

South Africa

Ethnicity in South Africa

Group selection

Levinson (³¹⁶⁷, 166-168) lists 4 racial and over 50 ethnic groups for South Africa. The by far largest racial group is the native African (or black), which comprises about 76% of the South African population. It is composed of 2 major and several minor ethnic groups. The Zulu build the largest ethnic group (about 22% of the population) and live mainly in the province KwaZulu Natal (the name of the provinces created in the mid 90s is used), which is located on the east coast between Lesotho and Swaziland. The second largest ethnic group is the Xhosa (about 18% of the population), which are widely dispersed. Under apartheid, however, their homelands were Transkei and Ciskei, two regions located in Eastern Cape province. The remaining minor ethnic groups are the Tswana (about 9% of the population living along the border to Botswana; their home nation), the North Sotho (about 9% of the population, living in Northern Province), the South Sotho (about 6% of the population, living in Free State province), the Tsonga (about 4% of the population living in Northern Province), the Swazi (about 2.5% of the population, living in North-West province), the Venda (about 2% of the population, living in the Northern Province) and the Ndebele (about 1% of the population, living on the borders of Gauteng province). The second largest racial group is the white, which comprises about 13% of the population. They split roughly 60-40 in two ethnic groups. The Afrikaners (or Boers) (about 8.5% of total population) are primarily of Dutch descent and were the first European settlers in South Africa. During the scramble for Africa (1880-1913) they were driven inland by the British and consequentially isolated from European influence, which lead them to develop their own culture and language (Afrikaans). Since then they see themselves as African rather than European. They have settled widely dispersed, so that there is no area where they have a clear majority. The second ethnic group is the English-speaking (about 4.5% of the population), which are primarily of British descent. They came with the British colonialization and live as the Afrikaner widely dispersed across the country. The third racial group is the Colored. They compose an own ethnic group (about 8.5% of the population). Their ancestors are of mixed European (English-speaking or Afrikaner) and African descent. They are concentrated in the Western Cape province, where

³¹⁶⁷ [Levinson, 1998]

they build a majority, but can also be found in most other provinces. They are a distinct ethnic group in South Africa, since they were discriminated by the whites and native African alike. In the years after apartheid, however, they have tended to vote for white parties rather than for the ANC. The Asians (primarily Indians, but also some Chinese) build the fourth racial group. As the Colored people they compose an own ethnic group (about 2.5% of the population). They live primarily in urban areas and are heavily concentrated around Durban in the KwaZulu Natal province (³¹⁶⁸; ³¹⁶⁹, 416-420; ³¹⁷⁰, 186, 201; ³¹⁷¹, ³¹⁷², 165-169). In 1910 the South African Union was founded as an independent dominion of the Commonwealth. Until 1948 the political landscape was structured by the political struggle for power between the South African Party (SAP), which aimed for close ties to Great Britain and was dominated by English-speaking people, and the National Party (NP), aiming to demarcate the Union from the former colonial masters and was primarily an Afrikaner party. From 1910 to 1919 the SAP held power and led the Union along with the British into World War I. During the following recession the gold mine owners decreased the wages and began to employ more native Africans, leading to increased tensions between the Afrikaner (generally less educated as the English-speaking people) and native African. 1924 the NP, which built on the worries of the Afrikaner, won together with the Labor party the national elections and began to build public jobs in order to decrease white unemployment. First racial segregation policies became effective (e.g. native Africans were not allowed to live in urban areas anymore). 1934 the SAP and NP surprisingly merged to the United South African National Party (United Party (UP)). The UP won the elections of 1938, but as World War II started it broke apart. Hertzog, an Afrikaner, wanted South Africa to stay neutral, while Smuts, an English-speaking, wanted to join the war on the side of the British. Hertzog lost the parliamentary vote and South Africa entered World War II on the side of the British. The United Party – now a predominantly English-speaking party – won the elections in 1943. The South African military industry boomed during that time and since many white industrial workers were at war in Europe, employers started to employ native Africans and brought them back to the cities, where their proportion among urban residents grew rapidly. Once again the white and especially the Afrikaner felt threatened and saw the apartheid policy of the re-founded Afrikaner dominated NP as a viable way to secure their economic, political and cultural position. As a result the NP won the national elections in 1948 on their apartheid platform and began to implement it. From 1948 to 1978 the NP ruled South Africa like a single party regime and enforced their apartheid policy (i.e. fostering ethnic differences among the native Africans, creation of African homelands outside of the cities, forbidding black organizations such as the African National Congress (ANC) or the Pan African Congress (PAC)). By 1978 the diplomatic pressure (e.g. South Africa already had to leave the Com-

³¹⁶⁸ [Marks and Trapido, 1987]

³¹⁶⁹ [Guelke, 1992]

³¹⁷⁰ [Reynolds, 1994]

³¹⁷¹ [Byrnes, 1996]

monwealth in 1961) on the NP government had increased so much that they were forced to abolish some of its apartheid policies and open the political system. The latter was achieved by creating separate chambers of parliament for the Colored and Asians, but which were subordinate to the white parliament and therefore had no real effect on politics. The native African, however, still did not get their own parliament chamber and remained discriminated. The constitutional reform done at the same time led to an even higher concentration of power. The office of the prime minister was disposed and all government power concentrated in the hands of the president and his security council. As common in presidential systems the government could not be dissolved by parliament. During the whole apartheid area there were strikes, demonstrations and unrest leading to violence (e.g. 1960 Sharpville, 1976-1978 Soweto uprising). In the mid 80s, however, the strikes, demonstrations, uprising and unrests got so severe that several townships and homelands had to be occupied by the military and the country was set in a permanent stage of emergence until 1990. In 1990 Frederik Willem de Klerk ended the apartheid policy and started negotiations with Nelson Mandela, the leader of the 1960 banned ANC, on a peaceful transition to democracy. The negotiations took place between 1990 and 1994 and led to a new constitution and the first general, democratic elections in South Africa. Unsurprisingly, the ANC achieved a stunning victory and in May 1994 Nelson Mandela took over the presidents office as the first black man in South African history. Although the ANC won 252 of the 400 seats in parliament it built a government of National Unity, including members of all four races (i.e. African, White, Colored and Asian) and members of the NP and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), a Zulu dominated party. 1996, however, the NP left the government, which after the elections 1999 was completely dominated by the ANC (won 266 of the 400 parliamentary seats). In the national elections 2004 the ANC even reached a 2/3 majority in parliament allowing it to change the constitution unilaterally. Thus, it seems that South Africa has moved from one dominant party system into another. The crucial difference, however, is that the latter is democratic, while the former was not (3173; 3174: 94-98; 3175; 3176; 3177; 3178; 3179).

Fearon's list (2003) is used as a starting point. The list resulting from the Atlas Narodov Mira (1960) is far too detailed. It contains groups (e.g. Malayans, Germans, French, Italian, Greece, Hottentots), which are politically absolutely irrelevant. The list from the Minorities at risk program is more appropriate but lumps all Europeans (i.e. Afrikaner and English-speaking) in one category. The changes between Fearon's list and the author's list are made for the following reasons: 1. Even though the smaller ethnic groups (i.e. North Sotho, Tswana, South Sotho, Tsonga, Swazi, Venda, Ndebele) all had their own homeland (1959-1994) during apartheid and therefore a very limited amount of local power, they were dropped for the following reasons. First, their local power was very limited,

since they lacked fundamental rights in most politically relevant areas (e.g. financial resources). Second, the homelands worked more like prisons for native Africans guarded by the Whites than areas of real local autonomy. Finally, some of the groups are completely (i.e. Tswana and Venda) others all but absent in the literature that has been consulted. If discussed they are generally referred to as supporters of several parties (e.g. ANC and IFP), from which one can conclude that they do not act politically as a coherent group. They have therefore been less able to influence politics. Thus, the new list only contains the major ethnicities in the four racial groups (i.e. native African: Zulu, Xhosa; White: Afrikaner, English-speaking; Colored; Asian). 2. The spelling has been changed from the British "coloured" to the American "colored".

Ethnicity has played a significant role in the political life of South Africa between 1945 and 2005. Both criteria are satisfied. There are several political parties that claim to organize a certain ethnic group (z.B.: the IFP sees itself as representative of the Zulu or the NP saw itself clearly as the South African Afrikaner party) (³¹⁸⁰, 54; ³¹⁸¹, 8). Additionally, from 1945 to 1990 the access to power depended on the ethnic background of a person. Native Africans were discriminated and had no access to political power during the apartheid era (1948-1990).

³¹⁸⁰ [Horowitz, 1991]

³¹⁸¹ [Rechmann, 2005]

Power relations

1946-1947: The time period was chosen from the beginning of the coding period (1946) to the change in power after the national elections 1948, which also mark the beginning of the apartheid regime. In the national elections 1943 the English-speaking United Party (UP) led coalition under Jan Smuts (also member of Churchill's war cabinet during WWII) won the elections (107 of the 150 seats) and formed the government. The vast majority of government members were Englishspeaking, which led me to code the power access of the English-speaking group as dominant. The re-founded Afrikaner National Party (NP) (called itself Herenigde Nasionale Party at that time and later changed back to their original name NP) won only 43 out of 150 seats in parliament and therefore formed the opposition. They had no members in government, but were not actively discriminated by the UP-coalition, which is why they have been coded as powerless. There was no evidence for discrimination of Colored and Asians. Coloreds are even listed as voters of the UP (³¹⁸²). However, they were not adequately represented in government, which is why their power access has been coded as powerless. Even though Smut's UP government began to move away from the rigid enforcement of segregationist laws for economic reasons (i.e. workers were needed in the military industrial complex and most white male workers were at war), he did not lift the Native's Land Act (1913) and Urban Area Act (1923), two of the core acts of discrimination during the apartheid era. Moreover, electoral law required proof of writing and reading skills, which most native Africans lacked. Therefore the

³¹⁸² [Byrnes, 1996]

power access of both native African ethnicities has been coded as discriminated (³¹⁸³).

³¹⁸³ [Saunders and Southey, 1998]

1948-1989: The next time period ranges from 1948 to 1990 and is commonly known as the apartheid era. It starts with the NP coming into power after the national elections 1948 and ends with president de Klerk's 'unbanning speech' in front of parliament (February 1990), where he announced that he would repeal discriminatory laws and lift the ban on the ANC, the United Democratic Front (UDF), the PAC and the communist party. He also announced to lift media restrictions and release all political prisoners not guilty of common-law crimes. In the 1948 national elections the Afrikaner dominated NP won the parliamentary elections (79 out of 150 seats) on their apartheid platform and were therefore entitled to form the government. Without further delay they began immediately to implement their agenda releasing a host of discriminatory laws against all native African ethnicities, Colored and Asians (e.g. Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1950), Population Registration Act (1950), Group Areas Act (1950), suppression of Communism Act (1950), Separate Representation of Voters Act (1951), etc.), replaced people in important offices by Afrikaner (e.g. judges in the Supreme Court), and changed in 1983 the government system from a parliamentary to a presidential system with a high concentration of power in the president's hands. The Afrikaner dominated NP became the dominant party between 1948 and 1990, winning a clear majority in all nine parliamentary elections and ensured that no member of another ethnic group held a politically crucial office. The Afrikaner have been coded as having a monopoly access to power. The English-speaking people have been coded as powerless for the following reasons. Until 1966 the majority of the English-speaking people supported the UP – their political home. Since 1961, however, as the NP began to attract English-speaking to expand their voter base, many English-speaker switched from UP supporters to NP voters, leading to an implosion of the UP in the 1966 elections (only 39 out of 166 seats). The NP, however, sustained a strongly Afrikaner nationalist posture that made few, if any, concessions to the sentiments of English-speakers on language and other questions. All other races and ethnicities were systematically discriminated and are therefore coded as such (³¹⁸⁴, 421; ³¹⁸⁵, 123-127; ³¹⁸⁶). There are two arguments that could be advanced to justify an alternative coding: 1. With the homeland policy each ethnic group was assigned some territory in rural South Africa. Thus, they should not be coded as discriminated, but as having local power. One can argue against this coding for the following two reasons. First, at any time during the apartheid era the homelands were kept under tight control of the Afrikaner dominated government in Pretoria. Second, those local areas of self-administration were in reality prisons set up by the whites to keep the native Africans, Coloreds and Asians away from the major urban areas of the country (e.g. Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape

³¹⁸⁴ [Guelke, 1992]

³¹⁸⁵ [Ottaway, 1996]

³¹⁸⁶ [Saunders and Southey, 1998]

Town, Durban). Hence, coding them as discriminated is more appropriate than coding them as having local power. 2. It could be argued that since the constitutional changes in 1983 the Colored and Asians had their own parliamentary chamber and were therefore no longer discriminated. Powerless would maybe be the more appropriate label for them between 1983 and 1990. Again, one can argue against this coding for the following two reasons. First, the White parliamentary chamber dominated both the Colored and Asian chamber by the ratio 4:2:1, giving the Colored and Asians no chance to influence politics. Colored and Asian people recognized the attempt of the Afrikaner government to co-opt them and abstained from the parliamentary elections in large numbers (voter turnout was generally below 20%), raising questions on the legitimacy of the parliamentary elections. Second, at the same time as changing parliamentary structure the Afrikaner government has also changed government structure from a parliamentary to a presidential system. This drastically decreased the influence of parliament over government, since the government is now independent of the parliament and cannot be dissolved by a vote of no confidence (³¹⁸⁷, 424; ³¹⁸⁸).

³¹⁸⁷ [Guelke, 1992]

³¹⁸⁸ [Saunders and Southey, 1998]

1990-1993: This time period is equivalent to the transition period to democracy. It starts with de Klerks "unbanning speech" in front of parliament in February 1990 and ends right before the first democratic election in the history of South Africa (1994). During the four-year lasting negotiations to democracy (for details on the negotiation process see ³¹⁸⁹, 630-634) de Klerk's government stayed formally in power. The Afrikaner remained dominant in that government, but there was no attempt to exclude other ethnic groups, which is why the power access of the Afrikaner is coded as dominant in that period. All discriminatory laws have been abolished formally, which is the reason the coding changes from discriminated to powerless for the first four ethnic groups on the list. There may have remained some informal discrimination, but there was no evidence in the literature that it would have gone beyond what one would expect in a normal process of transition after 42 years of discrimination. The power access of the English-speaking people has remained unchanged, which is the reason why the coding has also remained unchanged (³¹⁹⁰, 127-130; ³¹⁹¹).

³¹⁸⁹ [Southall, 1994]

³¹⁹⁰ [Ottaway, 1996]

³¹⁹¹ [Saunders and Southey, 1998]

1994-2005: The time period is equivalent to the time between the first democratic elections in April 1994 to the end of the coding period, including the elections in 1999 and 2004. In all democratic elections the ANC won a clear majority of the votes (over 60% of all votes, and currently even holds a 2/3 majority in parliament). Moreover, in all presidential elections so far the ANC candidate (i.e. Mandela and Mbeki) was elected president. A white party (1994 the NP, which joined the ANC in 1996; 1999 and 2004 the Democratic Party (DP)) and the IFP (a Zulu party) followed with some distance the ANC and built the second and third strongest parties in parlia-

ment (³¹⁹² and ³¹⁹³, 634-643 provide a detailed analyses of the 1994 elections; African Elections provides the results of 1999 and 2004). Even though Mandela and Mbeki did not need to incorporate the opposition in their cabinets they did, trying to represent the South African population in their governments of National Unity. Mandela's cabinet for example consisted of 14 native Africans, 7 Whites, 2 Coloreds and 4 Asians. The group of deputy ministers was similarly composed (³¹⁹⁴, 96-98; ³¹⁹⁵; ³¹⁹⁶, ³¹⁹⁷, 63-64). The Xhosa, which build the dominant ethnic group among the ANC leaders (e.g. Mandela, Mbeki, Sisulu, Tambo, Hani, Jordan), held the presidents office between 1994 and 2005. They also provided the majority of the native African ministers and deputy ministers. They have been therefore coded as senior partners. All other ethnicities have been coded as junior partners, since the each held at least 2 minister posts and some deputy minister posts during that time period. From 1994 to 1999 the NP even held a deputy presidents office (de Klerk) and Buthelezi, the leader of the Zulu dominated IFP, was minister of Homeland Affairs from 1994 to 2004. Finally, the deputy president from 1999 until 2005 was a Zulu (Jacob Zuma, which was forced to step down after being involved in a corruption scandal) (³¹⁹⁸, 639-641; ³¹⁹⁹, 62; ³²⁰⁰). One could argue that some ethnic groups (especially the Colored and Asians) held so few offices that powerless may be more appropriate. However, since there has been no evidence that their members were merely tokens coding them as junior partner seemed appropriate. Finally, one could also argue for a new time period starting 2004, since IFP members declined cabinet offers as long as the tensions between the IFP and the ANC have not been resolved. However, since the IFP is not the only Zulu representing party and there are plenty of Zulu ANC members incorporated in the government it appeared reasonable to opt against this way of coding.

2006-2009: For an overview of the ethnic landscape in South Africa with its many groups and sub-groups see the explanation made by the previous coder.

The coder argued for a division into four racial groups (Whites, Africans, Coloreds and Asians), which can be respectively diversified into ethnic groups. The author agrees with the coder that the main division in South Africa during the Apartheid period (1948-1989) was between racial groups and not ethnic. Yet while the previous coder argues for a subdivision of the Africans into Zulu and Xhosa (the two biggest African groups) and the dropping of the smaller African ethnic groups, the author argues for subsuming all African ethnic groups under the category of Blacks. During the Apartheid – and still in the transition period 1990-1993 – people got discriminated due to their racial (read: color of their skin), and not their ethnic identity. Although there were animosities and clashes between different ethnic groups of Blacks, on the national scale their racial identity counted, not their ethnic, which might have been an issue in

³¹⁹² [Reynolds, 1994]

³¹⁹³ [Southall, 1994]

³¹⁹⁴ [Maphai, 1995]

³¹⁹⁵ [Southall, 1994]

³¹⁹⁶ [Byrnes, 1996]

more regional questions.

Therefore, there was ethnic diversification and differences in access to political power between the two biggest white ethnic groups (Afrikaner and English speaking), but the discriminated racial groups were discriminated as Blacks, Coloreds and Asians, and not as Zulu, Xhosa, Indians, and so on.

Due to the distinction of Afrikaners and English speakers, the periodization into a first period 1946-1947, and a second one after the elections of 1948 with the victory of ethnic Afrikaners can be maintained, as well as the transition period of 1990-1993. For the Apartheid period one could argue for a change of the Afrikaner's status. Monopoly seems to be too strong for the actual situation, as the English speaking were not totally excluded from political power. Dominant might be a more accurate status.

As South Africa occupied Namibia up to its independence in 1990, Namibian population has to be integrated in the figures in the period from 1946 to 1989. But because of the small population of Namibia in relation to South Africa (about 3% of the whole population) the differences in the percentage is insignificant, leading to a slight increase of the percentage of racial Blacks and decrease of Whites.

Today (after the first democratic elections in 1994), ethnic identities are more meaningful, without becoming the most influential issue in questions of access to political power. Among others, Piombo (³²⁰¹, 455-458) and Mozaffar et al. (³²⁰², 386), argue for a high ethnic fragmentation of South Africa. People identify themselves first and foremost as members of an ethnic group and not of a race. Yet the authors argue as well that in political issues these ethnic identities can be less mobilized. The racial card is still more common, as the fault lines within the society run rather along racial distinctions than ethnic ones. In South Africa, the racial boundaries are more or less the same as class boundaries with Blacks belonging to the poor lower class and Whites to the well-off middle-class and upper-class (³²⁰³). Therefore, the big parties try to appeal to groups that can be rather defined by class (and race) than by ethnic factors (e.g. the ANC is stressing its pan-African program, not a Xhosa-program).

Yet, ethnicity is not totally absent from South African politics. Especially in the most recent years, politics got punctually "ethnicitized". Since 1994, the ANC is dominating the political landscape. As already stated, it claims to represent all (black) Africans. Yet, the party was strongly dominated by the Xhosa (e.g. the presidents Mandela and Mbeki were Xhosa), and therefore challenged by parties representing other ethnic groups (for a long time mainly by Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party in KwaZulu Natal).

But even within the ANC itself ethnic groups other than the Xhosa challenged the latter's hegemony. Despite these challenges and the increasing tensions within the leading ANC party, whereby the contending parties played more and more the ethnic card (³²⁰⁴), the situation regarding access to power remained relatively stable.

³²⁰¹ [Piombo, 2005]

³²⁰² [Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003]

³²⁰³ [Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003]

³²⁰⁴ [Kagwanja and Waititu, 2008]

Thabo Mbeki's resigning as president of South Africa in 2008 and his substitution by Kgalema Motlanthe for the remainder of his 2nd term as president did not lead to considerable changes. Yet the political field got further diversified by the formation of the new political party Congress of the People (COPE), founded mainly by former allies of Thabo Mbeki within the ANC, and appealing to a (non-racialized) middle-class. Within ANC itself, its 2007 elected new president Jacob Zuma, an ethnical Zulu, and his allies gained increasingly power.

2009, Jacob Zuma got elected as president of South Africa. During his election campaign he often played the ethnic card, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal. Zuma's ANC won support in this province, traditionally supporting the Inkatha Freedom Party. Due to his leadership, the ANC further lost its label as a Xhosa-Party.

Observers of South African politics are not certain at the moment about the role that ethnicity will play in the country's future. As stated, the Inkatha Freedom Party, traditionally representing the Zulus, lost many voters to the ANC, which is therefore increasingly becoming the party of all blacks (a role the ANC always claimed), but also other ethnic groups (e.g. ³²⁰⁵; ³²⁰⁶, 117; ³²⁰⁷). Yet this de-ethnicitization is tempered by Zuma's situational emphasis of his Zulu-ness and his bad reputation among some white South Africans. It is all too early to make any prognostics about an alleged decrease of the role of ethnicity and an increase of class as a crucial factor as some observers in South Africa have claimed (e.g. ³²⁰⁸).

As all the smaller ethnic groups have their political representations (very often without big influence on the national scale, but nevertheless rooted in their homelands), one can argue for a inclusion of those ethnic groups into the codings. Most of the political parties "of" these smaller groups share with the bigger parties their claims not to be ethnically exclusive. Yet as the ANC, the IFP or the parties of the Afrikaners and English speakers, they find their main support among a certain ethnic group. Therefore – and for the mere reason not to exclude more than 30% of the population from the codings – one can argue for a inclusion of them as "junior partners" as some of their representatives are ministers in the South African government.

The small community of about 7500 San in South Africa have a special status which is different to the other ethnic groups due to their particular lifestyle "outside" the nation state. In the literature often portrayed as discriminated, it appears that the status as powerless is more accurate. San do not have access to political power and they struggle for their particular (cultural) rights, but the South African state tries to secure at least partially their cultural particularities. Therefore, they should not be coded as discriminated, but as powerless (not irrelevant, as they have their political representation).

From 1994 to 2008, the Xhosas were coded as senior partners in the government, mainly due to the Xhosa presidency of the ANC (Mandela, Mbeki), and the Zulus', the other large black ethnicity's,

³²⁰⁵ [Mabotja, 2009]

³²⁰⁶ [Southall and Daniel, 2009]

³²⁰⁷ [Minority Rights Group International, 2007]

³²⁰⁸ [Wehmhoerner, 2009]

main representation by the Inkatha, which, on their turn, were considered as junior partners. In 2009, the ANC won the election again and one could therefore see a status quo in South African politics. But since Jacob Zuma is an ethnic Zulu, and because of the increasing support by Zulus for the ANC and the simultaneous decrease of their representation by the Inkatha, it appeared reasonable to introduce a new period and to code the Zulus as the new senior partner and the Xhosas as junior partner for the year of 2009 (while not changing the statuses of the other groups).

In June 2008 the Pretoria High Court ruled in favor of the Chinese Association of South Africa's petition that ethnically Chinese South African citizens be defined as Black in legislation benefiting previously disadvantaged groups such as the Broad-Based Economic Empowerment Act and the Employment Equity Act (³²⁰⁹). As ethnical Chinese are coded as Asians and thereby already as junior partners in government, a status which does not get altered by this decision, the codings were not changed.

³²⁰⁹ [United States Government State Department, 2008]

2009-2013: As the case is in the current version of the EPR update, groups that are coded as powerless in the first dimension of state power, but that does have some sort of regional autonomy will be coded as such. However the only group to be coded as being powerless in the first dimension of state power in this case is the San, however they are not coded as having regional autonomy as the two conditions that jointly needs to be fulfilled do not hold.

Furthermore both groups, the Afrikaners and the English, both junior partners, do not either satisfy any of the stated conditions for regional autonomy. In addition to these two groups being completely dispersed over South Africa and are in no sense territorially bounded, does there not exist any meaningful and active regional organ of some type. Both groups are correctly coded as being junior partners as they are sufficiently represented on national level.

The same scenario applies to the case of the Asian and Colored group. Moreover whilst the majority of Coloreds live in the Western Cape is the Asian community is more dispersed except for the case of Kwazulu-Natal where the majority of the Indian community lives. Furthermore neither the Asian nor the Colored group fulfil any of the criteria so as to be classified as being regionally autonomous. The coding of these groups as being junior partners by the previous coder remains valid.

At least it seems that South Africa is gradually moving towards a more diversified landscape considering that the ANC lost its two-thirds majority, preventing the party from changing the constitution and has new smaller parties risen in the ranks (³²¹⁰). It should be mentioned that the official opposition the Democratic Alliance, the official opposition, who got 16.66% of the vote in the 2009 elections is a very diversified party whose members come from a wide variety of different ethnic groups and is the claim thus wrongly made that it is essentially a white party considering for example that its Par-

³²¹⁰ [Wehmhoerner, 2009]

liamentary leader, Lindiwe Mazibuko is black (exact ethnicity not given) ⁽³²¹¹⁾. These are interesting developments considering that voters have frequently based their loyalty to a party on their ethnicity, but one may argue that in the long term trajectory South Africa may move towards becoming a more consolidated democracy where voters will base their decisions on a combination of other factors.

³²¹¹ [Majavu, 2011]

However when it comes to coding regional autonomy for the remaining ethnic groups does it become significantly harder to make any clear-cut assumptions. The reason being that there exists a number of ethnic tribes that still hold significant relations with government and thus will it be necessary to go into some detail regarding the latest developments in this regard as it will be essential in determining whether groups should be coded as being regionally autonomous or not. First, it should be noted that to the author's knowledge there exists no precise data of the composition of tribal leaders across South Africa that is readily available and for this to be disaggregated will arguably necessitate a much more intensive and comprehensive study undertaken at the local level. However in this case will this not alter any of the coding as can be concluded based on the following stated cases and will the ethnicity of the main political actors in the country in such as the incumbent president, President Zuma have a greater influence.

The case in South Africa is that still today in many villages over the country it is still the tribal chiefs that settle rural disputes together with having the entitlement to allocate land for home building and agriculture. This responsibility has since 1994 been shared with ward councillors tasked with rural development that are government appointed ⁽³²¹²⁾. The cooperation with ward councillors that are government appointed may lead one to conclude that this does not sufficiently fulfil the definition of being regionally autonomous as ultimately the decisions made by the group will have been made by consensus with locally appointed ward councillors which inevitably will aim to act in accordance with its respective political party's overall mandate.

³²¹² [Bell, 2010]

To legitimize the role and prominence of the traditional leadership in South Africa the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 Chapter 12 state that: Traditional leaders. 212 under the Role of traditional leaders include that "national legislation may provide a role for traditional leadership as an institution at local level on matters affecting local communities" ⁽³²¹³⁾ Just as a further statement of support does this indicate that there is not an active regional executive organ of some type that operates below the state level but above the local administrative level.

³²¹³ [Government of South Africa, 2014]

The prominence of the role of the traditional tribal leaders was again indicated by the passing of the Traditional Governance and Leadership Framework Act prior to the 2004 elections ⁽³²¹⁴⁾. One of the main points of this framework stipulated that a third or the traditional council must be women, thus arguably taking a stride towards a reversal of the apartheid-era politics that denied formal

³²¹⁴ [National Council of Provinces Minister of Justice]

property rights to widowed or single African women. However this has not been received without significant tension in many tribal groups whose leaders still denounce rule by woman and advocate that these social traditions should not be altered ⁽³²¹⁵⁾. This proposed alteration of the traditional patriarchal structure of tribes has evoked significant opposition from traditional leaders in the face of a significant amount of civil society groups.

³²¹⁵ [Bell, 2010]

Although outside of the given time period for this coding (2009-2013), in 2014 the Traditional Courts Bill (TBC) that has been promoted by the justice department since 2008 is finally off the table after years of opposition from civil society. In essence will the bill have created a separate legal system for an estimated 17 million people that are currently still living in the former Bantustans that were created by the Apartheid regime ⁽³²¹⁶⁾. This has just been one of the examples through which the post-Apartheid government has attempted to regularise and institutionalise the role of traditional leaders in a democratic South Africa despite in the process ultimately undermining the protection of citizens under constitutional civil rights ⁽³²¹⁷⁾. The proposed bill will have essentially granted traditional leaders sole authority in the interpretation and implementation of customary law such as not only being able to order forced labour within their respective boundaries, but will it have been made a criminal offence for rural people choosing to opt out of the jurisdiction of traditional courts. Thus access to alternative forms of justice prohibited and in the process is the authority of the constitution effectively evaded ⁽³²¹⁸⁾. Thus in line with the conditions that should be fulfilled in order to code a group regionally autonomous will the coding of a group as being autonomous have been strengthened if this bill have been passed.

³²¹⁶ [Reid, 2012]

³²¹⁷ [Reid, 2012]

³²¹⁸ [Reid, 2012]

Although President Zuma is a strong supporter of the proposed bill, historically the role of chiefs have been controversial under the Apartheid system as many chiefs were known to be very compliant with the Apartheid regime under the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 ^(3219; 3220). However whereas under the Apartheid era these traditional courts existed, but it was a different system for each of the respective homelands is President Zuma advocating for one unified system across all the territories (Zuma says South Africa needs traditional courts, ³²²¹).

³²¹⁹ [South African History Online, 2014]

³²²⁰ [Reid, 2012]

³²²¹ [BBC News Africa, 2012]

Thus under the Apartheid regime were the 10 Bantustans effectively deemed autonomous and were they created to concentrate members of a different ethnic group in one area ⁽³²²²⁾. This being said could one almost conclude that the regional coding should not be that difficult, however considering that ethnicity is lived out in the political sphere through political parties in South Africa is it extremely difficult to completely disaggregate the composition of these parties at a more localised or regional level as except for the case of national politicians are there not sufficient information available to indicate to what ethnicity group the members of the regional executive groups belong to. Moreover what is absolutely crucial to take

³²²² [South African History Online, 2014]

into account is that in South Africa it is becoming increasingly common that people from different ethnicity groups to marry and have children and subsequently can one not conclude that one belongs wholly to only one certain ethnic group. Thus it makes it even more difficult to assign regional autonomy to an ethnicity without possibly making some sweeping assumptions.

Despite that over the years of the precarious relationship between the incumbent government (ANC) and traditional leaders, who are united under The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA), the sole and authentic representative of the progressive traditional leadership of South Africa (³²²³) does the tribal leaders still receive remuneration from government in addition to other benefits including education by government and motor vehicles. However these benefits are not provided across the board to all traditional leaders and has this thus led to increasing tension between traditional leadership and government (³²²⁴).

³²²³ [Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa,

³²²⁴ [Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa,

The relationship between the government and traditional leaders under the Members of the House of Traditional Leaders (NHTL) is formalised to an extent under the auspices of the Department of Traditional Affairs of the Republic of South Africa (Department: Traditional Affairs, Republic of South Africa, 2014).

The traditional leaders vehemently proclaim the vital role that they fulfil in rural areas where the incumbent government and the state fails to deliver the necessary services as is set out in the constitution. The National House of Traditional Leaders have set out their mandate for the advancement of service delivery on various levels. The NHTL states that they actively participate in the Legislative process in parliament, but there is not exact evidence as yet as to whether any of their submissions have been included in the Bills as they stated on their own website. Furthermore it is stated by the NHTL that their participation in politics extends to Departmental level in addition to the Parliamentary processes (³²²⁵).

³²²⁵ [National House of Traditional Leaders, 2014]

This piece of information is related to the definition of regional autonomy that necessitates that the scope of regional autonomy in that they exercise some power over decisions such as cultural rights. However yet again, it is unclear what specific ethnicity does this as the proclamation is made by Contralesa and may the coder make a fallacy in possibly overstating the power of a group in their influence on decision-making. Moreover in this regard has the Traditional Courts Bill for example not been passed.

This clear interplay between the NHTL and the possible influence on the regional government's decision- and policy making as is linked to the previous condition for a group to be coded as regionally autonomous makes it rather difficult to make a categorical decision on whether this condition is sufficiently fulfilled. Reason being that the NHTL is an independent body so does it not fit the description of the second condition to the extent that the ethnic group is significantly represented in the executive of the regional governance (the National Council of Provinces) or that its mandate

does have an actual influence on the regional's government decision making and as it is not possible to attribute this to a specific ethnicity. The conclusion that is based on the fact that the influence of the NHTL on regional government is currently assessed. In this regard does the NHTL as an entity not have an overarching influence as after assessing the political representation of the parties in the respective 9 provinces as no traditional leader under the auspice of being a traditional leader is specifically mentioned ⁽³²²⁶⁾ However the coding tasks asks whether to assess whether the respective ethnicity groups are represented in regional governance, but again in no instance does a specific ethnicity dominate in this regard and is it arguable whether one would code this as being a condition of regional autonomy.

³²²⁶ [Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2014]

In order to understand the framework in which the traditional leaders operate in their intention to influence national government is it important to briefly explain the role of the regional executive bodies in South Africa that plays a significant role in influencing national politics and how they interact with the NHTL.

The National Council of Provinces (NCOP) is the upper house of the Parliament of South Africa under the (post-apartheid) constitution which came into full effect in 1997 its purpose is to represent the governments of the provinces, rather than directly representing the people ⁽³²²⁷⁾.

³²²⁷ [Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2014]

Based on this point of argumentation does it remain rather ambiguous as although one can conclude that although yes there is indeed different ethnicity groups represented when one bases this on the different political parties that are mentioned in the composition of the NCOP (although these are only the dominant ones being the ANC, Democratic Alliance, COPE, IFP and is a difficult task to assess from what exact ethnicity every single member of the NCOP is from as it consists of 90 members ⁽³²²⁸⁾. As all these members are dispersed over the country can one not categorically conclude that they are necessarily territorially bounded and thus is this not sufficient to fulfil the first condition of territorial concentration.

³²²⁸ [Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2014]

Furthermore despite the power of the NCOP to influence national decisions is it still effectively carrying out the mandate of the national government to a small extent and can one thus not assume that governance is not directed by an outside government at all however this is not a categorical fact as the NCOP is indirectly elected by the people who do not vote for a specific candidate, but for provincial legislatures, and each legislature then nominates a delegation of ten members to the NCOP ⁽³²²⁹⁾. Thus as the upper house of the Parliament of South Africa is its purpose to represent the governments of the provinces rather than act as a direct representation of the people. Based on the first condition does the coder conclude that it is not sufficiently fulfilled to code the ethnicity groups as being regionally autonomous.

³²²⁹ [Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2014]

One could argue that based on the overwhelming representation of the ANC delegates for example in the NCOP, that one could

guide the Xhosa for example as being regionally autonomous, but in essence does the inclusion of other political parties that are representative of other ethnic groups weakens the argument that all laws passed or actions that are undertaken are the sole prerogative of for example the Xhosa ethnicity. Furthermore the ANC compromises of course not only Xhosa members, but a wide variety of ethnicities, the most prominent example being that President Zuma is of Zulu ethnicity.

Overall, reasons why none the ethnicity groups was coded as autonomous include that despite the prominent presence of ethnicity groups not only through the framework of Contralesa for example, but in national and regional executive bodies one cannot significantly disaggregate the composition of these bodies in order to successfully assess whether one ethnicity completely fulfills the conditions of being coded regionally autonomous. Although it should be pointed out that the Afrikaners, English speakers, San, Asian and Colored do not form part of any tribal leaders and thus have no reference been made to them in this regard. Furthermore although reference has been made to the fact that ethnicity groups, most prominently through these traditional tribal leadership, attempt to influence regional and national politics through their input into policy making even at national level, can one not assume that any influence that they exert will be a constant feature and that it is exactly aligned with the goals of a certain ethnicity group. In addition for example is the power or legitimacy of these groups dependent on recognition by national government and the state and reference in the constitution and are local responsibilities also shared with government appointed ward councillors.

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Political status of ethnic groups in South Africa

From 1946 until 1947

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Blacks	0.77	DISCRIMINATED
Afrikaners	0.08	POWERLESS
Coloreds	0.08	POWERLESS
English Speakers	0.045	DOMINANT
Asians	0.02	POWERLESS

From 1948 until 1989

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Blacks	0.77	DISCRIMINATED
Afrikaners	0.08	DOMINANT
Coloreds	0.08	DISCRIMINATED
English Speakers	0.045	POWERLESS
Asians	0.02	DISCRIMINATED

From 1990 until 1993

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Blacks	0.77	POWERLESS
Afrikaners	0.08	DOMINANT
Coloreds	0.08	POWERLESS
English Speakers	0.045	POWERLESS
Asians	0.02	POWERLESS



Figure 679: Political status of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1946-1947.



Figure 680: Political status of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1948-1989.



Figure 681: Political status of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1990-1993.

From 1994 until 2008

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Zulu	0.23	JUNIOR PARTNER
Xhosa	0.18	SENIOR PARTNER
Pedi (North Sotho)	0.09	JUNIOR PARTNER
South Sotho	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Afrikaners	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Coloreds	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tswana	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
English Speakers	0.045	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tsonga	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Swazi	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Asians	0.02	JUNIOR PARTNER
Venda	0.02	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ndebele	0.015	JUNIOR PARTNER
San	2.0×10^{-4}	POWERLESS




Figure 682: Political status of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1994-2008.

From 2009 until 2013

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Zulu	0.23	SENIOR PARTNER
Xhosa	0.18	JUNIOR PARTNER
Pedi (North Sotho)	0.09	JUNIOR PARTNER
Coloreds	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tswana	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
South Sotho	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Afrikaners	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
English Speakers	0.045	JUNIOR PARTNER
Tsonga	0.04	JUNIOR PARTNER
Swazi	0.025	JUNIOR PARTNER
Venda	0.02	JUNIOR PARTNER
Asians	0.02	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ndebele	0.015	JUNIOR PARTNER
San	2.0×10^{-4}	POWERLESS




Figure 683: Political status of ethnic groups in South Africa during 2009-2013.

Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in South Africa

From 1946 until 1989




Figure 684: Map of ethnic groups in South Africa during 2009-2013.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
Blacks	2 048 718	Aggregate
Afrikaners	488 080	Regional & urban
English Speakers	68 129	Regional & urban
Asians		Urban
Coloreds		Dispersed

Table 198: List of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1946-1989.

From 1990 until 1993




Figure 685: Map of ethnic groups in South Africa during 2009-2013.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
Blacks	1 221 850	Aggregate
Afrikaners	427 158	Regional & urban
English Speakers	8341	Regional & urban
Asians		Urban
Coloreds		Dispersed

Table 199: List of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1990-1993.

From 1994 until 2013




Figure 686: Map of ethnic groups in South Africa during 2009-2013.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■ South Sotho	0	Regionally based
■ Swazi	455 609	Regionally based
■ Afrikaners	427 158	Regional & urban
■ Tswana	243 403	Regionally based
■ Xhosa	167 523	Regionally based
■ Zulu	128 231	Regionally based
■ Pedi (North Sotho)	79 563	Regionally based
■ Tsonga	34 926	Regionally based
■ Ndebele	28 389	Regionally based
■ Venda	21 090	Regionally based
■ San	10 322	Regionally based
■ English Speakers	8341	Regional & urban
Asians		Urban
Coloreds		Dispersed

Table 200: List of ethnic groups in South Africa during 1994-2013.

Conflicts in South Africa

Starting on 1966-08-26

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of South Africa	SWAPO		1966-08-26			

Starting on 1978-02-01

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of South Africa	ANC	Coloreds	1978-02-01	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of South Africa	ANC	Blacks	1978-02-01	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of South Africa	ANC	Asians	1978-02-01	Explicit	Yes	Yes