

Niger

Ethnicity in Niger

Group selection

The following groups are coded as politically relevant: **Djerma-Songhai, Hausa, Kanouri, Toubou, and Tuareg**. This classification of groups is based on Neef (³⁸⁹⁷) and other (concurrent) sources. The Gourmanche - a tiny minority ethnic group - are not listed as politically relevant. Sizes of groups are coded according to the CIA World Factbook (³⁸⁹⁸), which is consistent with other sources.

³⁸⁹⁷ [Neef, 2000]

³⁸⁹⁸ [CIA World Factbook]

Power relations

1960-1990

During both the one-party state of Hamani Diori and the military regime of Seyni Kountche (and, at the end, Ali Saibou) there was a clear dominance of the Djerma group over all other ethnic groups in the political arena and the army (³⁸⁹⁹, ³⁹⁰⁰, ³⁹⁰¹, ³⁹⁰², ³⁹⁰³). Therefore, the Djerma-Songhai are coded as “dominant”, and all other groups as “powerless” in this period.

³⁸⁹⁹ [Ibrahim, 1994]

³⁹⁰⁰ [Gervais, 1997]

³⁹⁰¹ [Riedel, 1990]

³⁹⁰² [Lund, 2001]

³⁹⁰³ [Davis, 2001]

³⁹⁰⁴ [Ibrahim, 1994]

Special note on the Tuareg and Toubou groups: There certainly was an economic and cultural discrimination of both these groups (e.g. prohibition of nomadism under Kountche (³⁹⁰⁴)) There is, however, no evidence of a particular political discrimination in comparison with other groups (besides the Djerma). The Tuareg and the Toubou are thus coded as “powerless” as well, instead of “discriminated”.

1991

The army led operations against Tuareg, involving massacres of Tuareg civilians (³⁹⁰⁵). Therefore the status of the group was changed for the next year to “discriminated”. There was however no such evidence for the Toubou group. Thus, the latter are still coded as “powerless”.

³⁹⁰⁵ [Ibrahim, 1994]

1992-1993: National conference and transitional government. Power-sharing arrangement

The Djerma-Songhai lose their political hegemony. Out of the 9 members of the executive committee of the national conference, for

example, only one is Djerma, whereas 6 are Hausa (³⁹⁰⁶). Prime minister of the transitional government was a Peul. One could however argue, that he was chosen because he was an “ethnically neutral” candidate whose ethnic group has never played a significant political role in the country. He thus did not represent his own ethnic group as president. Accordingly, the Peul are still seen here as “politically irrelevant”. Instead, the Hausa were coded as “senior partner” and the Djerma-Songhai and the Kanouri (who - in contrast to the Peul - are represented by a political organization) as “junior partners”.

³⁹⁰⁶ [Gervais, 1997]

At the same time, the Tuareg conflict escalated. The two Tuareg ministers that were first included into the transitional government are sacked and even detained like other high state officials of Tuareg origin (³⁹⁰⁷; ³⁹⁰⁸). Therefore, the Tuareg are coded as “discriminated”.

³⁹⁰⁷ [Ibrahim, 1994]

³⁹⁰⁸ [Kring, 1995]

There is no evidence of any targeted discrimination against the Toubou, but on the other hand no evidence of any political inclusion of this group. They thus remain coded as being “powerless”.

1994-1995

The CDS party leads a governing coalition after general elections in 1993. Because of voter support for many different parties, the latter are forced to form coalitions in order to get a majority and to be able to govern - which leads to a de-facto power sharing arrangement with the CDS as senior partner.

The CDS is generally considered a Hausa party (³⁹⁰⁹) and emerged from a regional organization whose goal it was to protect the Hausa civil servants’ interests against the Djerma dominance in politics (³⁹¹⁰). Its top leadership at the time did not only consist of Hausa politicians. For instance, the newly elected president of the republic, Mahamane Ousmane, considers himself to be Kanouri (³⁹¹¹). However, Hausa identity is primarily linguistically defined (³⁹¹²), and Ousmane - who hails from Zinder, the Hausa stronghold (³⁹¹³) - and other party leaders can be considered as Hausa nevertheless (³⁹¹⁴). Moreover, the party had a clear intention to rely on a Hausa majority electorate (³⁹¹⁵) and was also generally seen as a Hausa party. Therefore the Hausa were considered to be “senior partner” of the government.

³⁹⁰⁹ [Ibrahim, 1998]

³⁹¹⁰ [Lund, 2001]

³⁹¹¹ [Lund, 2001]

³⁹¹² [Riedel, 1990]

³⁹¹³ [Lund, 2001]

³⁹¹⁴ [Ibrahim, 1998]

³⁹¹⁵ [Ibrahim, 1994]

One of the most important junior partners of the government was the ANDP, a party rooted in the Djerma heartland. Its leader (a Djerma) became president of the National Assembly (³⁹¹⁶). Therefore the Djerma-Songhai were coded as “junior partner”.

³⁹¹⁶ [Ibrahim, 1994]

The PSDN, a Kanouri party (³⁹¹⁷), was also in the government coalition. Thus, Kanouri coded as “junior partner”.

³⁹¹⁷ [Ibrahim, 1994]

Despite ongoing violence between the army and the Tuareg group, the latter were included into the government (2 Tuareg parties, UDPS and PUND, formed part of the governing coalition). They were therefore coded as “junior partner”, too.

There is no evidence of Toubou inclusion, which is why they are coded as “powerless”.

1996

After new parliamentary elections in January 1995, the government coalition loses its majority and is forced to appoint Hama Amadou of the leading opposition party, the MNSD, as prime minister. The two factions (CDS and MNSD) are now more or less equally powerful⁽³⁹¹⁸⁾, leading to a situation with two “senior partners”.

³⁹¹⁸ [Ibrahim, 1998]

The MNSD was the ruling party during the end of the Djerma-dominated military regime, founded by Ali Saibou. Its leadership is mostly (but not exclusively) of Djerma origin⁽³⁹¹⁹⁾. The Djerma were thus also coded as “senior partner” during this short period.

³⁹¹⁹ [Ibrahim, 1994]

1997-1999

The political stalemate between president and prime minister and the resulting crisis lead to a military coup by Ibrahim Bare Mainasara in 1996. Flawed elections won by Mainasara (who becomes president), and oppression of all opposition. The military becomes the dominant power again.

In general, Mainasara (as an Army Colonel) was very close to the old palace guard and the former regime of Kountché⁽³⁹²⁰⁾. Also, the core of the military has always been composed of Djerma⁽³⁹²¹⁾. From this evidence one can conclude that the old Djerma elite returned to the center of power again during this period. As all political opposition was repressed, the Djerma-Songhai were coded as “dominant”.

³⁹²⁰ [Ibrahim, 1998]

³⁹²¹ [Gervais, 1997]

2000-2004

Return to civilian, democratic government after the assassination of Mainasara in 1999. The result is a coalition by the MNSD and CDS in another power-sharing arrangement. The MNSD - the party mostly dominated by the Djerma-Songhai - occupies both the presidency (Mamadou Tandja, who is, however, of Kanouri/Peul origin⁽³⁹²²⁾) and the post of the prime minister (Hama Amadou). The leader of the “Hausa party” CDS, Mahamane Ousmane, is president of the National Assembly. (All three appointments remained unaltered after the next elections in 2004.) Therefore, the Djerma are coded as “senior partner”, the Hausa as “junior partner”. The PSDN (the Kanouri party) also forms part of the governing coalition. Hence, the Kanouri are coded as “junior partner”.

³⁹²² [Ibrahim, 1994]

The MNSD - the dominant force in the government - is the party of the “old” (military) elite, the major adversary of the Tuareg movement. However, two ex-Rebel leaders, the Tuareg Rhissa Ag Boula and the Toubou Issa Lamine are included in the government (as Ministers of Tourism and Youth, Arts and Culture, respectively⁽³⁹²³⁾). Given their past and, in the case of Ag Boula future, affil-

³⁹²³ [IZF, 2014]

iation with the Tuareg/Toubou rebellion, one can code both the Tuareg and Toubou as “junior partners”.

2005-2009: Mamadou Tandja’s 2nd term

In early 2004 Rhissa Ag Boula is accused of being involved in the murder of an MNSD party cadre and leaves the cabinet [in 2008 he was sentenced to death]. As no other Tuareg participation in the cabinet is indicated, the Tuareg are coded as being “powerless” as of 2005. From 2005 onwards, The country’s politics continued to be based on an ethnic power-sharing (^{3924,3925}).

Tandja’s MNSD is the leader of a governing coalition of several parties. The MNSD has become an ethnically more diverse party (³⁹²⁶, 18). Nevertheless, given its closeness to the former (Djerma-dominated) one-party and military regimes (see comments above), the Djerma-Songhai can still be considered “senior partner” from 2006 to 2009. This view is somewhat confirmed by the fact that the CDS (see next paragraph) and (to a lesser extent) the oppositional PNDS are the Hausa parties (³⁹²⁷, 14, 18). The MNSD’s president, Seyni Oumarou - who served as Tandja’s prime minister from 2007 to September 2009 - is a Djerma. As a smaller ally of the MNSD, the ANDP - a clearly Djerma political party (³⁹²⁸, 14, 18) - also formed part of the government. Overall, no new evidence that would justify a change of the “senior partner”/“junior partner” coding.

The MNSD’s most important ally until June 2009 was still the CDS - which can also still be viewed as a Hausa party and which participated in the government (³⁹²⁹, 14, 18). Its leader, former president Mahamane Ousmane, served as president of the National Assembly until May 2009. The PSDN - a small Kanouri party (see comments above) - was another of MNSD’s political partners. Therefore, both the Hausa and the Kanouri are still considered to be “junior partners” in Niger’s government from 2006 to 2009.

A new Tuareg rebellion broke out in 2007 (just like in Mali). The rebel group MNJ demanded greater regional (economic and political) autonomy and a larger share of the region’s resources (uranium) for the Tuareg group (³⁹³⁰; ³⁹³¹; ³⁹³²). Similar to the Tuareg rebels in Mali, the rebels also claimed that the government had not met the terms of the peace deals signed in the 1990s (e.g. decentralization, economic development of the northern regions) (³⁹³³).

According to certain sources, Niger’s government maintained an ethnic balance and all ethnic groups were represented in the state apparatus, including Tuareg ministers (³⁹³⁴; ³⁹³⁵; ³⁹³⁶). Other sources (³⁹³⁷, 4) still speak of a marginalization of the Tuareg and of the political dominance of black ethnic groups in Niger. Overall, there was no convincing evidence for a change of the coding of the Tuareg and Toubou groups. Like in the 1990s, the government stuck to a repressive response to the rebellion, in contrast to the situation in Mali where the government negotiated with the rebels and generally exhibited a more inclusionary approach. Niger’s government

³⁹²⁴ [US State Department, 1999-2020]

³⁹²⁵ [Bertelsmann, 2003-2016]

³⁹²⁶ [Basedau, 2009]

³⁹²⁷ [Basedau, 2009]

³⁹²⁸ [Basedau, 2009]

³⁹²⁹ [Basedau, 2009]

³⁹³⁰ [US State Department, 1999-2020]

³⁹³¹ [IRIN Africa, 2008]

³⁹³² [IRIN Africa, 2007]

³⁹³³ [IRIN Africa, 2007]

³⁹³⁴ [US State Department, 1999-2020]

³⁹³⁵ [Bertelsmann, 2003-2016]

³⁹³⁶ [Freedom House, 2011]

³⁹³⁷ [Basedau, 2007]

did not address any of the rebels' grievances, among them the appointment of more Tuareg in the administration, the army and other security forces (³⁹³⁸). (On the other hand, there is no evidence of targeted state violence against the Tuareg as was the case at the end of the military regime.) One can thus consider the Tuareg and the Toubou groups to be "powerless".

³⁹³⁸ [Bertelsmann, 2003-2016]

2010

The country slid into a constitutional crisis in mid-2009 when president Tandja had the constitution changed to allow himself to stay indefinitely in power eliding all of the country's democratic institutions. Tandja replaced all ministers from the ANDP (Djerma-affiliated) and the RDP (no ethnic affiliation known). Subsequently, the CDS (Hausa-affiliated) left the governing coalition and joined the oppositional PNDP (³⁹³⁹), rejecting Tandja's unconstitutional moves. President Tandja replaced all leaving ministers with members of its own MNSD, which also won the parliamentary elections in November 2009 (also due to the boycott of opposition parties). Although this might be taken as a (self-enforced) downgrading of the Djerma and Hausa, one can conclude from the large share of Hausa among the MNSD supporters (45%; ³⁹⁴⁰) and the strong Djerma roots of the party that their power position does not change from the previous period. However, Issa Lamine, the ethnic Toubou and ex-rebel leader, lost his position in the government. Therefore the Toubou are again coded as being "powerless".

³⁹³⁹ [Jeune Afrique, 2009]

³⁹⁴⁰ [Basedau, 2009]

2011

In February 2010, Tandja was ousted in a military coup and has since been held in military custody while the country has been ruled by a military junta, the CSRD, led by Colonel Salou Djibo who installed himself as Chef d'Etat. The civilian M. Danda was named prime minister. Djibou belongs to the Djerma group; no ethnic affiliation is known for Danda. The (ethnic) composition of the Transitional Government created by the junta is unknown. However, the US State Department Report 2011 (³⁹⁴¹) in the yearly human rights report mentions that "all major ethnic groups were represented at all levels of government". Freedom House (³⁹⁴²) reports that "[d]espite the creation of these new institutions and the designation of a civilian prime minister, Djibo maintained his status as de facto head of state without any genuine checks on his power." Given that this judgment coincides with EPR coding rules of "token representation" and that the Djerma make up the bulk of military forces, the Djerma-Songhai are coded as being "dominant" in 2011. The military rule ended in April 2011 (³⁹⁴³)

³⁹⁴¹ [US State Department, 1999-2020]

³⁹⁴² [Freedom House, 2011]

³⁹⁴³ [Bertelsmann, 2003-2016]

2012-2016

General parliamentary and presidential elections were held in January 2011 and a new government was inaugurated in April 2011. M. Issoufou, an ethnic Hausa, from the PNDS (affiliated with Hausa too) won the elections. Brigi Rafini, an ethnic Touareg, was named prime minister. Mahaman Ousmane, an ethnic Toubou, was named minister for cattle raising ⁽³⁹⁴⁴⁾. Due to the former (pre-crisis 2010) inclusion of an ex-rebel leader of the Toubou in the government, this nomination is considered to be a sign of continuous inclusion of the Toubou. Again, the US State Department Report 2012 ⁽³⁹⁴⁵⁾ reports that “[a]ll major ethnic groups were represented at all levels of government.” (See also partial description by ³⁹⁴⁶). No signs for discrimination against any ethnic group have been found for this period. As the president is an ethnic Hausa and supported by a Hausa party having the strongest membership in parliament, the Hausa are coded as “senior partners”, while all other politically relevant ethnic groups are coded as “junior partners”.

³⁹⁴⁴ [Le Soleil, 2013]³⁹⁴⁵ [US State Department, 1999-2020]³⁹⁴⁶ [Le Soleil, 2013]*2017-2021*

As presidential elections took place in 2016, a new period is coded as of 2017. President Issoufou, an ethnic Hausa, was reelected for a second term in spring 2016. The oppositional candidate Hama Amadou, ethnic Peul but member of the Djerma-Songai-dominated MNSD party, was under arrest for the entire election period, which is why the opposition boycotted the second round of the elections. Consequently, Issoufou won with an overwhelming majority of votes ⁽³⁹⁴⁷⁾. He reassigned Brigi Rafini, an ethnic Tuareg, as prime minister ⁽³⁹⁴⁸⁾. Several months passed until the president managed to appoint a new Cabinet. Finally, however, he even received the support of the MNSD, which had been the opposition during the presidential elections ³⁹⁴⁹). The MNSD, consequently, was appointed ministerial posts in the government. Thus, from 2017 onward, the Hausa are coded “senior partners”, while the Djerma-Songhai and the Tuareg are coded “junior partners”.

³⁹⁴⁷ [Freedom House, 2017]³⁹⁴⁸ [Reuters, 2016]³⁹⁴⁹ [Freedom House, 2017]

According to the US Department of State Reports 2016-2020, “[a]ll major ethnic groups had representation at all levels of government” in 2020, also referring to the Cabinet ⁽³⁹⁵⁰⁾. In line with this observation, the Kanouri are included in the Cabinet as well, as they occupy the Ministry of Planning as well as the Ministry of Trade & Promotion of the Private Sector ⁽³⁹⁵¹⁾. The Kanouri are thus also coded “junior partners” as of 2017.

³⁹⁵⁰ [US State Department, 1999-2020]³⁹⁵¹ [CIA World Factbook]

In 2016, the former Toubou rebel leader Wardougou died of cancer while being in medical care in Dubai. His successor and interim leader of the newly founded Movement for Justice and Rehabilitation of Niger, Adam Tcheke Koudigan, continued expressing the Toubou’s dissatisfaction about their social marginalization in Niger. The group has occasionally taken arms and poses a military threat to the government, next to Boko Haram in the south and Al Qaida

in the north (³⁹⁵²; ³⁹⁵³). According to the sources consulted, the Toubou have been socially marginalized and are not represented in the current Cabinet. However, there is no indication that they are politically discriminated. It is therefore decided to categorize the Toubou as “powerless” from 2017 on.

³⁹⁵² [Jeune Afrique, 2016]

³⁹⁵³ [Opex360, 2016]

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Political status of ethnic groups in Niger

From 1960 until 1990

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa	0.56	POWERLESS
Djerma-Songhai	0.22	DOMINANT
Tuareg	0.08	POWERLESS
Kanouri	0.045	POWERLESS
Toubou	0.005	POWERLESS

From 1991 until 1991

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa	0.56	POWERLESS
Djerma-Songhai	0.22	DOMINANT
Tuareg	0.08	DISCRIMINATED
Kanouri	0.045	POWERLESS
Toubou	0.005	POWERLESS

From 1992 until 1993

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa	0.56	SENIOR PARTNER
Djerma-Songhai	0.22	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tuareg	0.08	DISCRIMINATED
Kanouri	0.045	JUNIOR PARTNER
Toubou	0.005	POWERLESS

From 1994 until 1995

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa	0.56	SENIOR PARTNER
Djerma-Songhai	0.22	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tuareg	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Kanouri	0.045	JUNIOR PARTNER
Toubou	0.005	POWERLESS



Figure 756: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 1960-1990.




Figure 757: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 1991-1991.




Figure 758: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 1992-1993.



Figure 759: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 1994-1995.

From 1996 until 1996

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa	0.56	SENIOR PARTNER
Djerma-Songhai	0.22	SENIOR PARTNER
Tuareg	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Kanouri	0.045	JUNIOR PARTNER
Toubou	0.005	POWERLESS

From 1997 until 1999

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa	0.56	POWERLESS
Djerma-Songhai	0.22	DOMINANT
Tuareg	0.08	POWERLESS
Kanouri	0.045	POWERLESS
Toubou	0.005	POWERLESS

From 2000 until 2004

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa	0.56	JUNIOR PARTNER
Djerma-Songhai	0.22	SENIOR PARTNER
Tuareg	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Kanouri	0.045	JUNIOR PARTNER
Toubou	0.005	JUNIOR PARTNER

From 2005 until 2009

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa	0.56	JUNIOR PARTNER
Djerma-Songhai	0.22	SENIOR PARTNER
Tuareg	0.08	POWERLESS
Kanouri	0.045	JUNIOR PARTNER
Toubou	0.005	JUNIOR PARTNER

From 2010 until 2010

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa	0.56	JUNIOR PARTNER
Djerma-Songhai	0.22	SENIOR PARTNER
Tuareg	0.08	POWERLESS
Kanouri	0.045	JUNIOR PARTNER
Toubou	0.005	POWERLESS



Figure 760: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 1996-1996.



Figure 761: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 1997-1999.



Figure 762: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 2000-2004.





Figure 763: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 2005-2009.



From 2011 until 2011

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa	0.56	POWERLESS
Djerma-Songhai	0.22	DOMINANT
Tuareg	0.08	POWERLESS
Kanouri	0.045	POWERLESS
Toubou	0.005	POWERLESS

From 2012 until 2016

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa	0.56	SENIOR PARTNER
Djerma-Songhai	0.22	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tuareg	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Kanouri	0.045	JUNIOR PARTNER
Toubou	0.005	JUNIOR PARTNER

From 2017 until 2021

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa	0.56	SENIOR PARTNER
Djerma-Songhai	0.22	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tuareg	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Kanouri	0.045	JUNIOR PARTNER
Toubou	0.005	POWERLESS



Figure 765: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 2011-2011.



Figure 766: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 2012-2016.



Figure 767: Political status of ethnic groups in Niger during 2017-2021.

Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Niger

From 1960 until 1960




Figure 768: Map of ethnic groups in Niger during 1960-1960.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
Tuareg	658 727	Regionally based
Toubou	193 817	Regionally based
Kanouri	74 855	Regionally based
Djerma-Songhai	51 275	Regionally based
Hausa	45 907	Regionally based

Table 286: List of ethnic groups in Niger during 1960-1960.

From 1961 until 2021




Figure 769: Map of ethnic groups in Niger during 1961-2021.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
Tuareg	658 727	Regionally based
Toubou	193 817	Regionally based
Kanouri	74 855	Regionally based
Djerma-Songhai	51 275	Regionally based
Hausa	45 907	Regionally based

Table 287: List of ethnic groups in Niger during 1961-2021.

Conflicts in Niger

Starting on 1991-10-24

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Niger	FLAA	Tuareg	1991-10-24	Explicit	Yes	
Government of Niger	UFRA	Tuareg	1996-12-29	Explicit	Yes	
Government of Niger	MNJ	Tuareg	2007-02-07	No	Yes	

Starting on 1994-01-18

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Niger	CRA	Tuareg	1994-01-18	Explicit	Yes	

Starting on 1995-03-22

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Niger	FDR	Toubou	1995-03-22	Explicit	Yes	

Starting on 2015-03-25

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Niger	IS		2015-03-25			