

Tanzania

Ethnicity in Tanzania

Because of the contrasting ethno political dynamics in Tanzania, it is valuable to distinguish between mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika) and Zanzibar, when assessing the respective status of ethnic groups within the country.

In Tanganyika, though not completely absent, ethnicity has not played a significant role since independence. Certain ethnic groups seem to be privileged in access to the state's bureaucracy. However political discourse and contests rarely refer to ethnic identity and "appeals to tribal or ethnic values do not work in Tanzanian politics" (³⁴⁰⁶). Reasons for this are a) that there is no large or dominant group in Tanzania despite the ethnic fragmentation (about 120 groups), b) the common lingua franca Kiswahili enhanced national identity and c) the domination of one political party since independence and Nyerere's leadership generally mitigated against regional or ethnic identities. Following the line of "Mwalimu" ("teacher") Nyerere, even after the introduction of a multi-party system, ethnic, local, regional or religious parties remain forbidden.

³⁴⁰⁶ [Göran, 1999]

Mainland Since the beginning of the democratization process in the 1990s, however, the Maasai have begun to form grassroot organisations to fight against marginalization and restrictions on their pastoralist lifestyle (³⁴⁰⁷, 370f.). Discrimination against the Maasai was and is confined to the cultural and economic realm, and is not intended to exclude them from political participation. According to their website, among the tasks of the Maasai Environmental Resource Coalition (MERC, a national network of Maasai grassroot organisations) is not only the representation of Maasai interests on the local level but also vis-a-vis national state institutions and decision makers. Thus, the Maasai are coded as powerless from 1992 on.

³⁴⁰⁷ [Neumann, 1995]

When it comes to religion, three main religious denominations may be distinguished in Tanzania, Christian, Muslim and African Traditional religions. While Muslims are overwhelmingly Sufis, Christians are further divided between Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Anglicans and Protestants churches (³⁴⁰⁸, 114, 116-7). A number of umbrella organizations for Christians denominations exist: the Tanzanian Episcopal Conference (Catholics), Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania, the Anglican Church in Tanzania and the Free Pentecostal Churches in Tanzania. While the former three religious

³⁴⁰⁸ [Gahnstrom, 2012]

denominations are united in a loose organization called, the Christian Council of Tanzania, the Pentecostal Church is not part of it (³⁴⁰⁹, 116-7). The Muslims are mainly represented by the Supreme Muslim Council of Tanzania (BAKWATA), which enjoys close links with the ruling CCM party and an extensive networks of mosques (2'800) and schools (see ARC 2012). However, since the return to multiparty elections, a number of smaller religious associations have challenged BAKWATA position, generally advocating a more conservative approach to religion. (³⁴¹⁰, 117) Finally, no national level umbrella organization exists for the African Traditional Religions and these do not matter for national level politics (³⁴¹¹, 115).

Demographically, however, the relative important of all major religious groups is difficult to ascertain, as no census on religious identities has been carried out since 1967. The last census, which gave a slight majority to Christians (32 % against 30 % for Muslims), is contested by the Muslim, who prefers to refer to the last colonial census (1957), which gives them a majority over Christians (³⁴¹², 698; ³⁴¹³, 116). However, these statistics suffer from the fact that African Traditional Religions are often practiced alongside Islam, or more often, Christian religions, and not to the exclusion of these religions (see ³⁴¹⁴, 698; ³⁴¹⁵, 116). Recent survey estimates show that if the cross-cutting aspects of these traditional religions are taken into account, then the share of population which refer themselves as Christians (referred in the EPR dataset as Others Mainland) account for nearly 60 % of the population, while the Muslims number about 36 %. (³⁴¹⁶: 64). The statistics are broadly in lines with other surveys Afro-barometer 2008 and DHS 2004 (See ³⁴¹⁷; ³⁴¹⁸, 116).

Note: EPR statistics are computed from the 0,964 share of the population of the Mainland Africans parent groups in previous periods (data is from the 2002 census; see ³⁴¹⁹) using the Christians/Muslims ratio, as practitioners of traditional religions perceive themselves generally as Christians or Muslims (see ³⁴²⁰, 698 and ³⁴²¹, 116).

Religious identities did not have particular political relevance for much of the period until the early 1990s and the return to multiparty politics. Against a background of economic and social crisis, as well as religious revivals both among Christian and Muslim communities within the broader region, religion did re-emerge as a factor influencing politics in the early 1990s (³⁴²², 121). The re-emergence of religion was further compounded by the fact that Mainland Muslims had been under-represented in senior political and administrative position, due to the consequence of British policies during the Colonial period, which put emphasis on private and missionary education as opposed to public education (³⁴²³, ³⁴²⁴ 16-17; ³⁴²⁵, 122-3). The salience of religious identities during this period was nevertheless confined to fundamentalist groups, while the established religious institutions remained neutral, despite a number of violent incidents opposing members of Christian and Muslim communities (Ibid.). For instance, the major Muslim organization, the National Muslim Coun-

³⁴⁰⁹ [Gahnstrom, 2012]

³⁴¹⁰ [Gahnstrom, 2012]

³⁴¹¹ [Gahnstrom, 2012]

³⁴¹² [Hellman and Kaiser, 2002]

³⁴¹³ [Gahnstrom, 2012]

³⁴¹⁴ [Hellman and Kaiser, 2002]

³⁴¹⁵ [Gahnstrom, 2012]

³⁴¹⁶ [Pew Forum on Religions and Public Life, 2010]

³⁴¹⁹ [Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics, 2011]

³⁴²⁰ [Hellman and Kaiser, 2002]

³⁴²¹ [Gahnstrom, 2012]

³⁴²² [Gahnstrom, 2012]

³⁴²³ [Hellman and Kaiser, 2002]

³⁴²⁴ [Wiedemann, 2010]

³⁴²⁵ [Gahnstrom, 2012]

cil of Tanzania, also known as BAKWATA, did not articulate any overtly political claims. The same also applies to established Christian organizations, such as the Tanzanian Episcopal Conference, that did not call to vote for any candidate based on religious affiliation. ^(3426, 137) Thus, although there is no doubt that the relevance of religious identities has been steadily rising; it is not warranted to disaggregate Mainland Africans into Christians and Muslim politically relevant groups for the period 1992-2009.

³⁴²⁶ [Gahnstrom, 2012]

Yet, in the run-up to the 2010 elections, religious identities have arguably become politically relevant, as previously major religious organizations, which had strived until then to remain neutral started to make overt political claims. As such, from 2010 onwards, the previously identified EPR group Mainland Africans ethnic group is divided into two subgroups: Mainland Muslims and Other Mainland (Christians and Traditional religions).

Indeed, these elections arguably represent a watershed, as established religious associations for the first did articulate religious claims. Indeed, in pastoral letter, the Roman Catholic Church called electors to vote in favor of candidates rejecting corruption ^(3427, 137, Tanzanian Affairs, 1.10.2009). As during the last legislative period, the governing Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party led by President Jakaya Kikwete, a Muslim, had been embroiled in scandals, the statement by the Catholic Church was widely perceived by Muslims as in support of the Opposition Chadema party, led by a Christian and former priest, Dr. Slaa. In reaction, a Muslim organization, Baraza Kuu, the nationwide Political Committee of the Council of Muslim Clerics launched a guideline, urging to vote for good representatives who fight to free Muslims from oppression ^(3428, 3429, 137-8). In addition, during the election campaign both Baraza Kuu, and the larger and more traditional Muslim organization, BAKWATA, called for the re-establishment of Islamic Kadhi Courts, that had been abolished at the independence, and openly threatened to withdraw their political support to CCM-led government ^(3430, 137). In light of these religious-based claims by major religious organization, the Muslim and Other mainland (Christians and African traditional religions) are coded as politically relevant from 2010 onwards.

³⁴²⁷ [Gahnstrom, 2012]

³⁴²⁸ [Tansania Information, 2009]

³⁴²⁹ [Gahnstrom, 2012]

³⁴³⁰ [Gahnstrom, 2012]

For the period 2010-2013, the Muslims are coded as junior partner and the Christians and followers of traditional religions as senior partner, in spite of the fact that the Tanzanian president, Jakaya Kikwete, is Muslim and that the Muslim representation in higher political offices has improved under his presidency ^(3431, 155). The reason is that, although other coding might be possible, it may not be ruled out that the previous overrepresentation of Christian due to educational advantage still persist, including when it comes to representation in the national executive. This is however a conservative coding.

³⁴³¹ [Gahnstrom, 2012]

It remains that religious identities, though important in politics, are clearly not the dominant fault lines in politics and the extent to which, they do matters for political behavior is probably still low

in Tanzania (G³⁴³², 157). However, albeit infrequent, it should be remarked that violence opposing both religious communities has been on the rise since 2010 (see ³⁴³³).

³⁴³² [Gahnstrom, 2012]

³⁴³³ [BBC Monitoring, 2013]

Zanzibar The paramount issue of ethnicity in Tanzania is connected to Zanzibar. The relationship between the semi-autonomous islands Unguja and Pemba and the mainland is a constant topic of political discussion, and appeals to a historical and cultural particularism of Zanzibar are common (³⁴³⁴, 126, 131). This particularism is founded on claims about the Islamic tradition of the islands and on a distinct Zanzibari culture (ibid., 127). The union between the mainland and Zanzibar is a post-colonial construction established after the overthrow of the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1964. According to Crozon (³⁴³⁵), between 1964 and 1972, the union was merely formal, and Nyerere had no control over the authoritarian regime of Zanzibar's President Karume (who nevertheless imposed a policy of Africanization on the islands). This started to change only with the merging of the mainland Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) party with the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) of Zanzibar resulting in the new party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) (³⁴³⁶, 124, 125). But still, Zanzibar has a large political and to some extent also judicial autonomy inside the union: It has its own president and parliament and on entering Zanzibar, passports have to be shown (³⁴³⁷, 17). Ethnically, there are three important groups in Zanzibar:

³⁴³⁴ [Crozon, 1998]

³⁴³⁵ [Crozon, 1998]

³⁴³⁶ [Crozon, 1998]

³⁴³⁷ [Wiedemann, 2010]

1. The Arab minority. Historically the elite of the islands, they were discriminated after the revolution of 1964 and the overthrow of the Sultan, suffering massacres, deportations and expropriations (³⁴³⁸, 104-107). In the 1980s, a policy of reconciliation was initiated by the government: Exiled Arabs were encouraged to return. The greater role of Arabs in the economy which followed this opening provoked again anti-Arab sentiments among the African population (³⁴³⁹, 128-131). Most Arabs of Zanzibar are of mixed African descent (³⁴⁴⁰, 64).

³⁴³⁸ [Prunier, 1998]

³⁴³⁹ [Crozon, 1998]

³⁴⁴⁰ [Ali Bakari, 2001]

2. The Shirazi are the indigenous African inhabitants of the islands. They are the majority population and "although primarily black, draw a distinction between themselves and 'Africans' who are more recent immigrants from the mainland" (f.e. ³⁴⁴¹, 252). Since after the revolution "Africanness" meant implicitly first-class citizenship, it was beneficial to people who before labeled themselves as "Shirazi" to switch to an "African" self-description. Consequently, the number of Shirazi diminished drastically in surveys on ethnic identity (³⁴⁴², 71, 72).

³⁴⁴¹ [Notholt, 2008]

³⁴⁴² [Ali Bakari, 2001]

3. The continental Africans are ethnically heterogeneous. Their common economic status at the poor end of Zanzibari society fostered historically their self-perception as a homogenous block (³⁴⁴³, 98).

³⁴⁴³ [Prunier, 1998]

Unlike the mainland, Zanzibar is overwhelmingly Muslim (99%) (³⁴⁴⁴, 3).

³⁴⁴⁴ [Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Tansania, 2005]

Still today, politics in Zanzibar exhibit a distinct pattern. In

contrast to the mainland, for example, a strong opposition force to the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party has emerged since the introduction of the multiparty system in the 1990's: the Civic United Front (CUF), a principally nationwide party which however only plays a significant role in Zanzibar. In three highly contested and violent elections (1995, 2000, 2005) the CCM candidate won by a small margin. Following a power sharing agreement between the CCM and the CUF in 2009 and approved in a referendum before the election, the CUF was included in the government as a junior partner. As a consequence, the 2010 elections were generally peaceful and ended once again with a narrow victory of the CCM over the CUF (US Department of state 2011).

There seems now to exist a tendency that both parties fight together for more political and economic independence from the mainland (³⁴⁴⁵). Although CUF is in favor of a stronger Islamic influence and for more autonomy, both CCM and CUF appeal to the Muslim voters. According to the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, CCM-Zanzibar is not the extended arm of mainland-CCM but can instead be considered as the follow-up to the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP). Neither is it considered more liberal or western than the CUF (³⁴⁴⁶: 3). In 1993, the CCM-government of Zanzibar decided to join the Organization of Islamic Conference, a decision which later had to be revoked because of its anticonstitutionality (³⁴⁴⁷, 135; ³⁴⁴⁸). According to Ali Bakari (³⁴⁴⁹, 171), in 2001 the leadership of CCM-Zanzibar consisted mainly of "black Africans".

The CUF generally has stronger support in areas with high Arab population. CUF leaders have close ties to emigrated Arab Zanzibaris on the Arabic peninsula (³⁴⁵⁰, 46). Nevertheless, and as stated above, the CUF cannot be said to represent Arab or Pemba nationalism in opposition to an "African" CCM (³⁴⁵¹, 188). Its chairman and since 2010 vice-president of Zanzibar, Seif Shariff Hamad is a Shirazi, and within the party's leadership in 2001, there was no representative of the Arab minority (³⁴⁵², 175).

The difficulty in coding the Zanzibar situation consists in the question to which ethnic group the obvious Zanzibari particularism has to be attributed. Based on the foregoing explications, it seems reasonable to locate it within the Shirazi and Arab groups. The latter were discriminated until the mid 1980s, and still excluded of executive positions at both regional and national levels today ("powerless"). The Shirazi can be seen as having regional autonomy. Population figures for the Zanzibar Arabs and the Maasai are based on absolute numbers provided by the Ethnologue, divided by the official country population based on the 2002 census (³⁴⁵³). The Shirazi figure was calculated with Notholt's (³⁴⁵⁴) relative figure for Zanzibar and the 2002 population data.

³⁴⁴⁵ [The Citizen, 2009]

³⁴⁴⁶ [Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Tansania, 2005]

³⁴⁴⁷ [Crozon, 1998]

³⁴⁴⁸ [Wikipedia, 2014]

³⁴⁴⁹ [Ali Bakari, 2001]

³⁴⁵⁰ [Mukangara, 2000]

³⁴⁵¹ [Ali Bakari, 2001]

³⁴⁵² [Ali Bakari, 2001]

³⁴⁵³ [Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics, 2011]

³⁴⁵⁴ [Notholt, 2008]

2010-2013: Based on the assessment, it has been decided to extend the 2009 for Tanzanian all group access to executive power. For the regional autonomy variable, decision to code Shirazi as benefiting from regional autonomy in Zanzibar has been extended to 2013, while the Arab population is still coded as not benefiting from regional autonomy. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned here, that information on ethnic backgrounds of members of the Zanzibar Cabinet and the Civic United Front is particularly limited.

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Political status of ethnic groups in Tanzania

From 1961 until 1963

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Mainland Africans	0.964	IRRELEVANT
Shirazi (Zanzibar Africans)	0.018	IRRELEVANT
Maasai	0.013	IRRELEVANT
Zanzibar Arabs	0.005	IRRELEVANT

From 1964 until 1984

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Mainland Africans	0.964	DOMINANT
Shirazi (Zanzibar Africans)	0.018	POWERLESS
Maasai	0.013	IRRELEVANT
Zanzibar Arabs	0.005	DISCRIMINATED

From 1985 until 1991

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Mainland Africans	0.964	DOMINANT
Shirazi (Zanzibar Africans)	0.018	POWERLESS
Maasai	0.013	IRRELEVANT
Zanzibar Arabs	0.005	POWERLESS

From 1992 until 2009

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Mainland Africans	0.964	DOMINANT
Shirazi (Zanzibar Africans)	0.018	POWERLESS
Maasai	0.013	POWERLESS
Zanzibar Arabs	0.005	POWERLESS



Figure 739: Political status of ethnic groups in Tanzania during 1961-1963.



Figure 740: Political status of ethnic groups in Tanzania during 1964-1984.





Figure 741: Political status of ethnic groups in Tanzania during 1985-1991.



From 2010 until 2013

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Others Mainland (Christians and traditional religions)	0.603	SENIOR PARTNER
Mainland Muslims	0.361	JUNIOR PARTNER
Shirazi (Zanzibar Africans)	0.018	POWERLESS
Maasai	0.013	POWERLESS
Zanzibar Arabs	0.005	POWERLESS




Figure 743: Political status of ethnic groups in Tanzania during 2010-2013.

Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Tanzania

From 1964 until 1991




Figure 744: Map of ethnic groups in Tanzania during 2010-2013.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■ Mainland Africans	881 114	Regional & urban
■ Shirazi (Zanzibar Africans)	3050	Regionally based
■ Zanzibar Arabs	1603	Regional & urban

Table 215: List of ethnic groups in Tanzania during 1964-1991.

From 1992 until 2009




Figure 745: Map of ethnic groups in Tanzania during 2010-2013.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
Mainland Africans	881 114	Regional & urban
Maasai	62 202	Regionally based
Shirazi (Zanzibar Africans)	3 050	Regionally based
Zanzibar Arabs	1 603	Regional & urban

Table 216: List of ethnic groups in Tanzania during 1992-2009.

From 2010 until 2013




Figure 746: Map of ethnic groups in Tanzania during 2010-2013.

	Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■	Others Mainland (Christians and traditional religions)	881 114	Regional & urban
■	Mainland Muslims	879 512	Regional & urban
■	Maasai	62 202	Regionally based
■	Shirazi (Zanzibar Africans)	3 050	Regionally based
■	Zanzibar Arabs	1 603	Regional & urban

Table 217: List of ethnic groups in Tanzania during 2010-2013.

Conflicts in Tanzania

Starting on 1978-11-11

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Tanzania	Government of Uganda		1978-11-11			