

Nigeria

Ethnicity in Nigeria

Group selection

Besides the three large groups Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, three minority groups are included in the list as politically relevant for national politics: Ijaw, Ogoni, and Tiv. Both the Ijaw and Ogoni groups are from the Niger Delta and have for a long time made ethno-political demands at the national level (²⁵⁰⁹; ²⁵¹⁰). The Tiv have also been active in national politics, e.g. through their party United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) after independence (²⁵¹¹).

²⁵⁰⁹ [Bah, 2005]

²⁵¹⁰ [Ejobowah, 2000]

²⁵¹¹ [Bah, 2005]

Any other of the hundreds of minority ethnic groups were not included as there was no evidence of any political representation of them at the national level. The communal violence these minority groups have engaged in is normally targeted against each other - for local reasons (e.g. land, local political positions etc.) (see e.g. ²⁵¹²) - and does not stem from a national struggle over the access to political power. Hence, it appears reasonable to focus on the ones that have raised their voice in national politics.

²⁵¹² [Fagbule, 2010]

It appears reasonable to agree with Fearon (²⁵¹³) in combining the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups to one politically relevant group. The Fulani have culturally adapted to the Hausa for the most part (²⁵¹⁴; ²⁵¹⁵). Also, scholars often use the term Hausa-Fulani to refer to one politically relevant group (e.g. ²⁵¹⁶). Additionally, the category "Muslim Middle Belt" was added to this group since the Muslim groups from the Middle Belt have usually been politically linked to the Hausa-Fulani establishment at the national level (e.g. Babangida as a Gwari).

²⁵¹³ [Fearon, 2003]

²⁵¹⁴ [Diamond, 1988]

²⁵¹⁵ [Rakov, 1990]

²⁵¹⁶ [Bah, 2005]

Group sizes according to the CIA World Factbook and, for the Ogoni group, based on ²⁵¹⁷).

²⁵¹⁷ [Minorities at Risk, 2014]

Power relations

1960-1964: From the first government after independence to the Dec 1964/March 1965 elections The first federal government was formed by a NPC/NCNC coalition (²⁵¹⁸). The NPC was a northern party, mainly representing Hausa-Fulani interests (²⁵¹⁹; ²⁵²⁰). The NCNC, in contrast, was a party based in the east of the country and dominated by Igbo (²⁵²¹). The NPC emerges as the strongest party in the elections and becomes senior partner in the government (²⁵²²). Abubakar Balewa - a Hausa - becomes Prime Minister. The NCNC constitutes the junior partner. Accordingly, the Hausa-

²⁵¹⁸ [Diamond, 1988]

²⁵¹⁹ [Bah, 2005]

²⁵²⁰ [Diamond, 1988]

²⁵²¹ [Diamond, 1988]

²⁵²² [Diamond, 1988]

Fulani and the Igbo groups were coded as being "senior partner" and "junior partner", respectively. The AG - a Yoruba party - is in the opposition (²⁵²³; ²⁵²⁴). However, the party controls the regional government of the western region. Thus the Yoruba were coded as having "regional autonomy".

It appears reasonable to code this period in the form of a power-sharing arrangement despite information about Hausa-Fulani dominance in national politics (²⁵²⁵). Igbo leader Nnamdi Azikiwe was first named Governor General and later became the country's first president, in 1963, after Nigeria proclaimed itself a Federal Republic.

²⁵²⁵ [Bah, 2005]

Generally, Nigeria's politics are dominated by the three main groups Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba. Since there are only three regions in the federation (North, East, West), also regional politics are dominated by these groups. In fact, the three parties NPC, NCNC, and AG controlled "their" respective regions to the degree of a one-party rule (²⁵²⁶). The three minority ethnic groups are thus coded as "powerless".

²⁵²⁶ [Diamond, 1988]

1965-1966 The NPC scores a decisive victory in the highly controversial 1964/5 elections, and Prime Minister Balewa is in the position to form a government after his own fancy (²⁵²⁷). After the post-electoral political crisis, the NPC promises to form a broad-based national government with the participation of all parties. However, this does not happen. The new government is only a superficial coalition. All strategically important, powerful positions go to the NPC. The NCNC and the new Yoruba party NNDP - an ally of the northern NPC - receive the irrelevant posts in the government (²⁵²⁸). Therefore the Hausa-Fulani were coded as "dominant" during this period.

²⁵²⁷ [Diamond, 1988]

²⁵²⁸ [Diamond, 1988]

The Igbo still control "their" eastern region, with a democratically elected regional NCNC government (²⁵²⁹). Therefore, the Igbo are coded as having "regional autonomy".

²⁵²⁹ [Diamond, 1988]

In contrast, the issue of regional power is more debatable in the case of the Yoruba. The new NNDP regional government mainly consisted of Yoruba, like for example the new premier Akintola. On the other hand, this government was virtually imposed upon the western region by the NPC-dominated federal government and - as the vehement popular protests showed - opposed by the majority of the local people (²⁵³⁰). Thus, in the terms of EPR's coding rules, this equals a "token" government appointed from outside (i.e. the central government). The Yoruba were thus coded as "powerless" (and without regional autonomy) during this period.

²⁵³⁰ [Diamond, 1988]

As for the minorities, the situation remains the same as in the first period (all three coded as "powerless").

The country's first military coup on January 15, 1966, is conducted by mainly Igbo officers and directed against northern dominance in politics. In July of the same year, a counter-coup by mostly northern officers already terminates this short interlude of Igbo leadership. According to EPR's coding rules, this ephemeral situation is

not taken into account in the present coding.

1967: According to the January-1st-rule, the new period resulting from the July 1966 counter-coup is coded as starting in 1967.

The coup-plotters handed power over to Yakubu Gowon. Though a northerner, Gowon was not of Hausa-Fulani origin nor of Islamic faith. His own ethnic group (Angas), however, did not play a relevant role in national politics - even after his rise to power - and the people who brought him to power were mainly Hausa-Fulani (e.g. Murtala Mohammed). The available information (²⁵³¹, ²⁵³², ²⁵³³, ²⁵³⁴) points to a leading role in national politics of the Hausa-Fulani group during this period. Implicit alliance with the Yoruba group during the civil war (²⁵³⁵), which was probably inevitable given the military challenge. Long-time Yoruba leader Awolowo was finance minister - after being released from prison - in the central government (²⁵³⁶). The Hausa-Fulani were thus coded as "senior partner" and the Yoruba as "junior partner", respectively, during this period.

²⁵³¹ [Agbu, 1998]

²⁵³² [Bah, 2005]

²⁵³³ [Falola, 2004]

²⁵³⁴ [Mustapha, 2004]

²⁵³⁵ [Bah, 2005]

In contrast, there is large-scale violence against Igbos conducted by northerners including northern soldiers in the north of the country after the Hausa-Fulani counter-coup, which was not stopped by northern military officers. Given that these pogroms were acquiesced (if not supported) by the northern military leaders who effectively held political power, the Igbo group was thus coded as "discriminated" in this one-year period.

Although Gowon created more states shortly before the civil war and, thus, somewhat diminished the political dominance of the three large ethnic groups at the sub-state level, it seems improbable to me that the effects of this action would already have effectively improved the situation of the minority groups in this period - even if large numbers of southern minority group members fought on the side of the federal troops against Biafra. They were thus coded as "powerless" again.

1968-1970: Civil war breaks out after Igbo leaders declare the formal secession of their eastern ("Biafra") region in May 1967. Again, according to the January-1st-rule, the new period is coded as starting in 1968.

The situation at the center of political power remains the same during these two years.

However, because of Igbo secessionism, the group is now coded with the power status of "self-exclusion" (and, according to the coding rules, as enjoying "regional autonomy within its own "Biafra" region).

The period ends with the end of the civil war and the surrender of the eastern region on January 15, 1970.

1971-1978: Gowon's rule after the civil war and the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime. Again, according to the January-1st-rule, the new period is coded as starting in 1971.

Gowon ruled until July 1975 when he was replaced in a bloodless coup by General Murtala Mohammed. Mohammed was later killed in an unsuccessful coup attempt and succeeded by his chief of staff, Olusegun Obasanjo, who returned the country to democracy in 1978/79 (like Mohammed, too, had planned to do).

In the postwar period, political power remained in the hands of a military council. However, Gowon was famous for his policy of reconciliation with and reintegration of the Igbo secessionists after the civil war (²⁵³⁷). Bah (²⁵³⁸) calls his rule an "inclusionary approach" in regard to ethnicity. The power status of the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba was thus left unchanged ("senior partner" and "junior partner", respectively) and the Igbo were also coded as "junior partner".

²⁵³⁷ [Bah, 2005]

²⁵³⁸ [Bah, 2005]

Regarding the three minority groups, it is essential to note that - despite the increase in the number of states - political power was more and more concentrated in the hands of the federal government at the expense of the sub-state entities from the 1970s on (²⁵³⁹; ²⁵⁴⁰). Yet, in this era (at least during Gowon's rule), the minorities were better represented at the level of the central state. Members of the Middle Belt groups formed an important part of the executive organ, and also the Ijaw were well represented (²⁵⁴¹). The Tiv (as the largest Middle Belt group) and the Ijaw were thus coded as "junior partners" during this period. There was no similar evidence for the Ogoni people. Hence, they remain coded as "powerless".

²⁵³⁹ [Ejobowah, 2000]

²⁵⁴⁰ [Mustapha, 2004]

²⁵⁴¹ [Library of Congress, 2014]

Mohammed was a Hausa, but there was no evidence that anything substantial changed after his rise to power. His and Obasanjo's rule, too, is appraised as an "inclusionary approach" regarding ethnicity by Bah (2005). Although Obasanjo is Yoruba, he was generally seen as an advocate of "northern interests" at the time, was also linked to the northern political establishment, and the Yoruba did not consider him to be "their" leader (²⁵⁴²). There was also no evidence for any substantial changes during his rule. It appears thus reasonable to combine the Mohammed and Obasanjo regimes with Gowon's rule after the civil war to one single time period.

²⁵⁴² [Falola, 2004]

1979-1983: Second Republic Election victory by the NPN and its presidential candidate Shehu Shagari. The NPN was remarkably national, but was still dominated by northern Hausa-Fulani elements (²⁵⁴³). Shagari was a Fulani. The NPN first formed a shaky coalition with the NPP (²⁵⁴⁴), which was an Igbo-dominated party (²⁵⁴⁵). The Hausa-Fulani clearly had the role of the senior partner in the government (²⁵⁴⁶; ²⁵⁴⁷). Alex Ekwueme, an Igbo (although member of the NPN), was Vice-President (²⁵⁴⁸). The Hausa-Fulani group as was thus coded "senior partner" and the Igbo as "junior partner". The Yoruba - whose party, the UPN, is in the opposition (²⁵⁴⁹; ²⁵⁵⁰) - are coded as "powerless" at the national level but as having "regional autonomy".

²⁵⁴³ [Bah, 2005]

²⁵⁴⁴ [Diamond, 1982]

²⁵⁴⁵ [Bah, 2005]

²⁵⁴⁶ [Bah, 2005]

²⁵⁴⁷ [Diamond, 1982]

After the NPP withdrew its support, Shagari ruled at the head of an exclusively NPN government. However, an Igbo (Ekwueme) was still Vice-President ⁽²⁵⁵¹⁾. Therefore, it appears reasonable to leave the Igbo's status unchanged - despite differing information that speaks of Hausa-Fulani favoritism in the context of the NPN's more and more repressive rule ⁽²⁵⁵²⁾.

²⁵⁵¹ [Diamond, 1982]

²⁵⁵² [Bah, 2005]

As for the minorities, there was no evidence of any substantial representation in the central government during this period. The Ijaw (until 1996 and the creation of Bayelsa State) ⁽²⁵⁵³⁾, and the Ogoni did not possess "their" own states, so they were coded as "powerless".

²⁵⁵³ [Ejobowah, 2000]

In contrast, it seems highly probable that the Tiv had (at least some) access to regional power in "their" Benue State ⁽²⁵⁵⁴⁾ during this democratic period. Although this is somewhat uncertain, the Tiv were thus coded as having "regional autonomy".

²⁵⁵⁴ [Bah, 2005]

The period ends with Buhari's military coup at the very end of 1983, which terminated Nigeria's Second Republic.

1984-1991: Successive authoritarian military regimes after the abortion of the Second Republic

Under the Buhari, Babangida and Abacha military regimes, dominance of the Hausa-Fulani group that controlled the military ^(2555; 2556). Buhari and his "putschist" forces were, in fact, closely associated with the ousted, northern-dominated government, and the basic power structure of the country was not to be changed ⁽²⁵⁵⁷⁾. Although Babangida and Abacha are/were not of Hausa-Fulani origin themselves (Babangida is from the Gwari group, Abacha a Kanuri), they clearly represented the Hausa-Fulani north ^(2558; 2559; 2560). As in the case of Gowon, their own ethnic groups never played a relevant role in national politics. (The Kanuri, furthermore, are related to the Hausa-Fulani and share with them the Islamic faith ⁽²⁵⁶¹⁾.) Over the years of Babangida's rule, the most powerful posts within the ruling military government and the leading positions in the security forces (police, army, navy) were more and more exclusively assigned to northern Muslims, while religion, too, became an ever more explosive source of cleavage, exacerbated by Babangida's pro-Muslim measures ⁽²⁵⁶²⁾. Joseph ⁽²⁵⁶³⁾ speaks of an "ethno-military rule" of the north between 1984 and 1998, after the collapse of the Second Republic. Merger of military and northern hegemony which provokes frustration and a sentiment of ethnic suppression in the south. Northern politicians support the military regime in order to preserve northern political dominance; the fate of the own ethno-regional group is, thus, tied to the survival of the regime. The polarization grows with the increase of violent actions from both sides (repression by the regime, resistance of the opponents) ⁽²⁵⁶⁴⁾. The Hausa-Fulani - which represent the dominant "core" group of the north - were thus coded as "dominant" during the military rule.

²⁵⁵⁵ [Bah, 2005]

²⁵⁵⁶ [Mustapha, 2004]

²⁵⁵⁷ [Bah, 2005]

²⁵⁵⁸ [Agbu, 1998]

²⁵⁵⁹ [Bah, 2005]

The Igbo - also as a consequence of the civil war - were hardly represented in the military, hence their political influence was

marginal (2565; 2566). They were thus coded as "powerless". Also more or less "powerless" were the Yoruba who were to be at the center of the pro-democracy struggle later (2567; 2568; 2569).

No group was coded with "regional autonomy" during military rule as federalism and sub-state power were essentially aborted in this period (2570; 2571).

Meanwhile, minorities from the Middle Belt and the Niger Delta were suppressed by the Babangida and Abacha regimes (2572; 2573). This suppression became increasingly intense over the years, especially against the minority groups in the Niger Delta, and took on a violent character from the 1990s on (see below). For the period of 1984-1991, however, all three minority groups were coded as "powerless".

1992-1998: After the Ogoni people had already issued an "Ogoni Bill of Rights" in 1990 and founded a political movement to fight for their rights, they presented their case before the UN in 1992 - which changed the regime's attitude toward the Ogoni people drastically. Propaganda, monitoring of the movement and harassment of its members were the response. Leading activists were persecuted (2574; 2575). By promulgating decrees such as the Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree (May 1993), the regime legally oppressed all minority groups' campaigns for social and political rights (2576). Ogoni leader Ken Saro Wiwa was later executed by Abacha along with other leading activists. In the second half of the 1990s, the Ijaw group also began to raise its voice against their marginalization (2577). Especially under Abacha, however, the regime just responded to it with more violent oppression (also employing military forces), and ethnic minority activists were terrorized (2578; 2579). Given these developments, the two Niger Delta minority groups Ijaw and Ogoni, which were particularly affected, were coded as "discriminated" from 1992 until 1998 (while the Tiv remain coded as "powerless").

The power statuses of the three large groups Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo remained the same as in the period before.

Note that the short interim presidency of Ernest Shonekan between August and November 1993 was not taken into consideration as this did not result in any significant changes and the military was effectively still the dominant force in these months (with Abacha as Defense Minister) (2580).

The period ends with the sudden death of Sani Abacha in June 1998. According to EPR coding rules, no separate period for the short interim rule by General Abubakar until multi-party elections were held in 1999 was inserted. Accordingly, the next period starts with the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1999.

²⁵⁶⁵ [Bah, 2005]

²⁵⁶⁶ [Mustapha, 2004]

²⁵⁶⁷ [Agbu, 1998]

²⁵⁶⁸ [Falola, 2004]

²⁵⁶⁹ [Mustapha, 2004]

²⁵⁷⁰ [Ejobowah, 2000]

²⁵⁷¹ [Mustapha, 2004]

²⁵⁷² [Bah, 2005]

²⁵⁷³ [Ejobowah, 2000]

²⁵⁷⁴ [Bah, 2005]

²⁵⁷⁵ [Joseph, 1999]

²⁵⁷⁶ [Bah, 2005]

²⁵⁷⁷ [Ejobowah, 2000]

²⁵⁷⁸ [Bah, 2005]

²⁵⁸⁰ [Joseph, 1999]

1999-2005: Olusegun Obasanjo became Nigeria's new president. He initially was not supported by his Yoruba people who did not think of him as advocating Yoruba interests (see above), but this gradually changed after he came to power for the second time (2581).

2581 [Falola, 2004]

A form of power-sharing between the three main ethnic groups was practiced in Obasanjo's government. Since the president is a Yoruba and his vice-president a Fulani, the presidency of the senate was given to an Igbo (2582). Therefore, the Yoruba were thus coded as "senior partner", and the Hausa-Fulani and Igbo as "junior partners" during this period.

2582 [Mustapha, 2004]

Mobilization in the Niger Delta against the central state, which the "natives" believe is depriving them of their oil wealth (2583). The Obasanjo government reacted vigorously (and violently in occasions) to the challenge. In September 1999, the military massacred Ijaw people in Bayelsa State (2584). The Ijaw were thus coded as "discriminated" in this period. The Ogoni group is coded as "powerless" since there is no information of any active, targeted discrimination during this period.

2583 [Ejobowah, 2000]

2584 [Bah, 2005]

The Tiv seem to have at least some sort of regional power in their state. Therefore, they are coded with "regional autonomy".

2006-2007: Obasanjo's remaining time in the presidential office before the elections in April 2007.

His rule becomes more and more unpopular, and in May 2006 the Nigerian parliament rejects his proposed constitutional amendment which would have allowed him to run for another term in 2007.

According to the U.S. State Department's Human Rights Report of 2006 (2585), the government maintained its balance (described above) between the three main ethnic groups Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani, and Igbo. Also the Freedom House Country Reports of 2006 and 2007 state that Obasanjo's government was ethnically diverse (2586). However, the conflict over oil revenues and environmental degradation, and the violence stemming from this conflict, continued in the Niger Delta, with the police and military instructed to use lethal force against civil opponents which led to summary executions and other abuses (2587; 2588). Overall, thus, the information available for the year 2006 presents the essentially same ethno-political picture as in the first seven years of Obasanjo's rule. Therefore, this period was added to the previous period of 1999-2005, leaving the power statuses of all ethnic groups unchanged.

2585 [United States Government State Department, 2006]

2586 [Freedom House Country Reports, 2006-2007]

2587 [Freedom House Country Reports, 2006-2007]

2588 [United States Government State Department, 2006]

Note that according to EPR's January-1st-rule, the next period is coded as starting in 2008 because the newly elected president Umaru Yar'Adua took office in May 2007.

2008-2009: With the election of Umaru Yar'Adua in April/May 2007, political power moves back once again to the Hausa-Fulani north. Yar'Adua hails from a Fulani aristocratic family and is a member of the ruling PDP, the party of outgoing president Obasanjo whose handpicked successor he is.

Political parties (at least the ruling one) seem to be more multi-ethnic now, and the importance of ethnicity for individuals' party affiliation decreased between 2001 and 2006 (²⁵⁸⁹, 18-9). But there is no doubt that ethnicity continues to play a central role in Nigerian politics. There are several organizations which explicitly promote/protect the interests of specific ethnic groups: the Arewa People's Congress (APC) is a militant Hausa-Fulani Muslim organization, the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) its democratic/constitutional counterpart; the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) is the Yoruba's militant nationalist organization; the Igbo Peoples Congress (IPC) is an organization protecting Igbo interests; the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) is an active secessionist movement with the aim of reestablishing the defunct Igbo Republic of Biafra; the Egbesu Boys of Africa are a militant Ijaw organization with the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) as its political counterpart; and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) aims to protect the rights and interests of the Ogoni group - to name just a few. Ethnic militias now constitute something like parallel sometimes state-endorsed security institutions at the regional level (Babawale 2001). Survey data also shows that ethnic identification is strongest among the Igbo, Ijaw, and Yoruba (²⁵⁹⁰).

Yar'Adua's vice-president (and acting president since the former's health-related absence from office) is an Ijaw. At the same time, the excessive and/or abusive state violence against the rebels in the Ijaw territories continues (²⁵⁹¹). Nevertheless, Ijaw demands for representation in the government have been met with the deliberate selection of Goodluck Jonathan as vice-president, and under Yar'Adua the government has taken on a more conciliatory stance in regard to the Niger Delta question, releasing prominent Ijaw leaders from prison (²⁵⁹²). Jonathan has even been criticized as being too focused on "his Ijaw kinsmen" and on Ijaw interests (²⁵⁹³, p. 5). Overall, given the specifications in EPR's coding instructions, it does not seem advisable to code an ethnic group with access to the vice-presidency as politically excluded - even if there are complaints about economic exploitation and marginalization, as in the case of the Ijaw. Therefore, the group was coded as "junior partner" in the period of 2008-2009. Also, in Bayelsa state (²⁵⁹⁴), they also have access to regional power.

In general, Yar'Adua's government is described as ethnically balanced (²⁵⁹⁵). Igbo leaders have repeatedly claimed to be politically marginalized ever since the Biafra war (²⁵⁹⁶; ²⁵⁹⁷), and it is true that they have not been "permitted" to assume the most powerful positions in Nigeria. Nevertheless, according to information provided by the CIA World Factbook, they are definitely included in the central government under Yar'Adua, providing for example Nigeria's

²⁵⁸⁹ [Cheeseman, 2007]

²⁵⁹⁰ [Lewis, 2007]

²⁵⁹¹ [United States Government State Department, 2007]

²⁵⁹² [International Crisis Group, 2007]

²⁵⁹³ [International Crisis Group, 2007]

²⁵⁹⁴ [Ejobowah, 2000]

²⁵⁹⁵ [United States Government State Department, 2007]

²⁵⁹⁶ [United States Government State Department, 2007]

²⁵⁹⁷ [International Crisis Group, 2007]

minister of foreign affairs. The same is true for the Yoruba. Thus, both the Igbo and the Yoruba groups were coded as "junior partners" during this period. The Hausa-Fulani are clearly the leading ethnic group again and are thus coded as "senior partner".

There was no precise information available about the Tiv's inclusion within the central state. However, they are the majority group in Benue State whose governor is also a Tiv (²⁵⁹⁸). Thus, they certainly have access to regional power.

²⁵⁹⁸ [Benue State, 2014]

Although the Ogoni group have achieved a "victory" over the state with the government's decision to replace Shell as operator of oil concessions in Ogoni areas (²⁵⁹⁹), there was no evidence of actual political inclusion of the tiny group in the central state nor of any meaningful power at the sub-state level. Thus, the Ogoni were still coded as "powerless" without "regional autonomy".

²⁵⁹⁹ [International Crisis Group, 2008]

2010: Umaru Yar'Adua continued his Presidency through 2009. No major changes in the cabinet composition were found, with the US state department upholding its judgment that his administration was "an example of

the Nigerian ethnic

diversity", as mandated by the law. Furthermore, the PDP and other major parties engage in "zoning", shuffling position between members of the major ethnic groups and geographical regions.

2011 - 2013: Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw, assumed the office of the president in 2010 after the (natural) death of Yar'Adua, being the first president from the South. His presidency was confirmed by the electorate in 2011. His vice-president Sambo is a Hausa (²⁶⁰⁰) and the cabinet is again considered to be a approximate mirror of the ethnic diversity of the country (²⁶⁰¹). The Tiv are represented by minister Ortom who holds one of the two ministerial posts reserved for the state of Bengue (the other one is held by an Idoma). However, he only holds a post as a Minister of state for Trade and Investment (and has thus a Minister of authority above him) in a cabinet of 30 Ministers with their respective ministers of state, his inclusion into the government is here judged to be a mere token representation of the Tiv not amounting to real power. As Jonathan is an Ijaw, the Ijaw are coded as being Senior Partner, while the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani are coded as Junior Partners. The Tiv are coded as being powerless. The status of regional autonomy has not changed, with the three main ethnic groups being in power in many states of the federal Nigerian state, the Tiv holding executive power in the Bengue State and the Ijaw having access to power in the Bayelsa state. This also reflects the law-mandated representation of ethnic groups at all levels of government and administration (²⁶⁰²).

²⁶⁰⁰ [United States Government State Department, 20

²⁶⁰¹ [United States Government State Department, 20

²⁶⁰² [United States Government State Department, 20

The Ogoni people continue in their struggle for greater autonomy and concessions with regard to cleaning up environmental pollution in the so-called Ogoniland. However, no signs were found for them

having regional autonomy or being represented in the government at the national level. They are therefore coded as being powerless.

Note: Despite the outbreak and escalation of the fights between the government and the islamist organization Boko Haram, it is here argued that the ethnic cleavages defined here as being politically relevant, are of more national importance and fit the EPR definitions better than the cleavage between Islamists and Christians & moderate Muslims. This judgment is based on the presence of political organizations making claims on behalf of a variety of ethnic groups, whereas the religious cleavage arises mainly due to the violent conflict between Boko Haram and the state & civilians.

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Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria

From 1960 until 1964

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	SENIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	POWERLESS
Igbo	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ijaw	0.1	POWERLESS
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS



Figure 559: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1960-1964.

From 1965 until 1966

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	DOMINANT
Yoruba	0.21	POWERLESS
Igbo	0.18	POWERLESS
Ijaw	0.1	POWERLESS
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS




Figure 560: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1965-1966.

From 1967 until 1967

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	SENIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	JUNIOR PARTNER
Igbo	0.18	DISCRIMINATED
Ijaw	0.1	POWERLESS
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS




Figure 561: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1967-1967.

From 1968 until 1970

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	SENIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	JUNIOR PARTNER
Igbo	0.18	SELF-EXCLUSION
Ijaw	0.1	POWERLESS
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS




Figure 562: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1968-1970.

From 1971 until 1978

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	SENIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	JUNIOR PARTNER
Igbo	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ijaw	0.1	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tiv	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS




Figure 563: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1971-1978.

From 1979 until 1983

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	SENIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	POWERLESS
Igbo	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ijaw	0.1	POWERLESS
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS



Figure 564: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1979-1983.

From 1984 until 1991

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	DOMINANT
Yoruba	0.21	POWERLESS
Igbo	0.18	POWERLESS
Ijaw	0.1	POWERLESS
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS




Figure 565: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1984-1991.

From 1992 until 1998

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	DOMINANT
Yoruba	0.21	POWERLESS
Igbo	0.18	POWERLESS
Ijaw	0.1	DISCRIMINATED
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	DISCRIMINATED



Figure 566: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1992-1998.

From 1999 until 2007

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	SENIOR PARTNER
Igbo	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ijaw	0.1	DISCRIMINATED
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS




Figure 567: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1999-2007.

From 2008 until 2010

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	SENIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	JUNIOR PARTNER
Igbo	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ijaw	0.1	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS




Figure 568: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 2008-2010.

From 2011 until 2013

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	0.29	JUNIOR PARTNER
Yoruba	0.21	JUNIOR PARTNER
Igbo	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ijaw	0.1	SENIOR PARTNER
Tiv	0.025	POWERLESS
Ogoni	0.005	POWERLESS




Figure 569: Political status of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 2011-2013.

Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Nigeria

From 1960 until 2013




Figure 570: Map of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 2011-2013.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■ Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	404 003	Regional & urban
■ Yoruba	115 989	Regional & urban
■ Igbo	39 871	Regional & urban
■ Tiv	38 952	Regional & urban
■ Ijaw	18 711	Regional & urban
■ Ogoni	469	Regionally based

Table 167: List of ethnic groups in Nigeria during 1960-2013.

Conflicts in Nigeria

Starting on 1966-01-15

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Nigeria	Military faction (forces of Patrick Nzeogwu)	Igbo	1966-01-15	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Nigeria	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad		2009-06-09			

Starting on 1967-07-06

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Nigeria	Republic of Biafra	Igbo	1967-07-06	Explicit	Yes	Yes

Starting on 1983-04-18

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Chad	Government of Nigeria		1983-04-18			

Starting on 1994-02-18

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Cameroon	Government of Nigeria		1994-02-18			

Starting on 2003-12-28

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Nigeria	Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa		2003-12-28			

Starting on 2004-06-04

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Nigeria	NDPVF	Ijaw	2004-06-04	Explicit	Yes	No