958, King Faisal was overthrown in a military coup led by General Abdul Karim Qasim. Thereafter, conspiracies among small groups of army officers became the most important instrument of political change ([2559]). Subsequent talks about Kurdish autonomy took place.

[2559] [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003]

In 1963, the military wing of the Baath party conducted a military coup, leading to the "Ramadan revolution."

Crucial events influencing coding decisions and cut-off dates were:

- Military coup by Quasim (1958) and subsequent talks about Kurdish autonomy.
- Takeover of the country by the Baath party (Ramadan revolution and military coup) (1963)
- Saddam's rise to power (1979)

1980-1991

During the reign of Saddam Hussein, groups other than his own ethno-religious group and political power base, the Sunni Arabs, were discriminated and on several occasions targeted by military operations. This resulted in the establishment of no-fly zones after the Second Gulf War (1991) to protect Kurdish populations in the north and the Shi'a majority in the south.

Assyrians: There are several Christian faiths present in Iraq of which the Assyrians make up the great majority. The total Christian population today is less than 1% ([2560]). The Assyrians formed their first political movement in 1979, which coincides with the beginning of the Saddam era and are therefore considered politically relevant from the 1980-1991 period. The ADM Assyrian Democratic Movement, founded in 1979 by Yunadim Kanna, opposed Saddam's regime during the 1980s and is the largest Christian party in Iraq ([2561]). It is reported that they do not identify as Arabs ([2562]) and that therefore, they were discriminated under Saddam Hussein's Arabization campaigns until 2003 ([2563]).

[2560] [Central Intelligence Agency, 2017]

[2561] [Anderson and Stansfield, 2009]

[2562] [Minority Rights Group International, 2017]

[2563] [Human Rights Watch, 2009]

1992-2003

The situation of the Kurds improved, as they "have been autonomous since 1991 in their northern region" ([2564]). "[T]his region was established as an allied-protected autonomous region following the end of 1991's Gulf War" (ibid). They are therefore coded as self-exclusionist for the period from 1991 through 2002. While the Kurdish security situation improved somewhat, the Shi'a were still actively, though less violently discriminated against. Sunni Arabs are coded as monopoly holders for this period.

[2564] [Minorities at Risk Project, 2009]

Turkmen: The Turkmen are the fourth largest ethnic group behind the Kurds, yet much smaller than the three main groups. According to a report by Minority Rights Group International, the group size is "estimated by some community representatives to number as many as 2.5 to 3 million, though international sources give a range of between 500,000 and 600,000" ([2565]). The lower estimate of roughly 1% to 1.5% of the total population is used here. Turkmen are mainly Muslim of both Sunni and Shia faith, a division that is also reflected in Turkmen political forces. They live in the northern region, mainly

[2565] [Minority Rights Group International, 2017]

on the border of Kurdistan and the Arab-led provinces in the Kirkuk area ([2566]). They emerged as a political force in consequence of the "de facto autonomy created by the events of 1991 in much of the Kurdish region, encouraging the formation of parties based on ideas of ethnic and sectarian identity" ([2567], 258). Their main representatives on the national level are two political parties: the nationalist Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF), founded in 1995 as a coalition of several existing Turkmen parties, with support from Turkey ([2568]) and the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkoman (IUIT). Contrary to the ITF, which is mainly based on Sunni Turkmen people, the IUIT has been referred to as "the most influential Shi'i Turkmen political party" ([2569] 122), and ran separately from the ITF in January 2005 elections. Under Saddam Hussein's regime, the Turkmen minority was reportedly "expelled from their lands and replaced by Arabs from other areas of Iraq" ([2570]) and therefore coded as "discriminated" in the period 1992-2003.

[2566] [Anderson and Stansfield, 2009]
[2567] [Tripp, 2016]
[2568] [Jawhar, 2010]
[2569] [Anderson and Stansfield, 2009]
[2570] [Minority Rights Group International, 2017]

2004-2011

The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 fundamentally altered the ethno-political distribution of power. The "muhasasa" system was introduced in an attempt to provide proportional government representation among Iraq's various ethno-sectarian groups ([2571]). Meanwhile, the US coalition relied heavily on the Shi'a majority in the South and also courted the Kurdish minority to construct the post-Saddam "order" (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004; [2572]; [2573]), ending the decades of Sunni monopoly rule in Iraq. In line with the 1 January rule, these changes have to be coded from the year 2004 onwards. Thornier questions concern the coding of the respective degrees of political power for the three main groups.

[2571] [Ibrahim, 2019]
[2572] [Katzman & Prados, 2005]
[2573] [Nasr, 2006]

Shi'a Arabs: In all quasi-governments and governments since the US invasion, Shi'a elites have been in a leading role, occupying significantly more cabinet posts than any other group. This is true for the coalition-appointed Iraqi Governing Council (ICG) that was in power between 13 July 2003 and 1 June 2004 (see [2574]), Iyad Allawi's Iraqi Interim Government after the "transfer of power" from the occupation forces to Iraqi authorities (in power from 28 June 2004 to 3 May 2005; see [2575]), Ibrahim al-Jaafari's Iraqi Transitional Government (3 May 2005 to 20 May 2006; see [2576]), and both of Nouri al-Maliki's governments (al-Maliki I: 20 May 2006 - 22 December 2010; al-Maliki II: 22 December 2010-2014; see [2577] as well as [2578]). All these governments and also the post-invasion order more general have been described as "Shiite-dominated" or "Shiite-led" in various sources (see e.g. [2579]; [2580]; [2581]; [2582]; [2583]; [2584]). In all cabinets, however, other groups have also been included. Thus, the Shiites are coded as senior partner in an ethno-political power-sharing regime from 2004.

[2574] [Otterman, 2004a]
[2575] [Otterman, 2004b]
[2576] [Beehner, 2005]
[2577] [Filkins & Oppel Jr., 2006]
[2578] [Wing, 2011]
[2579] [M"ockli, 2012]
[2580] [Visser, 2012]
[2581] [Ottaway & Kaysi, 2012]
[2582] [International Crisis Group, 2012a]
[2583] [International Crisis Group, 2013]
[2584] [Filkins, 2014]

Kurds: For the Kurds, the US invasion and post-Saddam Iraqi politics turned out to be a quantum leap in terms of political representation. They were a crucial partner for the US forces and their allies and have been duly represented in all branches of the post-invasion administration (see [2585] and the sources mentioned above). This has led analysts to conclude that "Iraq's Kurdish community, essentially underrepresented in and repressed by previous Iraqi governments, is emerging as a major force in post-Saddam Iraq" ([2586]), that "(t)he high-level Kurdish participation marked the first time in Iraq's history that the Kurds had entered national politics on an equal footing with Iraq's Arab majority" (ibid.), or that the "Kurdish parties are now one of the most powerful forces (if not the most powerful) within the post-Saddam environment" (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004, 162).

[2585] [Katzman, 2010]

[2586] [Katzman & Prados, 2005]

Even though Kurds are a major force in Iraqi politics by now, viewing them on an equal footing with the Shi'a majority is too far a stretch. In all cabinets since 2003, they have received significantly fewer seats than the Shi'a majority and, most of the time, roughly as many but often more important seats than the Sunnis. Also, their temporary role as the kingmakers in the government formation process of 2006, which secured them the presidency as well as the foreign ministry does not seem to justify a coding as senior partner ([2587]), keeping in mind the distribution of the other cabinet posts (see citations above). On these grounds, the Kurds are coded as junior partners from 2004 onwards.

[2587] [Katzman, 2010]

Their de facto autonomy status prevailing since 1991 was strengthened by the regime change and finally codified in the 2005 constitution ([2588]; [2589]). Thus, the Kurds are coded as regionally autonomous.

[2588] [Katzman, 2010]

[2589] [International Crisis Group, 2011]

Sunni Arabs: The previously dominant Sunni group clearly lost large amounts of its access to executive power. Especially the rigid de-Baathification program introduced by Paul Bremer's US-led administration purged many Sunnis from the government apparatus ([2590]). While Allawi's interim government took a somewhat softer stance and tried to reintegrate moderate ex-Baathists into the administration, al-Maliki used de-Baathification and the "Justice and Accountability law" succeeding it from 2008 onwards to get rid of internal Sunni rivals ([2591]; [2592]). All this has contributed to a sense of "marginalization" and "political exclusion" among the Sunni Arab community. Such grievances became apparent in the January 2005 parliamentary elections that were boycotted by large parts of the Sunni population as well as during the Sunni insurgency in 2006/07 ([2593]).

[2590] [Otterman, 2005]

[2591] [International Crisis Group, 2013]

[2592] [Otterman, 2005]

[2593] [International Crisis Group, 2013]

On the other hand, it was a stated aim of the US-led coalition to include the Sunnis into the post-Saddam Iraqi order ([2594]). As a matter of fact, in all the governing bodies or cabinets since the invasion, Sunnis have been represented in non-negligible numbers (see the sources cited above). Due to intra-Sunni splits between

[2594] [Filkins & Oppel Jr., 2006]

radical and moderate factions and perhaps also the grievances fueled by the vast power losses when compared to the pre-invasion regime, many Sunnis have never felt aptly represented ([2595]). Looking at the actual composition of the governments since 2003, we thus code the Sunnis as junior partner in an ethnic power-sharing regime.

[2595] [International Crisis Group, 2012a]

As far as the regional autonomy codings are concerned, neither Sunnis nor Shiites enjoy significant executive power at the regional level. While the Iraqi constitution allows for the formation of regions with quite substantial autonomy from the central government in Baghdad, all attempts by Sunnis or Shi'a dominated provinces to attain regional autonomy have been blocked by the al-Maliki regime (see e.g. [2596]). Thus, as stated above, only the Kurds are coded as regionally autonomous.

[2596] [Ottaway & Kaysi, 2012]

Assyrians: After the US invasion, the Assyrians were granted five token seats in parliament ([2597]) and are therefore coded "powerless". In the 2005 elections, the ADM took part as "The National Rafidain List" ([2598]). This coding continues until 2017 due to their continuing parliamentary representation. However, several reports state that in the chaos of the ongoing conflict about power between the three main groups, the Assyrians are dwindling to the point of political irrelevance (e.g. [2599]) and are targeted by islamist militants ([2600]).

[2597] [U.S. Department of State, 2016]

[2598] [Anderson and Stansfield, 2009]

[2599] [Anderson and Stansfield, 2009]

[2600] [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016]

Turkmen: In the post-Saddam era, the Turkmens started to return to their lands ([2601]) and were even represented in several government bodies between 2003 and 2005 (see ethnic compositions below). However, besides the three main political powers, they never held actual executive power and are therefore coded powerless. In 2016, violent local clashes between Turkmen and Kurdish armed groups were reported, which were based on ethnic affiliations ([2602]) but did not change the power balance.

[2601] [Minority Rights Group International, 2017]

[2602] [Human Rights Watch, 2016]

Yezidi/Sabaean-Mandean/Shabak: These groups each have one seat reserved in parliament since the U.S. invasion in 2003 ([2603]). However, they appear to be politically much less organized than the Assyrians and the Turkmen. While the Sabaean-Mandean group is hardly mentioned in other reports, the Yezidia and the Shabak minorities are described as distinct Kurdish groups ([2604]) and therefore not coded separately.

[2603] [U.S. Department of State, 2016]

[2604] [Minority Rights Group International, 2017]

2012-2018

The situation changed with the withdrawal of the last US forces in late 2011. While there had been accusations before that al-Maliki was purging internal, mainly Sunni rivals from his government, his increasingly authoritarian and exclusionary credentials became blatantly visible in the absence of the coalition forces ([2605]). On the very same day that the last US forces withdrew, Maliki turned against the most high-ranking Sunni politician, Vice President al-

[2605] [Filkins, 2014]

Hashimi, forcing him into exile. A similar fate awaited finance minister al-Issawi, another prominent Sunni leader, in late 2012. Apart from these most prominent cases, al-Maliki took several other steps to get rid of or reduce the influence of Sunni internal rivals ([2606]; [2607]). This has left the Sunnis with only "nominal representation" ([2608]). Another recent ICC report states that Maliki has "reneged" on his commitment to power-sharing and that the largely Sunni-backed Iraqi coalition, from which all Sunni cabinet members stem has lost "any clout to influence governance or the action of the security forces" ([2609]). Against this backdrop, the Sunni representation in the Iraqi government from 2012 onwards must be regarded as merely tokenistic and the Sunni minority is thus coded as powerless.

[2606] [Filkins, 2014]
[2607] [International Crisis Group, 2012a]
[2608] [International Crisis Group, 2013]
[2609] [International Crisis Group, 2012b]

The tradition of Shi'ite led governments since the toppling of Saddam Hussein continued. The outcome of the 2014 parliamentary elections led to the peaceful transition of power from former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi ([2610]). Therefore, Shi'a Arabs are coded as "Senior Partner".

[2610] [U.S. Department of State, 2016]

Under the Maliki premiership lasting from 2011 to 2014, there was "widespread perception of unachieved citizenship among members of the Sunni community" ([2611]). Sunnis felt marginalized and targeted by Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law, which the government used to legally pursue them. One of the consequences was that Sunni militants of the "Islamic State" (IS) terrorist group were able to take advantage of Sunni frustration and received backing by local Sunni armed groups seeking to topple the Maliki government ([2612]). It is said that Maliki tried to eliminate any political rivals, no matter their ethnicity ([2613]), therefore it would be too strong to mark them discriminated. However, in the absence of a long-established or well-developed political party to take forward their interests, they were not able to regain political power recently ([2614]).

[2611] [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016]
[2612] [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016]
[2613] [Mansour, 2017]
[2614] [Mansour, 2017]

Kurds: The Kurds generally defended their status as a regionally autonomous group and a junior partner in the Iraqi government despite some tensions between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish elite in 2014 about budget allocations as well as military operations against the IS insurgency ([2615]). Further, the designation of new Prime Minister al-Abadi in 2017 seems to have diminished Kurdish calls for independence and fostered the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil ([2616]).

[2615] [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016]
[2616] [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016]

Additional Information: Ethnic composition of the various post-Saddam governing bodies and governments.

- Iraqi Governing Council (ICG): 13 Shiites, 5 Kurds, 5 Sunnis, 1 Turkmen, 1 Assyrian Christian (see [2617])
- Iraqi Interim Government: Most cabinet members are Shiites, but Sunnis and Kurds are also well represented. Still one Turkmen and one Christian in the cabinet ([2618])

[2617] [Otterman, 2004a]
[2618] [Otterman, 2004b]

- Iraqi Transitional Government: 17 Shiites, 9 Kurds, 8 Sunnis, 2 Turkmens, 1 Christian ([2619]) [2619] [Beehner, 2005]
- Al-Maliki I: 17 Shiites, 7 Kurds, 7 members of the exclusively Sunni Iraqi Accord front, 5 members of Allawi's secular Iraqi National List including both Sunni and Shia elites ([2620]) [2620] [Filkins & Oppel Jr., 2006]
- Al-Maliki II (cabinet size varies over time): 20-28 Shiites, 7-9 Kurds, 7-11 Sunnis, some others ([2621]). [2621] [Wing, 2011]

2019-2021

The sectarian politics established under Maliki took a turn in the federal elections of May 2018. They marked a "key structural change, as cross-sectarian and cross-ethnic alliances emerged for the first time since 2003" ([2622]). As voting patterns were oriented less along ethnic or sectarian lines, Sunni, Shi'a and Kurdish electoral lists became "increasingly heterogeneous and complex" (ibid.). Iraq's consociational model of governance seems to have improved as two rival blocs emerged from the elections, Binaa and Islah, "each comprising a Shiite core with allied Sunni, Kurdish and minority parties" ([2623]). [2622] [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020] [2623] [Higel, 2020]

At the end of 2019, protests broke out in Baghdad demanding political and economic reform. Among others, the protesters criticized the muhasasa system, introduced in Iraq after the 2003 US-led invasion in an attempt to provide proportional government representation among the various ethno-sectarian groups. Many Iraqis believe the system is deeply flawed and acts as a conduit for corruption and political patronage ([2624]). [2624] [Ibrahim, 2019]

In May 2020 and following the failure of two other prime minister-designates, the Iraqi parliament finally approved Mustafa Kadhimi for the premiership. He appointed a technocratic cabinet including members of the three main ethnic groups ([2625]). Despite being contested, Kadhimi upheld the muhasasa system in his government appointments ([2626]). Thus, while the Shi'a Arabs keep their status as Senior Partner, the Sunni Arab group is henceforth coded as Junior Partner - similar to the Kurds. [2625] [Mamouri, 2020] [2626] [Higel, 2020]

In 2017, the Kurds held a referendum for independence, which led to tensions with the federal government in Baghdad. Yet, the Kurds remain "heavily invested in the Iraqi state, despite their aspirations for independence" ([2627]). Their coding remains the same. [2627] [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020]

Minorities including the Turkmen and the Assyrians continued to be represented in both the federal parliament as well as in the regional government of Iraqi Kurdistan ([2628]). Their coding remains powerless. [2628] [U.S. Department of State, 2019]

Yezidis: The Yezidis are a distinct group that were previously regarded as a subgroup of the Kurds. They are an ancient religious community and their language Kurmanji, for example, "is widely considered by both Yezidis and outsiders to be a dialect of Kurdish"

([2629], 10). They were regarded as infidels by ISIS and specifically targeted by the violent extremist group's incursion in Iraq in 2014. The Yezidis were enslaved, displaced and their population in Iraq was subsequently decimated from approximately 700'000 to 500'000 (ibid.). After these events, they began to call for more political inclusion in the Iraqi federal government. The Federal Supreme Court finally ruled in January 2018 that the Yezidi minority must have more seats in the country's parliament, reflective of the size of the community ([2630]). Even though the decision was reportedly "not implemented during the year" (ibid.), their more prominent role in the political landscape of Iraq shall be accounted for. They are listed as an individual group and coded as powerless starting from 2019 in line with the 1st of January rule. Their population share is split off from the Kurdish group and accounts for about 1% of the total population.

[2629] [Minority Rights Group International, 2017]

[2630] [U.S. Department of State, 2019]

Bibliography

[Anderson and Stansfield, 2009] Anderson, L and Stansfield, G. (2009). Crisis in Kirkuk: The ethnopolitics of conflict and compromise. Philadelphia: University of Pennsilvania Press.

[Baratta, 2004] Baratta, M. von (2004). Der Fischer Weltalmanach. Frankfurt: Fischer.

[Beehner, 2005] Beehner, L. (2005, 12 May). Iraq: Cabinet ministers. Council on foreign relations backgrounder. Retrieved on 27 May 2014 from: http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-cabinet-ministers/p8061#p1

[Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003] Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2003). Transformation Index BTI 2003. Retrieved on 13.09.17 from: http://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2003/pdf/BTI_2003_Iraq.pdf

[Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016] Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2016). Transformation Index BTI 2016. Retrieved on 31.08.17 from: http://www.bti-project.org/de/berichte/laenderberichte/detail/itc/IRQ/

[Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020] Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2020). Transformation Index BTI 2020. Retrieved on 01.08.20 from: https://www.bti-project.org/de/berichte/country-report-IRQ.html

[Central Intelligence Agency, 2017] Central Intelligence Agency. (2017). The world factbook. Retrieved on 13.09.17 from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html

[Central Intelligence Agency, 2005] Central Intelligence Agency. (2005). The world factbook. Retrieved from: http://tinyurl.com/2vhenp

[Filkins, 2014] Filkins, D. (2014, 28 April). What we left behind. The New Yorker. Retrieved on 28 May 2014 from: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2014/04/28/140428fa_fact_filkins?currentPage=all

[Filkins & Oppel Jr., 2006] Filkins, D., & Oppel Jr., R.A. (2006, 21 May). "Iraqui's form government, with crucial posts vacant.

New York Times. Retrieved on 28 May 2014 from: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/21/world/middleeast/21iraq.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0

[Higel, 2020] Higel, Lahib. (2020). On Third Try, a New Government for Iraq. International Crisis Group Report, 8 May 2020. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/third-try-new-government-iraq

[Human Rights Watch, 2009] Human Rights Watch. (2009). On Vulnerable Ground: Violence against Minority Communities in Nineveh Province's Disputed Territories. Report. Retreived on 14.09.17 from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/11/10/vulnerable-ground/violence-against-minority-communities-nineveh-provinces-disputed

[Human Rights Watch, 2016] Human Rights Watch. (2016). Iraq: Ethnic Fighting Endangers Civilians. Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs Clash in Northern District. Retreived on 13.09.17 from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/13/iraq-ethnic-fighting-endangers-civilians

[Ibrahim, 2019] Ibrahim, Arwa. (2019). Muhasasa, the political system reviled by Iraqi protesters. Al-Jazeera, 4 December 2019. Retrieved on 22.01.2021 from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/4/muhasasa-the-political-system-reviled-by-iraqi-protesters

[International Crisis Group, 2011] International Crisis Group. (2011). Iraq and the Kurds: Confronting withdrawal fears. Middle East Report, No. 103.

[International Crisis Group, 2012a] International Crisis Group. (2012a). "Déjà vu all over again: Iraq's escalating political crisis. Middle East Report, No. 126.

[International Crisis Group, 2012b] International Crisis Group. (2012b). Iraq's secular opposition: The rise and decline of al-Iraqi ya. Middle East Report, No. 127.

[International Crisis Group, 2013] International Crisis Group. (2013). Make or break: Iraq's Sunnis and the state. Middle East Report, No. 144.

[Jawhar, 2010] Jawhar, RT. (2010). The Iraqi Turkmen Front. In: Catusse M and Karam K, Returning to political parties? Partisan logic and political transformations in the Arab World. Paris and Beirut: Presses de l'IFPO and Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. Avail- able at: http://books.openedition.org/ifpo/1115 (accessed 04.12.15).

[Katzman & Prados, 2005] Katzman, K., & Prados, A. (2005). The Kurds in post-Saddam Iraq. CRS report for Congress.

[Katzman, 2010] Katzman, K. (2010). The Kurds in post-Saddam Iraq. CRS Report for Congress. Retrieved on 2 June 2014 from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22079.pdf

[Mansour, 2017] Mansour, Renad. (2017). Iraq after the fall of ISIS: The struggle for the state. Research paper of The Chatham House. Retreived on 07.09.2017 from: https://reader.chathamhouse.org/iraq-after-fall-struggle-state#

[Mamouri, 2020] Mamouri, Ali. (2020). Meet Iraq's new Cabinet. Al-Monitor, 7 May 2020. Retrieved on 22 May 2021 from: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/05/iraq-new-cabinet-mustafa-kadhimi-economy-security-covid19.html

[Minorities at Risk Project, 2009] Minorities at Risk Project. (2009). Minorities at risk dataset. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved on 16 November 2010 from: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/

[Minority Rights Group International, 2017] Minority Rights Group International. (2017). Crossroads: The future of Iraq's minorities after ISIS. Report in collaboration with Institute for International Law and Human Rights, No Peace Without Justice, and the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples. Retrieved on 13.09.17 from: http://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/MRG_Rep_Iraq_ENG_May17_FINAL2.pdf

[M"ockli, 2012] Möckli, D. (2012). Iraq after the US withdrawal: Staring into the abyss. CSS Analysis in Security Policy, No. 113. Retrieved on 29 May 2014 from: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=142375

[Nasr, 2006] Nasr, V. (2006). When the Shiites rise. Foreign Affairs, Juli/August 2006.

[Ottaway & Kaysi, 2012] Ottaway, M., & Kaysi, D. (2012). The state of Iraq. The Carnegie Papers, February 2012. Retrieved on 28 May 2014 from: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/state_of_Iraq.pdf

[Otterman, 2004a] Otterman, S. (2004a). Iraq: Iraq's governing council. Council on foreign relations backgrounder. Retrieved on 27 May 2014 from: http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-iraqs-governing-council/p7665

[Otterman, 2004b] Otterman, S. (2004b). Iraq: The interim government leaders. Council on foreign relations backgrounder. Retrieved on 27 May 2014 from: http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-interim-government-leaders/p7664

[Otterman, 2005] Otterman, S. (2005). Iraq: De-Baathification. Council on foreign relations backgrounder. Retrieved on 27 May 2014 from: http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-debaathification/p7853

[Tripp, 2016] Tripp, C. (2007). A history of Iraq. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[United Nations Organization, Population Division, 2004] United Nations Organization, Population Division. (2004). World population prospects. Retrieved from: http://tinyurl.com/388dd3

[U.S. Department of State, 2016] U.S. Department of State. (2016). Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016. Iraq. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Retrieved on 31.08.17 from: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=265498

[U.S. Department of State, 2019] U.S. Department of State. (2019). Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019. Iraq. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Retrieved on 01.08.20 from: https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/iraq/

[Visser, 2012] Visser, R. (2012). The emasculation of government ministries in consociational democracies: The case of Iraq. International Journal for Contemporary Iraqi Studies, 6(2), 231-42.

[Wing, 2011] Wing, J. (2011). Evolution of Iraq's Government from 2010-11. Retrieved on 28 May 2014 from: http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.ch/2011/11/evolution-of-iraqs-government-from-2010.html

Political status of ethnic groups in Ir

From 1946 until 1958

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Shi'a Arabs	0.625	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sunni Arabs	0.185	SENIOR PARTNER
Kurds	0.17	POWERLESS



Figure 504: Political status of ethnic groups in Iraq during 1946-1958.

From 1959 until 1963

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Shi'a Arabs	0.625	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sunni Arabs	0.185	SENIOR PARTNER
Kurds	0.17	SELF-EXCLUSION



Figure 505: Political status of ethnic groups in Iraq during 1959-1963.

From 1964 until 1979

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Shi'a Arabs	0.625	POWERLESS
Sunni Arabs	0.185	MONOPOLY
Kurds	0.17	SELF-EXCLUSION

Figure 506: Political status of ethnic groups in Iraq during 1964-1979.

From 1980 until 1991

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Shi'a Arabs	0.625	DISCRIMINATED
Sunni Arabs	0.185	MONOPOLY
Kurds	0.17	DISCRIMINATED
Assyrians	0.001	DISCRIMINATED



Figure 507: Political status of ethnic groups in Iraq during 1980-1991.

From 1992 until 2003

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Shi'a Arabs	0.625	DISCRIMINATED
Sunni Arabs	0.185	MONOPOLY
Kurds	0.17	SELF-EXCLUSION
Turkmen	0.01	DISCRIMINATED
Assyrians	0.001	DISCRIMINATED

From 2004 until 2011

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Shi'a Arabs	0.625	SENIOR PARTNER
Sunni Arabs	0.185	JUNIOR PARTNER
Kurds	0.17	JUNIOR PARTNER
Turkmen	0.01	POWERLESS
Assyrians	0.001	POWERLESS

Figure 509: Political status of ethnic groups in Iraq during 2004-2011.

From 2012 until 2018

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Shi'a Arabs	0.625	SENIOR PARTNER
Sunni Arabs	0.185	POWERLESS
Kurds	0.17	JUNIOR PARTNER
Turkmen	0.01	POWERLESS
Assyrians	0.001	POWERLESS



Figure 510: Political status of ethnic groups in Iraq during 2012-2018.

From 2019 until 2021

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Shi'a Arabs	0.625	SENIOR PARTNER
Sunni Arabs	0.185	JUNIOR PARTNER
Kurds	0.16	JUNIOR PARTNER
Turkmen	0.01	POWERLESS
Yezidis	0.01	POWERLESS
Assyrians	0.001	POWERLESS

Figure 511: Political status of ethnic groups in Iraq during 2019-2021.

Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Iraq

From 1946 until 1979

Figure 512: Map of ethnic groups in Iraq during 1946-1979.

	Group name	Area in km^2	Type
	Shi'a Arabs	108 150	Regional & urban
	Sunni Arabs	96 757	Regional & urban
	Kurds	72 420	Regional & urban

Table 183: List of ethnic groups in Iraq during 1946-1979.

From 1980 until 1991

Figure 513: Map of ethnic groups in Iraq during 1980-1991.

	Group name	Area in km^2	Type
	Shi'a Arabs	108 150	Regional & urban
	Sunni Arabs	96 757	Regional & urban
	Kurds	72 420	Regional & urban
	Assyrians	1000	Regionally based

Table 184: List of ethnic groups in Iraq during 1980-1991.

From 1992 until 2018

Figure 514: Map of ethnic groups in Iraq during 1992-2018.

	Group name	Area in km^2	Type
	Shi'a Arabs	108 150	Regional & urban
	Sunni Arabs	96 757	Regional & urban
	Kurds	72 420	Regional & urban
	Turkmen	2995	Regionally based
	Assyrians	1000	Regionally based

Table 185: List of ethnic groups in Iraq during 1992-2018.

From 2019 until 2021

Figure 515: Map of ethnic groups in Iraq during 2019-2021.

	Group name	Area in km^2	Type
	Shi'a Arabs	108 150	Regional & urban
	Sunni Arabs	96 757	Regional & urban
	Kurds	72 420	Regional & urban
	Turkmen	2995	Regionally based
	Assyrians	1000	Regionally based

Table 186: List of ethnic groups in Iraq during 2019-2021.

Conflicts in Iraq

Starting on 1948-04-14

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Egypt	Government of Israel		1948-04-14			
Government of Iraq	Government of Israel		1948-04-14			
Government of Jordan	Government of Israel		1948-04-14			
Government of Lebanon	Government of Israel		1948-04-14			
Government of Syria	Government of Israel		1948-04-14			

Starting on 1958-07-13

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Iraq	Military faction (free Officers Movement)		1958-07-13			
Government of Iraq	Military faction (forces of Abdul Wahab al-Shawaf)		1959-03-07			
Government of Iraq	NCRC		1963-02-07			
Government of Iraq	Military faction (forces of Abd as-Salam Arif)		1963-11-17			
Government of Iraq	SCIRI	Shi'a Arabs	1982-07-31	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Iraq	Ansar al-Islam	Sunni Arabs	2003-12-11	Presumed	Yes	
Government of Iraq	Ansar al-Islam	Kurds	2003-12-11	Presumed	Yes	
Government of Iraq	al-Mahdi Army	Shi'a Arabs	2004-04-03	Explicit	Yes, from EGIP	Yes
Government of Iraq	IS	Sunni Arabs	2004-05-16	Explicit	Yes	
Government of Iraq	RJF	Sunni Arabs	2004-10-02	Explicit	Yes	

Starting on 1961-12-30

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Iraq	KDP	Kurds	1961-12-30	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Iraq	PUK	Kurds	1976-12-30	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Iraq	KDP-QM	Kurds	1977-12-30	Explicit	Yes	

Starting on 1972-04-10

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Iran	Government of Iraq		1972-04-10			

Starting on 1990-08-01

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Iraq	Government of Kuwait		1990-08-01			

Starting on 2003-03-19

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Australia	Government of Iraq		2003-03-19			
Government of United Kingdom	Government of Iraq		2003-03-19			
Government of United States of America	Government of Iraq		2003-03-19			