

Niger

Ethnicity in Niger

Group selection

Classification of groups according to Neef (²⁴⁶²) and other (concurrent) sources. The Gourmanché - a tiny minority ethnic group - are not listed as politically relevant. Sizes of groups are coded according to the CIA World Factbook which is consistent with other sources.

²⁴⁶² [Neef, 2000]

1960-1989 During both the one-party state under Hamani Diori and the military regime of Seyni Kountché (and, at the end, Ali Saibou) there is a clear dominance of the Djerma group over all other ethnic groups in the political arena and the army (²⁴⁶³, ²⁴⁶⁴, ²⁴⁶⁵, ²⁴⁶⁶, ²⁴⁶⁷). Therefore, the Djerma-Songhai are coded as "dominant", and all other groups as "powerless" in this period.

²⁴⁶³ [Ibrahim, 1994]

²⁴⁶⁴ [Gervais, 1997]

²⁴⁶⁵ [Riedel, 1990]

²⁴⁶⁶ [Lund, 2001]

²⁴⁶⁷ [Davis Kossomi, 2001]

Special note on the Tuareg and Toubou groups: There certainly was an economic and cultural discrimination of both these groups (e.g. prohibition of nomadism under Kountché (²⁴⁶⁸)); There was however no evidence of a particular political discrimination in comparison with other groups (besides the Djerma). The Tuareg and the Toubou were thus coded as "powerless", as well, instead of "discriminated".

²⁴⁶⁸ [Ibrahim, 1994]

1991 The army led operations against Tuareg, involving massacres of Tuareg civilians (²⁴⁶⁹). Therefore the status of the group was changed for the next year to "discriminated". There was however no such evidence for the Toubou group. Thus, the latter are still coded as "powerless".

²⁴⁶⁹ [Ibrahim, 1994]

1992-1993; National conference and transitional government. Power-sharing arrangement: The Djerma-Songhai lose their political hegemony. Out of the 9 members of the executive committee of the national conference, for example, only one is Djerma, whereas 6 are Hausa (Gervais 1997). The prime minister of the transitional government was a Peul. One could however argue, that he was chosen because he was an "ethnically neutral" candidate whose ethnic group has never played a significant political role in the country. He thus did not represent his own ethnic group as president. Accordingly, the Peul are still seen here as "politically irrelevant". Instead, the Hausa were coded as "senior partner" and the Djerma-Songhai and the Kanouri (who - in contrast to the Peul - are represented by a political organization) as "junior partners".

At the same time, the Tuareg conflict escalated. The two Tuareg ministers that were first included into the transitional government are sacked and even detained like other high state officials of Tuareg origin (²⁴⁷⁰; ²⁴⁷¹). Therefore, the Tuareg are coded as "discriminated". There was no evidence of any targeted discrimination against the Toubou, but on the other hand no evidence of any political inclusion of this group. They thus remain coded as being "powerless".

²⁴⁷⁰ [Ibrahim, 1994]

²⁴⁷¹ [Kring, 1995]

1994-1995 The CDS party leads a governing coalition after general elections in 1993. They are forced to form coalitions in order to get a majority and to be able to govern - which leads to a de-facto power sharing arrangement with the CDS as senior partner.

The CDS is generally considered a Hausa party (²⁴⁷²) and emerged from a regional organization whose goal it was to protect the Hausa civil servants' interests against the Djerma dominance in politics (²⁴⁷³). Its top leadership at the time did not only consist of Hausa politicians. For instance, the newly elected president of the republic, Mahamane Ousmane, considers himself to be Kanouri (²⁴⁷⁴). However, Hausa identity is primarily linguistically defined (²⁴⁷⁵), and Ousmane - who hails from Zinder, the Hausa stronghold (²⁴⁷⁶) - and other party leaders can be considered as Hausa nevertheless (²⁴⁷⁷). Moreover, the party had a clear intention to rely on a Hausa majority electorate (²⁴⁷⁸) and was also generally seen as a Hausa party. Therefore the Hausa were considered to be "senior partner" of the government.

²⁴⁷² [Ibrahim Souley, 1998]

²⁴⁷³ [Lund, 2001]

²⁴⁷⁴ [Lund, 2001]

²⁴⁷⁵ [Riedel, 1990]

²⁴⁷⁶ [Lund, 2001]

One of the most important junior partners of the government was the ANDP, a party rooted in the Djerma heartland. Its leader (a Djerma) became president of the National Assembly (²⁴⁷⁹). Therefore the Djerma-Songhai were coded as "junior partner".

²⁴⁷⁹ [Ibrahim, 1994]

The PSDN, a Kanouri party (²⁴⁸⁰), was also in the government coalition. Thus, Kanouri coded as "junior partner".

²⁴⁸⁰ [Ibrahim, 1994]

Despite ongoing violence between the army and the Tuareg group, the latter were included into the government (2 Tuareg parties, UDPS and PUND, formed part of the governing coalition). They were therefore coded as "junior partner", too.

There is no evidence of Toubou inclusion, they are therefore still coded as "powerless". Neither is there evidence of political relevance of Peul.

1996 After new parliamentary elections in January 1995, the government coalition loses its majority and is forced to appoint Hama Amadou of the leading opposition party, the MNSD, as prime minister. The two factions (CDS and MNSD) are now more or less equally powerful (²⁴⁸¹), leading to a situation with two "senior partners".

²⁴⁸¹ [Ibrahim Souley, 1998]

The MNSD was the ruling party during the end of the Djerma-dominated military regime, founded by Ali Saibou. Its leadership is mostly (but not exclusively) of Djerma origin (²⁴⁸²). The Djerma were thus also coded as "senior partner" during this short period.

²⁴⁸² [Ibrahim, 1994]

1997-1999 The political stalemate between president and prime minister and the resulting crisis lead to a military coup by Ibrahim Baré Mainasara in 1996.

Flawed elections won by Mainasara (who becomes president), and oppression of all opposition. The military becomes the dominant power again.

In general, Mainasara (as an Army Colonel) was very close to the old palace guard and the former regime of Kountché (²⁴⁸³). Also, the core of the military has always been composed of Djerma (²⁴⁸⁴). From this evidence one can conclude that the old Djerma elite returned to the center of power again during this period. As all political opposition was repressed, the Djerma-Songhai were coded as "dominant".

²⁴⁸³ [Ibrahim Souley, 1998]

²⁴⁸⁴ [Gervais, 1997]

2000-2004 Return to civilian, democratic government after the assassination of Mainasara in 1999. The result is a coalition by the MNSD and CDS in another power-sharing arrangement. The MNSD - the party mostly dominated by the Djerma-Songhai - occupies both the presidency (Mamadou Tandja, who is, however, of Kanouri/Peul origin (²⁴⁸⁵)) and the post of the prime minister (Hama Amadou). The leader of the "Hausa party" CDS, Mahamane Ousmane, is president of the National Assembly. (All three appointments remained unaltered after the next elections in 2004.) Therefore, the Djerma are coded as "senior partner", the Hausa as "junior partner".

²⁴⁸⁵ [Ibrahim, 1994]

The PSDN (the Kanouri party) also forms part of the governing coalition. Hence, the Kanouri are coded as "junior partner", as well.

The MNSD - the dominant force in the government - is the party of the "old" (military) elite, the major adversary of the Tuareg movement. However, two ex-Rebel leaders, the Tuareg Rhissa Ag Boula and the Toubou Issa Lamine are included in the government (as Ministers of Tourism and Youth, Arts and Culture, respectively; ²⁴⁸⁶). Given their past and, in the case of Ag Boula future, affiliation with the Tuareg/Toubou rebellion, one can code both the Tuareg and Toubou as junior partners.

²⁴⁸⁶ [izf.net, 2014]

There is still no evidence of any political relevance of the Peul group.

2005-2009: In early 2004 Rhissa Ag Boula is accused of being involved in the murder of an MNSD party cadre and leaves the cabinet [in 2008 he was sentenced to death]. As no other Tuareg participation in the cabinet is indicated, the Tuareg are coded as being powerless as of 2005.

Mamadou Tandja's 2nd term, 2005-2009: Based on the information at hand, there was no evidence for any significant changes in Niger's ethno-political situation during the years from 2006 to 2009. The country's politics continued to be based on an ethnic power-sharing (2487; 2488). Thus the last period of 2000-2005 was extended to the year of 2009. In the following, a few additional explications on the specific ethnic groups are listed:

Tandja's MNSD is the leader of a governing coalition of several parties. The MNSD has become an ethnically more diverse party (2489, 18). Nevertheless, given its closeness to the former (Djerma-dominated) one-party and military regimes (see comments above), the Djerma-Songhai are still considered as "senior partner" from 2006 to 2009. This view is somewhat confirmed by the fact that the CDS (see next paragraph) and (to a lesser extent) the oppositional PNDS are the Hausa parties (2490, 14, 18). The MNSD's president, Seyni Oumarou - who served as Tandja's prime minister from 2007 to September 2009 - is a Djerma. As a smaller ally of the MNSD, the ANDP - a clearly Djerma political party (2491, 14, 18) - also formed part of the government. Overall, no new evidence that would justify a change of the "senior partner"/"junior partner" coding.

The MNSD's most important ally until June 2009 was still the CDS - which is perceived as a Hausa party and which participated in the government (2492, 14, 18). Its leader, former president Mahamane Ousmane, served as president of the National Assembly until May 2009. The PSDN - a small Kanouri party (see comments above) - was another of MNSD's political partners. Therefore, both the Hausa and the Kanouri are still considered to be "junior partners" in Niger's government from 2006 to 2009.

Still no evidence of any political relevance of the Peul group.

A new Tuareg rebellion broke out in 2007 (just like in Mali). The rebel group MNJ demanded greater regional (economic and political) autonomy and a larger share of the region's resources (uranium) for the Tuareg group (2493; 2494). Similar to the Tuareg rebels in Mali, the rebels also claimed that the government had not met the terms of the peace deals signed in the 1990s (e.g. decentralization, economic development of the northern regions) (2495).

According to certain sources, Niger's government maintained an ethnic balance and all ethnic groups were represented in the state apparatus, including Tuareg ministers (2496; 2497; 2498). Other sources (e.g. 2499, 4) still speak of a marginalization of the Tuareg and of the political dominance of black ethnic groups in Niger. Overall, there was no convincing evidence for a change of the coding of the Tuareg and Toubou groups. Like in the 1990s, the government

²⁴⁸⁷ [State Department, 2005-2013]

²⁴⁸⁸ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-.2012]

²⁴⁸⁹ [Basedau Stroh, 2009]

²⁴⁹⁰ [Basedau Stroh, 2009]

²⁴⁹¹ [Basedau Stroh, 2009]

²⁴⁹² [Basedau Stroh, 2009]

²⁴⁹³ [State Department, 2005-2013]

²⁴⁹⁴ [IRIN News, 2008]

²⁴⁹⁵ [IRIN News, 2007]

²⁴⁹⁶ [State Department, 2005-2013]

²⁴⁹⁷ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-.2012]

²⁴⁹⁸ [Freedom House, 2007-2011]

²⁴⁹⁹ [Basedau Werner, 2007]

stuck to a repressive response to the rebellion, in contrast to the situation in Mali where the government negotiated with the rebels and generally exhibited a more inclusionary approach. Niger's government did not address any of the rebels' grievances, among them the appointment of more Tuareg in the administration, the army and other security forces (²⁵⁰⁰). On the other hand, there is no evidence of targeted state violence against the Tuareg as was the case at the end of the military regime. One can thus consider the Tuareg to be "powerless".

²⁵⁰⁰ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-.2012]

2010 The country slid into a constitutional crisis in mid-2009 when president Tandja had the constitution changed to allow himself to stay indefinitely in power eliding all of the country's democratic institutions. Tandja replaced all ministers from the ANDP (Djerma-affiliated) and the RDP (no ethnic affiliation known). Subsequently, the CDS (Hausa-affiliated) left the governing coalition and joined the oppositional PNDS (²⁵⁰¹), rejecting Tandja's unconstitutional moves. President Tandja replaced all leaving ministers with members of his own MNSD, which also won the parliamentary elections in November 2009 (also due to the boycott of opposition parties). Although this might be taken as a (self-enforced) downgrading of the Djerma and Hausa, one can conclude from the large share of Hausa among the MNSD supporters (45%; ²⁵⁰²) and the strong Djerma roots of the party that their power position does not change from the previous period. However, Issa Lamine, the ethnic Toubou and ex-rebel leader, lost his position in the government. Therefore the Toubou are again coded as being powerless.

²⁵⁰¹ [Jeune Afrique, 2009]

²⁵⁰² [Basedau Stroh, 2009]

2011 In February 2010, Tandja was ousted in a military coup and has since been held in military custody while the country has been ruled by a military junta, the CSRD, led by Colonel Salou Djibo who installed himself as Chef d'État. The civilian M. Danda was named prime minister. Djibou belongs to the Djerma group; no ethnic affiliation is known for Danda. The (ethnic) composition of the Transitional Government created by the junta is unknown. However, the US State Department (²⁵⁰³) in the yearly human rights report mentions that "all major ethnic groups were represented at all levels of government". Freedom House (²⁵⁰⁴) reports that "(d)espite the creation of these new institutions and the designation of a civilian prime minister, Djibo maintained his status as de facto head of state without any genuine checks on his power." Given that this judgment coincides with EPR coding rules of "token representation" and that the Djerma make up the bulk of military forces, one can code the Djerma-Songhai as being dominant in 2011. The military rule ended in April 2011 (²⁵⁰⁵)

²⁵⁰³ [State Department, 2005-2013]

²⁵⁰⁴ [Freedom House, 2007-2011]

²⁵⁰⁵ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008-.2012]

2012-2013 General parliamentary and presidential elections were held in January 2011 and a new government was inaugurated in April 2011. M. Issoufou, an ethnic Hausa, from the PNDS (affiliated with Hausa too) won the elections. Brigi Rafini, an ethnic Touareg, was named prime minister. Mahaman Ousmane, an ethnic Toubou, was named minister for cattle raising (²⁵⁰⁶). Due to the former (pre-crisis 2010) inclusion of an ex-rebel leader of the Toubou in the government, this nomination is considered to be a sign of continuous inclusion of the Toubou. Again, the US State Department (²⁵⁰⁷) reports that "[a]ll major ethnic groups were represented at all levels of government." (See also partial description by ²⁵⁰⁸). No signs for discrimination against any ethnic group have been found for this period. The judgment that the Peul do not constitute a politically relevant group can be upheld. As the president is an ethnic Hausa and supported by a Hausa party having the strongest membership in parliament, the Hausa are coded as senior partner, while all other politically relevant ethnic groups are coded as junior partners.

²⁵⁰⁶ [Le Soleil, 2013]

²⁵⁰⁷ [State Department, 2005-2013]

²⁵⁰⁸ [Le Soleil, 2013]

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Political status of ethnic groups in Niger

From 1960 until 1990

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|----------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Hausa | 0.56 | POWERLESS |
| Djerma-Songhai | 0.22 | DOMINANT |
| Peul | 0.085 | IRRELEVANT |
| Tuareg | 0.08 | POWERLESS |
| Kanouri | 0.045 | POWERLESS |
| Toubou | 0.005 | POWERLESS |

From 1991 until 1991

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|----------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Hausa | 0.56 | POWERLESS |
| Djerma-Songhai | 0.22 | DOMINANT |
| Peul | 0.085 | IRRELEVANT |
| Tuareg | 0.08 | DISCRIMINATED |
| Kanouri | 0.045 | POWERLESS |
| Toubou | 0.005 | POWERLESS |

From 1992 until 1993

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|----------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Hausa | 0.56 | SENIOR PARTNER |
| Djerma-Songhai | 0.22 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Peul | 0.085 | IRRELEVANT |
| Tuareg | 0.08 | DISCRIMINATED |
| Kanouri | 0.045 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Toubou | 0.005 | POWERLESS |



Figure 547: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 1960-1990.




Figure 548: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 1991-1991.



Figure 549: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 1992-1993.

From 1994 until 1995

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|----------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Hausa | 0.56 | SENIOR PARTNER |
| Djerma-Songhai | 0.22 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Peul | 0.085 | IRRELEVANT |
| Tuareg | 0.08 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Kanouri | 0.045 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Toubou | 0.005 | POWERLESS |



Figure 550: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 1994-1995.

From 1996 until 1996

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|----------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Hausa | 0.56 | SENIOR PARTNER |
| Djerma-Songhai | 0.22 | SENIOR PARTNER |
| Peul | 0.085 | IRRELEVANT |
| Tuareg | 0.08 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Kanouri | 0.045 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Toubou | 0.005 | POWERLESS |




Figure 551: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 1996-1996.

From 1997 until 1999

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|----------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Hausa | 0.56 | POWERLESS |
| Djerma-Songhai | 0.22 | DOMINANT |
| Peul | 0.085 | IRRELEVANT |
| Tuareg | 0.08 | POWERLESS |
| Kanouri | 0.045 | POWERLESS |
| Toubou | 0.005 | POWERLESS |



Figure 552: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 1997-1999.

From 2000 until 2004

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|----------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Hausa | 0.56 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Djerma-Songhai | 0.22 | SENIOR PARTNER |
| Peul | 0.085 | IRRELEVANT |
| Tuareg | 0.08 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Kanouri | 0.045 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Toubou | 0.005 | JUNIOR PARTNER |



Figure 553: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 2000-2004.

From 2005 until 2009

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|----------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Hausa | 0.56 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Djerma-Songhai | 0.22 | SENIOR PARTNER |
| Peul | 0.085 | IRRELEVANT |
| Tuareg | 0.08 | POWERLESS |
| Kanouri | 0.045 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Toubou | 0.005 | JUNIOR PARTNER |

From 2010 until 2010

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|----------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Hausa | 0.56 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Djerma-Songhai | 0.22 | SENIOR PARTNER |
| Peul | 0.085 | IRRELEVANT |
| Tuareg | 0.08 | POWERLESS |
| Kanouri | 0.045 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Toubou | 0.005 | POWERLESS |

From 2011 until 2011

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|----------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Hausa | 0.56 | POWERLESS |
| Djerma-Songhai | 0.22 | DOMINANT |
| Peul | 0.085 | IRRELEVANT |
| Tuareg | 0.08 | POWERLESS |
| Kanouri | 0.045 | POWERLESS |
| Toubou | 0.005 | POWERLESS |

From 2012 until 2013

| Group name | Proportional size | Political status |
|----------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Hausa | 0.56 | SENIOR PARTNER |
| Djerma-Songhai | 0.22 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Peul | 0.085 | IRRELEVANT |
| Tuareg | 0.08 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Kanouri | 0.045 | JUNIOR PARTNER |
| Toubou | 0.005 | JUNIOR PARTNER |



Figure 554: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 2005-2009.




Figure 555: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 2010-2010.



Figure 556: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 2011-2011.



Figure 557: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 2012-2013.

Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Niger

From 1960 until 2013




Figure 558: Map of ethnic groups in Niger during 2012-2013.

| Group name | Area in km ² | Type |
|--|-------------------------|------------------|
| ■ Tuareg | 589 420 | Regionally based |
| ■ Toubou | 151 689 | Regionally based |
| ■ Kanouri | 66 299 | Regionally based |
| ■ Djerma-Songhai | 50 969 | Regional & urban |
| ■ Hausa | 46 082 | Regional & urban |

Table 166: List of ethnic groups in Niger during 1960-2013.

Conflicts in Niger

Starting on 1991-10-25

| Side A | Side B | Group name | Start | Claim | Recruitment | Support |
|---------------------|--------|------------|------------|----------|-------------|---------|
| Government of Niger | FLAA | Tuareg | 1991-10-25 | Explicit | Yes | |
| Government of Niger | UFRA | Tuareg | 1996-12-30 | Explicit | Yes | |
| Government of Niger | MNJ | Tuareg | 2007-02-08 | No | Yes | |

Starting on 1994-01-19

| Side A | Side B | Group name | Start | Claim | Recruitment | Support |
|---------------------|--------|------------|------------|----------|-------------|---------|
| Government of Niger | CRA | Tuareg | 1994-01-19 | Explicit | Yes | |

Starting on 1995-03-23

| Side A | Side B | Group name | Start | Claim | Recruitment | Support |
|---------------------|--------|------------|------------|----------|-------------|---------|
| Government of Niger | FDR | Toubou | 1995-03-23 | Explicit | Yes | |