

Uganda

Ethnicity in Uganda

Power relations

1962-1965

UPC and Kabaka Yekka (KY) coalition under Milton Obote → major constitutional concessions in favour of Buganda; DP was only party with true national focus and support among several ethnic groups (based on Catholic alliances); UPC also gained support from several groups based on an anti- Buganda alliance, but had mainly Langi-Acholi and Teso power base; that Obote's power was mainly based on his Langi group is underlined by the fact that he retreated to the Lango district during the constitutional crises and organized a counterattack from there; however, in the course of this period more and more opposition members switched over to the UPC which, thus, broadened its base. The army was dominated by Acholi, Langi, Teso and West Nilers. Baganda and Northerners are both coded as Senior Partner in this arrangement as most cabinet members were southerners while the prime minister and most of the army were Northerners (mainly Acholi+Lango); at independence Obote was very popular in the south as well, also in the kingdom areas – even in Buganda. Within the UPC, the faction around Obote saw themselves as representatives of the interests of the disadvantaged north and east while the faction around Ibingira served as advocates of interests of the southern Bantu people (⁴⁵⁹⁸, 30). Therefore the south-westerners as well as the Basoga are coded “junior partner”. Only that part of the Asian population of Uganda that held Ugandan citizenship has been coded (about half of this group). They are economically important, but irrelevant in terms of political power at the center during this period. 1964: army mutiny; breakup of UPC coalition with KY after referendum in “Lost Counties” + constitutional crisis; until 1965/6 a relative degree of pluralism and democracy had prevailed in Uganda, but developments in 1966 led to a chauvinist Baganda ethnicity and aggressive, militarist ethnicity on Obote's part.

⁴⁵⁹⁸ [Mutibwa, 1992]

1966-1971

Strike-back by Obote against the ongoing overthrow → arrest of 5 key ministers → February 1966 Obote assumed all powers, suspended the National Assembly + abrogated the constitution; also elimination of Baganda and other kingships = power shift back to center from Buganda; crisis was conflict between Obote/central gov. and the Ibingira faction, Edward Mutesa and the Buganda kingdom (⁴⁵⁹⁹, 37). result: unitary state with executive presidency → strong reaction in Buganda → Obote relied on armed forces to crush resistance (“battle of Mengo” in May 1966 = attack on Kabaka palace by gov. troops) including massacres against Baganda; army increasingly used coercive means against the opposition → Baganda are coded as discriminated since their region was kept in a state of emergency and they were suppressed by Obote as a group; the southwest is coded as powerless, but might as well have been discriminated; overall the nw cleavage was between south-west (former kingdoms) and the north and east; Obote recruited certainly more Northerners into the army; objectively he did not pack government or civil service with Acholi and Lango, but the general feeling was that he did; the Teso were discriminated as Brigadier Opolo from this group was arrested because of an alleged coup-plan and his group purged.

⁴⁵⁹⁹ [Mutibwa, 1992]

1972-1973

Social unrest and civil-military tensions laid the ground for Amin’s coup in 1971; in this coup Amin mainly mobilized forces comprising Kakwa (his own group), Lugbara and Madi; tensions between Amin and Obote had risen, because a) Amin increasingly recruited West Nilers into the army, instead of further recruitment of Lango/Acholi preferred by Obote; b) of a dispute over military promotions; c) the creation of paramilitary structures by Obote composed heavily of Langi; after the coup: extermination squads mainly composed of Nilotic and Sudanic people purged army camps of officers and soldiers (perceived as) loyal to Obote → Langi and Acholi officers were murdered and “Amin took the opportunity to eliminate his enemies, who happened to be from Acholi, Lango and Teso, the three groups which dominated the security forces” (⁴⁶⁰⁰, p. 88); the gap in the army was filled by recruitment of Nilotic elements loyal to Amin → army committed to hegemony of the far North; the officer corps mainly comprised Lugbara, Madi and Kakwa (and also Alur); in 1973, of 24 top military posts only three were not held by West Nilers; However, the first years of Amin’s rule (also called the “honeymoon years”, ⁴⁶⁰¹) saw support of Baganda and Basoga for Amin’s regime. In the south he initially gained support because of his respect for their traditional leaders – in the case of the Baganda by allowing the return of the Kabaka’s body; this, however, did not go along with real political power at the center and southern Bantu groups were rapidly disenchanted. The property taken from Asians mainly benefited Nilotic officers as well; the Karamoja were

⁴⁶⁰⁰ [Mutibwa, 1992]

⁴⁶⁰¹ [Mutibwa, 1992]

neglected or even brutally forced to “clothe themselves more fully”; the Asians were expelled in 1972 and are, thus, coded discriminated. Kakwa and West Nilers who became Muslim were usually called Nubians and the Kakwa are frequently described as Sudanic Nubian. Therefore, Kakwa and Nubians are coded as one group.

1974-1979

The coup attempt in 1974 by Brigadier Arube was a turning point after Amin’s consolidation of power. Since it was led by Kakwa officers and was nearly successful Amin afterwards felt constantly threatened from all sides; the military terror tactics of Amin spread to the West Nile district and in 1974 Amin further narrowed his power base by first purging Alur and Madi officers and then Lugbara officers; in 1974 no single Lugbara officer was left in the army. Amin was left with a very weak ethnic support: “His [Amin’s] major remaining military power base is the Nubian component of the army (and the strong Nubian presidential bodyguard units)” (4602, 218); he still relied on (Muslim) Kakwa (4603, 490) from his home region, but increasingly turned towards Nubians of Sudanese nationality. There were bloody purges of remaining Baganda in the civil service and the army after the attempts to kill Amin in 1974 and 1977. The fate of the southerners remained unchanged: harassment, torture and wanton killings at the hands of military thugs from the north (4604, 109). Therefore, all southern groups are coded “discriminated”.

4602 [Decalo, 1976]

4603 [Horowitz, 1985]

4604 [Mutibwa, 1992]

1980-1985

After three different, shortlived heads of state, finally Obote took power again in rigged elections in December 1980; Obote tried or promised to make his cabinet representative of the whole country including Buganda, but in the end relied on the UPC and the army which remained the ultimate source of support for Obote; the new army (UNLA) that overthrew Amin together with Tanzanian forces again consisted mainly of Langi, Acholi and Teso soldiers (4605, 73); the south did not support Obote’s return to power, much the opposite: “The mere return of Obote from exile in Tanzania in May 1980 had cast a chill over a large section of the Bantu nationalities of southern Uganda who were not in the UPC camp.” (4606, 149). In addition, fighting Museveni’s NRM based in Buganda, the government troops with their anti-Baganda sentiments made little distinction between active and passive supporters; there were also 3,000 Nkore soldiers in the army (from Museveni’s home district, recruited by him when he was minister of defence under Binaisa in 1979); however, in 1983 most of them defected and joined Museveni. Generally peoples of eastern Uganda favoured Obote while peoples of south-west favoured Museveni; in the far North, a campaign was waged against Kakwa and Lugbara as revenge for Amin’s rule; in addition, the UNLA fought against the Uganda National Rescue Front in the West-Nile region. Generally, the UNLA actions

4605 [Wiebe, 1998]

4606 [Mutibwa, 1992]

against insurgents in West Nile and Buganda strongly affected the population and resembled a genocide (⁴⁶⁰⁷, 144). Therefore, both groups are coded discriminated. The army also turned against the Karamojong who seized arms from Amin's defeated army for cattle-raiding. Here the question remains if this is sufficient to code the group as discriminated as has been decided in the coding; Baganda were increasingly alienated by violence in the Luwero Triangle where approximately 300,000 were killed under the Obote II regime. In 1985 Brigadier Okello took over government from Obote, but his Acholi-based regime only lasted until Museveni took power in 1986.

⁴⁶⁰⁷ [Weyel, 1995]

1986-1989

On the surface, Museveni formed a broadly-based government including DP and UPC members, but these were hand-picked and not representatives of their political organisation, but included on NRM terms; a reshuffle in Nov. 1986 removed these non- NRM members from key positions to junior functions (⁴⁶⁰⁸, 338). Museveni also included militias that had fought against Obote, such as the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), the Federal Democratic Movement (Fedemo) and UNRF. In addition, 13 posts were allocated to Baganda ministers while northern Ugandan groups were scarcely represented and between 1986-9 many government ministers from the opposition were arrested or charged with treason; the second cabinet of Museveni after indirect elections in 1989 had an overrepresentation of the West and Buganda (25 ministers from the West, 24 from Buganda, 11 from the East and 16 from the North) (⁴⁶⁰⁹, 80). The Baganda supported Museveni who in turn reinstalled their monarchy in the 90s and promised a Muganda Catholic as his successor in 2001. The NRA that replaced the former army structures became increasingly brutal in dealing with their opponents and revenge attacks against former army elements took place in 1986-7 in the North. In contrast to the NRA's discipline in the south and west, it showed harsh brutality in the north and east. The NRM essentially relied on ethnic identity for promoting officers in the army → south-western ethnic dominance (23 out of 35 promoted officers in 1995/6 from the West; of this 18 were Ankole), though Museveni declared the abolition of ethnic recruitment. Based on these development, the Southwesterners are coded as senior partner while the two other southern groups (Baganda and Basoga) are coded as junior partners. The northerners and the Teso are clearly discriminated. Because of lack of any information on the position of West Nilers and Karamojong these are coded irrelevant.

⁴⁶⁰⁸ [Ocitti, 2000]

⁴⁶⁰⁹ [Wiebe, 1998]

1990-2005

This period is introduced mainly due to the changed status of the Banyarwanda. 1990 saw the first political crisis of the NRM → the citizenship requirement was changed from 10 years' residence back to ancestry. This mainly affected the Banyarwanda who intensified the struggle to return to Rwanda culminating into the RPA invasion into Rwanda in October 1990. The Banyarwanda are coded discriminated since the citizenship issue was more or less directly targeted against them and their elites were sidestepped within the NRM where originally played a central role. All other groups remain in the same position as in the period before. The dominant position of Museveni remained in place. During the process leading to the new constitution in 1995, the no-party system in the end was adopted against the votes mainly of supporters of the UPC and DP. The government position prevailed in all central issues. The marginalization of northern groups is mirrored in the 1996 election results. While Museveni won with 75 % of votes, he only achieved 8,5% or 10,5% respectively in the Northern districts of Kitgum and Gulu (⁴⁶¹⁰, 88). Since access to central power only was and is possible through the NRM, this renders the north powerless (and in part discriminated). It seems reasonable to state that: "Regional splits have deepened since the NRM came to power. Most of the top leadership of the NRM comes from the west, particularly the former political unity of Ankole" (⁴⁶¹¹, 149, quoted after ⁴⁶¹², 32). Though there have been some improvements and a slight opening of the system, a relatively small group still dominates the centre based on the NRM today. That ethnicity still plays some role (though to a lesser extent than in earlier periods) is shown by Museveni's strategy to discredit rivals on the ground of their (regional/ethnic) support base. "The tactics, however, underlined that fact that, contrary to the NRM's claim that political parties encouraged ethnic differentiation in a democracy, it was on the contrary the NRM itself, through its militarist approach in the North and its ethnically-based political campaigning in Buganda and the western region, that demonstrated that it, and not the parties, was ethnically divisive." (⁴⁶¹³, 392). This period finishes with the repeal of the ban on political parties in mid-2005. Overall, there are several cleavages in Ugandan politics overlapping each other, namely ethnic, religious (Catholic vs. Protestant and Muslim during Amin's rule), Bantu vs. Nilotic and north vs. south. It is esp. difficult to make a distinction between ethnic and regional cleavages. In this coding it appears reasonable to code regional affiliations where they overlap or comprise certain ethnic groups and these groups were important for the political setting.

⁴⁶¹⁰ [Wiebe, 1998]⁴⁶¹¹ [Kasfir, 1998]⁴⁶¹² [Okuku, 2002]⁴⁶¹³ [Ocitti, 2000]

2006-2017

Ethnic power relations in Uganda have become even more difficult to assess since 2005. This is partly due to the emergence of a new opposition party, the FDC, which has a similar power base as Museveni's NRM and is based on unsatisfied NRM members opposing the president. While FDC's leader, Besigye, is from the West of Uganda like Museveni, his party is seen as rather ethnically diverse.

Nonetheless, elections in 2006 displayed voting along regional lines (esp. presidential elections): There was a marked regional division in the voting pattern. The North supported Besigye, while voters in the Western part of Uganda overwhelmingly voted in support of president Museveni. The margins were narrower in Central and Eastern Uganda, but Museveni received a comfortable majority in both of these regions. ⁽⁴⁶¹⁴⁾. This mostly confirms the power access of groups as it was coded for the period up to 2005. Northern groups certainly feel excluded and their overwhelming vote for the FDC can be seen as an expression of their grievances. However, as the following statement indicates, they should probably be coded as powerless rather than discriminated for this period: Ethnic groups in the north (Acholi, Langi, etc.) consider themselves excluded from the central state to a large degree because of historical factors (economic neglect), repressive military actions (e.g., forced resettlement into fortified camps during the fight against the LRA) and a lack of genuine political representation ^(4615, 2010). The Western groups are still the main power base of the regime. The election results also seem to back the coding of Baganda as junior partner. However, in September 2009 discord between the Baganda and central government erupted in riots leaving 40 people dead. There was further escalation in March 2010 when the Baganda royal tombs of Kasubi burned down under unclear circumstances ⁽⁴⁶¹⁶⁾.

President Museveni was reelected by a considerable margin (>60%) in 2011. Although it is noted that the composition of the new government indicates a slight shift towards the Northern and Eastern region (7 ministers), all important cabinet posts are held by ministers from the Central and Western region with the president coming from the latter ⁽⁴⁶¹⁷⁾. Accordingly, the South-Westerners are coded as senior partners, with the Baganda and Basoga as junior partners. Furthermore Google and LexisNexis searches indicate that there is no minister openly identifying with the ethnic Teso or Langi/Acholi. Therefore, the Eastern and Northern representatives can be seen as token. The two ethnic groups are coded as powerless. As the Banyarwanda still don't enjoy the same citizen rights as other inhabitants of Uganda, they are coded as being discriminated. The Baganda autonomy in the Buganda kingdom is still limited to the cultural rather than the political or fiscal sphere ⁽⁴⁶¹⁸⁾.

To quote the BTI country report from 2014-2016 ^(4619, 2014-2016), "much has happened, but little has changed" in Ugandan ethno-political landscape in this time period. The end of the pe-

⁴⁶¹⁴ [CMI, 2006]

⁴⁶¹⁵ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003-2016]

⁴⁶¹⁶ [Human Rights Watch, 2010]

⁴⁶¹⁷ [New Vision, 2011]

⁴⁶¹⁸ [Minorities at Risk, 2014]

⁴⁶¹⁹ [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003-2016]

riod is documented by parliamentary and presidential elections in February 2016, in which President Museveni won 60% of the votes cast, thus prolonging his already thirty-year premiership yet further (⁴⁶²⁰). The South-western groups he represents can therefore be considered senior partner in the ethnic power sharing environment.

⁴⁶²⁰ [Al Jazeera, 2016]

In the 2015 election, there were national and international calls of corruption and rigging (ibid, ⁴⁶²¹). Corruption notwithstanding, the political aftermath did not change power relations. One assessment of the cabinet deems it proportionally representative of regional (and thus ethnic) demographics - 17 ministers from the Central (Buganda) region; the Greater Western region 26 ministers; the Greater Eastern region has 19 ministers, the greater north has five ministers, and the greater West Nile region has eight ministers (⁴⁶²²). However, it is still unclear whether such representation, and the de-centralisation of political power to the regions is indicative of a change in politically significant ethnic groups, or a re-aggregation to the regional level.

⁴⁶²¹ [Huffington Post, 2016]

⁴⁶²² [Mwsigwe, 2016]

After careful consideration, the Acholi/Langi and Teso groups are still coded separately as politically significant groups. This is because although they are represented as part of the northern territories in the cabinet, there is no evidence to suggest that the northern ministers in the cabinet claim to only represent the ethno-regional identity. Particularly with the Acholi/Langi, longstanding grievances regarding the central government policies towards oil in the Acholi region have not been heeded by central government: Museveni did not select representatives from the oil regions to directing boards for Petroleum Authority and National Oil Company, although the Acholi Joint Acholi Leaders Forum submitted a request (⁴⁶²³). Decentralisation processes have led Acholi groups to feel more represented as they have a larger voice at the local level (⁴⁶²⁴, 412). However, as these groups still remain largely underrepresented in the cabinet, with only 5 ministers from the whole region, and one being the Minister of State for Northern Uganda, the coding of powerless remains, although in future, with increased decentralisation, this could change the status for regional power sharing.

⁴⁶²³ [Ogenga-Latigo, 2014]

⁴⁶²⁴ [Lindemann, 2009]

The citizenship issue of the Bayarwanda remains unresolved (as their tribe is not considered heritage of Uganda, but Rwanda), implying that they remain discriminated in terms of their political rights. Their status as discriminated therefore stands.

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Political status of ethnic groups in Uganda

From 1962 until 1965

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Northerners (Langi, Acholi, Teso, Madi, Kakwa-Nubian, Lugbara, Alur)	0.253	SENIOR PARTNER
South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	0.2	JUNIOR PARTNER
Baganda	0.16	SENIOR PARTNER
Basoga	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Karamojong	0.02	IRRELEVANT
Asians	0.005	IRRELEVANT



Figure 943: Political status of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1962-1965.

From 1966 until 1969

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	0.2	POWERLESS
Northerners (Langi, Acholi, Madi, Kakwa-Nubian, Lugbara, Alur)	0.173	DOMINANT
Baganda	0.16	DISCRIMINATED
Basoga	0.08	POWERLESS
Teso	0.08	DISCRIMINATED
Karamojong	0.02	IRRELEVANT
Asians	0.005	DISCRIMINATED



Figure 944: Political status of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1966-1969.

From 1970 until 1971

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	0.2	POWERLESS
Baganda	0.16	DISCRIMINATED
Langi/Acholi	0.1	SENIOR PARTNER
Teso	0.08	DISCRIMINATED
Basoga	0.08	POWERLESS
Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	0.079	JUNIOR PARTNER
Karamojong	0.02	IRRELEVANT
Asians	0.005	DISCRIMINATED



Figure 945: Political status of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1970-1971.

From 1972 until 1973

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	0.2	POWERLESS
Baganda	0.16	POWERLESS
Langi/Acholi	0.1	DISCRIMINATED
Teso	0.08	DISCRIMINATED
Basoga	0.08	POWERLESS
Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	0.079	DOMINANT
Karamojong	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Asians	0.005	DISCRIMINATED



Figure 946: Political status of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1972-1973.

From 1974 until 1979

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	0.2	DISCRIMINATED
Baganda	0.16	DISCRIMINATED
Basoga	0.08	DISCRIMINATED
Teso	0.08	POWERLESS
Far North-West Nilers (Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	0.049	POWERLESS
Kakwa-Nubian	0.031	DOMINANT
Karamojong	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Langi/Acholi	0.01	DISCRIMINATED
Asians	0.005	IRRELEVANT




Figure 947: Political status of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1974-1979.

From 1980 until 1985

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	0.2	DISCRIMINATED
Northerners (Langi, Acholi, Teso)	0.18	DOMINANT
Baganda	0.16	DISCRIMINATED
Basoga	0.08	DISCRIMINATED
Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	0.079	DISCRIMINATED
Karamojong	0.02	DISCRIMINATED
Asians	0.005	IRRELEVANT



Figure 948: Political status of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1980-1985.

From 1986 until 1989

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	0.2	SENIOR PARTNER
Baganda	0.16	JUNIOR PARTNER
Langi/Acholi	0.1	DISCRIMINATED
Teso	0.08	DISCRIMINATED
Basoga	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	0.079	IRRELEVANT
Karamojong	0.02	IRRELEVANT
Asians	0.005	IRRELEVANT



Figure 949: Political status of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1986-1989.

From 1990 until 2005

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baganda	0.16	JUNIOR PARTNER
South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro)	0.141	SENIOR PARTNER
Langi/Acholi	0.1	DISCRIMINATED
Basoga	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Teso	0.08	DISCRIMINATED
Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	0.079	IRRELEVANT
Banyarwanda	0.059	DISCRIMINATED
Karamojong	0.02	IRRELEVANT
Asians	0.005	IRRELEVANT



Figure 950: Political status of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1990-2005.

From 2006 until 2017

Group name	Proportional size	Political status
Baganda	0.16	JUNIOR PARTNER
South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro)	0.141	SENIOR PARTNER
Langi/Acholi	0.1	POWERLESS
Basoga	0.08	JUNIOR PARTNER
Teso	0.08	POWERLESS
Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	0.079	IRRELEVANT
Banyarwanda	0.059	DISCRIMINATED
Karamojong	0.02	IRRELEVANT
Asians	0.005	IRRELEVANT



Figure 951: Political status of ethnic groups in Uganda during 2006-2017.

Geographical coverage of ethnic groups in Uganda

From 1962 until 1965




Figure 952: Map of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1962-1965.

	Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■	Northernners (Langi, Acholi, Teso, Madi, Kakwa-Nubian, Lugbara, Alur)	243 165	Aggregate
■	South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	243 165	Aggregate
■	Baganda	39 293	Regionally based
■	Basoga	10 040	Regionally based

Table 315: List of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1962-1965.

From 1966 until 1969




Figure 953: Map of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1966-1969.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■ South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	243 165	Aggregate
■ Northerners (Langi, Acholi, Madi, Kakwa-Nubian, Lugbara, Alur)	243 165	Aggregate
■ Baganda	39 293	Regionally based
■ Teso	16 351	Regionally based
■ Basoga	10 040	Regionally based
■ Asians		Urban

Table 316: List of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1966-1969.

From 1970 until 1971




Figure 954: Map of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1970-1971.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■ South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	243 165	Aggregate
■ Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	243 165	Aggregate
■ Langi/Acholi	42 220	Regionally based
■ Baganda	39 293	Regionally based
■ Teso	16 351	Regionally based
■ Basoga	10 040	Regionally based
Asians		Urban

Table 317: List of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1970-1971.

From 1972 until 1973




Figure 955: Map of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1972-1973.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■ Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	243 165	Aggregate
■ South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	243 165	Aggregate
■ Langi/Acholi	42 220	Regionally based
■ Baganda	39 293	Regionally based
■ Karamojong	24 103	Regionally based
■ Teso	16 351	Regionally based
■ Basoga	10 040	Regionally based
Asians		Dispersed

Table 318: List of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1972-1973.

From 1974 until 1979




Figure 956: Map of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1974-1979.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■ South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	243 165	Aggregate
■ Langi/Acholi	42 220	Regionally based
■ Baganda	39 293	Regionally based
■ Karamojong	24 103	Regionally based
■ Teso	16 351	Regionally based
■ Far North-West Nilers (Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	15 742	Regionally based
■ Basoga	10 040	Regionally based
■ Kakwa-Nubian	2 293	Regionally based

Table 319: List of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1974-1979.

From 1980 until 1985




Figure 957: Map of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1980-1985.

Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■ South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	243 165	Aggregate
■ Northerners (Langi, Acholi, Teso)	243 165	Aggregate
■ Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	243 165	Aggregate
■ Baganda	39 293	Regionally based
■ Karamojong	24 103	Regionally based
■ Basoga	10 040	Regionally based

Table 320: List of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1980-1985.

From 1986 until 1989




Figure 958: Map of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1986-1989.

	Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■	South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	243 165	Aggregate
■	Langi/Acholi	42 220	Regionally based
■	Baganda	39 293	Regionally based
■	Teso	16 351	Regionally based
■	Basoga	10 040	Regionally based

Table 321: List of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1986-1989.

From 1990 until 2017




Figure 959: Map of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1990-2017.

	Group name	Area in km ²	Type
■	South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro)	42 410	Regionally based
■	Langi/Acholi	42 220	Regionally based
■	Baganda	39 293	Regionally based
■	Teso	16 351	Regionally based
■	Basoga	10 040	Regionally based
■	Banyarwanda	5 816	Regionally based

Table 322: List of ethnic groups in Uganda during 1990-2017.

Conflicts in Uganda

Starting on 1971-01-24

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Uganda	Military faction (forces of Idi Amin)	Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	1971-01-24	Presumed	Yes	No
Government of Uganda	Kikosi Maalum	Langi/Acholi	1972-09-16	No	Yes	No
Government of Uganda	Fronasa	South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	1973-03-30	No	Yes	No
Government of Uganda	Military faction (forces of Charles Arube)	Langi/Acholi	1974-03-22	No	No	No
Government of Uganda	UNLF	Langi/Acholi	1979-03-30	No	Yes	No
Government of Uganda	FUNA	Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	1980-08-30	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Uganda	UFM	Baganda	1981-02-08	No	No	No
Government of Uganda	NRA	South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	1981-02-17	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Uganda	NRA	Baganda	1981-02-17	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Uganda	UNRF	Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	1981-03-30	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Uganda	UPDA	Langi/Acholi	1986-08-09	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Uganda	HSM	Langi/Acholi	1986-10-18	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Uganda	UPA	Teso	1987-12-02	No	Yes	Yes
Government of Uganda	LRA	Langi/Acholi	1988-02-24	Explicit	Yes	No
Government of Uganda	Lord's Army	Langi/Acholi	1988-03-17	Explicit	Yes	Yes
Government of Uganda	WNBF	Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	1995-10-17	Presumed	Yes	No
Government of Uganda	UNRF II	Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	1996-06-22	Explicit	Yes	No
Government of Uganda	ADF	Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	1996-11-12	No	No	No
Government of Uganda	ADF	South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro)	1996-11-12	No	No	No

Starting on 1978-11-10

Side A	Side B	Group name	Start	Claim	Recruitment	Support
Government of Tanzania	Government of Uganda		1978-11-10			