

# Myanmar

## *Ethnicity in Myanmar*

### *Group selection*

We identify the majority group of the **Bamar (Barman)** (68%) as politically relevant as well as the groups living in the seven official ethnic minority states of Myanmar, namely **Kachins**, **Karenni (Red Karens)**, **Kayin (Karens)**, **Mons**, **Shan**, **Zomis (Chins)**, **Buddhist Arakanese**, and **Muslim Arakanese** (both inhabit Rakhine state). Further relevant groups are **Chinese**, **Indians**, and **Wa**.

The group sizes rely on the last official figures from 1983 (<sup>2977</sup>). They cannot be adjusted to more recent data as the figures on ethnicity from the 2014 census were still withheld at the time of the last review. The census was heavily criticized by human rights and ethnic minority organizations beforehand due to growing anxiety that the status of ethnic minority peoples could be undermined before the 2015 general election (<sup>2978</sup>; <sup>2979</sup>). It excluded the Rohingya in Rakhine state (mainly Muslim Arakanese) and was not conducted in Kachin state at all (<sup>2980</sup>; <sup>2981</sup>, 2). The figures given here largely correspond to current numbers given by the CIA World Factbook (<sup>2982</sup>).

<sup>2977</sup> [IRIN, 2012]

<sup>2978</sup> [Burma Centrum Nederland, 2012]

<sup>2979</sup> [Transnational Institute, 2014]

<sup>2980</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2014]

<sup>2981</sup> [UNHRC, 2016]

### *Power relations*

#### *1948-1957*

After independence from Great Britain in 1948, a democratic period followed with the **Bamar** majority as Senior Partner and the **Kachins** and the **Shan** in Junior Partner positions. However, this period was short and marked by political instability and increasing ethnic conflicts on the country's periphery (<sup>2983</sup>). The remaining minorities were cut off from executive power and are coded either Powerless (**Buddhist Arakanese**, **Muslim Arakanese**, **Mons**, **Wa**) or Discriminated (**Chinese**, **Indians**, **Zomis**, and **Karenni**) respectively. Concerning the **Karenni**, reports suggest their forced incorporation into Burma in 1947 without any political representation at the national level and continuous military presence in Karenni state. The army suppressed political expression, forcefully relocated citizens and even attempted to assassinate political leaders (<sup>2984</sup>, 30; <sup>2985</sup>). Based on this assessment, their status remains Discriminated for the entire period under review. This applies to the **Chinese** and **Indian** minorities as well, while the status of other

<sup>2983</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018]

<sup>2984</sup> [Bamforth, Lanjouw Mortimer, 2000]

<sup>2985</sup> [Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization]

groups is subject to change in subsequent periods.

The **Kayin** openly went into armed rebellion as their demands for independence, or at least federalism, voiced by organizations such as the Karen National Union (the KNU) and its armed branch, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), appeared increasingly futile (<sup>2986</sup>). Thus, their political status is considered Self-Excluded in this period.

<sup>2986</sup> [Minority Rights Group International, 2017]

*1958*

The **Muslim Arakanese** become Self-Excluded.

*1959*

Since independence, the military sought to prevent national disintegration by use of force but without offering a long-lasting political solution to the minority problems (<sup>2987</sup>). As the military, locally known as Tatmadaw, rose to power in the 1950ies, its inner circle emerged as the ruling elite with exclusive access to executive power. This new elite was made up entirely of Burman Buddhists, i.e. members of the **Bamar** ethnic group (<sup>2988</sup>). Thus, their coding is subsequently Dominant, while the **Kachins** and **Shan** become Discriminated.

<sup>2987</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

<sup>2988</sup> [Leibenluft, 2008]

*1960-1962*

The **Buddhist Arakanese** and the **Mons** become Self-Excluded, the **Shan** become Powerless.

*1963-1982*

In 1962, General Ne Win staged a coup against the democratically elected government, citing the rise of regional rebellions against the national government as a pretext for military intervention (<sup>2989</sup>). The coup finalized the rule of the **Bamar** military elite.

<sup>2989</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

The **Kachins** become Powerless, the **Shan** and the **Zomis** Self-Excluded.

*1983-1989*

The Citizenship Act of 1982 marked a fundamental deterioration for the situation of the **Muslim Arakanese** by excluding the Rohingyas and other Muslims from the list of 135 officially recognized national minorities (<sup>2990</sup>, 10; <sup>2991</sup>). The majority of the Muslim Arakanese, whose name refers to their homeland in Rakhine state - historically called Arakan - self-identifies as “Rohingya” (<sup>2992</sup>, 1). This denomination is used by most of the reports covering their precarious situation. However, here the label Muslim Arakanese seems appropriate in regard of the religious component of their exclusion by the Buddhist majority of the country, and also to distinguish

<sup>2990</sup> [Transnational Institute, 2014]

<sup>2991</sup> [Staniland, 2017]

<sup>2992</sup> [Nemoto, 2013]

them more clearly from the Buddhist Arakanese who face less discrimination by the state (<sup>2993</sup>). While the **Bamar** military elite usually tried to contain other ethnic groups within their territory, it treated the Muslim Arakanese as alien to their country in the first place (<sup>2994</sup>). It is difficult to clearly separate ethnic from religious or nationalist motives behind the increasing state-led discrimination they faced since the military took over power in 1962 (<sup>2995</sup>). Already in 1978, many were expelled to Bangladesh by a military operation which targeted people who were not considered citizens of Burma (<sup>2996</sup>, 9; <sup>2997</sup>). Based on their official denial of minority status in the Citizenship Act, the Muslim Arakanese are coded as Discriminated starting in 1983.

<sup>2993</sup> [Minority Rights Group International, 2017]

<sup>2994</sup> [Staniland, 2017]

### *1990-2011*

In the early 1990ies, the military government signed several cease-fire agreements with insurgents representing ethnic minority groups in exchange for territory and de facto administrative autonomy. Thus, most parts of the outer provinces, which are inhabited by the ethnic minorities, came under de facto control of powerful guerrilla groups (<sup>2998</sup>). However, the power balance at the national level did not change significantly with the **Bamar** led military still in power.

<sup>2998</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2010]

The continuing dominance of the army was further enshrined by the 2008 Constitution granting 1/4 of all national and 1/3 of all regional parliamentary seats to active-duty military appointees. Moreover, it provided for the military's indefinite power over all branches of government should the president, who must be of military background as well, declare a national state of emergency (<sup>2999</sup>; <sup>3000</sup>). According to the new constitution, a quorum of more than 75% would be necessary for further constitutional amendments, granting the military effectively veto power (<sup>3001</sup>).

<sup>2999</sup> [US State Department, 2013]

<sup>3000</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

<sup>3001</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

The only applicable changes here concern the **Kachins** who become Self-Excluded, and the **Wa**, who are coded with regional autonomy based on the fact that the embattled Burmese military made heavy concessions in return for an end of the conflict. The heavily armed Wa militia, the UWSA, was given full autonomy over what the regime termed "Special Region No. 2" or "Wa state". The UWSA was also granted lucrative business concessions, including tacit permission to deal in narcotics (<sup>3002</sup>).

<sup>3002</sup> [Marshall Davis, 2002]

*2012-2017*

Despite the fact that the ethnic power balance did not shift decisively in favour of the minority groups, this period is marked by some important political developments which are outlined below:

Myanmar held multi-party elections in 2010 for the first time after five decades of military rule. However, they were considered neither free nor fair (<sup>3003</sup>). The newly elected parliamentary government was headed by President Thein Sein, himself a former general and chairman of the military-backed and powerful Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) (<sup>3004</sup>). He appointed predominantly former senior military officers and/or USDP representatives, who had played important roles in the previous military junta. Only very few of the appointed ministers, namely in the departments of Education, Electric Power and Health, had no military background, even after cabinet re-shuffles in 2012 and 2013.

In 2012, the country held largely transparent and inclusive by-elections for 45 out of the total 664 seats in the legislature of which the National League for Democracy (NLD) party, chaired by Aung San Suu Kyi, won 43 (<sup>3005</sup>). However, the ruling USDP continued to hold the majority of seats in the national parliament and the regional assemblies, and active-duty military officers continued to wield authority at each level of government (<sup>3006</sup>).

In the subsequent general elections in November 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD defeated the USDP with an overwhelming majority. Ethnic minority groups did poorly and continued to lack access to important decision-making processes (<sup>3007</sup>; US Department of State 2016, 34). Despite the majority of seats won by the NLD, the constitution still guaranteed the military 25% of the seats in parliament, which further continued to control the three important ministries of Defense, Border Security and Home Affairs (<sup>3008</sup>, 6; <sup>3009</sup>; UNHRC 2016, 3). Therefore, even after the inauguration of a civilian government on 30 March 2016, the Tatmadaw remained very powerful. Moreover, because both dominant parties, the USDP as well as the NLD, were **Bamar** dominated, ethnic minorities barely gained any influence in decision-making processes (<sup>3010</sup>). Thus, the Bamar are still coded Dominant despite the historic political changes.

The seven minority states remained strictly controlled by the Bamar-led USDP (<sup>3011</sup>). During the 2015 elections hundreds of thousands of **Muslim Arakanese** as well as ethnic **Indian** and **Chinese** residents were prevented from voting by annulation of their temporary identity cards (<sup>3012</sup>; <sup>3013</sup>, 6). Furthermore, Muslim candidates – first and foremost Rohingya – were almost non-existent on the final voting lists due to disqualification by election officials or to nationalists' pressure to dispense with Muslim candidates (<sup>3014</sup>; <sup>3015</sup>, 7). Therefore, the status of these three groups remains Discriminated.

Similarly, the **Karenni** are still considered Discriminated given

<sup>3003</sup> [US State Department, 2012]

<sup>3004</sup> [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014]

<sup>3005</sup> [US State Department, 2012]

<sup>3006</sup> [US State Department, 2012]

<sup>3007</sup> [Freedom House, 2017]

<sup>3008</sup> [Burma Centrum Nederland, 2012]

<sup>3009</sup> [Minority Rights Group International, 2017]

<sup>3010</sup> [Freedom House, 2017]

<sup>3011</sup> [Sandar, 2014]

<sup>3012</sup> [Minority Rights Group International, 2017]

<sup>3013</sup> [UNHRC, 2016]

<sup>3014</sup> [Freedom House, 2017]

<sup>3015</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2017]

continued land confiscation and forced displacements in the context of hydropower and mining projects (<sup>3016</sup>). Moreover, ongoing fighting and huge socio-economic problems added to the Karenni peoples' status as one of the most vulnerable ethnic groups in the country. Note that other ethnic minority groups such as the **Kachins** and **Shan** as well as the **Kayin** to a somewhat lesser extent also lived in states where intense fighting persisted and faced similar human rights violations and abuse from both local ethnic armed groups and the Tatmadaw (<sup>3017</sup>, 380; <sup>3018</sup>; <sup>3019</sup>, 9). The decision to code those groups as Powerless – as opposed to Discriminated – is due to less evidence for deliberate discrimination at the hand of the state. Given that they regularly faced violence by armed groups of their own ethnicity, it is more difficult to specifically isolate a pattern of discrimination by state actors.

Peace negotiations were held in 2016 between the government and ethnic armed groups. However, no agreement was reached and fighting even intensified. While the armed groups demanded administrative autonomy for the ethnic minority states as well as strict separation of power between military and government, the government favoured decentralization over complete autonomy (<sup>3020</sup>, 379). Hence, there is no justification for any “regional autonomy” coding in this period.

<sup>3016</sup> [Minority Rights Group International, 2017]

<sup>3017</sup> [International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs

<sup>3018</sup> [Minority Rights Group International, 2017]

<sup>3019</sup> [UNHRC, 2017]

<sup>3020</sup> [International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs

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## *Political status of ethnic groups in Myanmar*

*From 1948 until 1957*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Bamar (Barman)	0.68	SENIOR PARTNER
Shan	0.085	JUNIOR PARTNER
Kayin (Karens)	0.07	SELF-EXCLUSION
Chinese	0.03	DISCRIMINATED
Zomis (Chins)	0.021	DISCRIMINATED
Mons	0.02	POWERLESS
Buddhist Arakanese	0.02	POWERLESS
Indians	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Muslim Arakanese	0.02	POWERLESS
Kachins	0.015	JUNIOR PARTNER
Karenni (Red Karens)	0.004	DISCRIMINATED
Wa	0.002	POWERLESS




Figure 618: Political status of ethnic groups in Myanmar during 1948-1957.

*From 1958 until 1958*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Bamar (Barman)	0.68	SENIOR PARTNER
Shan	0.085	JUNIOR PARTNER
Kayin (Karens)	0.07	SELF-EXCLUSION
Chinese	0.03	DISCRIMINATED
Zomis (Chins)	0.021	DISCRIMINATED
Mons	0.02	POWERLESS
Buddhist Arakanese	0.02	POWERLESS
Indians	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Muslim Arakanese	0.02	SELF-EXCLUSION
Kachins	0.015	JUNIOR PARTNER
Karenni (Red Karens)	0.004	DISCRIMINATED
Wa	0.002	POWERLESS




Figure 619: Political status of ethnic groups in Myanmar during 1958-1958.

*From 1959 until 1959*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Bamar (Barman)	0.68	DOMINANT
Shan	0.085	DISCRIMINATED
Kayin (Karens)	0.07	SELF-EXCLUSION
Chinese	0.03	DISCRIMINATED
Zomis (Chins)	0.021	DISCRIMINATED
Mons	0.02	POWERLESS
Buddhist Arakanese	0.02	POWERLESS
Indians	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Muslim Arakanese	0.02	SELF-EXCLUSION
Kachins	0.015	DISCRIMINATED
Karenni (Red Karens)	0.004	DISCRIMINATED
Wa	0.002	POWERLESS




Figure 620: Political status of ethnic groups in Myanmar during 1959-1959.

*From 1960 until 1962*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Bamar (Barman)	0.68	DOMINANT
Shan	0.085	POWERLESS
Kayin (Karens)	0.07	SELF-EXCLUSION
Chinese	0.03	DISCRIMINATED
Zomis (Chins)	0.021	DISCRIMINATED
Mons	0.02	SELF-EXCLUSION
Buddhist Arakanese	0.02	SELF-EXCLUSION
Indians	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Muslim Arakanese	0.02	SELF-EXCLUSION
Kachins	0.015	DISCRIMINATED
Karenni (Red Karens)	0.004	DISCRIMINATED
Wa	0.002	POWERLESS



Figure 621: Political status of ethnic groups in Myanmar during 1960-1962.

*From 1963 until 1982*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Bamar (Barman)	0.68	DOMINANT
Shan	0.085	SELF-EXCLUSION
Kayin (Karens)	0.07	SELF-EXCLUSION
Chinese	0.03	DISCRIMINATED
Zomis (Chins)	0.021	SELF-EXCLUSION
Mons	0.02	SELF-EXCLUSION
Buddhist Arakanese	0.02	SELF-EXCLUSION
Indians	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Muslim Arakanese	0.02	SELF-EXCLUSION
Kachins	0.015	POWERLESS
Karenni (Red Karens)	0.004	DISCRIMINATED
Wa	0.002	POWERLESS




Figure 622: Political status of ethnic groups in Myanmar during 1963-1982.

*From 1983 until 1989*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Bamar (Barman)	0.68	DOMINANT
Shan	0.085	SELF-EXCLUSION
Kayin (Karens)	0.07	SELF-EXCLUSION
Chinese	0.03	DISCRIMINATED
Zomis (Chins)	0.021	SELF-EXCLUSION
Mons	0.02	SELF-EXCLUSION
Buddhist Arakanese	0.02	SELF-EXCLUSION
Indians	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Muslim Arakanese	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Kachins	0.015	POWERLESS
Karenni (Red Karens)	0.004	DISCRIMINATED
Wa	0.002	POWERLESS



Figure 623: Political status of ethnic groups in Myanmar during 1983-1989.

*From 1990 until 2011*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Bamar (Barman)	0.68	DOMINANT
Shan	0.085	SELF-EXCLUSION
Kayin (Karens)	0.07	SELF-EXCLUSION
Chinese	0.03	DISCRIMINATED
Zomis (Chins)	0.021	SELF-EXCLUSION
Mons	0.02	SELF-EXCLUSION
Buddhist Arakanese	0.02	SELF-EXCLUSION
Indians	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Muslim Arakanese	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Kachins	0.015	SELF-EXCLUSION
Karenni (Red Karens)	0.004	DISCRIMINATED
Wa	0.002	POWERLESS




Figure 624: Political status of ethnic groups in Myanmar during 1990-2011.

*From 2012 until 2017*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Bamar (Barman)	0.68	DOMINANT
Shan	0.085	POWERLESS
Kayin (Karens)	0.07	POWERLESS
Chinese	0.03	DISCRIMINATED
Zomis (Chins)	0.021	POWERLESS
Mons	0.02	POWERLESS
Buddhist Arakanese	0.02	POWERLESS
Indians	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Muslim Arakanese	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Kachins	0.015	POWERLESS
Karenni (Red Karens)	0.004	DISCRIMINATED
Wa	0.002	POWERLESS




Figure 625: Political status of ethnic groups in Myanmar during 2012-2017.

## Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Myanmar

*From 1948 until 2017*




Figure 626: Map of ethnic groups in Myanmar during 1948-2017.

Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
Bamar (Barman)	289 885	Regional & urban
Shan	136 602	Regionally based
Kachins	73 841	Regionally based
Kayin (Karens)	58 142	Regionally based
Zomis (Chins)	47 506	Regionally based
Buddhist Arakanese	32 621	Regional & urban
Muslim Arakanese	15 603	Regionally based
Mons	14 027	Regionally based
Karenni (Red Karens)	12 712	Regionally based
Wa	11 168	Regionally based
Chinese	2 262	Regional & urban
Indians		Urban

Table 222: List of ethnic groups in Myanmar during 1948-2017.

## *Conflicts in Myanmar*

### *Starting on 1948-01-30*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	APLP	Buddhist Arakanese	1948-01-30	Explicit	Yes	No
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	Mujahid Party	Muslim Arakanese	1948-07-30	Presumed	Yes	Yes
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	ANLP	Buddhist Arakanese	1964-12-30	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	CPA	Buddhist Arakanese	1964-12-30	Presumed	Yes	No
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	RPF	Muslim Arakanese	1973-12-30	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	ALP		1977-05-31			
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	RSO	Muslim Arakanese	1991-12-25	Explicit	Yes	No
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	ARSA	Muslim Arakanese	2016-10-08	Explicit	Yes	No

### *Starting on 1948-02-28*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	CPB-RF		1948-02-28			
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	CPB	Buddhist Arakanese	1948-05-30	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	CPB	Wa	1948-05-30	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	CPB	Chinese	1948-05-30	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	CPB	Bamar (Barman)	1948-05-30	No	Yes, from EGIP	Split
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	PVO - "White Band" faction	Bamar (Barman)	1948-08-30	No	Yes, from EGIP	Yes
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	ABSDF		1990-12-30			

*Starting on 1948-12-30*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	MFL-MUF	Mons	1948-12-30	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	MPF	Mons	1952-12-30	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	NMSP	Mons	1959-12-30	Explicit	Yes	
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	BMA	Mons	1996-12-22	Explicit	Yes	No

*Starting on 1948-12-30*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	KNUP	Kayin (Karens)	1948-12-30	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	KNU	Kayin (Karens)	1966-12-30	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	God's Army	Kayin (Karens)	2000-01-26	Explicit	Yes	No
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	DKBA 5	Kayin (Karens)	2010-08-04	Explicit	Yes	Yes

*Starting on 1949-12-30*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	PNDF	Kachins	1949-12-30	Explicit	Yes	
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	KIO	Kachins	1961-02-27	Explicit	Yes	Yes

*Starting on 1957-12-30*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	KNPP	Karenni (Red Karens)	1957-12-30	Explicit	Yes	Yes



*Starting on 1959-11-21*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	NSH	Shan	1959-11-21	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	SSIA	Shan	1960-07-30	Explicit	Yes	
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	SNUF	Shan	1962-12-30	Presumed	Yes	Yes
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	SSA	Shan	1964-12-30	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	SSNLO	Shan	1969-12-30	Explicit	Yes	
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	SURA	Shan	1969-12-30	Presumed	Yes	No
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	SSRA		1976-08-30			
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	TRC	Shan	1984-04-29	No	Yes	No
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	MTA	Shan	1985-12-30	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	RCSS	Shan	1996-09-27	Explicit	Yes	No
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	SSPP	Shan	2006-11-21	Explicit	Yes	

*Starting on 1969-02-27*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of China	Government of Myanmar (Burma)		1969-02-27			

*Starting on 1973-01-10*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	LNUP		1973-01-10			

*Starting on 1991-12-30*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	NSCN-K	Naga	1991-12-30			No

*Starting on 1994-05-01*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	PSLF	Shan	1994-05-01	Explicit	Yes	Split

*Starting on 1997-03-15*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	UWSA	Wa	1997-03-15	Explicit	Yes	Yes

*Starting on 2009-08-26*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Myanmar (Burma)	MNDAA		2009-08-26			