

**South Africa**

# *Ethnicity in South Africa*

## *Group selection*

### *Ethnic heterogeneity*

Levinson (<sup>4717</sup>, 166-168) lists four racial and over 50 ethnic groups for South Africa. The largest racial group by a considerable margin is the native African (or black), which comprises about 76% of the South African population. It is composed of 2 major and several minor ethnic groups. The Zulu are the largest ethnic group (about 22% of the population) and live mainly in the province KwaZulu Natal (the name of the provinces created in the mid 90s is used), which is located on the east coast between Lesotho and Eswatini. The second largest ethnic group is the Xhosa (about 18% of the population), which are widely dispersed. Under apartheid, however, their homelands were Transkei and Ciskei, two regions located in Eastern Cape province. The remaining minor ethnic groups are the Tswana (about 9% of the population living along the border to Botswana; their home nation), the North Sotho (about 9% of the population, living in Northern Province), the South Sotho (about 6% of the population, living in Free State province), the Tsonga (about 4% of the population living in Northern Province), the Swazi (about 2.5% of the population, living in North-West province), the Venda (about 2% of the population, living in the Northern Province) and the Ndebele (about 1% of the population, living on the borders of Gauteng province).

<sup>4717</sup> [Levinson, 1998]

The second largest racial group is the “Whites”, which comprises about 13% of the population. They split roughly 60-40 in two ethnic groups. The “Afrikaners” (or Boers) (about 8.5% of total population) are primarily of Dutch descent and were the first European settlers in South Africa. During the scramble for Africa (1880-1913) they were driven inland by the British and are consequentially isolated from European influence, which lead them to develop their own culture and language (Afrikaans). They have settled in a widely dispersed manner, so that there is no area where they have a clear majority. The second ethnic group is the “English speakers” (about 4.5% of the population), who are primarily of British descent. They came with the British colonization and live, as the Afrikaner, widely dispersed across the country. The third racial group is the “Colored”, They compose a separate ethnic group (about 8.5% of the population). Their ancestors are of mixed European (English-

speaking or Afrikaner) and African descent. They are concentrated in the Western Cape Province, where they comprise a majority, but can also be found in most other provinces. They are a distinct ethnic group in South Africa, since they were discriminated by the whites and native Africans alike. In the years after Apartheid, however, they have tended to vote for white parties rather than for the ANC (<sup>4718</sup>).

The Asians (primarily Indians, but also some Chinese) build the fourth racial group. As the Colored people they compose a separate ethnic group (about 2.5% of the population). They live primarily in urban areas and are heavily concentrated around Durban in the KwaZulu Natal province (<sup>4719</sup>; <sup>4720</sup>, 416-420; <sup>4721</sup>, 186, 201; <sup>4722</sup>; <sup>4723</sup>, 165-169).

### *Historical background*

In 1910 the South African Union was founded as an independent dominion of the Commonwealth. Until 1948 the political landscape was structured by the political struggle for power between the South African Party (SAP), which aimed for close ties to Great Britain and was dominated by English-speaking people, and the National Party (NP), which was primarily an Afrikaner party that aimed to demarcate the Union from the former colonial masters. From 1910 to 1919 the SAP held power and led the Union along with the British into World War I. During the following recession the gold mine owners decreased the wages and began to employ more native Africans, leading to increased tensions between the Afrikaner (generally less educated than the English-speaking people) and native African. In 1924 the NP, which built on the worries of the Afrikaner, won the national elections together with the Labor party and began to build public jobs in order to decrease white unemployment. First racial segregation policies became effective (e.g. native Africans were not allowed to live in urban areas anymore). 1934 the SAP and NP surprisingly merged to the United South African National Party (United Party (UP)). The UP won the elections of 1938, but as World War II started it broke apart. Hertzog, an Afrikaner, wanted South Africa to stay neutral, while Smuts, an English-speaking, wanted to join the war on the side of the British. Hertzog lost the parliamentary vote and South Africa entered World War II on the side of the British. The United Party - now a predominantly English-speaking party - won the elections in 1943. The South African military industry boomed during that time and since many white industrial workers were at war in Europe, employers started to employ native Africans and brought them back to the cities, where their proportion among urban residents grew rapidly (<sup>4724</sup>).

Once again the white and especially the Afrikaner felt threatened and saw the apartheid policy of the NP as a viable way to secure their economic, political and cultural position. As a result,

<sup>4718</sup> [Minority Rights Group International, 2017]

<sup>4719</sup> [Marks and Trapido, 1987]

<sup>4720</sup> [Guelke, 1992]

<sup>4721</sup> [Reynolds, 1994]

<sup>4722</sup> [Byrnes, 1996]

<sup>4723</sup> [Levinson, 1998]

<sup>4724</sup> [South African History, 2017]

the NP won the national elections in 1948 on their apartheid platform and began to implement it. From 1948 to 1978 the NP ruled South Africa like a single party regime and applied their apartheid policy; i.e. fostering ethnic differences among the native Africans, creation of African homelands outside of the cities, forbidding black organizations such as the African National Congress (ANC) or the Pan African Congress (PAC). By 1978 the diplomatic pressure (e.g. South Africa already had to leave the Commonwealth in 1961) on the NP government had increased so much that they were forced to abolish some of its apartheid policies and open the political system. The latter was achieved by creating separate chambers of parliament for the Colored and Asians, but which were subordinate to the white parliament and therefore had no real effect on politics. The native African, however, still did not get their own parliament chamber and remained discriminated. The constitutional reform done at the same time led to an even higher concentration of power. The office of the prime minister was disposed and all government power concentrated in the hands of the president and his security council. As common in presidential systems the government could not be dissolved by parliament. During the whole apartheid area there were strikes, demonstrations and unrest leading to violence (e.g. 1960 Sharpsville, 1976-1978 Soweto uprising). In the mid-80s, however, the strikes, demonstrations and uprisings got so severe that several townships and homelands had to be occupied by the military and the country was set in a permanent stage of emergency until 1990. In that year, Frederik Willem de Klerk ended the apartheid policy and started negotiations with Nelson Mandela, the leader of the ANC (banned since 1960), for a peaceful transition to democracy. The negotiations took place between 1990 and 1994 and led to a new constitution and the first democratic general elections in South Africa.

Unsurprisingly, the ANC achieved a stunning victory, and in May 1994, Nelson Mandela took over as the first black president in South African history. Although the ANC won 252 of the 400 seats in parliament, it built a government of National Unity, including members of all four races (i.e. African, White, Colored and Asian) and members of the NP and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), a Zulu dominated party. In 1996, however, the NP left the government, which after the elections in 1999 was completely dominated by the ANC (won 266 of the 400 parliamentary seats). In the national elections 2004, the ANC even reached a 2/3 majority in parliament allowing it to change the constitution unilaterally. Thus, it seems that South Africa has moved from one dominant party system into another. The crucial difference, however, is that the latter is democratic, while the former was not (<sup>4725</sup>; <sup>4726</sup>: 94-98; <sup>4727</sup>; <sup>4728</sup>; <sup>4729</sup>; <sup>4730</sup>; <sup>4731</sup>).

#### *Politically relevant ethnic groups*

Fearon's list (2003) can be used as starting point to delineate the politically relevant groups. The list resulting from the Atlas Narodov

<sup>4725</sup> [Southall, 1994]

<sup>4726</sup> [Maphai, 1995]

<sup>4727</sup> [Byrnes, 1996]

<sup>4728</sup> [Saunders & Southey, 1998]

<sup>4729</sup> [PolityIV, 2005]

<sup>4730</sup> [Rechmann, 2005]

<sup>4731</sup> [African Elections, 2007]

Mira (1960) is far too detailed. It contains groups (e.g. Malayans, Germans, French, Italian, Greece, Hottentots), which are politically absolutely irrelevant. The list from the Minorities At Risk project is more appropriate but places Europeans (i.e. Afrikaner and English-speaking) in one category. Over time, different groups became more or less politically relevant and significant. This is explained in the individual time periods below. There are roughly three sets of ethnicities/groupings that become significant over time. The first set is along racial groupings (simply Blacks, Whites, Coloreds and Asians), which can be dis-aggregated into subgroups, both small (i.e. North Sotho, Tswana, South Sotho, Tsonga, Swazi, Venda, Ndebele) and more sizable African and white groups (Zulu, Xhosa, Afrikans-speaking and English-speaking).

### *The role of ethnicity*

Ethnicity has played a significant role in the political life of South Africa since 1945. Both criteria are satisfied: There are several political parties that claim to organize in the name of a certain ethnic group, such as the IFP for the Zulu or the NP for the South African Afrikaner party (<sup>4732</sup>, 54; <sup>4733</sup>, 8). Additionally, from 1945 to 1990, political freedoms and access to political power depended upon a person's ethnicity. All Native Africans were discriminated and had no access to political power during the apartheid era (1948-1990).

<sup>4732</sup> [Horowitz, 1991]

<sup>4733</sup> [Rechmann, 2005]

### *Power relations*

#### *1946-1947*

The time period was chosen from the beginning of the coding period (1946) to the change in power after the national elections 1947, which also marks the beginning of the apartheid regime. The relevant groupings in this period are racial in nature, "**Blacks**", "**Afrikaners**", "**English Speakers**", "**Coloreds**" and "**Asians**". This is because there was ethnic diversification and differences in access to political power between the two biggest white ethnic groups (Afrikaner and English speaking), but the discriminated racial groups were discriminated as Blacks, Coloreds and Asians, and not as Zulu, Xhosa, Indians, and so on.

In the 1943 national elections, the English-speaking United Party (UP) led-coalition under Jan Smuts (also member of Churchill's war cabinet during WWII) won 107 out of 150 seats and formed the government. The vast majority of government members were English-speaking, explaining their "dominant" status. The re-founded Afrikaner National Party (NP) (called itself Herenigde Nasionale Party at that time and later changed back to their original name NP) won only 43 out of 150 seats in parliament and therefore formed the opposition. They had no members in government, but were not actively discriminated by the UP-coalition, which justifies their "powerless" status. No evidence was found to suggest discrim-

ination of Colored and Asians. Coloreds are even described in one source as UP voters (<sup>4734</sup>). However, they were not adequately represented in government, which is why their power access is coded as “powerless”.

<sup>4734</sup> [Byrnes, 1996]

Regarding the status of Native Africans, even though Smut’s UP government began to move away from the rigid enforcement of segregationist laws for economic reasons (i.e. workers were needed in the military industrial complex and most white male workers were at war), he did not lift the Native’s Land Act (1913) and Urban Area Act (1923). These resulted in being two of the core acts of discrimination during the apartheid era. Moreover, electoral law required proof of writing and reading skills, which most native Africans lacked. Therefore the power-access of the Blacks (all native African ethnicities) are coded as “discriminated” (<sup>4735</sup>).

<sup>4735</sup> [Saunders & Southey, 1998]

### *1948-1989*

The next time period ranges from 1948 to 1990 and is commonly known as the apartheid era. It starts with the NP coming into power after the national elections of 1948 and ends with president de Klerk’s “banning speech” in front of parliament (February 1990), where he announced that he would repeal discriminatory laws and lift the ban on the ANC, the United Democratic Front (UDF), the PAC and the communist party. In this period, the coding continues along racial group lines, as opposed to disaggregating groups further: During the Apartheid - and still in the transition period 1990-1993 - people got discriminated due to their racial (read: color of their skin), and not their ethnic identity. Although there were animosities and clashes between different ethnic groups of Blacks, on the national scale their racial identity counted, not their ethnic, which might have been an issue in more regional questions. Furthermore, although the homeland policy assigned different ethnic groups territory, these were essentially prison-like areas ruled from Afrikaner government in Pretoria, who sought to keep non-whites from central areas of importance (e.g. Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban) (Brittanica 2017). Therefore, it makes no sense to disaggregate “Blacks” further into the ethnic sub-groups.

As South Africa occupied Namibia up to its independence in 1990, hence Namibian population has to be integrated in the figures in the period from 1946 to 1989. But because of the small population of Namibia in relation to South Africa (about 3% of the whole population) the differences in the percentage is insignificant, leading to a slight increase of the percentage of racial Blacks and a decrease of Whites (<sup>4736</sup>).

<sup>4736</sup> [South African History, 2017]

In the 1948 national elections the Afrikaner dominated NP won the parliamentary elections (79 out of 150 seats) on their apartheid platform. This agenda introduced discriminatory laws against all native African ethnic groups (Blacks), Colored and Asians. These included the “Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1950), “Population

Registration Act” (1950), “Group Areas Act” (1950), “Suppression of Communism Act” (1950) and the “Separate Representation of Voters Act” (1951). Crucially, they replaced people in important offices by Afrikaner (e.g. judges in the Supreme Court), and in 1983 changed the government system from a parliamentary to a presidential system with a high concentration of power in the president’s hands. Between 1948 and 1990 the NP was the dominant party, winning clear majorities in all nine parliamentary elections and discriminated systematically against all non-white races, who had no access to power (<sup>4737</sup>: 421; <sup>4738</sup>). This warrants a “discriminated” status for Blacks, Coloreds and Asians.

<sup>4737</sup> [Guelke, 1992]

<sup>4738</sup> [Saunders & Southey, 1998]

Although it is relatively non-controversial that the Afrikaners did not share power, it is unclear whether their relationship with other white groups render their access to power as “dominant” or “monopoly” in the apartheid period. Although they did not have equal access to power, the English-speakers, who were rich and economically important, were not excluded from power per se. They occupied a few token positions in the cabinet and over time, more voted for the NP, leading the English-speaking centered UP to collapse in the 1966 election, with only 39 out of 166 seats (<sup>4739</sup>, 123-127). Therefore, it would be too strong to push for a “monopoly” status for the Afrikaner group. Instead, they are “dominant”, and the English speakers are “powerless” (their token positions in government do not by any means warrant a power-sharing agreement).

<sup>4739</sup> [Ottaway, 1996]

One point of controversy comes to mind in the finalization of these codings. The constitutional changes in 1983 created a parliamentary chamber for the Colored and Asian groups, which challenges their “discriminated” status between 1983 and 1990. However, the White parliamentary chamber dominated both the Colored and Asian chamber by the ratio 4:2:1, giving the Colored and Asians no chance to influence politics. Colored and Asian people recognized the attempt of the Afrikaner government to co-opt them and abstained from the parliamentary elections in large numbers (voter turnout was generally below 20%), raising questions about the legitimacy of the parliamentary elections. Second, at the same time as changing parliamentary structure the Afrikaner government has also changed government structure from a parliamentary to a presidential system. This drastically decreased the influence of parliament over government, which is independent of the parliament and cannot be dissolved by a vote of no confidence (<sup>4740</sup>, 424; <sup>4741</sup>).

<sup>4740</sup> [Guelke, 1992]

<sup>4741</sup> [Saunders & Southey, 1998]

#### *1990-1994*

This time period is equivalent to the transition period to democracy. It starts with de Klerk’s ‘unbanning speech’ in front of parliament in February 1990 and ends right before the first democratic election in the history of South Africa (1994). During the four-year lasting negotiations to democracy (for details on the negotiation process see <sup>4742</sup>: 630ff) de Klerk’s government stayed formally in power.

<sup>4742</sup> [Southall, 1994]

The Afrikaner remained dominant in that government, but there was no attempt to exclude other ethnic groups, which is why the power access of the Afrikaner is coded as dominant in that period. All discriminatory laws have been abolished formally, which is the reason why the coding is changed from discriminated to powerless for the first four ethnic groups on the list (Afrikaners, Asians, Coloreds and English Speakers). Some informal discrimination may have remained, but no evidence was found in the literature that it would have gone beyond what one would expect in a normal process of transition after 42 years of discrimination. The power access of the English-speaking people has remained unchanged, which is the reason why the coding has also remained unchanged (<sup>4743</sup>: 127-130; <sup>4744</sup>).

<sup>4743</sup> [Ottaway, 1996]

<sup>4744</sup> [Saunders & Southey, 1998]

There is no regional autonomy in this period.

### *1995-2008*

The beginning of this time period was marked by the first democratic elections in April 1994, followed by the elections in 1999 and 2004. A defining characteristic of the power-sharing arrangement from the 1994 interim constitution was the government of “National Unity” (GNU), in which different African ethnic groups, Whites, Coloreds and Asians were represented proportionately, as were all parties with more than 5% of seats in the national assembly (<sup>4745</sup>, 84). Furthermore, all ethnic-linguistic groups, which following the Homeland policy were divided into provinces, were represented in the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), the upper house of the South African Legislature. Only parliamentarians from each of the 9 different provinces can be elected proportionately to represent their province (<sup>4746</sup>, 42). These two developments provide enough evidence to warrant the change of politically relevant groups in this period, to include a number of smaller ethnic groups; sub-groups of the “Black” racial group, according to ethno-linguistic provincial boundaries. This does not mean that the “racial card” is rendered insignificant: Indeed, the racial boundaries are more or less the same as class boundaries, with Blacks generally lower-class and Whites tending towards well-off middle-class and upper-class (<sup>4747</sup>). Therefore, the big parties try to appeal to groups that can be rather defined by class (and race) than by ethnic factors (e.g. the ANC has over time tended to stress the pan-African nature of its policies rather than pro-Xhosa, in this period at least).

<sup>4745</sup> [Bogaards, 2014]

<sup>4746</sup> [Piombo, 2009]

<sup>4747</sup> [Mozaffar, Scarritt & Galaich, 2003]

In all democratic elections in this time period the ANC won a clear majority of the votes (over 60% of all votes). Moreover, in all presidential elections in this period the ANC candidate (i.e. Mandela and Mbeki) was successful. A white party (1994 the NP, which joined the ANC in 1996; in 1999 and 2004 the Democratic Party (DP)) and the IFP (a Zulu party) trailed behind the ANC at some distance and built the second and third strongest parties in parliament (<sup>4748</sup> and <sup>4749</sup>: 634-643 provide a detailed analysis of the 1994

<sup>4748</sup> [Reynolds, 1994]

<sup>4749</sup> [Southall, 1994]



elections; <sup>4750</sup> provides the results of 1999 and 2004).

The **Xhosa**, which build the dominant ethnic group among the ANC leaders (e.g. Mandela, Mbeki, Sisulu, Tambo, Hani, Jordan), held the presidential office between 1994 and 2008. They also provided the majority of the native African ministers and deputy ministers. They are therefore coded as “senior partner”. Leading up to the resignation of Mbeki in 2008, the ANC party remained broadly stable but some challenges emerged as the “ethnic card” was played in internal party politics (<sup>4751</sup>). Regarding the other ethnic groups, the GNU (described above) meant that every ethnic group was represented - but in 1999 a constitutional change reversed this requirement. However, Mandela and Mbeki continued to integrate all ethnic groups as best as they could, in an attempt to reflect the South African population in their governments. Mandela’s cabinet for example consisted of 14 native Africans, 7 Whites, 2 Coloreds and 4 Asians. The group of deputy ministers was similarly composed (<sup>4752</sup>: 96-98; <sup>4753</sup>; <sup>4754</sup>, <sup>4755</sup>: 63-64). All other ethnicities have been coded as “junior partner”, since they each held at least 2 minister posts and some deputy minister posts during that time period. From 1994 to 1999 the NP even held a deputy presidents’ office (de Klerk) and Buthelezi, the leader of the **Zulu** dominated IFP, was minister of Homeland Affairs from 1994 to 2004. Finally, the deputy president from 1999 until 2005 was a Zulu (Jacob Zuma, who was forced to step down after being involved in a corruption scandal) (<sup>4756</sup>: 639-641; <sup>4757</sup>: 62; <sup>4758</sup>).

It could be argued that the change in the constitution in 1999 to dismantle the provincially-representative GNU, should have implications on the political relevance of certain ethnic groups (<sup>4759</sup>, 86). The dominance of the ANC party, alleged by historians such as Van Cranenburg and Kopecky (<sup>4760</sup>) to reflect a “hidden majoritarianism” in post-Apartheid South Africa, without compulsory inclusion of other ethnic groups in the executive, could undermine the presence of a platform for the many ethno-linguistic groups. Power-status (Senior Partner, Junior Partner etc) notwithstanding, it seems that the continuation of the NCOP as an upper-house of the Legislature with clear ethno-linguistic representative divisions still offers evidence that these groups remain politically relevant. However, future assessment of the power-sharing status of smaller groups (ie, **Tswana** and **North Sotho**, as well as the larger groups - **Pedi**, **Xhosa** and **Zulu**) will have to show that they are both a) included in the executive in non-token positions, and b) that they consider themselves and are perceived as representatives of their ethnic provincial base.

The small community of about 7500 **San** in South Africa have a special status which is different to the other ethnic groups due to their particular lifestyle “outside” the nation state. In the literature often portrayed as discriminated. In post-apartheid south Africa until roughly 2002, according to Minority Rights International (<sup>4761</sup>), they launched a two-step land-claim from the government, which was

<sup>4750</sup> [African Elections, 2007]

<sup>4751</sup> [Kagwanja & Waititu, 2008]

<sup>4752</sup> [Maphai, 1995]

<sup>4753</sup> [Southall, 1994]

<sup>4754</sup> [Byrnes, 1996]

<sup>4755</sup> [Venter, 2001]

<sup>4756</sup> [Southall, 1994]

<sup>4757</sup> [Venter, 2001]

<sup>4758</sup> [REDI, 2004]

<sup>4759</sup> [Bogaards, 2014]

<sup>4760</sup> [Van Cranenburgh & Kopecky, 2004]

<sup>4761</sup> [Minority Rights Group International, 2007]

successful. This ultimately allocated the San with rights to 38,000 hectares of land, on which a unique San (Khomani) national farm (linked with a sister park in Botswana) called the Kgalagadi Trans-frontier Park was created (<sup>4762</sup>). In between 1994 and 2002, then, it seems that the San were struggling for cultural autonomy, as space to practise traditional San activities (ie, in the park) was limited. A “powerless” coding therefore seems the most appropriate in this case. Furthermore, following 2002, various reports still describe the discriminated cultural position of the San, although one could argue they are not excluded politically per se, but rather that the political and economic customs of the majority population does not recognise or integrate alternative customs. Therefore, they remain coded as powerless after their land-rights struggle ends in 2002. Regarding regional autonomy, their successful land claim only gave them space to conduct culturally-unique activities; in other words, there is no political autonomy or devolved governmental power given to the San, therefore they have no regional autonomy.

<sup>4762</sup> [Minority Rights Group International, 2007]

### *2009-2019*

The election of Jacob Zuma as president in 2009 symbolizes the change in inclusive power sharing. During his election campaign he often played the ethnic card (Zulu), particularly in KwaZulu-Nata, a predominantly Zulu area, that traditionally supported the Inkatha Freedom Party (<sup>4763</sup>:117). Due to his leadership, the ANC lost its label as a Xhosa-Party. A new period with Zulus as “senior partner” is thereby introduced, because of the increasing support of Zulus for the ANC and the simultaneous decrease of their representation by the Inkatha. The Xhosa are now “junior partner”.

<sup>4763</sup> [Southall & Daniel, 2009]

The power-status of the other disaggregated ethnic groups is less clear. On the one hand, the ANC is a “strongly multi-racial and multi-ethnic party” (<sup>4764</sup>, 148), who enabled many ethnic groups to be represented. Indeed, Nexis-Lexis and Wikipedia searches show that the other groups have at least one or two representatives in the ANC-led cabinet during this time period. In this sense, the politically relevant ethnic groups do have meaningful roles in the executive, and there is no evidence that they are token. Less clear, however, is whether they stand as clear group representatives. In a recent work on “Consociational parties”, Bogaard argues that there has been a “long lasting political marginalization of (the ANC’s) minority interests”, due to the long-standing commitment to “non-racialism” and de-ethnicization (<sup>4765</sup>, 92ff.). Apart from the ongoing power-struggle between the Zulu and Xhosa, the ANC party-institution encourages non-ethnic mobilization and the politicians, to gain the top positions, must stick with this line (<sup>4766</sup>, 83f): Many minority-ethnic politicians in the ANC therefore do not “play the ethnic card”. For example, Bogaard notes that most white politicians are in the ANC due to left-wing values, and do not proclaim to represent white interests (ibid, 92). Furthermore, although politicians

<sup>4764</sup> [Lipset, 1998]

<sup>4765</sup> [Bogaards, 2014]

<sup>4766</sup> [Piombo, 2009]

from the same province group together to support a candidate (i.e. the north and south Sotho players in the ANC first supporting then seeking to undermine Zuma following his election as ANC President in 2007), there is no province, apart from KwaZulu-Natal, that votes strongly along ethnic lines (<sup>4767</sup>). The main ethnic divide within the party is the tension between Zulu and Xhosa, as Zuma's situational ethnicization of his role as leader, as detailed above, exaggerated any differences between the new, Zulu led ANC and the Xhosa dominated party under Mandela and Mbeki.

<sup>4767</sup> [Strafor, 2012]

On balance, however, as the groups remain in executive power, it seems prudent to argue that the smaller groups remain "junior partner" in this time. However, numerous sources cite how the centralisation of power in the ANC has ensured that ethnic divides do not gain politics salience, and it is not clear that the non-Xhosa and Zulu party members represent their ethnic groups in the ANC (<sup>4768</sup>, 51). The Zulu and Xhosa ethnic groups, also the biggest, seem to be more forceful in assuming their dominance than the others (<sup>4769</sup>). The onus on each future coding period should be to assess the extent to which the minority ethnic groups' elites in the executive are representative of their ethno-linguistic background, and whether their roles are token.

<sup>4768</sup> [Piombo, 2009]

<sup>4769</sup> [Fessha, 2010]

Jacob Zuma was re-elected on 24 May 2014, with a 62.2% share of the popular vote. The Zulu group can be considered "senior partner" therefore at this time, considered dominant in "top-party decisions" (<sup>4770</sup>). Zuma, however, is not the most popular of politicians, particularly in larger cities, and corruption scandals in recent years have brought his abilities under question (<sup>4771</sup>). Although the ANC hold a majority of seats (over 200 out of 400), there are many other parties (including the DA, IFP and NFP, see previous codes) which bring plurality to the political system and represent a viable opposition to Zuma. However, no party seems to claim to purely represent one ethnic group, and the dominance of the Zulu group does not seem threatened by the influence of other parties (<sup>4772</sup>).

<sup>4770</sup> [Reuters, 2016]

<sup>4771</sup> [The Economist, 2014]

<sup>4772</sup> [Brand South Africa, 2014]

Many ethnic groups are represented in the cabinet and the ANC, although evidently dominated by Zulus, presents itself as a broadly "all African" party. In this period, as the rest, there is no need for a re-aggregation of ethnic groups into their umbrella groups (Whites, Blacks, Coloreds, Asians), as they continue to be politically relevant - represented by at least one significant political actor who claims to represent their interests: The main reason for this is the continued recognition of each group (which apart from Afrikaners, Coloreds, Asians and English speakers align with provinces) in the National Council of the Provinces (NCOP), with 10 delegates present from each province. In deciding which power-status the groups have, it is important to look at the nature of their representation in government, which requires attention to the cabinet positions and the ANC itself. As with the 2009-2013 period, the representatives of the smaller groups are certainly present in the elites of the ANC-led government. For example, the deputy Prime Minister, Ramphosa,

is an ethnic Venda, and the Pedi are represented in the Health and International Relations ministries. However, the inclusion of these politicians in the cabinet does not necessarily mean that the minority groups are represented - indeed, some sources cite that minority ethnic groups in the ANC, such as the white Afrikaners or English speakers, do not consider themselves as representatives of their groups necessarily, rather identifying with the ideology of the party itself (ie, pro-worker) (<sup>4773</sup>). However, as a consequence of the Zulu and Xhosa tension, ethnic identity remains important as a distinguishing factor in governmental politics, and there is no evidence to suggest that the ANC minority members are not seen as group representatives. Therefore, a “junior partner“ status is allotted to all groups other than Zulu.

<sup>4773</sup> [Bogaards, 2014]

Mr. Jacob Zuma’s rule as President of South Africa came to an end in February 2018 after continuous pressure from his fellow ANC members notwithstanding his dissatisfaction with the decision to step down from the number one governing position. In 2017, the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled Mr. Zuma to face 18 counts of high-profile scandals including corruption, fraud, racketeering and money laundering. Mr. Zuma denied all of these allegations but resigned nevertheless paving the way for former deputy Prime Minister Cyril Ramaphosa to step in (<sup>4774</sup>).

<sup>4774</sup> [BBC, 2018]

### *2020-2021*

Following his resignation, new elections were set for May 2019, 6th since the end of apartheid. More than 25 years under the ANC rule, opposition parties were showing fingers towards the ANC for the overall economic and social situation in the country, specifically the increasing inequality between the rich and poor. Based on the analysis of BBC making use of the GNI scores since 1994, inequality increased throughout the years and peaked in 2005 (<sup>4775</sup>). In tandem with the corruption allegation under Zuma, 2019 elections marked a test for the ANC and Mr. Ramaphosa as well. ANC won 58% of the overall votes or 230 out of 400 seats in the National assembly. Later on, Mr. Ramaphosa was sworn in as president of the republic in his first five year term. However, this percentage has marked the lowest gain of the ANC since the first democratic elections in 1994 and compared the recent elections in 2014 (62%). This loss of support can be attributed to not just voter apathy (for example only 1 in 4 eligible voters registered to vote) and rampant corruption but also high rates of unemployment and the controversial topic of land ownership. Two other winners in elections are the Democratic Alliance with 21% and EFF with 11%. The latter, almost doubled its vote from 6% to 10% in 2019, claiming to seize white-owned land and nationalize mine industry. Another surprise of the 2019 elections is the rise of the Freedom Front Plus (VF+), a party representing the interest of the white minority, earning 2% of the overall vote, thus beating the IFP which is mainly composed of Zulu (<sup>4776</sup>).

<sup>4775</sup> [BBC, 2019]

<sup>4776</sup> [BBC, 2019a]

Similar to the previous coding period, ANC remains an "all African" party. This was confirmed during the victory speech of Mr. Ramaphosa who explicitly stated that his aim was to unite all South Africans regardless of race, gender or age calling for a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South Africa <sup>(4777)</sup>. It seems that Ramaphosa has at least for sure kept his promise of a gender-balanced cabinet naming 50% of the ministers women and 50% men. One particular appointment was of interest, namely Patricia De Lille, a leader of the recently created opposition party GOOD, as minister of public work and infrastructure <sup>(4778)</sup>.

<sup>4777</sup> [BBC, 2019b]

<sup>4778</sup> [Associated Press, 2019]

However it is unclear whether the ANC remains Zulu or Xhosa dominated taking into consideration that Ramaphosa is of Venda ethnic background. However, similar to previous coding it should be noted that his ethnic background does not mean necessarily that Venda minority interests are represented. Based on the official website of the government, it seems that the ANC has ensured an equal representation of all ethno-linguistic and ethnic groups in the government. Since, Ramaphosa does not belong to either Xhosa or Zulu group, their rivalry at least within the ANC seems irrelevant. Thus the status for all groups remains similar, whereas the former "junior partner" status of all other groups besides Zulu changes to "senior partner". Nevertheless, the struggle for a non-racial South Africa persists despite identity politics since for example, racial categorization is still used by the government to monitor economic changes across the country, a remnant of the official racism of the past <sup>(4779)</sup>.

<sup>4779</sup> [BBC, 2021]

The San continues to remain powerless during this period. However we found evidence that the San are now political represented by the Khoisan Revolution Party founded in early 2016. The Party aimed at advocating for two issues: a) language recognition; and b) land ownership. IXam, which is now considered an extinct Khoisan language is not among the 11 official languages recognized by the South Africa's constitution <sup>(4780)</sup>.

<sup>4780</sup> [BBC, 2016]

### *Regional autonomy*

Regarding regional autonomy, the roles of traditional leaders, regional governance at the province level and other regional bodies, reflect a potential for regional autonomy that warrants deeper investigation. Firstly, "The National Council of Provinces" (NCOP), the upper house of the Parliament, whose purpose is to represent the governments of the provinces, rather than directly representing the people <sup>(4781)</sup>. However, rather than being territorially (regionally) bounded, the members of the council belong to the various parties - the ANC, Democratic Alliance, COPE, IFP - and it would be a difficult task to assess whether each of the 90 members represent the ethnic make-up of their province perfectly <sup>(4782)</sup>. They are, as party representatives, carrying out the mandate of the government/their parties to a certain extent <sup>(4783)</sup>. Due to failing to fulfill the second condition thereof in the EPR coding rules, we continue to code

<sup>4781</sup> [Parliament of the RSA, 2014]

<sup>4782</sup> [Parliament of the RSA, 2014]

<sup>4783</sup> [Parliament of the RSA, 2014]

the ethnic groups as without regional autonomy. Furthermore, as the NCOP is the second chamber, but not a separate parliament, it barely fulfills the first condition. The autonomy of the provinces is constrained by financial dependence, and any provincial legislation can only be generated through the passing of national legislation (<sup>4784</sup>, 43).

<sup>4784</sup> [Piombo, 2009]

Secondly, tribal chiefs are invariably the first port of call to settle rural disputes, to allocate land for home building and agricultural decision making, along with the ward councillors for local development since 1994 (<sup>4785</sup>). The role of traditional leaders in electoral politics is crucial, exemplified in the civil-society-led opposition to the 2014 Traditional Courts Bill, which would have given traditional leaders sole authority in the interpretation and implementation of customary law (<sup>4786</sup>). The National House of Traditional Leaders (NHTL) sets out a mandate for the legitimacy of traditional leaders, but it is unclear how large their influence is on national legislature. They are also represented in the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA). The relationship between the government and traditional leaders under the Members of the House of Traditional Leaders (NHTL) is formalized to an extent under the auspices of the Department of Traditional Affairs of the Republic of South Africa. However, it does not seem that the NHTL or CONTRALESA fulfil the requirements for regional autonomy for any ethnic group, as they have no direct legislative jurisdiction or power.

<sup>4785</sup> [Bell, 2010]

<sup>4786</sup> [Reid, 2012]

Afrikaners and the English Speakers, both junior partners, do not either satisfy any of the stated conditions for regional autonomy. In addition to these two groups being completely dispersed over South Africa and in no sense territorially bounded, there is no meaningful and active regional governance mechanism.

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## Political status of ethnic groups in South Africa

*From 1946 until 1947*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Blacks	0.77	DISCRIMINATED
Afrikaners	0.08	POWERLESS
Coloreds	0.08	POWERLESS
English Speakers	0.045	DOMINANT
Asians	0.02	POWERLESS

*From 1948 until 1989*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Blacks	0.77	DISCRIMINATED
Afrikaners	0.08	DOMINANT
Coloreds	0.08	DISCRIMINATED
English Speakers	0.045	POWERLESS
Asians	0.02	DISCRIMINATED

*From 1990 until 1994*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Blacks	0.77	POWERLESS
Afrikaners	0.08	DOMINANT
Coloreds	0.08	POWERLESS
English Speakers	0.045	POWERLESS
Asians	0.02	POWERLESS

*From 1995 until 2008*




Figure 937: Political status of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1946-1947.




Figure 938: Political status of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1948-1989.




Figure 939: Political status of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1990-1994.



Figure 940: Political status of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1995-2008.

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Zulu	0.23	JUNIOR PARTNER
Xhosa	0.18	SENIOR PARTNER
Pedi (North Sotho)	0.09	JUNIOR PARTNER
Afrikaners	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Coloreds	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
South Sotho	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tswana	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
English Speakers	0.045	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tsonga	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Swazi	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Venda	0.02	JUNIOR PARTNER
Asians	0.02	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ndebele	0.015	JUNIOR PARTNER
San	$2.0 \times 10^{-4}$	POWERLESS

*From 2009 until 2019*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Zulu	0.23	SENIOR PARTNER
Xhosa	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Pedi (North Sotho)	0.09	JUNIOR PARTNER
Afrikaners	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Coloreds	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
South Sotho	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tswana	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
English Speakers	0.045	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tsonga	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Swazi	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Venda	0.02	JUNIOR PARTNER
Asians	0.02	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ndebele	0.015	JUNIOR PARTNER
San	$2.0 \times 10^{-4}$	POWERLESS

*From 2020 until 2021*

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Zulu	0.23	SENIOR PARTNER
Xhosa	0.18	SENIOR PARTNER
Pedi (North Sotho)	0.09	SENIOR PARTNER
Afrikaners	0.08	SENIOR PARTNER
Coloreds	0.08	SENIOR PARTNER
South Sotho	0.08	SENIOR PARTNER
Tswana	0.08	SENIOR PARTNER
English Speakers	0.045	SENIOR PARTNER
Tsonga	0.04	SENIOR PARTNER
Swazi	0.025	SENIOR PARTNER
Venda	0.02	SENIOR PARTNER
Asians	0.02	SENIOR PARTNER
Ndebele	0.015	SENIOR PARTNER
San	$2.0 \times 10^{-4}$	POWERLESS




Figure 941: Political status of ethnic groups in South Africa during 2009-2019.



Figure 942: Political status of ethnic groups in South Africa during 2020-2021.

# Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in South Africa

*From 1946 until 1989*




Figure 943: Map of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1946-1989.

Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
Blacks	752 800	Aggregate
Afrikaners	426 456	Regionally based
Coloreds	426 456	Regionally based
English Speakers	8347	Regional & urban
Asians	0	Urban

Table 346: List of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1946-1989.

*From 1990 until 1994*




Figure 944: Map of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1990-1994.

Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
Blacks	752 800	Aggregate
Afrikaners	426 456	Regionally based
Coloreds	426 456	Regionally based
English Speakers	17 875	Regional & urban
Asians	0	Urban

Table 347: List of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1990-1994.

*From 1995 until 2021*




Figure 945: Map of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1995-2021.

	Group name	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	Type
■	Afrikaners	426 456	Regionally based
■	Coloreds	426 456	Regionally based
■	Tswana	257 811	Regionally based
■	Xhosa	167 392	Regionally based
■	Zulu	128 617	Regionally based
■	Pedi (North Sotho)	79 563	Regionally based
■	South Sotho	68 994	Regionally based
■	Swazi	54 277	Regionally based
■	Tsonga	34 842	Regionally based
■	Ndebele	28 325	Regionally based
■	Venda	21 037	Regionally based
■	English Speakers	17 875	Regional & urban
■	San	10 301	Regionally based
■	Asians	0	Urban

Table 348: List of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1995-2021.



## *Conflicts in South Africa*

*Starting on 1966-08-25*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of South Africa	SWAPO		1966-08-25			

*Starting on 1978-01-31*

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of South Africa	ANC	Blacks	1978-01-31	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of South Africa	ANC	Coloreds	1978-01-31	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of South Africa	ANC	Asians	1978-01-31	Explicit	Yes	Yes