

**Nigeria**

# Ethnicity in Nigeria

## Group selection

Besides the three large groups **Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo**, three minority groups are included in the list as politically relevant for national politics: **Ijaw, Ogoni and Tiv**. Both the Ijaw and Ogoni groups are from the Niger Delta and have for a long time made ethno-political demands at the national level (<sup>3954</sup>; <sup>3955</sup>). The Tiv have also been active in national politics, e.g. through their party United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) after independence (<sup>3956</sup>).

<sup>3954</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>3955</sup> [Ejobowah, 2000]

<sup>3956</sup> [Bah, 2005]

Any other of the hundreds of minority ethnic groups were not included as there was no evidence of any political representation of them at the national level. The communal violence these minority groups have engaged in is normally targeted against each other - for local reasons (e.g. land, local political positions etc.) (see e.g. <sup>3957</sup>) - and does not stem from a national struggle over the access to political power. Hence, it appears reasonable to focus on the ones that have raised their voice in national politics.

<sup>3957</sup> [Fagbule, 2010]

In accordance with Fearon (<sup>3958</sup>), the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups are combined to one politically relevant group. The Fulani have culturally adapted to the Hausa for the most part (<sup>3959</sup>; <sup>3960</sup>). Also, scholars often use the term Hausa-Fulani to refer to one politically relevant group (e.g. <sup>3961</sup>). Additionally, the category “Muslim Middle Belt” is added to this group since the Muslim groups from the Middle Belt have usually been politically linked to the Hausa-Fulani establishment at the national level (e.g. Babangida as a Gwari).

<sup>3958</sup> [Fearon, 2003]

<sup>3959</sup> [Diamond, 1988]

<sup>3960</sup> [Rakov, 1990]

<sup>3961</sup> [Bah, 2005]

Group sizes according to the CIA World Factbook (<sup>3962</sup>) and, for the Ogoni group, based on Minorities at Risk (<sup>3963</sup>).

<sup>3962</sup> [CIA World Factbook]

<sup>3963</sup> [Minorities at Risk, 2014]

## Power relations

*1960-1964: from the first government after independence to the Dec 1964/March 1965 elections.* The first federal government was formed by an NPC/NCNC coalition (<sup>3964</sup>). The NPC was a northern party, mainly representing Hausa-Fulani interests (<sup>3965</sup>; <sup>3966</sup>). The NCNC, in contrast, was a party based in the east of the country and dominated by Igbo (<sup>3967</sup>). The NPC emerges as the strongest party in the elections and becomes senior partner in the government (<sup>3968</sup>). Abubakar Balewa - a Hausa - becomes Prime Minister. The

<sup>3964</sup> [Diamond, 1988]

<sup>3965</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>3966</sup> [Diamond, 1988]

<sup>3967</sup> [Diamond, 1988]

<sup>3968</sup> [Diamond, 1988]

NCNC constitutes the junior partner. Accordingly, the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo groups are labeled as “senior partner” and “junior partner”, respectively. The AG - a Yoruba party - is in the opposition (3969, 3970). However, the party controls the regional government of the western region. The Yoruba are thus coded as having “regional autonomy”.

3969 [Diamond, 1988]

3970 [Falola, 2004]

This period is coded as a form of a power-sharing arrangement despite information about Hausa-Fulani dominance in national politics (3971). Igbo leader Nnamdi Azikiwe was first named Governor General and later became the country’s first president, in 1963, after Nigeria proclaimed itself a Federal Republic.

3971 [Bah, 2005]

Generally, Nigeria’s politics are dominated by the three main groups Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba. Since there are only three regions in the federation (North, East, West), also regional politics are dominated by these groups. In fact, the three parties NPC, NCNC, and AG controlled “their” respective regions to the degree of a one-party rule (3972). The three minority ethnic groups are thus coded as “powerless”.

3972 [Diamond, 1988]

*1965-1966:* The NPC scores a decisive victory in the highly controversial 1964/5 elections, and Prime Minister Balewa is in the position to form a government after his own fancy (3973). After the post-electoral political crisis, the NPC promises to form a broad-based national government with the participation of all parties. However, this does not happen. The new government is only a superficial coalition. All strategically important, powerful positions go to the NPC. The NCNC and the new Yoruba party NNDP - an ally of the northern NPC - receive the irrelevant posts in the government (3974). The Hausa-Fulani are thus coded as “dominant” during this period.

3973 [Diamond, 1988]

3974 [Diamond, 1988]

The Igbo still control “their” eastern region, with a democratically elected regional NCNC government (3975). Therefore, the Igbo are coded as having “regional autonomy”.

3975 [Diamond, 1988]

In contrast, the issue of regional power is more debatable in the case of the Yoruba. The new NNDP regional government mainly consisted of Yoruba, like for example the new premier Akintola. On the other hand, this government was virtually imposed upon the western region by the NPC-dominated federal government and - as the vehement popular protests showed - opposed by the majority of the local people (3976). Thus, in the terms of EPR’s coding rules, this equals a “token” government appointed from outside (i.e. the central government). The Yoruba are hence coded as “powerless” (and without regional autonomy) during this period.

3976 [Diamond, 1988]

As for the minorities, the situation remains the same as in the first period (all three coded as “powerless”).

The country’s first military coup on January 15, 1966, is conducted by mainly Igbo officers and directed against northern dominance in politics. In July of the same year, a counter-coup by mostly northern officers already terminates this short interlude of Igbo lead-

ership. According to EPR's coding rules, this ephemeral situation is not taken into account in the present coding.

*1967:* According to the January-1st-rule, the new period resulting from the July 1966 counter-coup is coded as starting in 1967.

The coup-plotters handed power over to Yakubu Gowon. Though a northerner, Gowon was not of Hausa-Fulani origin nor of Islamic faith. His own ethnic group (Angas), however, did not play a relevant role in national politics - even after his rise to power - and the people who brought him to power were mainly Hausa-Fulani (e.g. Murtala Mohammed). The available<sup>(3977; 3978; 3979; 3980)</sup> points to a leading role in national politics of the Hausa-Fulani group during this period. Implicit alliance with the Yoruba group during the civil war (<sup>3981</sup>), which was probably inevitable given the military challenge. Long-time Yoruba leader Awolowo was finance minister - after being released from prison - in the central government (<sup>3982</sup>). The Hausa-Fulani are thus coded as "senior partner" and the Yoruba as "junior partner", respectively, during this period.

<sup>3977</sup> [Agbu, 1998]

<sup>3978</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>3979</sup> [Falola, 2004]

<sup>3980</sup> [Mustapha, 2004]

<sup>3981</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>3982</sup> [Falola, 2004]

In contrast, there is large-scale violence against Igbos conducted by northerners including northern soldiers in the north of the country after the Hausa-Fulani counter-coup, which was not stopped by northern military officers. Given that these pogroms were acquiesced (if not supported) by the northern military leaders who effectively held political power, I decided to code the Igbo group as "discriminated" in this one-year period.

Although Gowon created more states shortly before the civil war and, thus, somewhat diminished the political dominance of the three large ethnic groups at the sub-state level, it seems improbable to me that the effects of this action would already have effectively improved the situation of the minority groups in this period - even if large numbers of southern minority group members fought on the side of the federal troops against Biafra. They are thus coded as "powerless" again.

*1968-1970:* Civil war breaks out after Igbo leaders declare the formal secession of their eastern ("Biafra") region in May 1967. Again, according to the January-1st-rule, the new period is coded as starting in 1968.

The situation at the center of political power remains the same during these two years.

However, because of Igbo secessionism, the group is now coded with the power status of "self-exclusion" (and, according to the coding rules, as enjoying "regional autonomy" within its own "Biafra" region).

The period ends with the end of the civil war and the surrender of the eastern region on January 15, 1970.

*1971-1978:* Gowon's rule after the civil war and the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime. Again, according to the January-1st-rule, the new period is

coded as starting in 1971.

Gowon ruled until July 1975 when he was replaced in a bloodless coup by General Murtala Mohammed. Mohammed was later killed in an unsuccessful coup attempt and succeeded by his chief of staff, Olusegun Obasanjo, who returned the country to democracy in 1978/79 (like Mohammed, too, had planned to do).

In the postwar period, political power remained in the hands of a military council. However, Gowon was famous for his policy of reconciliation with and reintegration of the Igbo secessionists after the civil war (<sup>3983</sup>). Bah (2005) calls his rule an “inclusionary approach” in regard to ethnicity. The power status of the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba hence remained unchanged (“senior partner” and “junior partner”, respectively) and the Igbo are coded as “junior partner”.

<sup>3983</sup> [Bah, 2005]

Regarding the three minority groups, it is essential to note that - despite the increase in the number of states - political power was more and more concentrated in the hands of the federal government at the expense of the sub-state entities from the 1970s on (<sup>3984</sup>; <sup>3985</sup>). Yet, in this era (at least during Gowon’s rule), the minorities were better represented at the level of the central state. Members of the Middle Belt groups formed an important part of the executive organ, and also the Ijaw were well represented (<sup>3986</sup>). The Tiv (as the largest Middle Belt group) and the Ijaw are thus coded as “junior partners” during this period. I have no similar evidence for the Ogoni people. Hence, they remain coded as “powerless”.

<sup>3984</sup> [Ejobowah, 2000]

<sup>3985</sup> [Mustapha, 2004]

<sup>3986</sup> [Library of Congress, 2014]

Mohammed was a Hausa, but there is no evidence that anything substantial changed after his rise to power. His and Obasanjo’s rule, too, is appraised as an “inclusionary approach” regarding ethnicity by Bah (2005). Although Obasanjo is Yoruba, he was generally seen as an advocate of “northern interests” at the time, was also linked to the northern political establishment, and the Yoruba did not consider him to be “their” leader (<sup>3987</sup>). There is also no evidence for any substantial changes during his rule, which is why the Mohammed and Obasanjo regimes were combined with Gowon’s rule after the civil war to one single time period.

<sup>3987</sup> [Falola, 2004]

*1979-1983: Second Republic.* Election victory by the NPN and its presidential candidate Shehu Shagari. The NPN was remarkably national, but was still dominated by northern Hausa-Fulani elements (<sup>3988</sup>). Shagari was a Fulani. The NPN first formed a shaky coalition with the NPP (<sup>3989</sup>), which was an Igbo-dominated party (<sup>3990</sup>). The Hausa-Fulani clearly had the role of the senior partner in the government (<sup>3991</sup>; <sup>3992</sup>). Alex Ekwueme, an Igbo (although member of the NPN), was Vice-President (<sup>3993</sup>). The Hausa-Fulani group are hence coded as “senior partner” and the Igbo as “junior partner”. The Yoruba - whose party, the UPN, is in the opposition (<sup>3994</sup>; <sup>3995</sup>) - are coded as “powerless” at the national level but as having “regional autonomy”.

<sup>3988</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>3989</sup> [Diamond, 1982]

<sup>3990</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>3991</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>3992</sup> [Diamond, 1982]

<sup>3993</sup> [Diamond, 1982]

<sup>3994</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>3995</sup> [Falola, 2004]

After the NPP withdrew its support, Shagari ruled at the head of

an exclusively NPN government. However, an Igbo (Ekwueme) was still Vice-President (<sup>3996</sup>). Therefore, the Igbo's status is left unchanged - despite differing information that speaks of Hausa-Fulani favoritism in the context of the NPN's more and more repressive rule (<sup>3997</sup>).

As for the minorities, there is no evidence of any substantial representation in the central government during this period. The Ijaw (until 1996 and the creation of Bayelsa State) (<sup>3998</sup>), and the Ogoni did not possess "their" own states, so they are coded as "powerless".

In contrast, it seems highly probable that the Tiv had (at least some) access to regional power in "their" Benue State (<sup>3999</sup>) during this democratic period. Although this is somewhat uncertain, the Tiv are coded as having "regional autonomy".

The period ends with Buhari's military coup at the very end of 1983, which terminated Nigeria's Second Republic.

*1984-1991: successive authoritarian military regimes after the abortion of the Second Republic.* Under the Buhari, Babangida and Abacha military regimes, dominance of the Hausa-Fulani group that controlled the military (<sup>4000</sup>; <sup>4001</sup>). Buhari and his "putschist" forces were, in fact, closely associated with the ousted, northern-dominated government, and the basic power structure of the country was not to be changed (<sup>4002</sup>). Although Babangida and Abacha are/were not of Hausa-Fulani origin themselves (Babangida is from the Gwari group, Abacha a Kanuri), they clearly represented the Hausa-Fulani north (<sup>4003</sup>; <sup>4004</sup>; <sup>4005</sup>). As in the case of Gowon, their own ethnic groups never played a relevant role in national politics. (The Kanuri, furthermore, are related to the Hausa-Fulani and share with them the Islamic faith (<sup>4006</sup>).) Over the years of Babangida's rule, the most powerful posts within the ruling military government and the leading positions in the security forces (police, army, navy) were more and more exclusively assigned to northern Muslims, while religion, too, became an ever more explosive source of cleavage, exacerbated by Babangida's pro-Muslim measures (<sup>4007</sup>). Joseph (<sup>4008</sup>) speaks of an "ethno-military rule" of the north between 1984 and 1998, after the collapse of the Second Republic. Merger of military and northern hegemony which provokes frustration and a sentiment of ethnic suppression in the south. Northern politicians support the military regime in order to preserve northern political dominance; the fate of the own ethno-regional group is, thus, tied to the survival of the regime. The polarization grows with the increase of violent actions from both sides (repression by the regime, resistance of the opponents) (<sup>4009</sup>). The Hausa-Fulani - which represent the dominant "core" group of the north - are thus coded as "dominant" during the military rule.

The Igbo - also as a consequence of the civil war - were hardly represented in the military, hence their political influence was marginal (<sup>4010</sup>; <sup>4011</sup>). They are thus coded as "powerless". Also more or less "powerless" were the Yoruba who were to be at the center of

<sup>3996</sup> [Diamond, 1982]

<sup>3997</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>3998</sup> [Ejobowah, 2000]

<sup>3999</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>4000</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>4001</sup> [Mustapha, 2004]

<sup>4002</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>4003</sup> [Agbu, 1998]

<sup>4004</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>4005</sup> [Mustapha, 2004]

<sup>4006</sup> [Diamond, 1988]

<sup>4007</sup> [Library of Congress, 2014]

<sup>4008</sup> [Joseph, 1999]

<sup>4009</sup> [Joseph, 1999]

<sup>4010</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>4011</sup> [Mustapha, 2004]

the pro-democracy struggle later (<sup>4012</sup>; <sup>4013</sup>; <sup>4014</sup>).

No group is coded as having “regional autonomy” during military rule as federalism and sub-state power were essentially aborted in this period (<sup>4015</sup>; <sup>4016</sup>).

Meanwhile, minorities from the Middle Belt and the Niger Delta were suppressed by the Babangida and Abacha regimes (<sup>4017</sup>; <sup>4018</sup>). This suppression became increasingly intense over the years, especially against the minority groups in the Niger Delta, and took on a violent character from the 1990s on (see below). For the period of 1984-1991, however, all three minority groups are coded as “powerless”.

*1992-1998:* After the Ogoni people had already issued an “Ogoni Bill of Rights” in 1990 and founded a political movement to fight for their rights, they presented their case before the UN in 1992 - which changed the regime’s attitude toward the Ogoni people drastically. Propaganda, monitoring of the movement and harassment of its members were the response. Leading activists were persecuted (<sup>4019</sup>; <sup>4020</sup>). By promulgating decrees such as the Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree (May 1993), the regime legally oppressed all minority groups’ campaigns for social and political rights (<sup>4021</sup>). Ogoni leader Ken Saro Wiwa was later executed by Abacha along with other leading activists. In the second half of the 1990s, the Ijaw group also began to raise its voice against their marginalization (<sup>4022</sup>). Especially under Abacha, however, the regime just responded to it with more violent oppression (also employing military forces), and ethnic minority activists were terrorized (<sup>4023</sup>; <sup>4024</sup>). Given these developments, I coded the two Niger Delta minority groups Ijaw and Ogoni, which were particularly affected, as “discriminated” from 1992 until 1998 (while the Tiv remain coded as “powerless”).

The power statuses of the three large groups Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo remained the same as in the period before.

Note that the short interim presidency of Ernest Shonekan between August and November 1993 are not taken into account as this did not result in any significant changes and the military (with Abacha as Defense Minister) was effectively still the dominant force in these months (<sup>4025</sup>).

The period ends with the sudden death of Sani Abacha in June 1998. According to EPR coding rules, no separate period was inserted for the short interim rule by General Abubakar until multi-party elections were held in 1999. Accordingly, the next period starts with the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1999.

*1999-2007:* Olusegun Obasanjo became Nigeria’s new president. He initially was not supported by his Yoruba people who did not think of him as advocating Yoruba interests (see above), but this gradually changed after he came to power for the second time (<sup>4026</sup>).

A form of power-sharing between the three main ethnic groups was practiced in Obasanjo’s government. Since the president is a

<sup>4012</sup> [Agbu, 1998]

<sup>4013</sup> [Falola, 2004]

<sup>4014</sup> [Mustapha, 2004]

<sup>4015</sup> [Ejobowah, 2000]

<sup>4016</sup> [Mustapha, 2004]

<sup>4017</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>4018</sup> [Ejobowah, 2000]

<sup>4019</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>4020</sup> [Joseph, 1999]

<sup>4021</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>4022</sup> [Ejobowah, 2000]

<sup>4023</sup> [Bah, 2005]

<sup>4024</sup> [Joseph, 1999]

<sup>4025</sup> [Joseph, 1999]

<sup>4026</sup> [Falola, 2004]

Yoruba and his vice-president a Fulani, the presidency of the senate was given to an Igbo (<sup>4027</sup>). Therefore, the Yoruba are coded as “senior partner”, and the Hausa-Fulani and Igbo as “junior partners” during this period.

<sup>4027</sup> [Mustapha, 2004]

Mobilization in the Niger Delta against the central state, which the “natives” believe is depriving them of their oil wealth (<sup>4028</sup>). The Obasanjo government reacted vigorously (and violently in occasions) to the challenge. In September 1999, the military massacred Ijaw people in Bayelsa State (<sup>4029</sup>). The Ijaw are thus coded as “discriminated” in this period. The Ogoni group is coded as “powerless” since there is no information of any active, targeted discrimination during this period.

<sup>4028</sup> [Ejobowah, 2000]

<sup>4029</sup> [Bah, 2005]

The Tiv seem to have at least some sort of regional power in their state. Therefore, they are coded with “regional autonomy”.

Obasanjo’s rule becomes more and more unpopular, and in May 2006 the Nigerian parliament rejects his proposed constitutional amendment which would have allowed him to run for another term in 2007.

According to the U.S. State Department’s Human Rights Report of 2006 (<sup>4030</sup>, 2006), the government maintained its balance (described above) between the three main ethnic groups Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani, and Igbo. Also the Freedom House Country Reports of 2006 and 2007 state that Obasanjo’s government was ethnically diverse (<sup>4031</sup>, 2006, 2007). However, the conflict over oil revenues and environmental degradation, and the violence stemming from this conflict, continued in the Niger Delta, with the police and military instructed to use lethal force against civil opponents which led to summary executions and other abuses (<sup>4032</sup>, 2007; <sup>4033</sup>, 2006). Overall, thus, the information available for the year 2006 presents the essentially same ethno-political picture as in the first seven years of Obasanjo’s rule. Therefore, this period is added to the previous period of 1999-2005, leaving the power statuses of all ethnic groups unchanged.

<sup>4030</sup> [US State Department, 1999–2016]

<sup>4031</sup> [Freedom House, 1999-2017]

<sup>4032</sup> [Freedom House, 1999-2017]

<sup>4033</sup> [US State Department, 1999–2016]

*2008-2010:* With the election of Umaru Yar’Adua in April/May 2007, political power moves back once again to the Hausa-Fulani north. Yar’Adua hails from a Fulani aristocratic family and is a member of the ruling PDP, the party of outgoing president Obasanjo whose handpicked successor he is.

Political parties (at least the ruling one) seem to be more multi-ethnic now, and the importance of ethnicity for individuals’ party affiliation decreased between 2001 and 2006 (<sup>4034</sup>, 9, 18-9). But there is no doubt that ethnicity continues to play a central role in Nigerian politics. There are several organizations which explicitly promote/protect the interests of specific ethnic groups: the Arewa People’s Congress (APC) is a militant Hausa-Fulani Muslim organization, the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) its democratic/constitutional counterpart; the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) is the Yoruba’s militant nationalist organization; the Igbo

<sup>4034</sup> [Cheeseman, 2007]



Peoples Congress (IPC) is an organization protecting Igbo interests; the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) is an active secessionist movement with the aim of reestablishing the defunct Igbo Republic of Biafra; the Egbesu Boys of Africa are a militant Ijaw organization with the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) as its political counterpart; and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) aims to protect the rights and interests of the Ogoni group - to name just a few. Ethnic militias now constitute something like parallel sometimes state-endorsed security institutions at the regional level <sup>(4035)</sup>. Survey data also shows that ethnic identification is strongest among the Igbo, Ijaw, and Yoruba <sup>(4036)</sup>.

<sup>4035</sup> [Babawale, 2001]

<sup>4036</sup> [Lewis, 2007]

Yar'Adua's vice-president (and acting president since the former's health-related absence from office) is an Ijaw. At the same time, the excessive and/or abusive state violence against the rebels in the Ijaw territories continues <sup>(4037)</sup>, 2009). Nevertheless, Ijaw demands for representation in the government have been met with the deliberate selection of Goodluck Jonathan as vice-president, and under Yar'Adua the government has taken on a more conciliatory stance in regard to the Niger Delta question, releasing prominent Ijaw leaders from prison <sup>(4038)</sup>. Jonathan has even been criticized as being too focused on "his Ijaw kinsmen" and on Ijaw interests <sup>(4039)</sup>, 5). Overall, given the specifications in EPR's coding instructions, it does not seem advisable to code an ethnic group with access to the vice-presidency as politically excluded - even if there are complaints about economic exploitation and marginalization, as in the case of the Ijaw. Therefore, the group is coded as "junior partner" in the period of 2008-2009. Also, in Bayelsa state <sup>(4040)</sup>, they also have access to regional power.

<sup>4037</sup> [US State Department, 1999-2016]

<sup>4038</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2007]

<sup>4039</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2007]

<sup>4040</sup> [Ejobowah, 2000]

In general, Yar'Adua's government is described as ethnically balanced <sup>(4041)</sup>, 2007-2009). Igbo leaders have repeatedly claimed to be politically marginalized ever since the Biafra war <sup>(4042)</sup>, 2007-2009; <sup>4043</sup>, 11), and it is true that they have not been "permitted" to assume the most powerful positions in Nigeria. Nevertheless, according to information provided by the CIA World Factbook <sup>(4044)</sup>, they are definitely included in the central government under Yar'Adua, providing for example Nigeria's minister of foreign affairs. The same is true for the Yoruba. Thus, both the Igbo and the Yoruba groups are coded as "junior partners" during this period. The Hausa-Fulani are clearly the leading ethnic group again and are thus coded as "senior partner".

<sup>4041</sup> [US State Department, 1999-2016]

<sup>4042</sup> [US State Department, 1999-2016]

<sup>4043</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2007]

<sup>4044</sup> [CIA World Factbook]

There is no precise information on the Tiv's inclusion within the central state. However, they are the majority group in Benue State whose governor is also a Tiv <sup>(4045)</sup>. Thus, they certainly have access to regional power.

<sup>4045</sup> [Benue State Government, 2014]

Although the Ogoni group have achieved a "victory" over the state with the government's decision to replace Shell as operator of oil concessions in Ogoni areas <sup>(4046)</sup>, there is no evidence of actual political inclusion of the tiny group in the central state nor of any

<sup>4046</sup> [International Crisis Group, 2008]

meaningful power at the sub-state level. Thus, the Ogoni are coded as “powerless” without “regional autonomy”.

Umaru Yar’Adua continued his Presidency through 2009. No major changes in the cabinet composition were found, with the US state department upholding its judgment that his administration was “an example of the Nigerian ethnic diversity”, as mandated by the law. Furthermore, the PDP and other major parties engage in “zoning”, shuffling position between members of the major ethnic groups and geographical regions.

*2011-2015:* Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw, assumed the office of the president in 2010 after the (natural) death of Yar’Adua, being the first president from the South. His presidency was confirmed by the electorate in 2011. His vice-president Sambo is a Hausa (<sup>4047</sup>, 2010) and the cabinet is again considered to be a approximate mirror of the ethnic diversity of the country (<sup>4048</sup>, 2010-2013). The Tiv are represented by minister Ortom who holds one of the two ministerial posts reserved for the state of Bengue (the other one is held by an Idoma). However, he only holds a post as a Minister of state for Trade and Investment (and has thus a Minister of authority above him) in a cabinet of 30 Ministers with their respective ministers of state, his inclusion into the government is here judged to be a mere token representation of the Tiv not amounting to real power. As Jonathan is an Ijaw, the Ijaw are coded as being “senior partner”, while the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani are coded as “junior partner”. The Tiv are coded as being “powerless”. The status of regional autonomy has not changed, with the three main ethnic groups being in power in many states of the federal Nigerian state, the Tiv holding executive power in the Bengué State and the Ijaw having access to power in the Bayelsa state. This also reflects the law-mandated representation of ethnic groups at all levels of government and administration (<sup>4049</sup>, 2009).

<sup>4047</sup> [US State Department, 1999–2016]

<sup>4048</sup> [US State Department, 1999–2016]

<sup>4049</sup> [US State Department, 1999–2016]

The Ogoni people continue in their struggle for greater autonomy and concessions with regard to cleaning up environmental pollution in the so-called Ogoniland. However, no signs were found for them having regional autonomy or being represented in the government at the national level. They are therefore coded as being “powerless”.

Note: Despite the outbreak and escalation of the fights between the government and the islamist organization Boko Haram, it is here argued that the ethnic cleavages defined as being politically relevant, are of more national importance and fit the EPR definitions better than the cleavage between Islamists and Christians & moderate Muslims. This judgment is based on the presence of political organizations making claims on behalf of a variety of ethnic groups, whereas the religious cleavage arises mainly due to the violent conflict between Boko Haram against the state and civilians.

*2016-2021:* In 2015, presidential elections took place. Arguably for the first time, a new president was elected in a fully democratic

way (<sup>4050</sup>). The new president Buhari belongs to the ethnic group of the Fulani and is a member of the ACP, which is predominantly supported by Fulani. The Hausa-Fulani occupy the majority of ministerial posts, however, the Yoruba and the Igbo are also included in the cabinet.

The vice president belongs to the Yoruba group. Since the start of his term, president Buhari had to take two several months long medical leaves of absence to the UK, during which he was replaced by the vice president. This shows that the Yoruba are strongly represented in the government. Furthermore, the president of the Senate as well as some very influential ministers are members of the Yoruba group (<sup>4051</sup>; <sup>4052</sup>). The Igbo, even though showing separatist tendencies, occupy important posts, such as the ministry of Foreign Affairs (<sup>4053</sup>). For the period 2016-2017, thus, the Hausa-Fulani are coded “senior partner”, while the Yoruba and the Igbo are coded “junior partner”. All of these groups enjoy regional autonomy (<sup>4054</sup>).

The situation in Biafra is tense, and the Igbo enjoy regional autonomy (<sup>4055</sup>). Calls for secession are condemned by the presidency, and the government tries to calm down these tensions (<sup>4056</sup>).

The Ijaw have regional autonomy, as the governor of their home state Bayelsa is a member of the Ijaw ethnic group (<sup>4057</sup>). However, they feel marginalized and there is no indication that they have been included in the central government since the recent elections (<sup>4058</sup>). They are therefore coded “powerless”, even though enjoying regional autonomy.

As already mentioned above, the Tiv have enjoyed regional autonomy insofar as they have been included in the state government of Benue. The governor being in place since the elections in 2015 is Samuel Ortom. Before being elected governor of Benue, he occupied the ministry of State for Industry, Trade and Investment in the central government (<sup>4059</sup>; <sup>4060</sup>). The Tiv are thus still coded as having regional autonomy, although not being included in the central government.

There is still no indication of any political inclusion of the Ogoni on the national level, or them enjoying regional autonomy.

The most recent presidential elections took place in February 2019 and were deemed credible by international observers, despite some challenges and irregularities. In the same year, the Independent Electoral Commission conducted National Assembly, State House Assembly and local elections in 36 states of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory (<sup>4061</sup>). Nigerian citizens re-elected President Muhammadu Buhari and his running mate Yemi Osinbajo of the APC party for another four-year term in accordance with the constitution. Buhari won in 19 out of 26 states (<sup>4062</sup>). Consequently, Osinbajo, who is part of the Yoruba establishment, maintained his position as Vice President. According to the Council of Foreign relations, Osinbajo increased the likelihood of Buhari’s reelections in 2019 as he remained highly influential among Yoruba in the South (<sup>4063</sup>).

<sup>4050</sup> [Deutschlandfunk, 2015]

<sup>4051</sup> [Vanguard, 2017]

<sup>4052</sup> [The Guardian, 2015]

<sup>4053</sup> [Premium Times, 2017]

<sup>4054</sup> [Channels Television, 2015]

<sup>4055</sup> [Daily Post, 2017]

<sup>4056</sup> [The Guardian, 2017]

<sup>4057</sup> [This Day, 2017]

<sup>4058</sup> [This Day, 2017]

<sup>4059</sup> [Benue State Government, 2014]

<sup>4060</sup> [Nigeria Government, 2017]

<sup>4061</sup> [U.S. State Department, 2019]

<sup>4062</sup> [BBC, 2019]

<sup>4063</sup> [CFR, 2018]

Buhari's government abode the constitutional provision foreseeing the "federal character" of the governments meaning that cabinet and other high-level positions should represent each of the 36 states (<sup>4064</sup>). In July 2019, the state senate confirmed all 43 ministerial nominees which were mainly comprised of former governors and ministers, loyal to Buhari and a major help towards his reelections (<sup>4065</sup>). More specifically, only 14 out of 43 were first-term cabinet members. Thus, the situation regarding the ethnic power relations remains the same throughout this period with Hausa Fulani coded as "senior partner", Yoruba as "junior partner" and Igbo as "junior partner" since several key ministries are led by ethnic Igbo. However, regardless of the formal prohibition of ethnic discrimination, most ethnic groups claimed marginalization in terms of political representation.

<sup>4064</sup> [U.S. State Department, 2019]

<sup>4065</sup> [Financial Times, 2019]

It is worth noting that there were severe human rights issues conducted by state and non-state actors and including militant terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa, while impunity remained prevalent (<sup>4066</sup>).

<sup>4066</sup> [U.S. State Department, 2019]

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## Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria

*From 1960 until 1964*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	SENIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	POWERLESS
Igbo	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ijaw	0.1	POWERLESS
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS

*From 1965 until 1966*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	DOMINANT
Yoruba	0.21	POWERLESS
Igbo	0.18	POWERLESS
Ijaw	0.1	POWERLESS
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS

*From 1967 until 1967*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	SENIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	JUNIOR PARTNER
Igbo	0.18	DISCRIMINATED
Ijaw	0.1	POWERLESS
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS

*From 1968 until 1970*




Figure 770: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1960-1964.




Figure 771: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1965-1966.



Figure 772: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1967-1967.




Figure 773: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1968-1970.

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	SENIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	JUNIOR PARTNER
Igbo	0.18	SELF-EXCLUSION
Ijaw	0.1	POWERLESS
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS

*From 1971 until 1978*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	SENIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	JUNIOR PARTNER
Igbo	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ijaw	0.1	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tiv	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS

*From 1979 until 1983*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	SENIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	POWERLESS
Igbo	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ijaw	0.1	POWERLESS
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS

*From 1984 until 1991*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	DOMINANT
Yoruba	0.21	POWERLESS
Igbo	0.18	POWERLESS
Ijaw	0.1	POWERLESS
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS

*From 1992 until 1998*




Figure 774: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1971-1978.



Figure 775: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1979-1983.




Figure 776: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1984-1991.




Figure 777: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1992-1998.

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	DOMINANT
Yoruba	0.21	POWERLESS
Igbo	0.18	POWERLESS
Ijaw	0.1	DISCRIMINATED
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	DISCRIMINATED

*From 1999 until 2007*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	SENIOR PARTNER
Igbo	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ijaw	0.1	DISCRIMINATED
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS

*From 2008 until 2010*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	SENIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	JUNIOR PARTNER
Igbo	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ijaw	0.1	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS

*From 2011 until 2015*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	JUNIOR PARTNER
Igbo	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ijaw	0.1	SENIOR PARTNER
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS

*From 2016 until 2021*




Figure 778: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1999-2007.




Figure 779: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 2008-2010.




Figure 780: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 2011-2015.




Figure 781: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 2016-2021.

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	SENIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	JUNIOR PARTNER
Igbo	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ijaw	0.1	POWERLESS
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS

# Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Nigeria

From 1960 until 1960




Figure 782: Map of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1960-1960.

	Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
■	Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	378 129	Regionally based
■	Yoruba	115 576	Regionally based
■	Igbo	39 990	Regionally based
■	Tiv	37 492	Regionally based
■	Ijaw	18 437	Regionally based
■	Ogoni	467	Regionally based

Table 288: List of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1960-1960.

From 1961 until 1961




Figure 783: Map of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1961-1961.







Group name		Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
	Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	378 129	Regionally based
	Yoruba	115 576	Regionally based
	Igbo	39 990	Regionally based
	Tiv	37 492	Regionally based
	Ijaw	18 437	Regionally based
	Ogoni	467	Regionally based

Table 289: List of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1961-1961.

*From 1962 until 2021*




Figure 784: Map of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1962-2021.







	Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
	Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	402 948	Regionally based
	Yoruba	115 576	Regionally based
	Igbo	39 990	Regionally based
	Tiv	38 787	Regionally based
	Ijaw	18 618	Regionally based
	Ogoni	467	Regionally based

Table 290: List of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1962-2021.

# Conflicts in Nigeria

*Starting on 1966-01-14*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Nigeria	Military faction (forces of Patrick Nzeogwu)	Igbo	1966-01-14	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Nigeria	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad		2009-06-08			

*Starting on 1967-07-05*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Nigeria	Republic of Biafra	Igbo	1967-07-05	Explicit	Yes	Yes

*Starting on 1983-04-17*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Chad	Government of Nigeria		1983-04-17			

*Starting on 1994-02-17*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Cameroon	Government of Nigeria		1994-02-17			

*Starting on 2003-12-30*



Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Nigeria	Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa		2003-12-30			

*Starting on 2004-06-03*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Nigeria	NDPVF	Ijaw	2004-06-03	Explicit	Yes	No

*Starting on 2015-03-14*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Nigeria	IS		2015-03-14			